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ABSTRACT
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND URBAN RENEWAL 
IN NORFOLK, 1950-1959
Forrest R. (Hap) White 
Old Dominion University, 1991 
Director: Dr. Maurice Berube
Although a number of scholars have examined the 
impact that the U. S. Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of 
Education decision had upon local school policies, there is 
a paucity of research on what repercussions that decision 
may have had upon a broad range of other related municipal 
issues. This historical case study explores the effect 
that opposition to court ordered school integration had 
upon the placement of school buildings and urban renewal 
projects in one Southern city, Norfolk, Virginia, where 
there was strong reason to believe that the municipal 
powers of school plant planning, redevelopment, and city 
planning were deliberately used to forestall court-ordered 
school integration. Census tract data, capital budget 
documents, school board minutes, planning papers, and con­
temporary newspaper accounts were used in combination with 
interviews with decision-makers, municipal officials, and 
newspaper reporters to write a history of school desegre­
gation and urban renewal in Norfolk during the period both 
immediately before and after the Brown decision.
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According to the research, the leadership in Norfolk, 
as well as in other Southern cities, made a concerted 
effort to plan for the demise of segregation, and that this 
preparation took place in three phases: an attempt before 
the Brown decision to make Black school facilities more 
nearly equal to those of whites, a quiet reassessment 
period following Brown, in which limited school desegrega­
tion seemed possible, and a frantic effort to massively 
resist by relying upon the urban renewal powers of the city 
to delay or negate the authority of the federal courts.
Although Norfolk, which before Brown had pockets of 
Black population spread throughout the city, appeared to 
use its urban renewal powers to move from segregation de 
jure to segregation de facto by tearing down mixed race, 
transition neighborhoods, closing or demolishing affected 
schools, and carefully dividing the city into single race 
school zones. In addition, the city shifted to reliance 
upon tiny "vest pocket" schools and the careful placement 
of public facilities to create racially distinct school 
districts. Shortly after the Brown decision, Norfolk 
launched in several major new and highly speculative 
redevelopment projects that tore down the homes of close to 
ten percent of the city's population, including the Black 
plaintiffs in its school desegregation suit. In spite of 
these efforts, Norfolk served as the chief battleground 
upon which the fate of "interposition" and Massive 
Resistance (to school desegregation) Plan was decided.
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INTRODUCTION 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
Although the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
the Brown v. Board of Education cases sent shock waves of 
protest across most of the Deep South, only the extent of 
the decree actually came as a surprise to most of those who 
were charged with the planning and leadership of Southern 
cities. That some sort of decision from the Court over­
ruling at least a portion of the South's elaborate system of 
segregated education was a foregone conclusion among many in 
leadership roles; clearly the "separate but equal" 
facilities maintained by communities, particularly those in 
the rural areas, were so far from equivalent that only the 
most callous court could disregard the distinction.
Moreover, desegregation had already begun in the nation's 
military, interstate transportation, public accommodation, 
and recreational facilities, either through administrative 
action or legal intervention, and it was hard to imagine 
that a nation that had so recently committed itself to 
fighting wars overseas to avert repression would allow its 
own public schools to remain as the last bastion of racial 
subjugation at home.
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The main thesis of this work is that the individuals 
charged with the leadership and management of Southern 
cities had ample time, plenty of opportunity, and strong 
motivation to plan for the demise of school segregation in 
their community, that this planning process began well 
before the Brown v. Board of Education cases were ever 
decided, and that it grew increasingly intense as the 
prospect of court-ordered integration became more and more a 
reality. Moreover, this research theorizes that these 
leaders took deliberate steps to use all of the powers at 
their disposal, including both the more obvious control over 
school plant planning, educational administration, and 
student attendance, as well as a full range of redevelop­
ment, city planning, code enforcement, and urban renewal 
activities to delay and otherwise forestall court-ordered 
school desegregation in their community. The study focuses 
on the link between school desegregation and urban renewal 
activities in one community, Norfolk, Virginia, that most 
nearly fits the hypothesized variables.
Since 1938 the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) had advanced a wither­
ing legal attack on the peculiar practices that provided the 
basis for maintaining segregated schools. Although their 
assault was aimed at discrimination in graduate education, 
the intent of their approach was clearly to amass an 
irrefutable body of precedent that would lead to a court
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
decision striking down once and for all the logic that 
separate schools could be equal in American society. In 
Gaines v. Missouri (1938) the Supreme Court struck down the 
argument that a government could avoid the responsibility to 
maintain a (law) school for Blacks when it preserved one 
exclusively for whites.1 Even though Missouri helped to 
send its Black law students to schools in other states, the 
logic of the N.A.A.C.P. was convincing to the nine lawyers 
who sat in judgement as justices on the Court: they under­
stood that there were certain powerful advantages associated 
with attending a law school in the state where one intended 
to practice. In Sweatt v. Painter,2 the Court decided that 
the makeshift law school provided for Blacks by the state of 
Texas to avoid the Gaines precedent could not provide equal 
educational experience for Blacks. Again the lawyers on the 
court were sympathetic to the argument that a law school 
that lacked an adequate law library, a distinguished 
faculty, and many of the other trappings of a quality legal 
education was clearly inferior, and therefore unequal. In 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma, the Court found that separate 
treatment of Blacks, even when they were allowed to attend 
the same school as whites, was also unconstitutional
^-Robert A. Leflar, "Law of the Land: The Courts and the
Schools," chap. in Don Shoemaker, ed., "With All Deliberate 
Speed," (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 1.
2Oliver Brown, et al v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Shawnee County, Kansas,, et al., as reprinted in Race 
Relations Law Reporter 1: 1 (February, 1956), p. 8.
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discrimination. In the case, the plaintiff had been forced 
to sit in the hall outside of his classes, had limited 
access to the library, and had been subjected to other 
degrading treatments designed to limit his contact with his 
fellow (white) students.3
Thus, knowledgeable Southerners knew that the United 
States Supreme Court would have to follow these same 
precedents if it were faced with similar circumstances in 
public education, i.e., the absence of any facility for 
Blacks, separate facilities for Blacks that could be shown 
to be clearly inadequate or inferior, or instances of 
separate and degrading treatment for Black students. Four 
of the five cases accepted by the Court in its 1952 session 
were designed to do precisely that:
1. In the title case, Oliver Brown, et al. v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al., the 
Court was presented with the appeal of a Black elementary 
student who lived in a mixed race area. Although Topeka had 
integrated its secondary schools, Linda Brown was forced to 
ride a bus across town to the Black elementary school, while 
whites in her area walked to the nearby neighborhood school. 
The N.A.A.C.P. contended that in light of the McLaurin 
precedent, such separate treatment was degrading, and thus 
contrary to constitutional guarantees of equal treatment.
3Robert A. Leflar, op cit., p. 2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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2. In the Virginia case, Davis, et al. v. the County 
School Board of Prince Edward County, the county did not 
provide a senior high school for Blacks pupils. Since those 
Black students who wished to attend high school were bused 
to another county, the N.A.A.C.P. contended that, in line 
with the Gaines and Sweatt v. Painter decisions, such an 
arrangement was separate and unequal treatment in terms of 
the physical plant provided, the curriculum, and the 
extensive transportation required to access the facility.4
3. In Briggs v. Elliot, the N.A.A.C.P. lawyers argued 
that the physical facilities for Blacks in Clarendon County, 
South Carolina, were inferior to those provided for whites. 
The case was designed to follow the Sweatt v. Painter 
precedent: the Black schools in the county were older hand- 
me-downs from the white community, and many lacked play­
grounds, ball fields, cafeterias, libraries, auditoriums, 
and other facilities present in the newer (white) schools.
In addition, this case featured a whole new realm of social 
psychological research that pointed to the low self-esteem 
of the Black children who attended these inferior schools.
4. To support the N.A.A.C.P.'s contention in Gebhart 
v. Belton, university researchers in Delaware amassed a 
large body of literature to show that Black schools in that 
state were inferior to white ones in terms of pupil-teacher
4Milton Finklestein, Hon. Jawn A. Sandifer, Elfreda 
Wright, Minorities: U.S.A. (New York: Globe Books, 1971).
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ratios, teacher training, extracurricular activities, 
supplies, school materials, library books, and other 
curricular and instructional support qualities. The 
plaintiffs hoped to play on the Sweatt v. Painter decision 
and promote a finding that separate instructional programs, 
even in otherwise similar physical facilities, could be 
shown to be inferior, and thus contrary to the equal 
protection provisions of the U. S. Constitution.
5. The fifth case, which challenged the validity of 
federal statutes requiring segregation in Washington, D. C., 
had only limited application to other public school systems, 
since the schools in the nation's capital came more directly 
under the financial and operational control of the U. S. 
Congress than anywhere else in the country.5
The fact that the cases were first heard in the fall 
of 1952, re-argued during the 1953 session of the Court, and 
finally decided on May 17, 1954, gave the South plenty of 
time to prepare for the eventuality of an adverse ruling. 
Once decided, the Court held a second hearing on enforcement 
in April, 1955,e and it was not until May 31, 1955, almost 
three years after the initial cases had been accepted for 
review, that the Supreme Court issued its implementing
sLeflar, op cit. , p. 3; Brown v. Board, op cit., 
pp. 5-7; Walter G. Stephan, "A brief Historical Overview of 
School Desegregation,” chap. in Stephan and Joe R. Feagin, 
eds., School Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future (New
York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 11-17.
6Leflar, pp. 3-4.
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decree requiring desegregation "with all deliberate speed." 
Even then, in mandating that school districts make a "prompt 
and reasonable start towards full compliance," the Court 
recognized that a "transition period" would be necessary 
before such compliance could be achieved. Nevertheless, the 
justices indicated that lower courts could "consider prob­
lems related to administration, arising from the physical 
condition of the school plant, the school transportation 
system, personnel, revision of school districts and 
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of 
determining admission to public schools on a nonracial 
basis" if these tended to promote separate and unequal 
treatment of students to maintain segregated schools.7
Although most Southern leaders expected to lose the 
Prince Edward County (no equal facilities), Clarendon, South 
Carolina (unequal facilities), and Delaware (unequal treat­
ment) cases, where the quantifiable differences between 
Black and white schools could be remedied short of desegre­
gation, the defeat in Brown proved to be the most trouble­
some, since it could only be remediated by school integra­
tion. Even if the South were to build literally hundreds of 
new and largely unneeded schools, it still might have to 
integrate some buildings in order to comply with the Brown 
dictate that similarly situated students not recive separate 
treatment just to maintain racial separation. Nevertheless,
7Brown v. Board, p. 11.
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the Brown precedent, because it focused on the long cross­
town bus ride, cut to the core of what many urban Southern 
leaders, both Black and white, felt was most unjust about 
the separate but equal system of Black and white education 
that had evolved in most of their cities.®
The most immediate effect of the Brown decision was to 
strike down the laws requiring segregated schools (i.e., de 
jure segregation) in seventeen states (Texas, Oklahoma, 
Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware) 
and permitted in four others (Kansas, Arizona, New Mexico, 
and Wyoming).9 Although the focus of the court decisions 
was upon state laws requiring segregation, the obvious 
impact would be felt more directly in the local schools of 
thousands of communities across the Deep South and Border 
States of the Confederacy. The decision, however, left in1 
tact the kind of separate race schools found most often in 
the cities of the North, West, and Midwest, where the 
segregation, although not absolute, was due to the 
individual's choice of neighborhood and place of residence, 
i.e., de facto segregation. Thus, substantially equal
sPretlow Darden, former Mayor of Norfolk, interview by 
author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 13 August 1975; and Francis 
Crenshaw, former member of the Norfolk School Board, interview 
by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 7 February 1991.
9Southern School News, 3 September 1954.
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schools that served separate race neighborhoods were still 
permitted by the Court; only the particular circumstance 
presented by Linda Brown, a Black living closer to a white 
school than a Black one, was initially found unconstitu­
tional. At least one major study of integration in 24 
Northern, Western, and Midwest cities found that even in the 
areas of the country that had already desegregated, most 
schools could be clearly designated as single race institu­
tions, and that a large percentage of children living under 
the rules of de facto segregation actually went to school 
with very few members of the opposite race.
Thus, most communities could comply with the dictates 
of the Court with only a minimum of integration, and most 
schools could continue as essentially single race schools 
except in the few areas of each city where there were mixed 
race neighborhoods, transition areas, or where two racially 
distinct areas would have to be served by the same school. 
Even then, the cities that had already desegregated had 
evolved an elaborate system of gerrymandered school 
districts, liberal transfer policies, "schools of choice," 
staggered enrollment procedures, in-school segregation by 
tracking, and other quasi-legal devices to avoid larger 
scale integration or to ensure that whites would not have to 
attend predominantly Black schools.10
10Robin M. Williams and Margaret W. Ryan, eds., Schools 
in Transition: Community Experiences in Desegregation (Chapel
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1954),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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This careful distinction between continued segrega­
tion by place of residence and court-ordered integration was 
one of the chief reasons that the Brown decree was met with 
only mild reaction in most areas of the Border States where 
there was a relatively small Black population, and where it 
was for the most part concentrated in a large, central, and 
over crowded section of the downtown, and only occasionally 
in small scattered settlements in other parts of the city. 
This distinction meant that the Northern model of de facto 
segregation could be adopted without undue hardship, except 
in those few cities of the Border South that had very large 
concentrations of Black population, a history of racial 
strife, or vast social class distinctions between their 
Black and white or ethnic citizens.x:L
The prospect of large-scale race-mixing in the public 
schools had Southern leaders more concerned than any other 
aspect of the Brown precedent. Indeed, several years before 
the Supreme Court actually rendered its call for desegrega­
tion, Southern newspapers openly speculated about the magni­
tude of the reaction that would follow an adverse ruling:
A decision of the Supreme Court that would 
provide for the admission of Negro students to 
public schools in areas where they would 
constitute a large proportion or a majority of 
the students might be the worst thing, rather 
than the best, that could happen in race
pp. 45, 57, 102, 240, 242, and 443.
X1lbid., p. 40 and pp. 80 -110.
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relations where people of both races were not 
ready for such changes. The law is a living 
instrumentality, and if society must live under 
it, [then] the law must also live with 
society.12
For this reason, a number of localities in the Border 
States, especially the larger cities, began almost immedi­
ately to take steps to comply with the dictates of the 
Court, while there was no integration at all in the eight 
states of the Deep South where Blacks comprised 22% or more 
of the population (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North 
Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Virginia) 
until they were pushed to the wall by the courts.13 
There, the racial mores were more firmly rooted, and racial 
separation more firmly entrenched, especially in those areas 
with the highest percentage of Black population, a figure 
that could run as high as 70% to 80% in some of the rural 
counties. In these communities, desegregation meant not 
just the transfer of large numbers of Blacks to previously 
all-white schools, a situation that was rare even in the 
areas of the country that had already desegregated; it also 
would require assignment of whites to Black schools, a 
practice that was almost unheard of almost anywhere else in
12Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 December 1952.
13Southern School News, September 1956; Southern School 
News, September 1957; and W. D. Workman, Jr., "The Deep 
South," chap. in Don Shoemaker, op cit., p. 89.
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the world.14 This difference was largely responsible for 
the violent reaction to the Court's decree.15
Although Blacks and whites lived and worked in greater 
proximity to one another in the South, the history of the 
region presaged a more violent reaction to an adverse Court 
ruling than elsewhere in the country. It was here that 
slavery had flourished and its abolition been most strongly 
resisted; and the area's strong state's rights philosophy, 
adopted as much for racial considerations as any other 
cause, meant that the authority of the Court was sure to be 
challenged. Southern leaders had every right to fear that 
the repercussions from an adverse ruling in the Brown case 
might cause deep disruptions in their way of life, their 
political stability, and their economic rejuvenation. Be­
cause of the sad history of slavery, interracial inter­
actions had evolved from a master-slave relationship, a 
situation that was vastly different than in Northern and 
Midwestern cities, where Blacks were but one more immigrant 
group. Southern leaders pointed to several strong demo­
graphic differences between the races that made the assign­
ment of whites to Black schools politically impossible. 
Although most of these distinctions evolved because of the 
condition of servitude and severe discrimination under which 
Blacks suffered, nevertheless whites expressed some legiti­
14Williams and Ryan, op cit.
1SW. D. Workman, op cit., p. 89.
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mate concerns about the vast differences that existed 
between the two populations, even in the urban areas, in 
health and sanitation, especially the much higher venereal 
disease rate among Blacks; home environment, that included 
both social class distinctions and such indicators of pover­
ty as higher incidence of unemployment, public dependency, 
and single parent families; morality, indicated by higher 
rates of illegitimacy, incarceration, and teenage pregnancy; 
and lower intellectual development, measured by lower read­
ing scores, more illiteracy, and higher drop-out rates.xs
Although a substantial body of evidence has been com­
piled about those communities that complied immediately with 
the dictates of the Court either voluntarily or under 
pressure from the courts, the history of desegregation in 
the Deep South during the period immediately after the Brown 
decision takes place almost exclusively in the chambers of 
the various state legislatures, and not in the local school 
systems that were most directly threatened by the decision. 
Thus the story of desegregation in the Urban South between 
1954 and 1960 has been told in the hundreds of communities 
in the Border States that complied (Baltimore, St. Louis, 
Topeka, Washington, Chattanooga, Clinton (Tennessee), 
Louisville, Wilmington, and Little Rock,1-'7 but the record
XSW. D. Workman, Jr., op cit., pp. 89 -90.
^Robert L. Crain, et al. , The Politics of School 
Desegregation: Comparative Case Studies of Community
Structure and Policy-Making (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1968);
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during this period is largely missing in the cities of the 
Deep South that resisted. There the focus has been so 
completely upon the legislative maneuvering of the states or 
the legal precedents of the federal courts that the actions 
of the school boards, city councils, planning commissions, 
housing authorities, and others charged with the responsi­
bility for planning and leading the cities have been largely 
ignored. If the history of desegregation in these cities 
has been written, it has concentrated upon events that 
occurred after the schools were ordered by the courts to 
integrate, and not upon what the cities did to prepare for 
that eventuality during the substantial period of time, at 
least a decade in most communities, that they had to make 
arrangements for the demise of de jure segregation. Even 
then, the focus has been so completely upon desegregation 
suits and school board actions that the larger context of 
local governmental action is missing.
One hypothesis of this research is that local offi­
cials responded to the threat of court-ordered desegregation 
in the same manner as their counterparts in state capitals 
and the Congress, and used every means at their disposal to 
frustrate, delay, or defuse the impact of school desegrega-
Southern School News, June, 1956; Southern School News,
3 September 1954; Jeffrey A. Raffel, The Politics of School 
Desegregation: The Metropolitan Remedy in Delaware 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980); and Ray Rist, 
Desegregated Schools: Appraisals of the American Experience
(New York: Academic Press, 1979).
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tion in their community. Clearly they were as cognizant of 
the threat posed by desegregation as their colleagues in the 
state legislatures--the N.A.A.C.P. legal defense team 
lawyers began filing court challenges all across the nation 
shortly after Brown3-B— and the local electorate was making 
the same kinds of demands as the state-wide constituencies. 
And certainly local officials were as adept as their 
brethren in the legislatures in using the powers at their 
disposal to frustrate and circumvent the dictates of the 
courts. Even so, however, most of the case studies of local 
school desegregation controversies in the Deep South do not 
begin until almost a decade3-9 or two20 later. The
record of school desegregation both before the Brown
• 1 1
decision and between the decree and its implementation is so 
blank that one major history of school desegregation covers 
the entire period between 1954 and 1962 in less than a 
page;23- another accomplishes it in six.22 What happened
3-8Lino A. Gragila, "From Prohibiting Segregation to 
Requiring Integration, chap. in Walter G. Stephan and Joe R. 
Feagin, eds., School Desegregation: Past. Present, and
Future, (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 69-96.
19Robert L. Crain, op cit.
2°Charles V. Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt, Community
Politics and Educational Change: Ten School Systems Under
Court Order (New York: Longman, Inc., 1981).
23-George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The
History of School Desegregation (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1983), p. 3.
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in the intervening years is largely unknown, although cities 
and school boards in the Deep South appeared to have both 
motive and opportunity to move the segregated status of 
their school systems from de lure to de facto, and possible 
to hypothesize that they took the same kinds of actions then 
that they would take a decade later to preserve that status. 
Only the historical record is missing.
Any attempt to hypothesize a concerted local response 
to the threat of court-ordered desegregation would have to 
imply several stages of reaction:
1. An Attempt to Make Separate "Equal," 1950-1955. 
Since most Southern leaders were aware of both the legal 
effort to end school desegregation and the various prece­
dents involved,23 one thesis of this research is that many 
urban school systems made a concerted attempt to build new 
school facilities for Blacks and correct deficiencies in 
both funding and facilities that might have existed.
Several Southern states adopted this approach during the 
period between 1950, when the threat of court-ordered 
integration first became apparent, and 1955, when the exact 
nature and intent of the U. S. Supreme Court and the various 
federal district courts became known. In 1953, Mississippi,
22Walter G. Stephan, "A Brief Historical Overview of 
School Desegregation," chap. in Stephan and Feagin, op cit., 
p. 3.
23Sam Ervin,Jr., "The Case for Segregation," Look,
3 April 1956 (v. 20, no. 7), pp. 32-33.
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in "anticipation of the U. S. Supreme Court's desegregation 
decision" created a "foundation plan to preserve segregation 
on a voluntary basis through [building] equal school facili­
ties."24 Georgia and South Carolina both began school 
equalization programs in 1951,25 while Louisiana,25 and 
Oklahoma27 waited until after the initial Brown decision 
(1954) before providing massive new funding for school 
construction targeted to improving Black schools. In most 
cases, these efforts were begun with new taxing authority, 
new (sales) taxes, popular referendums and other measures 
that indicated strong public (white) support for building 
new schools and upgrading the dilapidated school facilities 
used by Blacks. The states obviously had their eye on the 
N.A.A.C.P victories in higher education, because their 
attention was on more than just the physical facilities of 
the schools. Everywhere the states felt a new urgency to 
provide additional funding, facilities, curriculum support, 
textbooks, and increased teacher salaries for their Black 
schools. Mississippi increased its appropriations so that 
25% more per pupil was allocated for Blacks than whites;23 
salary scales for Black teachers all across the South
1 Southern School News, July 1956.
'W. D. Workman, Jr., p. 92.
‘Southern School News, 3 March 1955.
’Southern School News, 4 May 1955.
'Southern School News, 6 December 1956
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suddenly shot up; and Alabama and Virginia found that Black 
teachers were actually paid more than whites (because of 
greater seniority and more advanced degrees).29
Thus, one logical extension of this finding is the 
hypothesis that this effort to create equal but separate 
schools had its counterpart on the local scene as well, and 
that during the period that the Brown cases were actually 
being decided, local school boards and communities turned 
their own attention to improving Black education: to
building new schools; providing playgrounds, cafeterias, 
auditoriums, libraries, and other facilities to existing 
facilities; and increasing teacher salaries and spending for 
textbooks, supplies, training, and other measurable support 
items as away to ensure that segregation would continue even 
if such "separate" facilities were required to be truly 
"equal," the expected decree from the Court.
2. A Transition Period, 1955-1956: from Calmness to
Hostility. Initially the states reacted calmly, even going 
so far as to indicate some intent to comply with the Supreme 
Court's decision, but this "Wait and See" attitude was 
quickly followed by open hostility and defiance when the 
courts began to move to enforce the Brown mandate. From 
school boards and political leaders all across the South the 
message was first that they could "handle" desegregation
29Workman, p. 93.
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without doing irreparable harm to public education,30 but 
soon the states became involved in order to take away any 
authority local officials might have had to comply. In 
Virginia, for instance, the governor's attempt at moderation 
through local action (the Gray Plan) quickly gave way to 
more defiant measures,31 and soon states were enacting a 
bastion of legal measures to insure that local schools would 
stay segregated.
Those areas in the Border States that attempted com­
pliance with the Court's decree at the outset (i.e., St. 
Louis, Washington, Baltimore, Tennessee, and Delaware), 
began to experience an unexpected level of racial tur­
moil32 that gave cause for concern to moderates in the 
Deep South. Hostility first to the Brown decision, and 
later to the Supreme Court began to grow as Southerners 
realized that they would receive very little, if any, 
transition period in their own community. The N.A.A.C.P. 
kept up its legal pressures, and soon suits were being filed 
all across the South.33 In addition, other segregated 
institutions, such as state parks, city recreation
3QSouthern School News, 3 September 1954.
31James W. Eley, Jr., The Crisis of Conservative 
Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive
Resistance, Twentieth-Century America Series, (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1976), pp. 36-37.
32Southern School News, 4 November 1954.
33Lino A. Gragila, "From Prohibiting Segregation to 
Requiring Integration," op cit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
facilities, and public transportation34 were being ordered 
by federal courts to desegregate, and both the intent and 
authority of the judiciary to enforce its integration orders 
were becoming clearer.
At the local level this "Wait and See" attitude 
probably had its most obvious impact upon school building 
programs, and a number of communities may have delayed new 
projects until they could better discern the impact of the 
courts' decisions. This situation at least appears to be 
prevalent at the state level: by 1956 Mississippi was
reporting that only a third of its counties had actually 
complied with the plan to "equalize" Black schools;35 
Arkansas experienced similar delays in its own districts 
immediately after the Brown decision;36 and Virginia 
newspapers indicated that "there was no longer any great 
pressure on local officials . . .  to continue the special 
and costly attention to Negro school building programs."3'7 
One logical extension of this finding is the hypothesis that 
once communities began again to build schools in the period 
following Brown, the dictates of that decision were critical 
in determining the location and size of new buildings. 
Communities probably abandoned sites under consideration if
34Southern School News, 7 April 1955.
35Southern School News, July 1956.
36Southern School News, 1 December 1954.
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
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they were found to be too close to racial dividing lines, 
and turned instead to new locations that could continue to 
carry a single race designation.
Although many Southern leaders felt at first that 
Blacks in their community would be content with equal 
facilities, their attitude changed when they saw local 
Blacks aligned with the N.A.A.C.P. efforts to desegregate 
schools through the courts. At first Southerners tended to 
blame this change on "outsiders,"33 and even to see it as 
a "communist plot,"39 an inclination that parallels the 
experience of several Northern and Mid-western cities where 
there was opposition from the white community to school 
desegregation.40 Just as in the cities that had already 
desegregated, race relations in a number of communities in 
the Deep South began to deteriorate as whites saw that their 
own local Blacks leaders had abandoned the call for equali­
ty, and were pushing instead for school desegregation.41 
This growing feeling of animosity between the races probably 
had other outlets in the politics and civic life of most 
communities, so that the coming crisis over school desegre­
gation colored almost every aspect of racial dialogue. 
Moreover, those few local school boards that did persist in
33Southern School News, 6 January 1955.
39James W. Ely, Jr., op cit., p. 31.
4°Williams and Ryan, op cit., p. 237.
41Southern School News. January 1955.
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their efforts to keep harmony between the races soon found 
themselves isolated by both the Black and white 
communities.42
3. Overt Attempts to Move from de jure to de facto 
Segregation, 1956-1960. The hostility to the U. S. Supreme 
Court, Brown, the N.A.A.C.P., and forced school desegrega­
tion began to find a number of outlets at the state level. 
Beginning in November, 1955, state legislatures all across 
the South began to turn to "interposition"— a long lost 
constitutional interpretation that compels states to "inter­
pose" their own authority in order to protect their citizens 
from unjust actions of the federal government— as the answer 
to continuing segregation. The idea was especially promoted 
by James J. Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News Leader, 
and swept across the rhetoric of Southern politicians, even 
in the Border States that had already begun desegregation. 
Within 18 months after Kilpatrick began to promote 
interposition as a valid legal doctrine, all eight of the 
states of the Deep South had passed formal interposition 
resolutions and a package of laws designed to use the police 
powers of their state to enforce segregated schools.43 In 
addition to the anti-N.A.A.C.P. laws that were enacted in 
most of the Deep South states, eight states passed pupil 
placement laws designed to block transfers between white and
42Southern School News, June 1956.
43W. D. Workman, Jr., p. 97.
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black schools, six states authorized the closing of public 
schools under the threat of integration, four states pro­
vided financial aid to students who attended private schools 
to escape court-ordered desegregation, and most weakened 
their laws on compulsory attendance, teacher salaries, 
transportation, term of teacher contracts, and the like.44 
Each of these laws was an attempt to delay desegregation by 
forcing the courts to peel away a layer of state government 
that had been interposed between the local schools and the 
courts. In addition to state authorities, the logic of 
interposition was at the heart of the Southern Manifesto 
signed by 100 Southern Senators and Congressmen; the 
Manifesto proclaimed that "integration was contrary to 
established law," and professed that government officials 
had a duty to resist integration "with every legal means" at 
their disposal.45 Thus, one logical assumption is that 
local officials also attempted in their own way to "inter­
pose" the authority of their own level of government between 
the courts and the schools. As the smoke from the political 
rhetoric began to clear at the state level, the focus ap­
pears to have shifted to localities, because they possessed 
a number of exclusive powers in the administration of public 
schools that could be useful in delaying even the most
44Patrick E. McCauley, "Be It Enacted," chap. in Don 
Shoemaker, ed., "With All Deliberate Speed." op cit., p. 132.
45Walter G. Stephan, op cit., p. 12.
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aggressive court: foremost among these was the power to
actually assign pupils to schools. The editors of Southern 
School News indicated that seven states were investigating 
the potential of creative use of pupil assignment authority 
as a way to deter integration.
Authorities in school administration are of 
the opinion that the power to assign individual 
pupils to particular schools is an inherent one, 
essential to the efficient operation of the 
schools . . . .  It is not necessary that a child 
be assigned to the school most conveniently 
located for his attendance . . . .  Legal pre­
cedents supporting school boards' pupil assign­
ment powers . . . uphold the authority of school 
boards to assign pupils on the basis of factors 
relevant to education and the efficient 
administration of the school system.45
Southern legal scholars also seized upon the assign­
ment of school attendance zones as an administrative local 
power that was corollary to the actual assignment of indi­
vidual students. Several factors, other than the race of 
the students, could be used to support the creation of 
school attendance zones: the distance from home to school,
the maximum utilization of school space, transportation 
considerations, topographical barriers, and the conformity 
of institutions (in order to prevent frequent trans­
fers).4-7 One study of integration in Northern and Mid­
46Southern School News, February 1957.
^"Report of the Subcommittee on Zoning,” New York 
Board of Education, 14 December 1956, reprinted in Race 
Relations Law Reporter 1: 5 (October 1956), p. 847.
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western cities found a distinct pattern of drawing attend­
ance zones to fit the racial characteristics of the neigh­
borhoods, rather than just the geographic proximity to the 
school.4® One logical assumption is that Southern school 
officials became just as adept at blocking desegregation 
with this technique as their Northern counterparts were in 
limiting integration. The city of Charlottesville, for 
instance, when faced with court-ordered desegregation, 
divided itself into six elementary school zones; the lines 
of one zone were so carefully drawn that they included 
almost all of the Black students who had applied to go to 
previously all-white schools.49
Courts were also not disposed to dispute the power of 
local school boards to locate and build schools, even when 
the placement of the building had the same effect, because 
of prevailing housing patterns in the community, as desig­
nating the building as a "white" or "Black" school. This 
was the practice in several Northern cities with substan­
tial Black populations, and it was able to withstand 
judicial review even when the evidence indicated that the 
choice of a particular school location was dictated more by 
the desire to limit integration than sound pedagogical con­
siderations :
4SWilliams and Ryan, op cit., p. 57.
49Southern School News, September 1958.
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The fact that in a given area a school is 
populated almost exclusively by the children of 
a given race is not of itself evidence of 
discrimination . . . [thus] the choice of
school sites is a permissible exercise of 
administrative discretion.50
Not only was the careful location of school buildings 
to minimize integration accepted by the courts, it was a 
course strongly urged by Richmond News Leader editor James 
J. Kilpatrick, who was fast becoming the chief spokesman of 
Southern defiance to the Court. In an editorial just a few 
days (May 20, 1954) after the U. S. Supreme Court's initial 
decision in the Brown case, and before any real enforcement 
effort was expected, Kilpatrick opined that:
A great part of the problem, especially in 
the cities, could be handled by the relocation 
of school buildings and the gerrymandering of 
enrollment lines.
Not only was such a course urged, at least one 
researcher has found strong evidence to suggest that the 
Richmond School Board, under the leadership of Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., who was later to sit on the U. S. Supreme 
Court, built several new schools in Black neighborhoods in 
accordance with this effort to forestall desegregation 
efforts.51
5°Shannon Marguerite Henry v. Walter Godsell, et al.,
U. S. District Court, Michigan, 12 August 1958, No. 14,769, 
reprinted in Race Relations Law Reporter 3: 5 (October 1958),
pp. 914-916.
51James W. Eley, Jr. op cit., pp. 36, 134.
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In addition to the placement of the building, the 
determination of the size of the building and the number of 
students to be served was also an undisputed administrative 
authority of local boards. So also was the ability to shift 
or realign the attendance zone of a school threatened by 
court-ordered integration so that its racial designation was 
dramatically changed. This strategy was applied success­
fully in Newport News, when Thomas Jefferson, the city's 
newest elementary school, was threatened with court-ordered 
integration. At the opening of the 1955-56 school year, 
parents of ten Black students tried to enroll their 
children. Within a week the School Board voted to shift the 
attendance zone, and turn the school over to the Black 
community rather than integrate it. The federal judge 
(Walter Hoffman) refused to intervene, ruling that even the 
post hoc assignment of attendance zones was a permissible 
administrative authority of local school boards.52
Thus, although almost every school board in the South 
was focusing, because of the particular precedent set in the 
Brown case, upon the proximity of Blacks students to nearby 
white schools,53 a realization was growing that the boards 
were not powerless before the courts. Legal scholars were 
careful to point out that:
52Southern School News, October 1955.
53Southern School News, August 1957.
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The Constitution, in other words, does not 
require integration. It merely forbids dis­
crimination. It does not forbid such dis­
crimination as occurs as a result of voluntary 
action [such as choice of residence, neighbor­
hood, city, etc.].54
One other assumption is that local governments, just 
like their school boards, were also willing to use every 
legal means at their disposal to delay or deter the threat 
of school desegregation. The single power most directly 
related to public education was the authority to control the 
finances of the school system. Especially in Virginia, a 
state with dependent school districts, education relied 
heavily upon the revenue support of local governments; 
evidence suggests that several of these municipalities used 
their power of the purse during the desegregation crisis to 
intimidate the Black community and manipulate the local 
school board. The state enacted a special funds cut off law 
that allowed localities to appropriate school funds on a 
month to month, instead of an annual, basis, and a number of 
rural counties relied upon this authority to indicate their 
willingness to close down public schools threatened with 
court-ordered desegregation.55
In addition to the powers to finance and administer 
public schools, which included the authority to assign 
students, draw attendance zones, locate and construct
54Southern School News, August 1956.
5SSouthern School News, 6 July 1955.
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buildings, local governments had the considerable powers of 
urban renewal— redevelopment, city planning, zoning, code 
enforcement, and economic development— at their disposal. 
Although the historical record offers very little direct 
evidence that these powers were used to forestall school 
integration, the director of the federal Housing and Home 
Finance Agency (HHFA) has indicated that a number of 
Southern cities used urban renewal powers to break up 
integrated low-income neighborhoods in order to achieve de 
facto segregation:
Where, in a few Southern cities, there had 
been a protest against this, a compromise was 
sometimes reached involving proposed re-use for 
other than residential purposes. Thus a slum 
formerly housing both Negro and white families 
was proposed as the location for industry or a 
public institution. Urban renewal too often 
seemed to be an instrument for wiping out 
racially integrated living.56
Thus, if applied judiciously, urban renewal authority 
could be made to complement other local efforts to forestall 
court-ordered desegregation. In fact, many of the municipal 
powers of urban renewal parallel the powers of school boards 
to creatively administer their own authority in order to 
replace de jure with de facto segregation, only the unit of 
measurement changes: instead of schools, one is altering
5SRobert C. Weaver, "The Urban Complex," chap. in Jewel 
Bellush and Murray Hausknecht, eds., Urban Renewal: People, 
Politics, and Planning (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1967), p. 94.
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neighborhoods. For instance, since topographical barriers 
were a valid consideration when assigning school attendance 
zones, acquisition of additional land under the urban 
renewal powers of a city for parks, playgrounds, state 
colleges, industrial parks, or other public purposes could 
be used to place legal topographical barriers between 
neighborhoods, and thus preserve the racial character of the 
schools that served those neighborhoods, in spite of the 
fact that some Blacks may have lived closer to a white 
school. Similarly, the placement of an interstate highway, 
one of the strategies used in Mobile, Alabama, could be used 
to divide neighborhoods and school attendance zones into 
racially distinct areas.57 Some evidence exists that 
these techniques were used in other cities outside of the 
Deep South. One major study of school integration found 
that St. Louis and Baltimore may have used a combination of 
natural geographic barriers and selective redevelopment to 
keep Blacks confined to racially distinct school attendance 
zones.58
Similarly, just as they could tear down or close 
schools directly threatened by court-ordered integration and 
rebuild new schools in areas where the racial composition 
was more clearly defined, cities may have used their powers 
of redevelopment, as Robert Weaver has charged, to tear down
57Willie and Greenblatt, op cit., p. 189.
5BRobert L. Crain, et al., op cit., pp. 15, 72-73.
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mixed race or transition areas where the racial composition 
of neighborhood schools would have been equally mixed.59 
Parallel to the power to size the school to the capacity of 
the neighborhood in order to keep its racial identity, is 
the authority, through redevelopment, to adjust the size of 
the neighborhood to meet the racial designation of the 
school. Also, just as school boards could alter attendance 
zones, cities could change their own size through merger and 
annexation, and thus alter the pattern of school attendance.
v>When Newport News was faced with court-ordered desegregation 
in 1958, for instance, the city merged with Warwick County, 
and the resultant ripple effect on school attendance zones 
allowed it to successfully delay integration for another 
year.so Richmond also used this strategy effectively, and 
at least one study has indicated that its efforts to annex 
surrounding counties was motivated largely by racial and 
school desegregation considerations.61
Thus, local governments had at their disposal a much 
larger arsenal of powers than even the states that could be 
"interposed" between the courts and the schools in order to 
forestall court-ordered school desegregation. Evidence also 
suggests that some, if not all, of these powers of urban 
renewal and school plant planning were used in some cities
59Robert C. Weaver, op cit.
s°Southern School News, January 1959.
6XWillie and Greenblatt, op cit., pp. 231-232.
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to achieve de facto segregation as a replacement for de jure 
systems. Unfortunately, the state of school desegregation 
research is such that, except for isolated incidents that 
may be the exception, rather than the rule, insufficient 
evidence exists to determine just how far cities in the Deep 
South were willing to go in applying these powers in their 
effort to forestall integration. If the rhetoric of their 
counterparts in the U. S. Congress and state legislatures is 
to be believed, however, some assumption may be made that 
local officials were willing to use every lawful means at 
their disposal to prevent integration, and to this end the 
extensive arsenal of school administrative, planning, 
redevelopment, and urban renewal powers were used to carve 
out racially distinct school districts and attendance zones.
Certainly plaintiffs in a number of school desegrega­
tion suits have charged that cities used their various urban 
renewal powers deliberately to create segregated neighbor­
hoods, strictly enforce well defined color barriers, isolate 
Black populations, relocate integrated schools, and other­
wise frustrate efforts to desegregate.62 Their claim has 
been in part supported by demographic researchers63 and
62Karl Taeuber, "Desegregation of Public School 
Districts: Persistence and Change," Phi Delta Kappan 72: 1,
(September, 1990), pp 18-24.
63Gary Orfield, "Ghettoization and Its Alternatives," 
chap. in Paul E. Peterson, ed., The New Urban Reality 
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 161-
196.
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other social scientists,64 but they have chosen to blame 
school boards, rather than redevelopment authorities, 
planning commissions, or city councils, for efforts to 
replace de jure with de facto segregation. Educational 
authorities, however, have largely overlooked these charges, 
and chosen to focus instead on the political implications of 
school board decisions only when they were finally faced 
with a court order to desegregate, an approach that ignores 
the fact that most communities had at least a decade to 
prepare for the demise of de jure segregation. For this 
reason, the actions of school boards, as well as those of 
other political and municipal leaders, during the period 
just before and after the Brown decision have remained 
largely unrecognized. In fact, the focus on school board 
actions so late in the controversy has leant credence to the 
school-board-as-villain theory in a number of communities, 
when the truth may be that school boards were merely being 
dragged along in the planning, redevelopment, and housing 
activities of other local authorities; that is, that the 
placement of schools and drawing of new attendance zones was 
the last act in a far more elaborate plot to replace de jure 
with de facto segregation— a drama in which Southern school 
boards may have really played only a minor role. Thus,
64Karl Taueber, "Residence and Race: 1619 to 2019," chap. 
in Winston A. Van Horne, ed., Race: Twentieth Century
Dilemmas— Twenty-First Century Prognoses (Milwaukee:
University of Wisconsin, 1989).
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partly because the. previous educational histories of the 
period focused so exclusively upon the events surrounding 
the actions of school boards only when they were finally 
implementing a court decision, they may have ignored the 
other cast of characters— the interplay of activity with 
other municipal agencies that may be involved— and also 
missed the first few acts of the school desegregation drama.
In fact, one further assumption is that cities used 
their urban renewal powers more often to forestall school 
desegregation in the 1950s than in the 1960s, the decade for 
which some documentation exists. Not only was the motiva­
tion perhaps stronger in the 1950s, because of the 
prevalence of the interposition doctrine, the courts and 
community groups would exercise less scrutiny of actions 
that bore the imprint of racial planning, partly because up 
to that point all planning in the Deep South, and most of 
the rest of the nation as well, was designed to support the 
"separate but equal" doctrine in housing and "neighborhoods 
of choice" concepts that were legally permissible for 
several years after Brown.65 Moreover, even without the 
school desegregation controversy, the decade of the 1950s 
would have been challenging enough for the school boards and 
municipal leaders of the Urban South. The mass migration of 
Blacks that had taken place earlier from the rural South to
65Heywood, et al. v. Public Housing Administration,
135 F. Supp 217, reprinted in Race Relations Law 
Reporter 1: 2 (April, 1956), p. 347.
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Northern cities shifted after World War II to include the 
major Southern urban centers. Most of the older cities of 
the South did not have a central ghetto or Black district 
like their Northern counterparts; instead almost every 
white, middle-class neighborhood had a small concentration 
of Blacks living nearby from which its domestic workers were 
drawn.66 Since both the housing and the schools were 
strictly segregated in accordance with state laws, the 
burden of maintaining separate race schools was placed 
almost exclusively upon Black children, who, because of the 
dispersal of their neighborhoods, had to be bused across 
town to achieve racially separate schools. Yet this was 
exactly the situation outlawed in the Brown case— Linda 
Brown was being bused past the white schools in 
Topeka,Kansas67— and it was the circumstance most directly 
under attack by N.A.A.C.P. lawyers.66
The changing pattern of Black migration was not, 
however, the only force defining the need for urban renewal. 
The military build up that had taken place during World War 
II continued through the Korean conflict and on into the 
Cold War era, placing enormous pressures on Sunbelt cities 
to plan and build for the influx of population and indus­
66Karl E. and Alma F. Taueber, Negroes in Cities: 
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing, 1965), pp. 23-122.
^ Southern School News, September 1958.
6SWalter G. Stephan, op cit., p. 13.
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tries. Veterans returning from the war and their "baby 
boom" offspring began to place their own demand for more 
housing, schools, shopping centers, and public services. In 
short, the 1950s was a decade of shifting population, 
housing, and land use policies, especially in the Urban 
South, and it was here that the tools of redevelopment, land 
use planning, school planning, and urban renewal really came 
of age.®9
In light of the enormous controversy surrounding 
school desegregation late in the decade, one reasonable 
speculation is that these same tools may have been just as 
easily applied to prevent certain land uses, especially 
those related to integrated school districts, as they were 
to promote others more acceptable to school and municipal 
leaders. The mammoth building boom that was going on in 
schools and houses could just as easily have been directed 
to preserve racially identifiable districts as to advance 
the other goals of community planning, but the record is 
either missing or unclear. Even so, in the Urban South 
there was both opportunity, in the shifting patterns of 
school attendance zones and housing that were taking place 
any way, and motive, in the effort to preserve a segregated 
society, to hypothesize that the powers of urban renewal 
were used to preserve segregated schools as much as
69Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and
Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1981).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 7
possible. The older cities of the South also experienced an 
urgency of situation— Blacks living in closer proximity to 
white schools than their own— that added impetus to their 
motive. One prediction based upon these assumptions is that 
the level of official efforts to replace de jure with de 
facto segregation is directly proportional to three 
predictor variables: (1) the extent of opposition to court-
ordered integration, a relative constant across the entire 
South; (2) the urgency of the situation, a measure of Black 
housing dispersion and potentially mixed-race schools as 
well as the immediacy of a court order to integrate the 
schools; and (3) ample opportunity in large scale planning, 
redevelopment, and urban renewal efforts. It is assumed 
that where these three variables were present to a large 
degree, new schools, highways, redevelopment projects, and 
other public initiatives were undertaken in part to achieve 
racially segregated school districts, i.e., to move from de 
jure to de facto segregation with all deliberate speed.
Part of the purpose of this work is to test the theory 
of a link between efforts to preserve school segregation 
and urban renewal activities by examining one community, 
Norfolk, with both strong motive and ample opportunity to 
apply the powers of local government to oppose court-ordered 
desegregation. In short, this effort will attempt to show 
that the placement of new school buildings, redevelopment 
projects, and major public facilities, both immediately
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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before and after Brown, was designed in part to delay or 
deter the threat of court-ordered school integration. Thus, 
this work, although largely an urban history of Norfolk 
during the 1950s, will attempt to fill in a major gap in 
school desegregation research on the decade.
When educational authorities have seriously looked at 
efforts to desegregate public schools, they have chosen 
either the "white flight" scenario advanced by James 
Coleman70 and David Armor71 or the more benign explana­
tion of Orfield's economic choices,72 Charles Willie and 
Susan Greenblatt's "tipping theory,"73 the "avoidance" 
theory of Cataldo, Giles, and Gatlan.74 Most of the 
research supporting these propositions comes from the 
1960s,75 however, and ignores any exploration of the
70James S. Coleman, Sara P. Kelly, and John A. Moore, 
Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973 (Washington, D.C.: 
Urban Institute, 1975).
71David J. Armor, "White Flight and the Future of School 
Desegregation," chap. in Walter G. Stephan and Joe R. Feagin, 
eds., School Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future,
(New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 187-225.
72Gary Orfield, "School Segregation and Residential 
Segregation," chap. in Stephan and Feagin, School Desegre­
gation: Past, Present, and Future, op cit., pp. 231-244.
73Charles V. Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt, Community 
Politics and Educational Change: Ten School Systems Under
Court Order, op cit.
74Everett F. Cataldo, Michael W. Giles, and Douglas S. 
Gatlin, School Desegregation Policy: Compliance, Avoidance,
and the Metropolitan Remedy (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath
and Company, 1978).
7BJames S. Coleman, et al., op cit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 9
charges that school boards or other municipal authorities 
took deliberate efforts to replace de jure with de facto 
segregation before that time.
Thus, not only does a serious gap exist in the study 
of school desegregation efforts between the time Brown was 
contemplated and actually implemented, there is also a 
compelling need for a more complete analysis of the inter­
play between school desegregation, city planning, redevelop­
ment, school plant planning, and urban renewal efforts. The 
current study proposes to fill that gap by focusing on one 
city where there was both ample opportunity and strong 
motive to hypothesize such a link.
Norfolk turns out to be a remarkable city for such a 
study: not only did it face an historic school desegrega­
tion controversy late in the decade that led to the closing 
of its previously all-white junior and senior high schools, 
it also gained national recognition as one of the cities 
that was most proficient in the use of the powers of 
redevelopment, land use planning, and urban renewal. In 
fact, by the end of the decade Norfolk had bulldozed more 
acres, demolished more homes, and erected more public 
housing units (per capita population) than almost any other 
city in the nation.7S Thus, only two events make the 
history of Norfolk remarkable during this era— the ferocity
7sJean L. Stinchcombe, Reform and Reaction: City
Politics in Toledo (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing,
1968), p. 134.
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of its attack upon urban blight, and the tenacity of its 
resistance to school integration; that they may be 
inexorably linked should come as no surprise.
Not only was Norfolk the first city in the nation to 
qualify for federal urban renewal assistance, its initial 
redevelopment project was used by the rest of the nation as 
a model of careful and humanitarian planning considera­
tions.7'7 Like other cities in the Urban South, it faced 
tremendous pressures to build new schools, housing, and 
public facilities during the population boom of the 1950s. 
Even so, shortly after the implications of the Brown deci­
sion became clear, Norfolk launched into a new phase of both 
school construction and redevelopment that closed or 
demolished a dozen schools and the homes of 20,000 people—  
almost 10% of the city's population— and cleared more than 
800 acres in and around the downtown area, giving it the 
appearance of one of the war-ravaged cities of Eastern 
Europe.78 Even though the city had some really antiquated 
schools, the buildings closed or demolished were not the 
worst in the city; in fact many took on new life as 
administrative offices, textbook depositories, or mainten­
ance facilities. Similarly, although the city had substan­
77"Federal Slum Clearance Gets Its First Full Scale 
Tryout in Norfolk, Va.," Architectural Forum, May 1950, 
pp. 134-138.
78John C. Scmidt, "Norfolk: A City Remakes Itself,"
Baltimore, March 1969, reprinted by the Norfolk Redevelopment 
and Housing Authority.
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tial slum properties, the areas that were demolished did not 
for the most part consist of the most dilapidated housing in 
the city; instead they were largely the environs of the 
white working class, complete with modern plumbing and 
central heat, in a spite of the fact that the city was still 
combating pit privies, community outhouses, and tar paper 
shacks. Norfolk in 1950 fit the pattern of most of the 
other older urban centers in the South, i.e., there were 
pockets of Black population scattered all across the city; 
by 1960, however, this arrangement had changed,79 and 
these mixed-race or transition areas appear to have either 
been the focus of redevelopment efforts or else were served 
by new "vest pocket" schools sized to maintain separate but 
equal facilities.
Although the story in Norfolk may be more compelling 
than elsewhere, it is not thought to be unique; instead 
Norfolk was selected precisely because its extensive use of 
the powers of urban renewal and its historic school desegre­
gation conflict make just such a revelatory case study 
possible. Motive is difficult, if not impossible, to infer 
from a single or even a string of isolated actions, but in 
Norfolk the trail is extensive enough to make such implica­
tions possible.
Even though the "motive" behind such actions may be 
difficult to determine in ex post facto research, one may
79Taueber and Taueber, op cit., pp. 35-96.
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still closely examine the elements that lay behind Norfolk’s 
school plant decisions and its major phases of redevelop­
ment. Jean Stinchcombe, in her classic study of redevelop­
ment in Toledo and other cities, points to the four elements 
that are necessary to carry out such an extensive urban 
redevelopment program: strong political leadership, clarity
and continuity of direction, administrative competence, and 
strong community support. Although she concludes that these 
are almost never present for a sustained period in cities 
with a counci1-manager form of government, a footnote points 
to Norfolk as an exception, a deviant case with extensive 
redevelopment activity.80
Because Norfolk appears so different in this regard, 
some other unifying element may have been present that was 
more powerful than the usual mix of politics and civic pride 
which helped this city overcome the limitations normally 
inherent in its form of government, and united both its 
citizenry and its political leadership behind a dramatic 
course of redevelopment activity. This dissertation 
hypothesizes that fear of school desegregation in Norfolk 
was a motivating force behind the city's sudden shift in 
school operations and the second phase of its redevelopment 
activities; and that, in Norfolk, the effort to preserve 
segregated schools provided the power to overcome a frag­
mented political structure, divided priorities over future
8°Jean L. Stinchcombe, op cit., pp. 129-150.
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direction, shifts in administrative leadership, and apathe­
tic community support.
The research for this study relies upon a variety of 
primary source materials: census tract data on the racial
mix and condition of the housing in the redeveloped neigh­
borhoods were used to explore the motive for their demoli­
tion; school board memoranda, legal briefs, planning docu­
ments, capital project budgets, and newspaper clippings have 
been examined in an effort to determine the attendance 
zones, population served, location, and date of demolition 
of the school buildings effected by redevelopment. Second­
ary sources include books, journals, and articles from the 
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Ledger- Dispatch, and Journal and 
Guide newspapers.
As a historical case study, the research probes the 
line between purely historical and case study research, 
especially applying the accepted methodology of critical 
case or exemplary case study research.sx When the project 
was first envisioned (1974), a number of the principle sub­
jects involved in the various planning and redevelopment 
decisions were still alive, and interviews were conducted at 
that time as part of a larger oral history approach. For 
the most part, the interviews were not really helpful: like
Watergate witnesses, the subjects either developed a
81See Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and
Methods, Revised Edition (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage
Publications, 1989), pp. 47, 113, 139.
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selective memory of controversial decisions or else sought 
to smooth over any potential controversy with bland plati­
tudes. Because many of the individuals are now deceased, 
interviews with several groups of secondary actors were also 
utilized. One such group included individuals in the bureau­
cratic, as opposed to the political structure, of planning 
and administration. By and large these persons are younger 
than the principles, and therefore more likely to be alive. 
The drawback in relying too completely upon this group is 
that although they were more willing to reveal the influence 
of certain groups and individuals behind major decisions 
with which they were involved, they tended to see the city 
from a very selective view, that focused just upon school 
issues, city planning, code enforcement, or redevelopment 
decisions, for instance, without placing these in the larger 
context of just what motivated these decisions. For this 
reason, a second group of primary observers was developed 
from the newspaper reporters and editors who covered the 
various events of the era. These individuals also tended to 
be younger than the primary actors, but unlike the other 
secondary players, they were trained to see events both in 
detail and to place them in the larger context by analyzing 
trends, transitions, trade-offs, and trivialities. Several 
former reporters confirmed the wisdom of this approach by 
observing that newspapermen of this era earned their reputa­
tion by "how much they knew but didn't tell."
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The project focused upon the link between school 
desegregation and the planning, politics, and redevelopment 
in the city of Norfolk from 1950 to 1959. Redevelopment and 
planning decisions were studied by examining what types of 
projects or public policies were planned, who proposed or 
opposed them, when they were advanced, and why— i.e., an 
assessment of their impact, both intended and actual, by 
looking at the target group or location. Educational deci­
sions were examined chiefly in the context of the location 
of new schools and the relationship between site selection 
and the city's larger planning and redevelopment processes.
A second and related approach has been to more close­
ly examine the relationship between these issues— desegrega­
tion, planning and redevelopment— and the various groups 
struggling for power. To this end, Robert Dahl's issues 
approach was applied to discern the various different types 
of power in the community, and especially who had the power 
to make certain decisions. In studying political, educa­
tional, and redevelopment decisions in New Haven, Dahl found 
that politicians tended to focus their efforts on the 
political arena, the city's big businessmen dominated 
redevelopment and planning decisions, and educational policy 
was left largely to middle-class community leaders who had 
little interest in either redevelopment or politics.32
S2Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1961).
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One thesis of the current research project is that 
while the focus of these different leadership groups may 
vary, a single compelling community controversy, like school 
desegregation may cut across all levels of decision-making. 
In the midst of such a controversy, the approach of these 
various groups will differ, even when they are faced with 
the same problem: politicians make political decisions,
even on issues related to redevelopment policy or the 
location of school buildings; businessmen support economic 
ends so ardently that they will abandon even the most 
tightly held personal philosophy (i.e., segregation) to 
protect economic growth; civic leaders look to the potential 
for impact upon their own constituency; and social activists 
seek to enhance their own agenda. Although their motives 
may be different, a single unifying fear or compelling issue 
may be powerful enough to build a consensus for dramatic 
action even among these very different and disparate groups.
The initial stage of the research was conducted by 
utilizing the extensive local history collection at the 
Sargeant Memorial Room in the Kirn Memorial Library in 
Downtown Norfolk. Clip files are maintained in relative 
chronological order by topics (i.e.,"School Construction 1," 
Government and Politics, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority), location (i.e., Patrick Henry Elementary School, 
Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village) and by biographical 
entries. Back copies of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,
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Ledqer-Dispatch, and Journal and Guide newspapers were then 
reviewed during the time frame of major events, court deci­
sions, project announcements, budget statements, municipal 
elections, or other transition points for background 
articles, editorials, letters to the editor, and contrasting 
opinions. In addition to these largely secondary sources, a 
few other depositories of primary source material still 
exist. Minutes of crucial school board meetings and 
documents held by the City of Norfolk, such as back copies 
of master plans, consultants reports, capital projects 
budgets, and the like were helpful in identifying key 
school, planning, and municipal actions under study. 
Historical materials held by the Norfolk Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority were also reviewed. The Archive Section 
of the Old Dominion University Library has the private 
papers of a few individuals or groups, including those 
collected for this work (i.e., the Norfolk Committee for 
Public Schools).
Once an extensive review of the written source mate­
rial was complete, the research moved into an oral history 
phase that concentrated upon developing taped interviews 
with both the remaining living principals and key secondary 
participants. At this point in the research a more complete 
operational definition of both the "who" and the "what" 
under study was formulated in order to develop probing 
questions that would be used to explore the "how."
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Interviews on a related topic were conducted earlier (in 
1975) with the last remaining councilmen, planning commis­
sioners, and housing authority commissioners, several of 
whom are now deceased. Only one city councilman and one 
school board member from the era were still alive for 
interview. The current study continued to follow that 
earlier format: each person was asked leading questions
about their role in the events and decisions of the city, as 
well as their relationship with and perception of other key 
individuals, groups, or projects that took place during the 
period. Interviewees were not asked about the existence of 
a "power structure," as in Floyd Hunter's research,83 but 
rather queried as to who actually made certain decisions 
about selected projects or policy directions familiar to the 
interviewee. Each individual was interviewed in his own 
home or office, and the tape recorder was placed on the 
least obtrusive setting (i.e., remote or battery power, 
condenser or directional mike) in order to reduce the 
subject's anxiety. After a few introductory questions to 
reconfirm the subject's formal role in the events, each 
person was asked to give his impression of the era as a 
means to set an informal tone for the interview. In order 
to reduce the interjection of bias on the part of the 
interviewer, each of the subjects was afforded a full
S3Floyd W. Hunter, Community Power Structure, (Chapel 
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
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opportunity to tell his own story without interruptions or 
unnecessary prodding. At the conclusion of this portion of 
the interview, each subject was asked a few issue specific 
questions related to his particular role or area of 
expertise, his impression of other competing power groups, 
and his conclusion as to who actually made certain community 
decisions of which he might have been aware.
The "what" includes the location of new school 
buildings, such as Tidewater Park, Roberts Park, Young Park, 
Titustown, Coronado, and Rosemont; the panoply of events 
surrounding the school crisis of 1958-1959; the development 
of major planning and redevelopment projects, such as 
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority Project One, the 
master plan for the central business district, the highway 
plan, the placement of the public library and other 
community facilities, and redevelopment projects for the 
Atlantic City, Downtown, Broad Creek, Lamberts Point, and 
Brambleton sections of the city; and major innovations in 
municipal policy, such as the development of building, 
zoning, housing, and health codes, as well as their relative 
enforcement or the selectivity of enforcement.
The major risk in any such undertaking is that the 
historian, or his readers, will apply the moral perspective 
of the 1990s to judge events that happened more than three 
decades ago. Not only is this wrong, this judgement is 
unfair to the individuals who were forced to make critical
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decisions in a difficult age. To say that events herein 
described are controversial is an understatement. Emotions 
were strong and key issues were hotly debated, albeit behind 
closed doors; unless we are free as students of the era to 
perceive and analyze events without injecting the biases of 
our own time, the field of serious local history will be 
abandoned to "puff pieces" and promotional tracts that sani­
tize the past in order to promote investment in the present.
The advantage of historical perspective— hindsight— is 
a crucial element to examining the events of any era, and 
enables a more complete analysis of the context, events, 
issues, motivations, and the various approaches to desegre­
gation, redevelopment, planning and related issues in the 
pre- and post-Brown eras than was possible through con­
temporaneous studies, single issue treatises, or works from 
the period immediately following the era. Nevertheless, any 
approach would be unfair to the citizens of the 1950s if it 
required them to share the same advantage of our own more 
modern perspective in order to get fair treatment in a 
history of their own period. The public officials herein 
depicted were responding to tremendous public pressure to 
use whatever means were legal and appropriate to protect 
what was seen as an important element in their daily lives. 
That they enjoyed the overwhelming support of their consti­
tuencies in these undertakings is evident in the voting 
patterns of the era. In a democratic society we must be
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prepared to accept the fact that powerful and principled 
elected leaders will do everything in their authority to 
respond to such a mandate without condemning in any way 
their actions. This is above all else a story of power—  
power that was abused only when the moral standards and 
historical hindsight of the 1990s are inappropriately 
applied.
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PROLOGUE 
NORFOLK BEFORE 1 9 5 0
Four sailors with a barmaid in tow steamed out into 
Granby Street and launched into a chorus of "Roll Out The 
Barrel." A single car cut out of traffic and pulled to the 
curb, jubilantly sounding its horn over their slurred rendi­
tion of the chorus. This mild commotion on an otherwise 
still August afternoon stirred onlookers from their shaded 
refuge in the shops and storefronts that lined the street; a 
few quick words were exchanged, and the news flashed through 
the gathering crowd. Other cars began sounding their horns 
in salute, and soon a blaring procession of automobiles was 
inching its way past the swelling throng. The taverns along 
Beer Barrel Row began closing their doors as their patrons 
rushed to join the melee in the street. The "Roll-Out-The- 
Barrel" boys had by now picked up a chorus line of converts 
that was snake-dancing arm in arm through the stalled traf­
fic. Streamers of toilet paper drifted down from the offi­
ces above, the opening salvos in a furious fusillade of 
impromptu confetti that belied the constraints of wartime 
rationing. The merrymakers who danced in the streets below 
were the precursors of one of the most raucous, brawling,
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celebrations in Norfolk's history. The day was Tuesday, 
August 14, 1945— V-J Day— and the radio had just signaled 
the end of World War II. Not since Patrick Henry's army of 
patriots had burned this Tory stronghold to the ground had 
the nation's domestic military forces had such a grand night 
on the town. One solemn sailor surveyed the jubilant commo­
tion that surrounded him and summed up the frequent lament 
of his colleagues, "Of all the damned places to be when this 
thing happened, we had to be in Norfolk."1
The following day dawned quietly for the city; half of 
its population were nursing their worst hangover of modern 
times. The other half— Norfolk's more permanent residents 
— faced an even grimmer morning after. The city's streets 
were empty, its shops, banks and government offices having 
been closed for a day of prayer and thanksgiving. Gone were 
the sailors, the shipyard workers, the snake dancers, the 
blaring automobiles, and the drunken carousers of the night 
before; even the taverns and the bawdy houses of Beer Barrel 
Row were closed for the day. Here and there the white Dixie 
cup of a sailor's cap bobbed among the flotsam of confetti 
and other jetsam of the celebration. A handful of bleary- 
eyed strangers still ruled this empty roost from perches 
tucked away well off the beaten path.2 To Norfolk's more 
permanent residents this panorama of desertion served as a
^Norfolk. Virginian-Pilot, 15 August 1945.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 August 1945.
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grim reminder of what the city would be like without its 
Navy; while the war was raging overseas they had thought 
only of tolerating this domestic military invasion until 
they could reclaim the city as their own— the city had given 
little thought to really making a "home" for its transient 
population. Now that the war was officially over, however, 
the thought of empty streets and the fleet's departure 
struck the community to the core, rousing it from its civic 
stupor and infusing it with a thirst for fresh leadership 
and new direction.
Control of city hall had long been in the hands of 
the city's professional politicians, a group that had always 
shown tremendous willingness to run the show without 
external interference. The "Prieur Machine," as the local 
affiliate of the statewide (Harry F.) Byrd Organization was 
called, was run by Clerk of Courts William "Billy" Prieur. 
Time and circumstances over the course of the Depression and 
the war years had combined to make the Prieur Machine far 
more powerful than either the perks of office or the 
patronage of political organization would have indicated.
Since they were powerless to influence the delibera­
tions at city hall, and unwilling to risk the ire of the 
Organization that controlled so many jobs in a hard strapped 
economy, Norfolk's business and financial leaders turned 
their attention instead during the Depression to a more 
receptive arena, the sphere of civic involvement. Not only
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did they achieve great success in these endeavors, well 
separated from the political operations of the city, they 
also forged key alliances and learned to build a community 
coalition of their own that would one day rival the more 
entrenched political operatives. Through the Community 
Chest and a number of related charities, the businessmen 
worked tirelessly to relieve the suffering of their fellow 
citizens; through the National Recovery Administration and 
its volunteer successor, the Emergency Relief Commission, 
they learned to rely on federal support in this effort. 
Through their own Citizens Crime Commission they studied the 
harsh economic impact that slums had, not only upon the cost 
of city services, but also upon the lives of their 
inhabitants.
The war years had brought incredible hardships to the 
citizens and great turmoil to city government. Norfolk 
experienced a tremendous period of growth at the start of 
the war, and its population would double, even triple on the 
weekends, as thousands of sailors, soldiers, and shipyard 
workers descended upon the downtown area for leave on the 
town. This put an enormous strain upon both the city's 
municipal services and its aging housing stock; the politi­
cians were so reluctant to provide even essential municipal 
services for these new, more "temporary," residents that the 
Navy Department had to step in to build schools, parks, 
playgrounds, recreation areas, highways, utilities, and a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 6
host of other projects. The businessmen forged their own 
alliance with the Navy, and, acting as the Norfolk Housing 
Authority, built thousands of new housing units for the 
servicemen.
The first postwar problems, however, began to appear 
almost immediately as the specter of closed stores and empty 
streets served as a grim reminder of the fact that, in 
peacetime, Norfolk would again have to stand on its own 
financial feet: no longer would the Navy be willing to foot
the bill for some much-needed and long overdue municipal 
improvement. That prospect so frightened city hall that the 
City Council called for a cutback in planned improvement 
projects and current levels of service.3 This proved to be 
the final straw for Norfolk's business establishment: they
had endured the national vilification of the city in the 
media and halls of Congress for its sordid nightlife, but 
they would not now stand for a self-imposed recession. Area 
businessmen knew that the city could not maintain its posi­
tion in the world of trade by depending solely upon merchant 
shipping and local industries; Norfolk needed the Navy, now 
more than ever, and local merchants turned their efforts 
furiously into remaking the city into a place where the Navy 
would want to stay, rather than remain known infamously as 
the world's worst liberty port. The subsequent uproar of
3Marvin W. Schlegel, Conscripted City: Norfolk In World
War II (Norfolk: Norfolk War History Commission, 1951),
p. 361.
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merchants and businessmen over proposed municipal cutbacks 
prompted a dramatic.turn of events. The powder keg of civic 
unrest was finally ignited.
Almost as suddenly as the tides of war began to 
recede, a new wave of community pride and civic boosterism 
rose to take its place. The war years that had witnessed a 
dramatic upsurge in citizen activity to accommodate and 
alleviate the bombardment of Navy personnel4 now gave way 
to a new direction in civic involvement. The civic leaders 
who had gone all out to beef up the wartime charities to 
serve the new, transient population were not now content to 
rest. The club ladies who had knocked themselves out to 
provide wholesome entertainment for "the boys" were no 
longer content to sit at home. The volunteers who had 
staffed the bandage brigades and peopled the U.S.O.'s were 
looking for a new cause. The transient residents who had 
poured into the city during the war years were now almost as 
established as the old-timers; they would not tolerate a 
cutback in the very services and facilities designed to meet 
their needs. Thus, all of these diverse elements— the 
civic, the business, the volunteer, and the transient 
communities— had a hand in forcing the issue of Norfolk's 
postwar renewal out into the open; all of them urged a 
dramatic reversal of municipal policy.
4Theodore A. Curtin, A Marriage of Convenience: Norfolk
and the Navy, masters thesis (Norfolk: Old Dominion
University, 1969), pp. 148-149, 130-138.
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Another issue seethed beneath the surface of this 
desire for change. During the war crime had become big 
business in the city. Gamblers, prostitutes, racketeers, 
and bootleggers had invaded the area— as they invariably do 
to all boom towns— to cater to the more salacious desires of 
sailors out on leave and shipyard workers out on the town. 
Norfolk's finest citizens began to feel that too many of 
these mobsters and racketeers controlled city hall, 
replacing their own more legitimate voice with bribes and 
payoffs. The blatancy with which the city's "other element" 
conducted its gruesome activities shocked and enraged the 
citizenry; it was no wonder that such conduct was the talk 
of the town, and an open link between the gangsters and the 
politicians was widely suspected.5 The citizenry had been 
long-suffering of all sorts of war-time carpetbaggers and 
entrepreneurs, but the prospect that these gangsters and 
racketeers would continue to control the city's fate in 
peacetime now became too great a burden to bear, and thus 
the closing months of 1945 became the winter of discontent 
for many Norfolk residents.
Political conformity had bred a closed society in 
Norfolk— afraid to accept outsiders, new ideas, or even 
dissension among its provincial little community. The 
city's close proximity to the Navy and government workers
5Pretlow Darden, 13 August 1975, op cit., and other 
confirming sources.
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during World War 11 had boon a positive force that had done 
much to erase that stagnation. In many ways the war years 
had been a bitter experience--the crowding, the incon­
venience, the crime, and the hcdonism--for both the home- 
towners and the sailors alike, but in the end, it had opened 
the minds of many Norfolkians to a world beyond their own 
parochial realm, and many more had found an important 
mission in ministering to strangers from all parts of 
America. Norfolk had opened its doors to the Navy slowly, 
cautiously, and even grudgingly, but: now a fear was growing 
that those doors, once closed, would remain shuttered 
forever.
The next few months would witness some remarkable 
changes for a city overly conditioned to accept the narrow 
scope and dreary conformity of its venerable political 
leaders. The citizenry that had so recently focused its 
full attention upon fighting despots overseas would suddenly 
turn its efforts towards resisting a more home grown version 
of totalitarianism. The hometown folks who had so recently 
despised the visiting sailors as an army of occupation would 
suddenly turn to welcome them instead as economic liberat­
ors. That bleak specter of closed stores and empty streets 
in Norfolk's downtown commercial district would prompt a 
fondness for the profligacy and crowded jubilation of 
sailor's revelry, and that longing would in turn provide the 
public mandate for a remarkable chain of events that would
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sweep this once seedy little, backwater, port into the 
forefront of a national municipal reform movement, bringing 
as well an era of unheralded progress and prosperity.
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CHAPTER ONE 
PLANNING THE NEW NORFOLK
When bulldozers ripped into the wall of a house in the 
700 block of Smith Street on December 11, 1951, they marked 
both a new beginning and a crumbling end. At long last the 
city was moving from the quiet haunts of its earlier infamy 
into the spotlight of national attention. The house that 
first shuddered, shook, and then crumbled that wintry 
morning marked the beginning of the first federally financed 
slum clearance project in the country.1 The event marked 
as well the passing of a very special style of government in 
Norfolk, and served as both the legacy and the tombstone of 
the final retreat of a progressive reform movement in the 
city.
Those first bulldozers were riding the crest of a wave 
of civic pride and boosterism that would jettison the city 
to the forefront of the Age of Redevelopment before it 
surged, and then dissipated against the shoreline of the 
future. The muffled applause of the gloved dignitaries who 
had gathered to witness this miracle of modern government 
faded as the bulldozers tore through the sagging structure.
xNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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In their eyes the memories of yesteryear were giving way to 
a dynamic new effort to rebuild the shining metropolis of 
the future. Those first bulldozers were the most dramatic 
and tangible evidence that the dreams of an indolent age 
were at last on their way to becoming a reality.
That first house stood as well as a sad omen of what 
would come. As the small crowd that attends such functions 
gathered, crewmen bound the house in chains and clamped them 
to the bulldozer designated for the job. At the appointed 
moment, the machine started and lurched forward, dragging 
its chains through the underpinnings of the structure. The 
house shook, but did not fall2— a remarkable augury of 
blight's resistance to eradication. As if to prophesy the 
unseen forces of the future that would chart the city's 
course--as if to warn of invisible props that braced 
Norfolk's progress— the house still stood, its under­
pinnings completely destroyed. Embarrassed crewmen re­
attached their chains to a more elevated point, expectant 
dignitaries and reporters chatted idly by, news photo­
graphers reloaded for a second shot, and history paused 
momentarily in the making. The second time the bulldozers 
lurched, the chain took hold, and the frame collapsed in a 
shower of crumbling plaster, rotting boards, billowing dust, 
and scattering functionaries.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 December 1951.
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Norfolk was irreversibly embarking upon a bold, new 
venture, but it was more than just a fervent desire to erase 
the memories of an unpleasant past that had put the city in 
the vanguard of urban renewal. It was more than just the 
aimless longing for the golden dream of "A New Norfolk;" 
more than just the fulfillment of campaign promises.
Norfolk had reached this pinnacle of regeneration because a 
specific group of men had possessed the courage to not just 
dream, but to act. Theirs was a bold vision, and it was 
shared by men and women all across the country, but the 
difference in Norfolk was that they were just the sort of 
individuals who could make that aspiration a reality. All 
were committed to the cause, and all were conditioned to 
success. They had made their reputations, both business and 
civic, by overcoming long odds; they knew how to gamble for 
high stakes, but, more importantly, they knew how to win.
The men that sparked Norfolk's redevelopment were business­
men who wielded the personal power and prestige to overcome 
almost any opposition and drag the city into nearly any 
venture. Certainly the fine points of that redevelopment—  
the stakes, the expense, the delay, the social costs, and 
the human suffering— were as misunderstood by the general 
public of Norfolk as in any city in the country, but it was 
here that the city's leading citizens put their reputations 
on the line behind renewal. And that made all the 
difference.
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The city-manager type of reform government was 
designed to be a "businessman's rule." The system was 
intended to take the power out of the hands of the political 
hacks and give it to the true leaders of the community, and 
then back them up with the technical and professional 
expertise necessary to make the very best decision for the 
community. City government, the theory went, had become too 
complex, its myriad services so vast, its management so 
technical, and its planning too vital to be left to 
amateurs. That was the ideal, but in far too many 
city-manager cities, the power had merely passed from one 
group of parochials to another. In most cities the real 
leaders, the real opinion-makers, had lost interest in 
municipal affairs; the result of their abdication was that a 
group of small businessmen and petty interests took over 
instead--a group that was still businessmen, but only second 
rate ones; they were capable only of dreaming small dreams, 
and often failed to comprehend the bigger picture. In most 
cities the directorship of the taxpayers' multi-million 
dollar municipal corporation had settled into the grasp of 
people scarcely off the assembly line— foremen, at best, who 
could only hold the machinery of government on course until 
the real leaders with vision returned to take control of the 
enterprise.
In Norfolk, however, a peculiar set of circumstances 
had befallen the city and was forcing a different sort of
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leader to the top. The little men had so bungled the pre­
rogatives of power that the first team had been forced out 
of their board rooms and counting houses to take over. At 
the close of World War I it was clear that Norfolk was in 
danger of folding altogether in the hands of the "small men" 
who ran most other cities; the lure of wartime profiteering, 
the power to control the expansion of municipal services, 
and the opportunity to promote political or parochial 
interests had been too much for them. The transfusion of 
new leadership that was taking place in Norfolk's reform 
movement came from the bluest blood in the city. At last 
the real corporate minds hoped to take over the directorship 
of city government. They understood management on a large 
scale, and they knew that even if they could promote 
themselves to the city's board of directors, that they could 
not fulfill their aspirations for the city alone; just as in 
their own private enterprises, they would need an army of 
specialists, planners, and consultants to plot and carry out 
their vision. Nevertheless, they dreamed big dreams, but 
they also possessed the dynamism, the energy, and the 
wherewithal to carry them out.
Even so, any move to snatch control of the city from 
the political organization that had ruled it for decades 
would be no mean accomplishment, especially in a Virginia 
election system that used every conceivable means, including 
the poll tax and early registration deadlines, to keep the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
voting population small and manageable. In fact, when the 
frustrations of the city's business and civic leaders first 
began to surface and take on a political bent in the winter 
of 1945, the poll books for the June election had already 
been closed, thereby precluding any effort to register new 
voters who shared their hope of reform.3 It was the stormy 
resignation following the war of Norfolk's usually staid 
city manager in "a violent temper" over the Council's pro­
posed cut back of essential city services'1 that proved to 
be the culminating event. The resignation, and the 
manager's parting blast at machine politics, took the 
community by surprise, especially since he was just a few 
months away from becoming eligible for a substantial 
retirement pension.5 Talk at a testimonial dinner hastily 
arranged in his honor by the business community soon turned 
to a political agenda. At first the businessmen sought an 
audience with Organization chieftain Billy Prieur, hoping to 
convince him of the need for a change in the leadership at 
city hall,6 but when these efforts at appeasement proved 
futile, the People's Ticket of Richard D. Cooke, Pretlow 
Darden, and John Twohy was born.
3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1946.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 June 1946.
5Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 21 February 1946.
sPretlow Darden and Vernon Gornto, campaign manager for 
the People's Ticket of 1946, interview by author, Tape 
recording, Norfolk, 17 August 1975.
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The men that now proposed to take control of Norfolk 
had two undeniable loci of power: the one financial and the
other civic. These were not the ordinary group of downtown 
merchants hoping to harness municipal spending to keep the 
central business district alive. There was not a single 
retailer in the lot; instead they were the heavyweights of 
the area's business community: bankers, realtors, brokers,
builders, corporate attorneys, and building supply whole­
salers— they had more than just a personal interest in 
Norfolk's rebirth and redevelopment, they had a financial 
stake in it. They were more than just the area's top 
businessmen, however, they were the foremost representatives 
of the city's civic pride and community spirit. Time and 
time again the city's charities had turned to these men 
during the Depression and war years because they not only 
knew how to get things done, they knew how to unite the 
citizenry in the process.
Although it was left to corporate attorney Richard D. 
Cooke, automobile dealer Pretlow Darden (younger brother of 
Virginia's popular wartime governor), and concrete magnate 
John Twohy to carry their standard, this was a group effort 
that found almost every substantial business and civic 
leader in the city aligned against one of the most power­
ful, well financed, and experienced local political 
organizations in the state; failure meant great risk and 
personal sacrifice for all who participated in this palace
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coup. All had benefitted from their alliance with the Byrd 
Organization in the past, and now had much to lose if the 
selective enforcement, special treatment, and red tape of 
municipal government were suddenly turned against them. All 
relied too heavily in their business and corporate ventures 
on the rapid processing of building permits, legal docu­
ments, inspections, and applications not to fear a 
significant threat of intimidation if their venture were to 
fail. Once committed, they had no intent of not succeeding, 
and they threw themselves into the selfless work of the 
political campaign with the same vigor, skill, and 
determination evident in their civic and corporate 
achievements. It proved to be a hotly contested race— "the 
hottest political campaign in Norfolk's history."7
The "Silkstocking Ticket," as the Cooke-Darden-Twohy 
group was immediately labeled in the hardball oratory of the 
Prieur Organization stalwarts, hoisted the "Time For A 
Change" standard and ran carefully against the lackluster 
record of the wartime Council. They were determined to run 
as three conservative businessmen who had close ties of 
their own to the statewide Byrd Organization, thereby 
avoiding the appearance at least of challenging Prieur 
directly. It was a clever strategy, but it meant they had 
to both out do the existing administration in conservative 
rhetoric and out organize the Prieur Machine on its home
7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 June 1946.
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turf. As part of that effort, they pledged not to seek 
re-election, thereby hoping to convince the traditional 
Organization voter that they only meant to revitalize 
Norfolk's governmental structure, not found another 
political dynasty.
Fortunately the People's Ticket had both the personal 
credibility and the backing to pull off one of the most 
dramatic upsets in the otherwise closed conformity of 
Virginia's political arena. Their election by a better than 
2-to-l margin in the largest voter turnout the city had ever 
witnessed, gave them a mandate to bring progressive 
government to Norfolk.8 As if to seal their pledge of 
"business-like government, free from political influence and 
control,"9 their first order of business was to set about 
hiring the "best city manager money can buy . . . not to get 
the best would be money wasted."10 They turned quickly to 
Charles A. Harrell, past president of the International City 
Manager's Association. In addition to having a strong 
national reputation for long-range planning and careful 
administration, Harrell had grown up in Norfolk and had 
started his career in its service. Even though he left
BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 June 1946.
9"Things For Which We Stand: Vote 'The People's
Ticket,'" a political handbill, undated (June, 1946), Sergeant 
Memorial
Collection, Kirn Public Library, Norfolk. 
xoPretlow Darden.
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Norfolk when political favoritism blocked his path at 
home,11 he had maintained close ties to the area. Even 
so, it was the Council's promise not to interfere in his 
administration, not the money or the home town connection, 
that proved successful in luring him away from his post in 
Schenectady, New York.12
Harrell set busily about the task of rebuilding 
Norfolk's tarnished national image and cleaning its squalid 
municipal house. There was a sense of urgency in the 
actions of the Silkstocking administration: years later
former People's Councilman and later Mayor Pretlow Darden 
would remark, "We knew what we had to do, and we knew 
[because of the promise not to succeed ourselves] we were 
only there for four short years; so we did it."13 As part 
of the campaign promise to bring "sound and efficient 
administration" to city hall,14 the People's Council gave 
Harrell free reign to bring in an army of professionals and 
consultants to help chart the city's rebirth, and Harrell 
skillfully involved as many of the city's crucial business 
and civic leaders as possible in a new hierarchy of 
appointed boards and commissions that further removed the 
functionaries at city hall from the decision-making process.
1:LNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 June 1950.
12Pretlow Darden.
13Pretlow Darden.
14"Things For Which We Stand," op cit.
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The task of municipal house cleaning, however, ran 
into some serious opposition, especially from the well 
entrenched forces in the Public Safety (Police and Fire) 
Department. A fortuitous event, however, helped to break 
the back of the Organization in this arena as well. A young 
captain of detectives, Claude "Bubba" Staylor, who later 
served as both chief of police and a city councilman, took 
the initiative when the Organization's police chief was out 
of town to raid Norfolk's "protected" gambling and numbers 
rackets. The raid sent off howls of protest, especially 
when the police chief quickly returned to drop the charges 
against several of what the newspaper was willing to label 
as the city's "most notorious gangsters"15 for lack of 
evidence, while more than a hundred of their customers 
languished in jail.16 The blatant partiality of this 
treatment, and the fact that Staylor had uncovered evidence 
of bribes and payoffs to more than half the force, helped to 
unravel a comprehensive scheme of corruption in city 
government. A blue ribbon grand jury appointed from the 
city's business and civic elite used its charge to 
investigate the charges as an opportunity to bring down both 
the protected rackets and the police hierarchy.17 The
15Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 December 1948.
16Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 December 1948.
17Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 March 1949.
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Silkstocking Takeover was thus complete, and the Organiza­
tion's grip on City Hall was at last broken.
City Manager C. A. Harrell was not one to delay once 
he had achieved the circumstances conducive to action. The 
scandal in the police department and the publicity generated 
by its subsequent investigation had given him the mandate 
for reform that he sought; skillfully he shifted people at 
city hall to promote his professionals to a larger grasp of 
power. Although many of the experts who had descended upon 
the city returned quickly to their previous haunts in indus­
try, commerce, and academia, they left behind the blueprints 
for progress in their voluminous charts, statistics, and 
analyses. Harrell conspired to shift as much of the burden 
of charting municipal expansion as he could from the offices 
in city hall to the volunteer boards and commissions that 
established the policies. He knew well that the work of 
these boards would outlast the electoral mandate of the 
People's Council; and attracting top notch men and women to 
these posts would be the most enduring legacy of the 
Silkstocking Takeover. The People's Council exercised such 
a strong personal pull that they acted as a magnet to 
attract others of similar talent from industry, commerce, 
the arts, the professions, and the charities into volunteer 
service to the city. By staffing these independent boards 
and commissions with his own professional advisors and then 
feeding them the reports of the hired consultants, Harrell
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knew that he could broaden his mandate of progress beyond 
the limitations of the work force at city hall.
The roster of the postwar City Council, Redevelopment 
and Housing Authority, and the Planning Commission read like 
a listing of local Community Fund chairmen, charitable bene­
factors, First Citizen Award winners, and civic head-liners 
— just the type of individuals who so rarely get personally 
involved in running the day to day operations of municipal 
enterprises. The men who had been forced to take over the 
rebirth and redevelopment of Norfolk were the true opinion 
leaders in the community. They had the power, the prestige, 
and the respect to personally dispense with the types of 
objections that hamstrung so many similar dreams of rebirth 
across the country.3-8
Harrell's plan worked better than anyone could have 
expected. Not a single community leader ever refused the 
Council's call to volunteer service,3-8 and the city's 
boards and commissions began calling for new ventures that 
would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier. 
Norfolk's citizens soon began to discern the fruits of their 
labor: a municipal airport, water treatment plant, modern
bus system, a bridge-tunnel link to Portsmouth, new connect­
ing links to the downtown, and a host of other new highway
xaFor a more complete analysis of this point, see 
Jean L. Stinchcombe, Reform and Reaction: City Politics in
Toledo (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1958), pp 129-150.
18Pretlow Darden.
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and municipal ventures. Only a portion of Harrell's program 
was cast in concrete; the rest was set in careful planning 
and legislation. As part of the city's new housekeeping 
system, Harrell advocated a vast upgrading of the municipal 
statutes regarding property. The business and civic leaders 
who peopled the various volunteer boards and commissions 
took the lead in recommending revamped zoning ordinances, 
new building codes, stronger health and safety ordinances, 
and one of the nation's first minimum housing codes.20 It 
was such an ambitious program that it would never have 
passed without their support. The new ordinances would 
effect more than 40% of the city's existing housing stock 
(based upon 1940 Census data), and had the recommendations 
come from bureaucrats, instead of established community 
leaders, the public would quickly have suspected that 
partisan motives or the type of selective enforcement that 
characterized the wartime Council were involved. Yet here 
were Norfolk's First Citizens, the leaders of its various 
charities, financial institutions, real estate firms, 
industries, and business enterprises calling for an 
uplifting that began with their own boot-straps.
The Norfolk Housing Authority, born of the Navy's need 
for wartime dwellings, had been among the first commissions 
to catch the spirit of rebirth. The Authority was deter­
mined not to die out with the end of the war effort; it knew
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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how much the city still had to accomplish in order to pro­
vide adequate housing for its citizens. "Redevelopment" was 
added to its title for the first time at the close of the 
war, and now the new Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority began to revise its calling. Instead of just 
serving as the Navy's link to additional housing, the 
N.R.H.A. hoped to provide the means to eliminate much of the 
city's crime- and disease-infested slums.21 It began to 
formulate a plan that included two phases: the first
entailed the renovation of more than 1,000 wartime housing 
units to accommodate civilian public housing tenants; the 
second phase included an aggressive proposal to build 1,890 
more public housing units in order to clear the path for 
slum removal. The Authority's sales pitch was accompanied 
by the release of a graphic pictorial publication, This Is 
It, designed to sell both the human and the economic ele­
ments of the plan. The Authority did not mince its words, 
the booklet was clearly designed to sell public housing as 
the essential first step to the rebirth of the rest of the 
city:
A 1937 study showed that the city was 
spending $5 for every $1 collected from real 
estate taxes and other income from five slum 
areas. Public housing cuts these service costs 
to a minimum. Public housing reduces the 
subsidy that taxpayers contribute every year to 
perpetuate Nineteenth Century hovels which
21Theodore A. Curtin, "A Marriage of Convenience: 
Norfolk and the Navy," 1917-1967, op cit., p. 140.
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injure the value of nearby property, impede the 
city's growth, and threaten the whole population 
with crime and disease . . . .  The citizens of 
Norfolk will not, we believe, be satisfied with 
anything less than the complete elimination of 
every unfit dwelling in the city. Year by year, 
house by house, the reconstruction must go on 
until the combined efforts of the Norfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority and private 
builders enable every family to enjoy a decent 
home.2 2
It was an argument skillfully designed to appeal to 
the business and civic leaders that the commissioners felt 
comprised their natural constituency; indeed, even under the 
wartime administration of the Prieur Organization, the 
Housing Authority had been the sole prerogative of the 
business and civic elite that now constituted the Silk- 
stocking Takeover. Now that the People's Ticket was in 
power, the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
became the showpiece of the new administration. All five 
commissioners were the very pillars of the city's new 
businessmen's elite: Charles L. Kaufman was a prestigious
corporation lawyer who had strong connections with several 
of the city's leading financial institutions; Thomas N. 
Wilcox, a partner in Mayor Richard Cooke's law firm, had 
similar corporate credentials; David L. Pender was the 
president of the Southgate Brokerage Company and the 
240-store chain of the Pender Grocery Company (later called 
Colonial Stores); C. W. Grandy was an investment banker who
22Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, This Is It 
(Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1946), pp. 30, 47-48.
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also ran his own cotton brokerage; and James E. Etheridge 
was the president of one of the largest residential and 
commercial real estate firms in the area. Two earlier 
commissioners who had been important in the formulation of 
the Authority's present aspirations represented this same 
corporate elite: Louis H. Windholz had been chairman of the
Norfolk and Southern Railway Company, the Baltimore Steam 
Packet Company, the Seaboard Airline Railway, and numerous 
other transportation and shipping concerns; George H. Lewis 
had served as a director of the Virginia Electric and Power 
Company (Virginia Power), Pender Grocery Stores, the Hampton 
Roads Maritime Exchange, and several other ventures.23
These men, by virtue of the very extensive civic and 
charity work, had gathered a constituency that was far 
larger than just the business elite they seemed so 
adequately to represent. Of the seven commissioners who had 
helped to formulate the Authority's postwar program, five 
had headed the Community Fund, four had been named First 
Citizen, three had served on Colonel Borland's 1937 Citizens 
Crime Conference, and all seven had actively studied the 
dreadful conditions of Norfolk's aging housing stock (the 
1940 Census revealed that more than 40% of the housing units
23Community Builders of Norfolk, Virginia (Norfolk: 
Community Builders, Inc., 1942); The History of Lower 
Tidewater, Virginia, vol. Ill: Family and Personal History
(New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co., Inc., 1954);
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, This Is It, 
op cit., p. 10.
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in Norfolk were dilapidated or lacked adequate plumbing and 
sanitary facilities). All had hung their heads in shame 
when Nathan Straus, a top federal housing official who was 
rounding out his tour of 137 cities, remarked of Norfolk's 
blight, "I have travelled all over the United States, from 
one end to the other, but I have never seen anything as bad 
as this."24 The epidemic warnings of Public Health 
Director John M. Huff also helped to promote their efforts 
to convert the Navy's wartime housing from military to 
civilian use as public housing for the city's poor;25 and 
each of the seven knew well that the unsafe health and 
sanitary conditions posed a very great danger to all the 
citizens of Norfolk.26
It was more, however, than just shame; it was more 
than just crime, taxes, property values, health, and housing 
conditions that motivated these men. All had lived through 
a most peculiar period in the history of Norfolk's growth: 
the crisis proportions of wartime conscription had strangely 
welded the entire citizenry into an active and cohesive 
civic force.27 As members of the wartime Housing Author­
ity, they had seen how quickly the people of Norfolk could
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
25 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 November 1948.
26Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Norfolk: Historic Southern
Port, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962), p. 370.
27Marvin W. Schlegel, Conscripted City: Norfolk in
World War II, op cit.
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respond to alleviate the most intolerable hardships. The 
sense of shared emergency had made the city vibrant and 
alive; it had carried over into a post war boom that was 
unique for the city; it had provided the impetus for the 
reform movement that was the first tenet of their faith; and 
finally, it had awakened the citizens to the fact that for a 
community united, all things were possible. If they could 
once more promote the sense of shared emergency, once more 
strike the vein of civic shame that prompted action, then, 
the commissioners believed, they could translate these 
forces into a renewed impetus for growth in general and a 
personal mandate for redevelopment and public housing in 
specific. Theirs was an ambitious plan, and the commission­
ers knew that citizen support was essential to its adoption.
A series of timely events, however, helped to 
underscore the need for public housing, careful community 
planning, and quick municipal action. The Brambleton 
section of the city had for some time been convulsed with 
racial turmoil when several Blacks sought to defy the 
community's strict standard of segregated housing. During 
the war years the vast influx of families into the city had 
put a premium on housing space in the few small areas of the 
city reserved for Blacks. More than half of the Black 
families in the city had been forced to either take in 
borders or double up, just as in the white community, but in 
the Black neighborhoods, this meant two or more families
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living in a one- or two-room apartment. There had been 
almost no private housing built for Blacks in more than a 
decade and a half, and Brambleton appeared as the ideal site 
for Black expansion. Brambleton was a small (1,100 homes) 
white community that was bounded on two sides by Black 
developments, and on the other two sides by industrial 
properties and the Elizabeth River. Once the first few 
Black families began to push across Corprew Avenue, the 
traditional dividing line between the Black and white 
communities, whites responded with attacks, threats, broken 
windows, and minor acts of vandalism.23 After a series of 
stormy Council sessions, an interracial committee was 
appointed to study the situation. The Council had hoped 
that the issue would die without further incident, and that 
some way would be found to guarantee "the separation of 
white and Negro homes in the area,"29 but Norfolk's award 
winning Black newspaper, the Journal and Guide, refused to 
let the issue drop. The aggressive attack of the editors 
helped to convince the white community that further 
incidents would occur unless something was done:
It cannot be emphasized too strongly, and it 
is worth repeating again and again, that the 
housing situation affecting Norfolk's Negro 
citizens is not only acute, but desperate, 
while, by a fair comparison, no such problem 
faces the white population.
2SNorfolk Journal and Guide, 8 June 1946.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 June 1946.
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The housing predicament with which this 
community is confronted cannot be resolved by 
the simple expedient of viewing it as a racial 
matter. It is based upon an elementary human 
need and its amelioration must be on this basis 
alone.
It is an age-old story of the law of supply 
and demand . . . .  Norfolk's Negro population 
has grown by some 25,000 in the last few years, 
but little new housing has emerged to shelter 
this population increase . . . while, on the 
other hand, construction of new white units has 
been over 5,000.
Even assuming that private capital were 
available and homes [for Blacks] could be built, 
under present restrictive conditions, where 
could the necessary land be found?30
The Black and white communities remained at logger­
heads, and the interracial committee appointed by the 
Council failed to devise a new color line in the Brambleton 
area. Nor did the turmoil cease with the first few incur­
sions; the breakdown of time-honored color lines began to 
affect other blocks in the Brambleton section. The situa­
tion failed to stabilize, and soon whole neighborhoods were 
in flight. The Journal and Guide continued to intimate that 
further incidents would occur unless the white community 
began to take some drastic measures to provide housing units 
for Blacks. The fact that the Journal and Guide's veiled 
threats of racial turmoil were reprinted for the white 
community in the Virginian-Pilot helped to build the 
momentum for some sort of intervening public action— some
3°Norfolk Journal and Guide, 1 June 1946.
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step that would alleviate the housing crisis in the Black 
community, yet also work to preserve the separate status of 
white neighborhoods. Thus, the Authority's push for public 
housing struck a core of need recognized by both the Black 
and white communities, and public support for the proposal 
began to build rapidly.
By 1948 a solid consensus in the community had been 
achieved: for two years the Norfolk Redevelopment and
Housing Authority (N.R.H.A.) had been angling for official 
endorsement of its slum removal program; during that time 
the events in Brambleton and its surrounding neighborhoods 
had been simmering; the public had listened to Public Health 
Director Dr. John Huff warn of the epidemic dangers of crime 
and contagion in the city's slums; and opinion in the Black 
community had coalesced around the single, dominant theme of 
their housing crisis. The City Council was at last ready to 
take official action, but the nature of their commitment 
was, as yet, still undiscernible. The Council was quick, 
however, to agree upon two points; first, the city faced a 
"critical shortage of housing meeting the minimum health 
standards in Negro and some low-income white areas," and 
second, that "this condition is a matter of concern to all 
other Norfolk residents, regardless of their own pleasant 
living surroundings."31 For ten years Norfolk's councils 
had agreed that it was "time to do something," the situation
31Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 November 1948.
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was "acute," the housing shortage was "serious,"32 so the 
debate this time focused upon what official actions, short 
of encouraging private developers to enter the normally 
unprofitable low-income housing market— a step that earlier 
councils had repeatedly taken without success— could be 
taken to officially alleviate the crisis. One councilman 
recommended that the city "should be among the first in 
line"— those words would prove prophetic— for new federal 
redevelopment funds then under Congressional considera­
tion.33 The suggestion touched such a core of response 
that the Council, already straddled with heavy commitments 
to an aggressive array of capital improvements, was ready to 
embark upon "a pure gamble:"34 it approved an additional 
$25,000 appropriation to the N.R.H.A. for the purpose of 
further studying the prospects of slum removal. Thus the 
Authority was charged with the responsibility to develop a 
plan for urban renewal and public housing even before such a 
program was either legally or financially feasible!
The Council's gamble for federal funding was not an 
idle gesture to ameliorate an increasingly exacerbating 
situation; it was a carefully calculated risk. The 
Depression and World War II had left the core of many of the 
nation's cities in a condition comparable to Norfolk's; it
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 December 1938.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 November 1948.
34Pretlow Darden.
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seemed only a matter of time before Congress cleared the way 
for such action. Norfolk, however, had every intention of 
leaping into the national limelight as the first municipal­
ity to embark upon a program of redevelopment; grabbing the 
headlines of urban renewal seemed the city's best oppor­
tunity to shake its sleazy wartime reputation and focus 
national attention instead upon all phases of its postwar 
renaissance. Publicity, however, was only one-half of the 
quotient: Norfolk, more than any other city its size, had
seen clearly how federal funds could provide the needed 
transfusion for massive community expansion. For almost a 
decade the Organization Council had refused to embark upon 
any municipal project or extend any public service unless 
the Navy dangled the carrot of federal funding as an 
incentive. Federal funds had aided in the construction of 
more than 3,400 dwellings, had upgraded numerous municipal 
facilities, including schools, parks, playgrounds, highways, 
recreational centers, water and sewer projects; had poured 
millions of dollars into the area's economy;35 and had 
helped, with both these new facilities and the multiplier 
effect of federal investment, to immeasurably increase the 
standard of living for all the citizens of Tidewater.35
The Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority had 
already sought to allay fears that its actions would be
3STheodore A. Curtain, op. cit.
35N.R.H.A., This is It, p. 8.
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competing with the private market by challenging the city's 
builders to begin their own redevelopment programs. This Is 
It, the Authority's official promotional tract, recalled 
earlier objections to its plans, and sought graphically to 
explain how the city could embark upon a mammoth rebuilding 
effort, even under existing legislation, and not expend any 
local funds. The commissioners knew first hand that federal 
funds had provided the impetus for the city's dramatic 
economic expansion over the past decade; all five commis­
sioners were experiencing, along with the rest of the city's 
business establishment, the fruits of a local economic boom 
that had been financed largely with federal support, and 
there was really very little doubt that Norfolk would once 
again be in line for federal dollars as soon as new funds 
for housing and renewal became available.
The Authority hired planning consultant Charles K.
Agle to study Norfolk's downtown slums and develop a master 
plan for a major urban renewal project. His report was a 
shock even for native residents who had long known that 
housing conditions in the area around the downtown were 
deplorable. Methodically he studied block by block, hovel 
by hovel, to reach his conclusions: "large scale redevelop­
ment is the only chance the city ever has had to accomplish 
a drastic modernization of its heart."37 Map after map,
37"Federal Slum Clearance Gets Its First Full Scale 
Tryout in Norfolk, Va.," Architectural Forum, May, 1950, 
p. 137.
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table after table, showed the same concentration of irre­
versible blight choking the central business district: 
blocks where every structure needed major repairs, where 
almost all of the houses dated back to the Nineteenth 
Century, where there were 13 or more fires over a two-year 
period, where there were 17 or more arrests in the previous 
months, and where there was a heavy concentration of 
tuberculosis.33 As in many other cities, the streets of 
Norfolk's downtown area were the direct descendants of cow 
paths and carriage ways upon which a gridiron street pattern 
had been imposed.39 All of the major highways that linked 
commuters to the downtown ceased a mile short of the central 
business district, discharging their traffic into a complex 
maze of back alleys and clogged feeder roads.40 The City 
Planning Commission found that:
. . . many streets were less than fifty-feet in 
right-of-way width, and all were inadequate, 
even for single family neighborhoods . . . .  not 
only are they inadequate for moving traffic, but 
they are [also] an economic liability . . . .  
some business decentralization is inevitable.
However, if effective means are taken to 
increase accessibility, ease of movement and 
parking facilities in the central business
3SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
39Architectural Forum, op cit., p. 135.
4°E. T. Beall, George W. Price, and Donald R. Locke, 
"Face Lifting For Better Urban Living," Norfolk, XII: 1
(February, 1950), p. 7.
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district, values can be stabilized and excessive 
decentralization of business can be avoided.41
The Agle Report was a sobering eye-opener in other 
respects. In addition to just reporting the slum conditions 
that cried out for renewal, it attempted as well to chart 
all of the potential obstacles to successful redevelopment. 
It was in this regard that many citizens found the report 
shocking. Few individuals realized how very profitable slum 
properties— even in an area as blighted as Norfolk's central 
ghetto— could be to its owners, and some of the city's 
finest families were shown to have heavy investments in slum 
housing. The report showed that even under rent control, an 
average slum dwelling assessed at $400 in total value could 
achieve contract rents of $142 a year per room, out of which 
very little besides the $10.80 per year real estate tax bill 
had to be paid for maintenance and upkeep. One example, 
pointed to as typical of the inflated value of slum housing, 
sheltered 32 families in a rickety, wood frame building that 
had only four sinks and four toilets; it brought in $4,500 a 
year in rent and paid out only $98 in taxes.42 A complex 
called the Tidewater Apartments proved an even more notor­
ious example of slum profiteering: there were 152 single
room units that netted the owners $23,400 a year in rent;
4XCity Planning Commission, Major Highway Plan, Part I, 
Major Highways and Collector Streets (Norfolk, 1950), 
pp. 15, 5.
42Architectural Forum, pp. 136-137.
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the only facilities for cooking, cleaning, washing, drink­
ing, and sanitation were six cold water privies consisting 
of a single faucet and toilet. The total tax bill for the 
complex was less than $600 a year43— a highly profitable 
investment.
Thus Norfolk was compelled by a number of powerful 
motivators to become the first city in the nation to qualify 
for federal funds the following June, when President Truman 
signed the U. S. Housing Act of 1949. The act granted 
municipalities both the legal authority and the necessary 
funding support to buy up such properties. Before the act 
was passed, the city could rely upon its powers of eminent 
domain to purchase private property only if were to be 
reused for "public" purposes, such as land for schools, 
highways, and parks, but additional public investment in 
such a deteriorating neighborhood would have been foolish. 
Before this new power of redevelopment passed to cities, 
nothing in the municipal arsenal would permit cities to buy 
up private property, tear it down, and then resell it to 
other private residential, commercial, or industrial 
developers— the essence of urban renewal. The act empowered 
cities to buy up large quantities of slum housing for a 
fair" price— roughly 60% above their assessed value, or less 
than two year's rent on most buildings— and to acquire the
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 9
rest through condemnation proceedings.44 The Agle Report 
had predicted that "the future of Norfolk for the rest of 
its history will be fixed by the action of the next ten 
years;"45 it might just as well have added that the 
enabling legislation and supporting federal funding would be 
the city's only real chance to have much of a future at all.
At last assured of both federal funding and community 
support, the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
forged ahead with its program— the first urban renewal 
initiative in the country. N.R.H.A. Project One— the 
businessman's baby that had been so carefully nurtured along 
by the city's power elite— bore a striking resemblance to 
the blustery, full-speed-ahead approach of its sires: it
proposed to bulldoze 120 acres of blighted land to make way 
for broad highways, light industries, new commercial 
districts, civic improvements, schools, playgrounds, and a 
giant convention hotel. It also bore the mark of City 
Manager C. A. Harrell's balanced approach of careful 
planning and community concern: almost all of the 1,800
families uprooted by the bulldozers would be relocated in 
modern, sanitary public housing units, and many would 
eventually move back into their own neighborhood, once it 
had been rebuilt at public expense. No one doubted the 
legitimacy of the undertaking: the slum properties cleared
44Architectural Forum, p. 137.
45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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represented some of the most squalid, festering hovels in 
the nation;46 the municipal projects undertaken were those 
seen as most essential to salvaging the central business 
district; and the land cleared for renewal was seen as the 
most critical for restoring the city's flagging real estate 
tax base. Before demolition even began, however, the 
Authority rushed to completion several hundred new public 
housing units on vacant land in order to absorb the first 
wave of redevelopment refugees.47 Each time the bull­
dozers poised to bite off another chunk of blighted land, 
the N.R.H.A. rushed to completion new housing projects to 
absorb its relocated residents. Indeed, this was all part 
of the careful, humanistic approach of the Silkstocking 
Takeover that promised "to alleviate as much as possible the 
hardships which are the by-products of such a project."43
Partly because this was the first redevelopment 
project in the nation, and Norfolk was aware that the rest 
of the nation was watching, and partly because the city had 
been so long prepared for this endeavor, N.R.H.A. Project 
One was a masterfully planned and conceived undertaking; 
certainly it was one of the most studied proposals ever 
advanced by a municipality. Ever since the Citizens Crime
4SNorfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Report
(Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1957), pp. 5-6.
47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 August 1950.
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 August 1951.
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Conference of 1937 exposed the financial and human cost of 
slum life, the city's business elite had dreamed of downtown 
renewal. The Authority's own study in 1946 (This Is It) and 
the 1949 Agle Report had added depth and dimension to the 
vision. It took five years to complete N.R.H.A. Project 
One, but the enormity of its carefully planned success was 
apparent to all. In the end, the project offered something 
for everyone: broad new thorough-fares provided downtown
merchants with their first really modern link to the rest of 
the area; a new light industrial zone on Tidewater Drive was 
attracting so many new private investments that it was 
prompting as own multi-million dollar construction boom;49 
new businesses were already moving into the redeveloped 
commercial areas; backers of a major new convention hotel 
(the Holiday Inn Waterside) were examining a corner site in 
the project;50 and the former residents of some of the 
city's most dilapidated dwellings were able to reclaim their 
old neighborhoods, now completely rebuilt as planned 
communities. More importantly, the whole community was 
caught up in the feeling of pride and boom psychology that 
accompanies such a dynamic undertaking, and the spin-off 
effects could be seen in hundreds of other unrelated 
expansions, investments, rehabilitations, and storefront
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 March 1956.
5°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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modernizations.51 Urban renewal proved to be a spark that 
kindled the area's entire business community to action, and 
Norfolk raced to blot out the memories of its sordid past.
A more complete description of the size and scope of 
N.R.H.A. Project One is necessary in order to fully compre­
hend its full impact. The project included one 80-acre 
section that is bounded by Virginia Beach Boulevard on the 
north, Lincoln Street on the east, Brambleton Avenue on the 
south, and Monticello Avenue on the west; it then extended 
east along Brambleton Avenue to include a broad strip 
surrounding Tidewater Drive— roughly 127 acres. New York's 
Stuyvesant Town was the biggest housing project then in 
existence, but it was a little more than one-third the size 
of N.R.H.A. Project One; New York had 40 times the popula­
tion of Norfolk in 1950, but less than twice the slum clear­
ance acreage contained in Norfolk's undertaking.52 Land 
acquisition cost $5.7 million, of which the federal govern­
ment paid two-thirds ($3.8 million). Norfolk's $1.9 million 
share was not a cash loss, because it was worked off in land 
set aside to build a new school, recreation center, fire and 
police station, utility lines, and street improvements for 
which the city would have had to pay anyhow. The project 
generated an additional $18 million in public expenditures
51George J. Hebert, "Downtown Norfolk: Commercial and
Municipal Progress," Norfolk, XXI: 1 (February, 1950), p. 10.
52Architectural Forum, p. 132.
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generated an additional $18 million in public expenditures 
— more than half of which came form the state or federal 
government for public housing and highway improvements— and 
$15.6 million in private construction.53 The total cost 
to the federal government for building the 3,000 public 
housing units planned by the N.R.H.A. commissioners was 
close to $30 million34— a sizeable multiplier in any 
economy.
The business leaders who sired N.R.H.A. Project One 
saw redevelopment as more than just a means to eradicate 
blight, relieve deprivation, and cure downtown traffic 
congestion; they were focusing as well on a more serious 
situation that struck deep at their own sense of financial 
security. Norfolk had too many of its economic eggs tied up 
in one basket; its huge naval installations made the city 
essentially a one-industry town55--an enterprise that was 
virtually exempt from real estate, personal property, and 
other local tax assessments. After World War I Norfolk paid 
a heavy price for this over reliance when disarmament left 
the nation with a one-ocean navy that, after the outbreak of
33Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Report to 
the City Council (Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1974), p. 46;
Architectural Forum, p. 132; Ira R. Hanna, "The Growth of the 
Norfolk Naval Air Station and the Norfolk-Portsmouth 
Metropolitan Area Economy in the Twentieth Century," masters 
thesis (Norfolk: Old Dominion University, 1967), p. 92.
54Architectural Forum, p. 132.
53Architectural Forum, p. 134.
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the West Coast.56 A brief inspection of the waterfront 
gave ample evidence of the fact that coastwise shipping—  
once the economic staple of the area— had been almost 
completely absorbed by rail and trucking facilities; other 
than shipbuilding and coal export, the city had no other 
private industry of any magnitude,57 and, in fact, suffer­
ed a severe shortage of available industrial land. A few 
million dollars clipped off of a naval appropriation by an 
errant congressional committee could well send the area into 
an economic tailspin.
Since the end of the war the city's economic leaders 
had given serious attention to attracting new business as a 
hedge against such congressional capriciousness,Bs but had 
achieved little success. City Manager Harrell had already 
recommended an aggressive plan of annexation or, he warned, 
"the city would die by inches,"59 but annexation under the 
present state of Virginia politics was both a cos'tly and a 
risky proposition, although one to which Norfolk was deeply 
committed. Even with the prospect of acquiring vacant land 
through annexation, however, the city's business leaders
56Thomas van Wertenbaker, Norfolk Historic Southern 
Port (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1962).
S7Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan for the Central 
Business and Financial District (Norfolk, 1956), p. 79.
S8Architectural Forum, p. 134.
59C. A. Harrell, The Norfolk Story: Annual Report for
1948, (Norfolk, 1948), p. 9.
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still had to face the harsh reality that Norfolk could not 
hope to serve as a major industrial hub simply because it 
lacked a cheap source of power.60 A plan to attract light 
industry into newly developed sites close to the heart of 
the area's financial and commercial district— a scarce 
commodity in any community— was Norfolk's only hope for a 
competitive alternative. For this reason, a major 
redevelopment project that entailed massive clearing of land 
close to the downtown, was seen as the one best hope for the 
area's continued financial success. More than a third of 
the land cleared in N.R.H.A. Project One was thus dedicated 
to developing prime industrial and commercial sites with 
both rail and major highway access.61 The catch was that 
in order to be able to provide new land for these kinds of 
critical business and industrial uses, the majority of the 
land cleared under redevelopment powers had to be 
"residential" in nature. Federal law at the time also 
mandated that the majority of the land must continue a resi­
dential use. Thus cities, like Norfolk, could clear a slum, 
but they had to balance residential, industrial, 
commercial,and public uses in the type of carefully planned 
undertaking exemplified by N.R.H.A. Project One.62
60Architectural Forum, p. 135.
61Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 April 1952.
62Housing and Home Finance Agency, A Guide to Slum 
Clearance and Urban Development (Washington, D.C., 1950).
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Finally, N.R.H.A. Project One was successful at alle­
viating a part of the housing shortage for poor Blacks.
Not only did it create 3,000 new public housing units,®3 
it proposed to split these between the project site and 
newly acquired vacant land on the outskirts of the downtown. 
This was in keeping with the housing pattern in the rest of 
Norfolk at the time: Black neighborhoods were spread across
the city instead of concentrated in a single downtown 
district, as in most Northern cities.64 Since only 1,800 
families would be moved out of the project area during 
demolition65 (and 3,000 units were being built), this 
represented a significant net gain in housing for Blacks.
The fact that the new Black housing area would be carefully 
isolated by broad new thoroughfares (i.e., Virginia Beach 
Boulevard on the north, St. Paul's Boulevard on the west, 
Brambleton Avenue on the south, and Tidewater Drive on the 
east) also was a plus for the white community fearful of 
encroachments into white housing areas. In addition, a 
new recreation center, fire station, police precint 
station,66 and the first elementary school (Young Park)
6Architectural Forum, p . 132.
64Karl E. Taueber and Alma Taueber, Negroes in Cities: 
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change. (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 35-96.
SSN.R.H.A., Report, 1957, op cit.
66N.R.H.A., Report to the City Council, 1974, op cit. , 
p. 46.
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built for Black students67 (the others were hand-me-downs 
from the white community, a standard practice in the South) 
were included as part of the project. By designating the 
new school, park, and recreational facilities for use by 
Blacks (under the practice of the day), the city hoped to 
relieve some of the pressure to integrate white facilities 
in adjoining neighborhoods.66
City Manager C. A. Harrell also saw redevelopment as a 
panacea for many of the city's other municipal needs as 
well. Throughout his tenure as city manager, Harrell placed 
a strong emphasis on neighborhood needs: upgrading schools
and residential streets, decentralizing police and fire 
facilities, building parks, playground, recreation areas, 
and community centers. N.R.H.A. Project One bears the 
imprint of his careful community planning as well. Besides 
meeting the obvious commuter transportation needs of the 
area by building two additional highway approaches to the 
downtown, the project represented the city's first full 
attempt to create a planned public community for its Black 
residents. Although surrounded by the updated highway 
system, Young Park, a 752-unit public housing project (named 
for P. Bernard Young, Sr., founder of the Journal and Guide, 
Norfolk's distinguished Black newspaper) would be built upon
^ Norfolk Journal and Guide, 19 April 1958.
66Sam J. Ervin, Jr., "The Case for Segregation," Look, 
April 3, 1956 (vol. XX, 7), pp. 32 and 33.
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a neighborhood street concept that would make it virtually 
inaccessible to through traffic. Population density would 
be reduced from the pre-redevelopment levels of 50 families 
per acre to only 20. In addition, the phased development of 
the project was designed so that every family would have a 
place to go as the project gained momentum69— a goal that 
in reality was far easier to work out on paper than in 
practice, especially since a number of families and single 
individuals were ineligible for public housing.
As part of his concept of professional community 
planning, City Manager Harrell was taking active steps to 
prevent future slums from occurring in the ring of older 
middle-class housing which separated the downtown area from 
the newer postwar subdivisions on the outskirts of the city. 
Roughly one-third of the city's housing could be described 
as in danger of slipping from relatively good housing for 
its era into the dilapidated state that precedes a full 
fledged slum70— all of it in this middle-class ring that 
included all or portions of the city's first streetcar and 
automobile suburbs— Ghent, East Ghent, Lamberts Point, Park 
Place, Colonial Place, Riverview, Highland Park, West 
Highland Park, Fairmont Park, Ballentine Place, Lafayette 
Residence Park, Winona, Villa Heights, Brambleton, Chester­
field Heights, Atlantic City, and the soon to be annexed
69Architectural Forum, p. 134.
70Architectural Forum, p. 136.
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sections of Ingleside, Estabrook, Norview, and Coronado.
The tremendous influx of people attracted to the Tidewater 
area during the war— Norfolk's population increased by 48% 
or almost 70,000 people between 1940 and 19507:L— placed a 
premium upon existing houses, and many of the homes in these 
areas either took in borders or were cut up into multi- 
family dwelling units. The transient nature of this new 
renting population and the inadequacy of many of the 
remodeling jobs left deteriorated dwellings in even the 
finest neighborhoods.
The major weapon in Harrell's arsenal against blight 
was the newly formulated minimum housing code, which was 
scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1954. Housing 
codes were still a relatively new concept at the time that 
Walter Hoffman (later, a federal judge) and his committee of 
lawyers and building officials put together one for Norfolk; 
in fact, less than a dozen other cities across the nation 
had begun experimentation with code enforcement as a way to 
prevent blight. Housing codes provide "livability stand­
ards" for dwellings, rather than concentrate on the more 
limited coverage afforded by fire, building, and health 
codes. Examples of provisions in Norfolk's new code 
included: at least one window per room, running water
inside the building, a flush toilet connected to a sewer
7:LU. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Population, 
1950, vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part 46, 
Virginia, Chapter B (Washington, D.C., 1952), pp. 26-27.
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(but not necessarily inside the dwelling), adequate means of 
garbage disposal, and a safe form of central heating with a 
flue to the outside of the building— none of them extra­
vagant standards by any measure, but they did represent a 
distinct improvement over the conditions that existed in 
many semi-blighted areas. The Norfolk code writers were 
obviously setting their standards on the low side of "liva- 
bility," because they realized that strong enforcement would 
be the key to its effectiveness as a slum deterrent.72 As 
a tribute to the wisdom of the code writers, almost 2,500 
dwellings were rehabilitated during the first two years of 
the code's operation; only 173 buildings were vacated as a 
result of enforcement activities, and most of these were 
re-occupied later after completion of the required reno­
vations.73
The small crowd of dignitaries and city officials who 
gathered outside the hovel at 755 Smith Street that wintry 
morning in 1951 had come to cheer the revitalized spirit of 
a New Norfolk as much to applaud the singular event they 
were witnessing. The New Norfolk was as blustery, bold, and 
bullish as it sires in the city's business establishment; it 
was as compassionate and humane as the civic leaders and 
charity workers who presided at its birth; it was as level­
headed, pragmatic, and professional as the planners,
72Architectural Forum, pp. 136-137.
73Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 October 1956.
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designers, and consultants who fussed over its infant 
developments; and finally, it was as careful, concise, and 
well directed as the city manager who tutored it. In elect­
ing the Silkstocking Ticket, the voters had opted for a 
change from the cautious, humdrum course plotted by the 
wartime Council; they got more than for which they had 
bargained. In 1946 the people had been swept up in the 
vision of a New Norfolk, sleek and shining in the shimmering 
sunlight; by 1951 they were witnessing the bricks and 
mortar, the concrete, steel and glass, of its realization.
A revitalized redevelopment and housing authority was 
plotting eradication of the city's blight; a new port 
authority was bent on reclaiming the glory of its past; new 
zoning laws and subdivision laws regulations extended the 
promise of orderly expansion; annexation initiatives held 
out the assurance of continued growth; revamped health, 
housing, fire, and building codes served as an omnipresent 
guard against future deterioration; a massive capital 
improvements program was rapidly solving the physical needs 
for more schools, water, sewage, street lighting, traffic 
control, and transportation facilities; construction was 
already underway on a new bridge-tunnel link and a modern 
airport terminal; extended highway access promised an end to 
the city's isolation;74 and everywhere there was evidence
74C. A. Harrell, "Norfolk— A Progress Report," Norfolk 
XII: 2 (Autumn, 1950), pp. 9-14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
that the citizens themselves had caught the spirit of these 
ventures and were embarking on their own fix up, expansion, 
rebuilding, and modernization campaigns in thousands of 
smaller endeavors.
For many, Redevelopment Project One represented the 
highwater mark of the city's effort not just to tear down 
the old and build the new, but to do it with such style and 
vision that it would capture the attention of the nation, 
and thereby erase some of the taint of its earlier infamy.
It marked a sharp contrast between the foot-dragging of the 
wartime Council and the foot-racing of the Silkstocking 
administration. Buoyed of spirit, restored of confidence, 
and optimistic once again in outlook, Norfolk's citizens 
were finally prepared to face the future without trepida­
tion.
Redevelopment Project One represented as well a 
remarkable diversity of personalities, a fortuitous display 
of insight, and a timely turn of events:
1. Charles L. Kaufman and the other citizen elites 
that served as commissioners of the Norfolk Redevelopment 
and Housing Authority had first envisioned the dream of 
renewal in the days of Colonel Borland's 1937 Citizen's 
Crime Conference; they had nurtured that dream through the 
war years as the Norfolk Housing Authority; they had revived 
it in the post-war era when their mission shifted from 
planning military accommodations to managing public housing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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units; and they had lobbied the Silkstocking Council for a 
risky advance to solidify their plans for redevelopment. At 
long last they were able to step back with pride and watch 
the transformation of the N.R.H.A. from the ugly duckling of 
public largesse to the single, domineering force in the 
city's renewal renaissance. Throughout this decade and a 
half, the seven men who had served as commissioners never 
wavered from what they saw was the mission of their 
organization, and they had the perseverance to see it come 
about.
The seven commissioners were the true giants of the 
city's business and civic establishment; they possessed 
enough status and personal power in the community to over­
come all opposition to redevelopment, and that was no mean 
task. Profiteering from Norfolk's blight and over charging 
its poorest residents were as widespread among its slumlords 
and a certain segment of its real estate community as any­
where in the nation;75 in many instances the profits were 
collected by families and individuals that had almost 
parallel standing in the community. But the commissioners 
of the N.R.H.A. had the sheer force of commercial and 
financial persuasion to stare down opposition from even 
these well connected property owners. Their standing in the 
community was so high that they were able to launch the city 
boldly and irrevocably into what was in most of the other
75Architectural Forum, p. 137.
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council-manager cities of the nation a torturous and easily 
side-tracked course.-76
2. The People's Ticket of Pretlow Darden, Richard 
Cooke, and John Twohy, in combination with a loose voting 
alignment with independent Councilman Rives Worsham,-7-7 
possessed much the same kind of community power and 
prestige. By ripping political control of city hall from 
the grasp of the Prieur Organization, they restored faith in 
municipal government— a step that was necessary before any 
progressive measure could be taken with citizen support.
The people of Norfolk would never have stood for the imposi­
tions provided by the revamped building, fire, health and 
minimum housing codes if they had feared indifferent or 
selective enforcement for political gain; they would not 
have stood for either the cost or the inconvenience posed by 
massive municipal construction initiatives if they had 
doubted the motives behind such improvements; neither would 
they have had granted their government the power to acquire 
and destroy private property in preparation for the eventual 
resale to other private investors— the real teeth in the 
redevelopment process— if either end of urban renewal had 
been controlled by ring politicians.
-76For a more complete explanation of this point, see 
Jean L. Stinchcombe, Reform and Reaction: City Politics in
Toledo (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1968),
pp. 129-150.
■^Pretlow Darden.
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The People's Ticket maintained dignity and devotion to 
principle in spite of the controversy that raged about them. 
Nobody doubted their motives or questioned either their 
integrity or their purpose, but a group that embarks on so 
many unparalleled municipal endeavors must inevitably make 
enemies and provoke opposition. The Council chambers rever­
berated with the hubbub of both civic support and fierce 
opposition throughout the brief tenure of the People's 
administration, but the Council plunged onward despite the 
controversy, always careful to explain each step of the 
undertaking to those who would follow. This was the true 
mark of their partisan independence, for no political group 
could have long endured the intensity of the public debate, 
the level of criticism, or the unpredictability of popular 
support posed by each new initiative. Nevertheless, the 
People's group had the courage to persevere and risk being 
judged only by their accomplishments.
3. City Manager C. A. Harrell was the right man at the 
right time to carry out the initiatives of the People's 
administration. He represented absolute incorruptibility 
and professionalism at a time in which both were sorely 
needed at city hall. Twenty years after his reign as 
manager, Norfolk was still completing the final phases of 
the ambitious program he had set forth. More than any other 
single individual, Harrell understood the true potential for 
municipal planning and government. He was responsible for
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snatching control over the operation of city government from 
the grasp of short-sighted governmental functionaries and 
then tutoring both citizens and municipal workers alike on 
what could be accomplished. His was a vision of greatness 
for city government that would be hard to forget, even long 
after he had passed from the local scene. Harrell brought 
the best technical and professional minds in the county to 
study the city's problems and to help chart its growth; 
many of them decided to stay on and lend a hand in achieving 
the realities promised in their reports. Harrell made 
Norfolk City Hall one of the most desirable locations in the 
country for aspiring public servants: not only was the city
continually at the forefront the newly developing fields of 
municipal planning, urban renewal, and code enforcement, the 
People's administration promised that these new powers would 
be used exclusively for municipal service, free from the 
taint of political interference or partisan purpose that was 
apparently so prevalent elsewhere. Harrell dared to empower 
the citizens— both the dynamos of its civic and business 
elite and the sparkplugs of its neighborhood leagues— to 
help plan and promote municipal endeavors. He inspired the 
best from his own employees and was able once again to 
restore a sense of pride and accomplishment to city offices. 
Harrell's vision, backed up by the proposals of numerous 
citizen groups and consultants, provided Norfolk with the 
basis for a Master Plan for city growth and development— a
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step that put it almost two years ahead of other areas in 
the competition for federal urban renewal dollars. Other 
writers have bemoaned the lack of unity and leadership that 
plagues most council-manager cities and precludes for the 
most part decisive action; thanks to City Manager C. A. 
Harrell and his close connection and cooperation with the 
People's Council and its corporate elite, Norfolk suffered 
no such disability. In fact, Norfolk, because it had such 
leadership, thrived in the area of urban renewal where most 
other council-manager cities failed: it was precisely
because it had truly achieved such a professional and non­
partisan atmosphere that such action was possible. Most 
other council-manager cities, because politics was mixed in 
with their administration, failed to achieve the level of 
consensus that was possible to sustain such activities— a 
level of unanimity that was ordinarily only possible in the 
highly partisan strong mayor cities.7s
4. Lawrence M. Cox, the executive director of the 
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, headed a 
promising young staff of planners and designers who moved 
quickly to seize their opportunity before the momentum for 
progress dissipated. "Hustling young Larry Cox," as he was 
described by one trade magazine,79 was ambitious and 
demanding enough to get quick results. The Authority's
7Ssee Jean L. Stinchcombe, op cit.
79Architectural Forum, p. 136.
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program for relocation, as well as the total design for 
N.R.H.A. Project One, set a standard for the rest of the 
nation. Cox had been head of the N.R.H.A. almost from its 
founding, and over the years, especially during the hectic 
war years, had developed a capable staff that was both loyal 
to him and fully committed to redevelopment. Close 
collaboration between Cox, the N.R.H.A. Commissioners, the 
City Council, and the business community helped to push 
N.R.H.A. Project One off of the drawing boards and into 
reality.
5. The support of Norfolk's two major daily news­
papers, the morning Virginian-Pilot and the evening Ledger- 
Dispatch (later the Ledger-Star after a merger with the 
Portsmouth Star), was instrumental in advancing both the 
cause of the Silkstocking movement and the accomplishments 
of its administration. The two papers, although fierce 
competitors, were owned and published by the same family 
group; together they served as the spokesmen for the city's 
business elite, and the accolades of triumph from the 
newspapers for the latest ground breaking or achievement 
frequently sounded brassier than any possible press release. 
The support of the papers, especially the more progressive 
Virginian-Pilot was critical to the People's efforts to win 
election, maintain momentum through the police scandal, and 
promote its program of redevelopment, code enforcement, and 
bonded indebtedness. Reporters for both papers were
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insiders to both the events and the intrigue at city hall, 
and this access to the decision-makers, as well as the fact 
that a reporter in this era kept a fixed beat for years, 
gave them a stake in protecting their sources. In those 
days a reporter's reputation depended as much upon "what he 
knew and didn't tell as it did upon what he knew."so
6. The spirit of adventure and self-sacrifice that 
prevailed among Norfolk's citizenry helped enormously in 
clearing the hurdles inherent in redevelopment. The 
People's Ticket had been elected in 1946 with an over­
whelming mandate for progress, and the citizens waited 
patiently through the initial stages of planning and 
development. Seizing control of city government took more, 
however, than winning a single election, yet the citizens 
did not lose faith even during the darkest hours of the 
police scandal— an event which could have easily wrecked all 
hope of progressive active in most administrations; in 
Norfolk, instead, it helped to assure success. The citizens 
were prepared for action, and they watched patiently as each 
new step unfolded. Norfolk's growth in population during 
the war year had been enormous, and municipal services had 
suffered greatly under this additional burden, but the 
people never lost faith that City Manager Harrell and the
BORobert H. Mason, former editor of the Norfolk 
Virginian-Pilot, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 
27 September 1979.
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Silkstocking Council would eventually catch up to this level 
of growth with their own ambitious program of expanded 
municipal services.
Other cities that were similar to Norfolk in many ways
found their own plans for growth and redevelopment stymied
because their own citizens lacked either the vision or the 
spirit of sacrifice to participate in progress; not so with 
Norfolk. Redevelopment, especially of the magnitude that 
had been planned, called for enormous personal hardships 
from many individuals, especially from those who could least 
afford to suffer more, and yet they bore their discomfort, 
and for the most part, bore it in silence. The People's 
government and its attendant push for progress truly 
represented the efforts of a rejuvenated body politic; the 
bulldozers that ripped through the sagging walls of the 
first Smith Street structure and the adjacent areas in
N.R.H.A. Project One represented the high point in the
momentary blaze of glory that characterized the Silkstocking 
Takeover.




N.R.H.A. Project One would take more than five years 
to complete, but even before the bulldozers ripped through 
that first house on Smith Street, the men who had charted 
the meteoric rise of Norfolk's corporate stock had already 
retreated back to the plushness of their board rooms and 
counting houses. The individuals who had so carefully 
planned and nourished its inception were already fading from 
the scene. Each new ground breaking or ribbon cutting 
ceremony marked the passing of the old order: the planning
phase was over, and now it was time for the builders.
The Silkstocking Takeover had run into a snag: as
part of its promise to clean up city government and make it 
more responsive, the People's Ticket of Cooke, Darden, and 
Twohy had promised not to seek a second term; now the very 
events that served as tributes to their triumph stood as 
well as a tombstone to their passing. The Silkstocking 
Ticket was unable to propagate successors. The spirit of 
renaissance and reform that had vaulted it to victory had by 
1950 dissipated, and then dissolved completely.
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At first, as their term drew to a close, the reform 
movement sought to find others who would carry their 
banner,1 but the sense of shared emergency that had pro­
pelled their postwar successes was giving way to an "Era of 
Good Feeling."2 The business and civic leaders who had 
been drawn to the city's rescue now began to answer other 
callings; no one was willing to take again the risk they had 
earlier dared and openly oppose the Prieur Organization.
The sense of urgency and shared emergency that had brought 
the reformers to power had passed; the Outs had become the 
Ins in the type of political perversity that always hastens 
the doom of such reform movements; dramatic change had 
become altogether too commonplace in Norfolk; and the extra­
ordinary, the unusual, had become all too customary. Busi­
ness was booming, and the citizens were no longer forced to 
turn to the corporate community to avert certain financial 
ruin. Local prosperity, aided by the Cold War state of 
military readiness, had lulled the citizens into false sense 
of overall contentment, fully prepared to count their bless­
ings in the privacy of their own homes, untouched by and 
undemanding of municipal government.
When their search for successors came up dry, the 
stalwarts of the People's group again sought an audience 
with Organization chieftain Billy Prieur, hoping to find
xPretlow Darden.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 July 1961.
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some middle ground that would continue their legacy of 
progress within the more limited confines of machine 
politics. Finding compromise candidates was no easy matter, 
especially because Prieur would not agree to anyone who had 
played even the slightest role in the Silkstocking Takeover. 
Eventually the political negotiators were able to agree upon 
one man who emerged at the top of everyone's list of 
potential contenders.3 W. Fred Duckworth was an ideal 
choice to head the Harmony Ticket that would emerge from 
these backroom discussions: as a relative newcomer to
Norfolk from small-town North Carolina, he had no close 
financial, civic, or strong connections with the Silk- 
stocking crowd. On the other hand, he possessed the type of 
outstanding managerial skills necessary to head up Norfolk's 
complex municipal organization. Duckworth had been brought 
to the area in 1936 by the Ford Motor Company to manage its 
South Norfolk plant, one of the few major industrial 
concerns in the area not directly owned by the People's 
reformers. Several years later he left that position to 
manage the area's War Production Board, a post that expanded 
his circle of community contacts. After the war he opened 
up Cavalier Ford, his own car dealership,4 a project that 
received heavy financial backing from some of the Silk- 
stocking group. Even though he was not a Norfolkian by
3Pretlow Darden.
4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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either birth or heritage, the People's group was favorably 
impressed by his managerial acumen, his impressive array of 
skills, and the extent of his commitment to his adopted 
city.5
The People's group were not as pleased with Duck­
worth' s two running mates, both of whom were chosen less for 
their accomplishments than because nobody could find solid 
grounds to scratch them from the list. N. B. Etheridge, an 
independent garage owner, was a political unknown without 
any apparent ties to either the Organization or the Silk- 
stocking crowd. Lawrence C. Page had served on the City 
Council just before the war, but had shown the good sense to 
excuse himself from office before being branded for its 
wartime failures. Although a real estate broker by pro­
fession, he had no close ties to the powerhouses of the 
People's group, and since he had also run as a Republican 
for the U. S. Senate against Organization scion Harry F. 
Byrd, Sr.,® he was obviously no longer closely associated 
with Prieur's crowd. For the People's forces, the Harmony 
Ticket of Duckworth, Page and Etheridge represented a 
marriage of necessity, rather than a bond of trust between 
these two disparate political groups.7
5Pretlow Darden and Robert W. Mason.
®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 June 1942; and 14 June
1950.
7Pretlow Darden.
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Shortly after the bulldozers ripped through the wall 
of that first house on Smith Street, City Manager C. A. 
Harrell, the one man who more than any other had been 
responsible for the rebirth and rejuvenation of Norfolk, 
departed to accept a similar position in San Antonio, Texas. 
At the time, the most common explanation for his departure 
was that he and Duckworth, the new mayor, had clashed 
bitterly over who would run the show at city hall.3 The 
city could not endure two chief administrators pulling in 
opposite directions, and Duckworth, with his "bulldozer 
drive and directness," was bent on running the city from the 
mayor's office, a marked contrast to the free-wheeling 
independence granted Harrell under the People's reign.9 
For his part, Harrell had indicated for years that he would 
resign his position before violating his strict professional 
creed of independence from partisan considerations;10 the 
arrival of Duckworth and the Harmony Ticket, however, meant 
that the Organization was again advancing a foothold in city 
hall. When Harrell left, with him went all hope of con­
tinuing the municipal reform brought about by the People's 
group; shortly thereafter his police chief and a number of 
other key administrators instrumental in carrying out his
8Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1961.
9Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 July 1975.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 June 1950.
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program also departed with indications that they had been 
fired by the new Council.x:L
Mayor W. Fred Duckworth was the perfect man to step in 
now and fill the gap in leadership left by Harrell's 
departure: he offered a continuation of the progress and
prosperity without necessitating any further decision or 
dissension on the part of the citizens. He was an extra­
ordinarily able leader, and if the decorum of democracy was 
somewhat abridged under his tutelage, the voters did not 
seem to mind very much. The Planning Stage had passed, the 
Builder had taken over, and the people approved unquestion- 
ingly the fruits of his labor, giving credit equally to the 
Planners and the Builder alike. Duckworth was above all 
else a bricks-and-mortar man, and he presided daily over the 
construction of the New Norfolk; as the building blocks of 
its bright facade were laid in place, nothing, not even the 
heavy storm clouds of racial disunity building on the 
horizon, seemed capable of diverting that progress.
The Organization made no attempt under Duckworth to 
return to the corrupt and profligate practices of its 
wartime administration; its members had been absent long 
enough from the seats of power that they were content to 
settle for positions, without demanding authority. Although 
hard-headed, and occasionally dictatorial, Duckworth had no
x:LClaude J. Staylor, former Chief of Police and City 
Councilman, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk,
25 July 1979.
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problem adapting to the programs begun under the People's 
group. He continued Harrell's administrative innovations, 
merely rerouting the technical advisors through the mayor's 
office. He was extremely aggressive, but like Harrell, he 
had a sense of how to handle himself; when he moved, he 
moved decisively, but he never moved until he was satisfied 
that all the conditions were favorable. Harrell's departure 
brought relations with the People's group dangerously close 
to a head, but Duckworth stepped in with a firm hand to take 
personal control of city government, and so assuaged some of 
the fears of machine politics.
During the Duckworth era, Norfolk was clearly run from 
the mayor's office: Council policy was invariably decided
there during the private pre-sessions before the regular 
public meeting, and those councilmen not in attendance were 
told later how to vote. Duckworth thrived on consensus, and 
minor differences between Council members at the public 
session took on major proportions in his mind. Although 
protective of the Organization's interests, Duckworth would 
not brook incompetence. He rose quickly to the top of the 
Organization and soon, along with Prieur, dominated its 
decisions as well. This combination of elected authority, 
political power, administrative expertise, and driving 
personal force was devastating to city employees who 
faltered or got out of line.
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Duckworth did not have to bargain for acquiescence 
from the People's group; he won it through strength. The 
Silkstocking crowd respected Duckworth's ability and 
integrity, or at least they feared crossing him without a 
guarantee of victory. Although more political than they had 
been, Duckworth's program did not differ perceptively from 
their own: city hall was still well run; there was little
evidence of corruption; business leaders were still 
consulted; the authority of the expert consultants and 
advisors was still in tact; and the framing of Harrell's 
blueprints was well underway. All in all, the business 
establishment had few complaints, although plenty of reason 
to feel uneasy: such power, concentrated in one man, if
misdirected, could prove disastrous for the city. The 
citizens, too seemed relatively content with Duckworth's 
administration, and councilmanic contests during this time 
produced very little in the way of a challenge to the 
Mayor's preeminence.
This was truly the "Era of Good Feeling," as one local 
historian labeled it:12 even the corporate and civic 
leaders who had wrested control of the city's growth from 
the courthouse ring politicians now breathed as well the 
chloroform of prosperity. Business as usual prevailed at 
city hall: "the reformers had grown tired, the regulars had
12Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 July 1961.
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taken over, and things would have to get pretty bad before 
the reformers would stir again.13
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Brown v.
Board of Education case struck like a thunderbolt through 
this false sense of local optimism that prevailed in May of 
1954. By the time the citizens of Norfolk looked up to 
discern the dangers ahead, they found the state's political 
leaders scurrying in panic for punitive strictures and 
hastily contrived extra-legal shelters as a means of 
diverting the raging force of racial discontent that had 
been building for centuries in the backwaters that 
surrounded the city. There was never any question that 
Norfolk would be left free, or that its leaders would even 
be willing for that matter, to pursue an independent course 
of reaction, separate from the rest of the state. The very 
fact that Duckworth was now so firmly entrenched at the 
throttle of municipal control would mean that the path of 
response would follow as well the same dictates of the Byrd 
Organization.
It is ironic that Norfolk would become the main 
battlefield upon which the fate of Virginia's Massive 
Resistance (to school integration) plan would be decided: 
it was one of the most liberal cities in the South, and vast
13Louis I. Jaffe, as quoted by Harold Sugg, "1945-1965: 
Youth Takes Command," chap. in Lenoir Chambers and Joseph E. 
Shank, Saltwater and Printer's Ink: Norfolk and Its
Newspapers (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina
Press, 1967), p. 368.
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segments of its population had little use for those racial 
codes and strictures, both written and unwritten, that were 
primarily Southern. The storm whipped waves of Massive 
Resistance would break as well over Arlington, Charlottes­
ville, Prince Edward County, and Warren County, but these 
would be small scale tests of its voracity when compared to 
a city of Norfolk's size. At the time, Norfolk had a 
population rapidly approaching 300,000 and was earning new 
status as Virginia's largest city. More than one-third of 
its population represented directly the liberalizing 
influence of service in its naval or N.A.T.O forces; the 
rest of its citizenry greatly benefitted in their day-to-day 
contact with these as well as other representatives of vast 
national and international interests. Norfolk, particularly 
under the able leadership of Harrell and the People's admin­
istration, had forsaken its obligatory glance to Richmond 
for guidance, and instead looked to the rest of the world 
for approval.
The many, varied opportunities of government service 
in Tidewater had made the city a mecca for southern Blacks 
hoping to improve their lot in life. The integration of the 
military forces that had taken place during the administra­
tion of President Truman meant that Blacks could rise to 
positions of leadership in an integrated society that 
existed just on the periphery of Norfolk's own. The lure of 
steady e m p l o y m e n t  in the area's many fine shipyards and
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re-work facilities had prompted a continual stream of 
job-hunters that began pouring into the city before the 
hostilities of World War II had even begun. Although most 
Norfolk Blacks were of relatively low economic status when 
compared to their white neighbors, a middle class was 
growing at a faster pace than elsewhere in the South. 
Although most of the major trade unions had not yet been 
cracked, the door of opportunity to non-discriminatory 
positions in government and war-related industries had just 
been opened, and opportunities in the private sector would 
soon be available as soon as Blacks had achieved success in 
these endeavors.
All in all, the history of race relations in Norfolk 
had been good, especially under the even-handed municipal 
management of C. A. Harrell and the Silkstocking crowd.
Only 27% of Norfolk's 300,000 citizens were Black, a Black 
population "large enough to provide leadership, but not so 
large as to be believed to threaten established 
patterns."14 But to Duckworth, the Black leadership had 
already proven itself a thorn in the side of municipal 
unanimity, and Duckworth was not one to overlook even the 
slightest irritant. Even though Black councilmanic 
challenger P. B. Young had posed no real threat in the 1952 
race, Duckworth was apparently miffed that the Black
14Jane Reif, Crisis in Norfolk, (Richmond: Virginia
Council on Human Relations, 1960), p. 1.
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community had opposed his own "harmony" slate. There were 
other, more serious signs of a growing challenge in the 
Black community, far more significant than the periodic 
offering of token opposition candidates. By 1954 Blacks 
found themselves in the position of increasingly vocal 
opposition to the Mayor's policies in the fields of housing, 
development, recreation, and municipal finance. The Supreme 
Court's decision in May of that year only opened up an area 
of dissension that was more readily visible to the general 
public.
Ever since the first Blacks began moving in to the 
white section of Brambleton in the mid-1940s, a succession 
of City Councils had been incapable of halting the demise of 
traditional barriers to integrated neighborhoods. The tub- 
thumping of the Organizations' wartime Council gave mute 
sanction to a wave of white violence and vandalism that 
temporarily halted the spread in the Brambleton area,15 
but the election of the People's Ticket in June of 1946 gave 
new impetus to that transition. The People's group tried to 
maintain an air of orderly calm and reasonableness; their 
approach was to talk out differences with committees 
comprised of members of both races. In the atmosphere of 
calm that prevailed under their reign, traditional barriers 
to color advancement in Brambleton fell quickly. Brambleton 
had always had led a somewhat tenuous existence as the sole
lsNorfolk Journal and Guide, 1 June 1946.
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white community in the zone of the city dominated by Blacks, 
and its white residents had relied heavily on the combina­
tion of natural, geographic, and traditional barriers to 
keep it that way. Once the color barrier around Corprew 
Avenue was successfully breached and violence had subsided, 
the area fell quickly to growing pressure to provide homes 
for the emerging Black middle-class. In 1949 Ruffner 
Elementary was opened for the diminishing white population 
of Brambleton and the Stonewall Jackson School was turned 
over to the Black school system.16 In 1950, the John 
Goode (Elementary) School, ironically named for Norfolk's 
Confederate congressman and president of the Virginia 
Constitutional Convention instrumental in stripping Blacks 
of the power to vote,17 was turned over to the Blacks. In 
1952 Ruffner was reopened as a junior high school in the 
Black school system, signaling the final defeat of the 
area's last white holdouts.18
Once the color line had been successfully breached and 
finally broken in the Brambleton section, it fell more 
easily in other parts of the city as well. Norfolk in the 
1950s, like many other older Southern cities, was unlike its 
Northern counterparts: it did not have a single, central,
16Norfolk Journal and Guide, 1 June 1946.
17Henry S. Rorer, History of Norfolk Public Schools 
(Norfolk: by author, 1968), p. 207.
iaNorfolk Journal and Guide, 19 April 1958.
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Black ghetto surrounded by a ring of white suburbs.19 
Instead, Norfolk was an amalgamation of a number of small 
communities, most of which had their own sections for Black 
housing. Successive annexations had brought these communi­
ties within the city boundaries, but the result was that 
Norfolk's Black population occupied a number of isolated 
districts that spread out from the central downtown housing 
area. Consequently, by 1950 Black communities existed next 
to whites in the Atlantic City, Lamberts Point, Granby 
(Bollingbrook), Sewells Point (Titustown), Berkley, 
Campostella, and Tanner's Creek (Oakmont) sections of the 
city.20 There was some pressure to expand the color lines 
in these areas, but the traditional proximity of Black and 
whites in the city had forestalled the white exodus that had 
taken place in Brambleton, Chesterfield, and in some areas 
of Berkley.21 Thus, there was little apparent danger of 
open racial conflict within the city boundaries in 1954 when 
the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision was handed 
down: the city's traditional residential patterns, its
history of good race relations, opportunities for 
advancement in the military and government service, already 
integrated military housing, and the increasing 
desegregation of the city's private charitable, health
19Taueber and Taueber, op cit., pp. 35-96.
2°U. S. Census of Population, (1950), op cit..
21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 May 1946.
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religious, welfare, and educational boards22 seemed 
adequate to surmount any submerged hostilities.
Increasingly, however, local attention began to focus 
on the working class neighborhoods of the Tanner's Creek 
District of Norfolk County, scheduled for annexation into 
the city on January 1, 1955. Portions of the district had 
been unpoliced cesspools of crime, gambling, prostitution 
and roadhouses that operated under quasi-official auspices 
just beyond the legal reach of city enforcement; other areas 
were characterized by vast tracts of substandard housing 
without adequate plumbing or facilities. The area had 
already prompted uncharacteristic bickering on the otherwise 
harmonious City Council over unexpectedly high cost of 
annexation versus the dire necessity of Norfolk's continued 
need for room for industrial and suburban expansion.23
By the summer of 1954, Norfolk County officials had 
all but washed their hands of the area, its annexation 
having been officially sanctioned. The Tanner's Creek 
District existed in a state of limbo: Norfolk County
officials refused to maintain costly municipal services in 
an area that would soon no longer be their problem, and the 
City of Norfolk had not yet acquired title or authority to 
deal with the area. Norfolk's eleventh-hour hesitations 
over the exorbitant asking price and the reluctance of a few
22Jane Reif, Crisis in Norfolk, p. 1.
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 March 1954.
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councilmen to close the deal only served to increase the 
area's sense of isolation from governmental authority. At 
any rate, Tanner's Creek residents began to grow accustomed 
to the idea of handling matters in their own manner without 
any official intervention.
By mid-summer, the area's sense of isolation and help­
lessness was further increased by the breakdown of tradi­
tional color barriers in the formerly all-white Coronado 
section. Coronado was a small (300 homes) community of 
white, middle-class wage earners; it lay between Tidewater 
Drive and Sewells Point Road with its northern boundary at 
Widgeon Road. Since a large number of its families were 
military, the area had a more rapid turnover of ownership 
than would be otherwise expected. Like many other areas in 
the city, Coronado was bounded on two sides by the well- 
defined Black neighborhoods of Oakwood, Oakwood Park, and 
Rosemont.24 Most of the homes in these traditional Black 
sections were far below the level of the all-white Coronado 
homes: 85% were found to be substandard in terms of plumb­
ing, utilities, and "tarpaper construction."25
Coronado was bounded as well by one of the few housing 
areas for middle-class Blacks, and only narrow Widegeon Road 
separated the white and Black developments. Chesapeake 
Manor Apartments (332 units), Chesapeake Manor Gardens (389
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 August 1954.
25Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
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homes), and Mamie Homes, Incorporated (150 homes), all built 
since 1950, made the northern boundary of Coronado a haven 
for Black middle-class families, many of them displaced by 
Redevelopment Project One. The Black community faced a 
severe shortage of available middle-class housing, and the 
long waiting lists at all of the properties north of 
Coronado had put a premium on housing there.26 In addi­
tion, a number of Black leaders complained that most Black 
neighborhoods "were generally denied city improvements"2-7 
such as curbs, gutters, parks, playgrounds, sewer and street 
repair. All in all, Coronado, with its plentiful supply of 
middle-class housing, city improvements, and high rate of 
turnover, was a natural target for Black expansion.
Trouble began when a Black couple was looking at a house in 
the Black section on the north side of Widgeon Road; a white 
Navy housewife spotted them, walked across the road, and 
asked them if they wanted to buy her house. Because of the 
huge demand and short supply of middle-class housing for 
Blacks, this first Navy family received a higher price for 
their home than they would have received from a white buyer. 
Other Navy families followed suit, and soon panic gripped 
Coronado's more established white residents. At about this 
time the market in Coronado for sale to white buyers all but 
disappeared; the white banking establishment, realizing the
26Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 22 August 1954.
2-7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 31 August 1954.
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inevitable, refused to finance white buyers in Coronado, and 
the Veteran's Administration appraisals were dropped as they 
"generally do go down in areas where Negroes are moving into 
what was once all-white territory".23 Once the pattern 
had begun, white home-owners found it impossible to reverse: 
they were trapped and limited by powers beyond their grasp.
The harassment of Black buyers began innocently 
enough: two elderly white ladies had allowed a bundle of
papers to blow out their car window; other passing motorists 
stopped to help them retrieve the papers. When others 
learned that the panorama of stopped automobiles lining both 
sides of the street had frightened off a prospective Black 
buyer, the idea of neighborhood caravans was begun "to show 
that it was a white neighborhood."29 The idea caught on 
immediately; although a number of homes were sold to Black 
buyers, few Blacks had actually moved into their houses. As 
the word spread to outlying areas, outsiders began to join 
in the caravans. Soon random acts of violence, especially 
against unoccupied dwellings already sold to Blacks, became 
commonplace. Bricks and bottles were hurled as missiles, a 
"No Nigers (sic) wanted" sign appeared,30 the pipes to one 
house were ripped out before a Black family could move
28Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 22 August 1954.
29Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 30 July 1954.
3°Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 16 August 1954.
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in,31 a bomb was thrown at another house, a dozen white 
youths rocked the car of a Black couple,32 another house 
and automobile were bombed,33 bullets were fired into 
Black homes,34 and soon armed caravans of whites and 
Blacks began roaming the area looking for trouble.35 The 
prospect that the present rate of property damage, if not 
halted, would escalate into human tragedy became more and 
more evident.
Blacks in and around the Coronado area were clearly 
terrified by the racial turmoil they confronted. The 
Norfolk County Police, still the legal authority in the 
Tanner's Creek District, were not much help in appeasing 
their fears. The County Police came promptly when called, 
but they engaged in only minimal defensive patrolling.
Often the Police stood among crowds of jeering whites and 
were indistinguishable from the taunters. County officials 
were understandably eager to play down the true extent of 
the threat that existed in Coronado, but one officer's 
characterization of the site of a bomb blast, "the hole 
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bone,"36 only aroused Blacks to the fear that little was 
being done to protect them. Black leaders turned first to 
the Norfolk City Council for help,37 and then to the 
governor when their pleas for assistance were denied. 
Duckworth refused to provide police protection for Black 
families because the city would not acquire jurisdiction 
until January 1, 1955; Governor Stanley was powerless under 
state law to commit the State Police or National Guard 
unless the local governing body first requested aid. The 
fact that former Council aspirant P. B. Young, Sr., carried 
the request to the governor over the protestations of the 
Norfolk City Council, further enraged Duckworth.33 After 
a month of escalating violence had passed since the request 
for city assistance, the Virginian-Pilot stepped in with 
some harsh words of criticism for the Mayor and the rest of 
his City Council:
The leadership in the Norfolk City govern­
ment has been short-sighted in deciding not to 
show any interest in Coronado; the residential 
area just outside the City line . . . .
It does not make good sense for a city to 
use its authority one mile beyond the city limit 
to make a numbers racket raid, such as was made 
Thursday by Norfolk police, but to withhold its 
influence and authority from a problem which has 
potentially much more tragic consequences than a 
numbers game.
3SNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 30 August 1954.
37Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1954.
38Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 September 1954.
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It would be better to provide too much law 
enforcement than what may tragically prove later 
to have been too little and too late. The hoodlum 
elements ought not to be left in any doubt as to 
what confronts them if they continue to make an 
unpleasant situation worse.39
In desperation, the Black leaders finally approached 
their old contacts in the Silkstocking crowd who, although 
no longer in control of any governmental authority, 
nevertheless still possessed enormous financial power and 
corporate authority. A reporter for the Journal and Guide 
summed up the resultant beefed-up county patrols this way:
The powers-that-be Downtown, after caucusing 
with the Uptown [Black] leaders, brought pressure 
to bear upon county officials, and the tragedy 
that could have been Coronado was averted.40
A serious breach between the city's Black community 
and its white political leaders was growing, and the fact 
that P. B. Young and others had effected, with Silkstocking 
backing, a successful flanking maneuver around the Council 
only made matters worse. Duckworth and the Organization 
were clearly opposed to any further expansion of the Black 
population within the city, and they set about to severely 
chastise anyone who strayed beyond the acceptable 
boundaries. The city government had done all that it could 
legally do to block a group of Black developers from
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 September 1954.
4°Norfolk Journal and Guide, 7 January 1956.
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acquiring a large tract of land off Broad Creek Road; the 
white leaders were strongly opposed to any development that 
allowed Blacks to settle along the City's major approach 
route from Virginia Beach (now Virginia Beach Boulevard). 
Once they saw that the deal could not be prevented, the City 
Planning Commission stepped in to prevent residential use by 
Blacks, and zoned as much of the tract as possible for 
industrial and commercial purposes.41 When Black leaders 
persisted in attempting to develop the remaining acreage 
into an attractive subdivision (Broad Creek Shores), the 
city employed its powers of eminent domain to buy up some of 
the land as a further obstacle. The City Council passed an 
ordinance authorizing the Department of Parks and Recreation 
to acquire a 40-acre tract "by purchase or condemnation, if 
necessary," for use as a public park and school site.42 
The Black population of the city was enraged and could see 
"no other apparent valid reason for seizing the land, other 
than to prevent colored home owners from locating on 
it."43 The action prompted a 40-hour whirlwind drive in 
the Black community to collect enough signatures on a 
petition for a referendum, and thereby block the ordinance 
from taking effect.
41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 31 August 1954.
42Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
43Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
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Newly appointed Councilman Roy B. Martin, Jr., rose 
with the Organization's response, a proposal to "study" the 
question, with an eye towards amending the section of the 
city charter that dealt with such referendums. The Black 
community had organized the petition drive (25% of the total 
vote cast in the most recent councilmanic election was 
needed; since the last race had been one of the "no-contest" 
elections for which Duckworth became famous, only 5,456 
votes had been cast. Black leaders collected 2,488 sig­
natures in less than two days) in order to affect some sort 
of compromise with the city,44 but the Council and the 
Black community remained at loggerheads for more than a 
month. At last, with the day of the referendum fast 
approaching, the Organization agreed to a compromise; it was 
wisely unwilling to test its strength at the ballot box in 
what was seen by many white leaders as an illegal and 
arbitrary use of power. The city agreed to take only 24 of 
the original 40 acres in the site, and leave the other 16 
acres, already platted and under contract, for development 
as Broad Creek Shores. The city's chief concern, that the 
Black housing development be widely separated from all-white 
Ingleside Elementary School, was met,45 and the Blacks 
were able to keep a large tract of waterfront property,
44Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 July 1955.
4SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1955; Roy B. 
Martin, Jr., former Mayor of Norfolk, interview by author, 
tape recording, Norfolk, 18 February 1991.
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clearly separated by the city's acquisition and natural 
geographic barriers from nearby all-white communities, for 
expansion. Councilmen Page, Abbott, and Riley, hardliners 
to the biter end, dissented in the decision because it 
included paying a premium price to the Black developers for 
the city's share of the original tract. The final balloting 
on the matter produced one of the few split-votes ever 
recorded on the Duckworth Council,46 and ensured the 
Mayor's bitter enmity for cracking the facade of his 
previously united front. The Black community left the 
Council chambers congratulating themselves for their 
victory, unaware that Mayor Duckworth, a sore loser at the 
game of power politics, was already plotting their demise.
At the height of the Broad Creek Shores controversy, 
the city had appointed a three-man committee to study "the 
need and desirability of obtaining additional sites for use 
in constructing private homes for our colored citizens."47 
At the time of its appointment, the Land Committee, or 
Kaufman Committee as it was called in the Black community, 
had been a part of Mayor Duckworth's efforts to compromise 
the impasse short of granting land in the Broad Creek area 
to Black developers. Recognizing the city's "desperate 
need" for additional, suitable sites for Black development 
outside of Broad Creek, the Mayor turned to the Silkstocking
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
^Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
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crowd to solve the dispute peaceably. The three most 
powerful representatives of the old People's group still 
left in the city's government— N.R.H.A. Chairman Charles 
Kaufman, Planning Commissioner Henry Clay Hofhemier, II, and 
John S. Jenkins— were appointed to the committee. Privately 
the committee was charged with the responsibility of finding 
additional room for Black expansion in areas that would not 
threaten white housing developments or segregated schools; 
no one wanted a repeat of the racial strife that charac­
terized the Coronado settlement.
Initially the committee received a hostile reception 
from the Black community because of its association with the 
Mayor's position on Broad Creek shores, but gradually the 
panel's outstanding reputation for fairness and the high 
esteem in which its members were generally held, won over 
the support and cooperation of the Black community. The 
Journal and Guide apologized for its initial inhospitality, 
terming it "a natural reaction to an unnatural determination 
on the part of City Council."48 After considerable study 
and numerous meetings with Black leaders, the committee 
failed to find appropriate sites for new developments; 
indeed Norfolk's desperate need for more space for all types 
of expansion was the driving motivation behind its costly 
annexation initiatives.
48Ibid.
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Instead the Land Committee adopted a proposal to 
undertake an extensive reclamation project in a section of 
the new Tanner's Creek District that included Oakwood, 
Lincoln Park, and Rosemont— a 370-acre site that included 
more than 1,000 dwellings, all of them already occupied by 
Black families. Oakwood began its existence as a shanty 
town on the outskirts of existing (white) settlements before 
the turn of the century. For as little as $50 a Black 
family could purchase a small tract of land and then 
scrounge scrap lumber, tarpaper, and materials to build a 
shack. Eighty-five percent (85%) of the homes were sub­
standard; few had adequate sanitary facilities; and even 
fewer could be rehabilitated to comply with existing city 
codes.49 Even the Journal and Guide recognized that the 
area contained "some of the worst imaginable slums," and 
applauded the committee's decision.50 The committee 
proposed a massive redevelopment and reclamation project 
that would rebuild the community to accommodate 2,500 
families— 1,500 more than at present— in individual homes, 
semi-detached housing, and garden apartments. The project 
would include an elementary school, playground, and small 
shopping center.51
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956. 
5°Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
S3-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
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The proposal was well received by members of both the 
Black and white communities; "inasmuch as the site proposed 
for reclamation has been occupied by colored people for the 
past sixty-five years, the segregation factor does not enter 
the package."52 In point of fact, no other alternative 
existed for the area. Most of the homes would have to be 
condemned and torn down anyway under existing health, fire, 
safety, and building codes, and the city would be unwilling 
under current spending formulas to extend sewer and water 
lines to the area or pave streets, provide sidewalks, 
streetlights, or gutters. The Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority sought to allay the fears of Oakwood residents by 
promising to give a "liberal" appraisal for existing homes, 
relocate those homes sound enough to save, provide financing 
for new homes, give residents priority in site selection, 
and even trade comparable land for redeveloped sites.53
Kaufman and the N.R.H.A. were surprised then to hear 
the voracity of the Oakwood community's opposition to 
renewal. Most residents knew they were too poor to afford 
the new development even if their current substandard 
dwellings were generously appraised; they lived in Oakwood 
because there they could survive on little or no regular 
income. "We old people can't buy new homes," said one 
resident, "If you take our homes, we'll just be out in the
52Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
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street."54 Horae owners were understandably unwilling to 
take their turn in the waiting lines for a unit in Norfolk's 
already overcrowded public housing. They had heard horror 
stories from other Blacks who had been resettled during 
N.R.H.A. Project One; thus, they were content instead to 
stay where they were, as they were. The strong anti-rede­
velopment sentiment forced a critical re-examination of the 
Oakwood project on the part of the city's Black leadership. 
Attorneys J. Hugo Madison and Joe Jordan objected that the 
project tended to perpetuate residential segregation.55 
Others began to question the advisability of crowding an 
additional 1,500 families in an area that already held more 
than 1,000. Most stated they would oppose it until the 
current residents were given sufficient guarantees, written 
or otherwise, to sway a majority of local support. Thomas 
Young, president of the Journal and Guide, and Rev. W. L. 
Hamilton, pastor of Shiloh Baptist Church, Dr. Lyman Brooks, 
president of Norfolk State College (now University) and 
other Black leaders who maintained a strong attachment to 
the Silkstocking crowd, still favored the project, but the 
growing split in the Black community over the city's use of 
its redevelopment and housing powers was quickly pushing 
younger, more activist leaders to the forefront.55
54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
55Norfolk Journal and Guide, 31 March 1956.
5SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 April 1956.
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The Oakwood Redevelopment controversy was an important 
episode in the history of the period for a number of 
reasons. First, it marked the emergence of an important 
coalition between Mayor Duckworth and the remnants of the 
People's group still in power. Both groups were committed 
to continuing the city's informal practice of segregated 
housing and eager not to repeat the horrors of the Coronado 
situation. Mayor Duckworth may have been rebuffed at his 
premature attempt to forestall a Broad Creek Shores settle­
ment, but with the Silkstocking crowd and the Norfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority firmly in his camp, 
further efforts would be both more calculated and more 
successful. Oakwood represented the willingness of the old 
People's representatives to harness the powers of redevelop­
ment to insure segregated housing developments. It also 
indicates the area of the city that was the most natural 
target for new redevelopment activity: few of the homes in
Oakwood could ever hope to pass the city's minimum housing 
codes, and blight and dilapidation were evident throughout 
the neighborhood.
Finally, Oakwood points to a growing split in the 
Black community between the older, business oriented leaders 
like P. B. Young, Rev. Hamilton, and W. T. Mason and the 
younger, more aggressive activists like Joe Jordan, Victor
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Ashe, and J. Hugo Madison.57 The next round would be 
fought in the courts, and the younger leaders had neither 
the commitment to compromise nor the skill at bargaining 
possessed by their elders. Oakwood proved that these 
younger, more aggressive leaders were gaining a ready 
audience of listeners willing to hear the message that the 
forces of state and local authority were being piled up 
against them and that a new tack was both desirable and 
necessary. The more established Black leaders such as 
Young, Hamilton, and Mason still commanded enormous respect 
in both the Black and white communities, but all their 
powers of amelioration would be needed to avert future 
strife between their charges and the Organization.
57For a more complete explanation of this poinc, see 
Henry Lewis Suggs, P. B. Young, Newspaperman 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1988), 
p. 183.
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CHAPTER THREE 
FIRST REACTIONS TO BROWN
The intensity of the school integration controversy 
may best be seen within this context of an ongoing power 
struggle between segments of the Black and white communi­
ties; in both instances, Norfolk's pattern of residential 
segregation, because it brought Black and white neighbor­
hoods within close proximity to one another, was the cause 
of friction between the races. Even so, the initial 
reaction in Norfolk to the Supreme Court decision was a 
decided calmness. School Superintendent Brewbaker spoke for 
the educational community when he urged:
. . .  an intellectual rather than an emotional 
approach. We must accept these decisions and 
give them considered judgment and not let our 
emotions get in the way . . . .  We will do 
everything we can from an intelligent point of 
view.
Brewbaker went on to forecast "very little mixture" of 
races due to the residential "lines" within the city. 
Councilmen Ezra T. Summers and Roy Martin echoed the 
political sentiment:
Norfolk will probably be less effected than 
any city in the state because of the geographical 
set up here [that includes] well-defined 
residential districts.
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The Virginian-Pilot also pointed to the bulwark of de facto 
segregation that stood against integration encroachments:
In Norfolk and other Virginia cities where 
Negro and white schools are built largely in 
conformity with the white and Negro patterns of 
residence, where the Negro population is 
distinctly in the minority, and where the two 
races respect each other, adjustment to the new 
order will be gradual and not likely to produce 
deep change for a considerable time . . .
The majority of Southerners, and the best 
of [the] Southern leadership will strive to 
work out their civilization in accord with the 
constitutional requirements."x
Newly elected Governor Thomas B. Stanley, fresh from 
his narrow victory over Republican challenger Theodore 
Roosevelt (Ted) Dalton, reacted calmly as well. He contem­
plated "no precipitate action" and stated that the "views of 
leaders of both races will be invited" in approaching the 
problems created by the court. But Stanley's calm reaction 
was met with a hail of abuse from Southside Virginia, from 
whence had come his winning margin over Dalton, and soon he 
assumed a more militant posture, "I shall use every legal 
means at my command to continue segregated schools in 
Virginia." Former Governor Tuck accurately expressed the 
Southside's sentiment:
There is no middle ground, no compromise 
. . . If the other [areas of Virginia] won't 
stand with us, I say make 'em . . . I f  you ever 
let them integrate anywhere, the whole state 
will be integrated in a short time.
xNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 May 1954.
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A new political group, the Defenders of State Sover­
eignty and Individual Liberties , was then being formed in 
the Southside to feed the venom of the state politicians and 
give credence to their pledge to resist integration at all 
cost. The Defenders did not represent the night-rider or 
confederate-flag-waving brand of resistance, but as a 
state-wide organization they gave backbone to all those 
politicians, both state and local, who similarly pledged 
unyielding opposition to integration in any form.’'
In spite of the hysteria that characterized the South­
side in general and the leadership of the byrd Organization 
in specific, the reaction on the part, of Norfolk citizens 
remained one of tranquility. A sampling of let.tors to the 
editor of the Virginian-Pilot: revealed that by a two-to-one 
ratio the writers expressed "a cairn, rational attitude 
towards desegregation and/or a strong disapproval of the 
public stand of Virginia officials." A local group for 
interracial cooperation concluded from this analysis that:
There exists in this area [Norfolk] of the 
South a body of moderate, informed, thoughtful, 
educated, and earnest public opinion which would 
accept desegregation easily. Extremist opinion 
is always noisy, and people who are against 
anything shout louder than those who arc simply 
acquiescent.a
2Virginius Dabney, Virginia: The Now Dominion. (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. !>2H-b3i.
3The Women's Council For Interracial Cooperation, 
"Letters to the Press: A Sampling of Public Opinion on
Desegregation," W.C.I .C. News Sheet, March, 19 lib.
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One predictable response from Norfolk officials was 
the immediate halt and quiet reassessment of the city's 
dramatic school building program. The postwar baby boom had 
brought the state-wide need for classroom space to crisis 
proportions, and Governor John Battle had arranged to set 
aside $75,000,000 in state funds for school construction 
during his four year (1951-1955) term. The localities had 
previously been held responsible for all such construction 
— a fact that put Virginia's school system at the bottom of 
any listing of quality or funding effort: in 1950 Virginia
had the lowest percentage of high school attendance in the 
nation, next to the highest percentage of high school drop­
outs before graduation, and next to the smallest percentage 
of school age children in school— and the state had never 
before done much to help its localities meet their pressing 
needs.4 Norfolk, in the waning days of the People's 
administration and City Manager C. A. Harrell's tenure in 
office, jumped at this chance to receive its share of state 
funding and embarked upon an aggressive $13,000,000 school 
construction program that included new buildings and 
improvements to both the Black and white school systems 
alike.5 This program included the first new school build­
ings for Blacks in the city, the others having been hand-me- 
downs from the white community as population shifts and
4Dabney, op cit., pp. 522, 524.
sNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 28 January 1955.
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needs dictated.® Four new schools, (Bowling Park, Young 
Park, Diggs Park, and Lindenwood) three of them built in 
part with federal funds as a consequence of the city's 
redevelopment efforts, had been added to the Black system 
prior to the Brown decision,7 and other funds were spent on 
additions or improvements to existing schools®.
The Norfolk School Board went to great lengths to 
spell out its position as clearly as possible:
1. We intend, without mental reservation, to 
uphold and abide by the laws of the land.
2. We believe in the Public School system, and 
pledge our efforts to its continuation in this 
City.
3. We believe that our primary duty is to 
preserve and promote the welfare of all the 
children involved, through education, and that 
any system by us administered must be devised to 
achieve this end, within the framework of the 
law.
4. Unstudied action, or mere lip service to a 
principle could jeopardize the aims of all, and 
might well lead to disintegration, rather than 
integration of any form.
5. We do not believe that local conditions 
permit the customs, habits, or prejudices of 
over a century to be abolished overnight by 
fiat, but rather can be met or reconciled only 
by prayerful deliberation, by reasoned planning, 
and by the will and desire to succeed.
®Norfoik Journal and Guide, 19 April 1958.
7W.P. Sullivan (Director of Buildings and Grounds), 
"Cost Data, Outline Specifications and Facilities in the New 
Schools Constructed in Norfolk, Virginia, Since 1951," a 
report to the Norfolk School Board, 15 February 1956,
Norfolk Public Schools files.
aNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 28 January 1955.
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6. We do not think it is legally within our 
powers to immediately effect these changes, but 
rather we contemplate that the State Department 
of Education, under whose rules and regulations 
we now operate by law, must first make these 
changes possible, as and when prescribed by the 
Legislature of Virginia. We assume and rely on 
the fact that this will be done within the time 
and in the manner required.9
In spite of their careful appeal to the political 
realities of the day— "it is [not] legally within our powers 
to immediately effect these changes"— and obeisance to the 
State Department of Education and the state Legislature, 
both controlled by the Byrd Organization, the fact that 
their statement also carried the code words of compliance—  
"abide by the laws of the land,"— and indicated their inten­
tion to preserve public education "within the framework of 
the law," gave further reason for the state's political 
leaders to question whether Norfolk's School Board intended 
to abide by whatever plan of opposition they eventually 
dictated. Norfolk's hope that "reasoned planning" would 
eventually get them out of the dilemma offered no solace to 
the rest of the state, but at least indicated a course of 
action for local political leaders.
Behind the scenes the School Board worked to insure 
that, through "reasoned planning,"10 it could back up its 
assertion that integration could be minimized with careful 
attention to the geographic location of its schools.
9Formal School Board Minutes, 1 July 1955, Norfolk 
Public Schools files.
10Ibid.
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Although new school construction had been halted following 
the Brown decision,11 rapid expansion of the whole Tide­
water area, the advent of the postwar "baby boom" genera­
tion, and the pending annexations meant that new schools 
were needed almost immediately. The first order of the 
Board was to get its building plan back on track as quickly 
as possible.
At the time of the Brown decision, the school system 
had several projects under consideration which were 
jeopardized by the changing political landscape. In 
addition to Oceanair Elementary, which was already in the 
planning stages, three other sites were under active con­
sideration for new schools: a tract South of Indian River
Road at the Virginian Railroad tracks was proposed for 
"Southside Junior High School" for Blacks; a large parcel of 
land on Maltby, Shoop, and Withers Avenues in the Ballentine 
area was supported as a replacement for the aging Lafayette 
School; and a site just west of the existing facility was 
proposed for rebuilding the equally dilapidated Titustown 
Elementary school for Blacks (see Figure 1, page 148).12 
All three projects faced new scrutiny, apparently as a 
result of the Brown v. Board decision, and the Board's 
intention to continue building facilities for Blacks seemed 
to dissolve: "Southside" (i.e., Campostella) Junior High
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
12Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of Schools, 
to H. H. George, Norfolk City Manager, 11 November 1954, 
Norfolk Public Schools files.




Figure 1. School Sices Under Consideration in 1954
A Titustown Elementary Annex 4 Cottage Toll Road Sice
B Southside (Campostella) Junior 5 Military Highway Site
1 Maltby Avenue Sice 6 Norview Junior High
2 Ingleside Junior High Site 7 Lansdale Junior High Site
3 Atterbury Road Site 8 Lakewood Junior High Site
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was not built until almost a decade later; the Maltby Avenue 
tract was sold to a private developer; and, although an 
addition was built on a portion of the third site, Titustown 
Elementary was never rebuilt as originally intended.
In addition to these projects, Superintendent 
Brewbaker indicated that the City Planning Commission had 
assisted in selecting five other sites in the Tanners Creek 
district scheduled for annexation, where there was an 
"urgent need" for two new junior high schools and three 
700-pupil elementary schools. The School Board proposed 
building one of the junior high schools on additional land 
around Ingleside Elementary, and a 33-acre tract in the 
Sherwood Forest area (bounded by Atterbury, Birch, and East 
Sewells Point Road) was being considered for both an 
elementary and a junior high school; the other tracts under 
consideration included a 20-acre site on Cottage Toll Road 
(later Tidewater Drive) and Norman Avenue extended, a 
12-acre tract one half block west of Military Highway, and 
an eight acre site north of Norview High School.13 In 
spite of the urgent need for new facilities, only one of 
these sites was found acceptable. Ingleside Junior High 
School was never built, the site was too close to Broad 
Creek Shores and other Black housing developments (see 
Figure One, previous page). Although the Board did decide 
to build Sherwood Forest Elementary on a portion of the 
tract on Atterbury and Sewells Point Road, the land was also
13Ibid.
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apparently too close to Black housing to win approval for a 
junior high in the era of school desegregation; the Cottage 
Toll Road tract, site of a city nursery, was found to be 
unsuitable for development (three decades later it became 
Northside Park); the Military Highway tract was rejected 
when it was found to be in the path proposed for Interstate 
64; and the smallest site of all, the eight-acre tract north 
of Norview High School was used to satisfy the critical need 
of the district for a junior high school (Norview).
Because of the urgent need for new school buildings, 
there followed a furious period of planning by the School 
Board. School Board files indicate that a number of plans 
were considered by the school administration over the next 
few months, but the School Board only advanced those that 
could clear all of the possible political objections. Gone 
was any focus on rebuilding aging Black facilities; gone 
also were any sites that might prove to be too close to 
nearby Black communities, and thereby pose a threat to 
continued school segregation. When construction plans for 
1955 were finally announced, School Superintendent J. J. 
Brewbaker assured the city manager that:
. . . desegregation will have no effect on this 
building program. With the exception of the 
addition to Oakwood [Elementary School], all 
other construction is for and needed for white 
children.14
X4Letter from School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker to 
Norfolk City Manager Sherwood Reeder, 8 August 1955, Norfolk 
Public Schools files.
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Even so, finding a suitable site for a badly needed 
junior high schools in the Tanner's Creek District proved to 
be a difficult task. In addition to the Ingleside and 
Sherwood Forest tracts, plans to locate the school at 
Lansdale and Lakewood were also submitted to the Council for 
approval.15 The Board even went so far as to have archi­
tects draft plans for a Lakewood16 and a Lansdale Junior 
High. In end, however, after much behind-the-scenes 
maneuvering, the Council scratched the Lansdale and Lakewood 
sites from an extended list of proposed projects, and con­
verted Willard Elementary into a junior high instead.17
Even though a consultant had indicated that Norfolk's 
school population would increase by more than 4,000 students 
per year for the next few years18— the equivalent of five 
new schools a year— Norfolk elected to move slowly and 
deliberately, even if this meant badly overcrowding some 
existing facilities and adding a double shift at others.19 
Instead of launching an aggressive new building program as 
originally envisioned, the Board opted to adopt a safer
15"Summary of Long Range Building Program: School 
Construction Needs, 14 September 1956, Norfolk Public 
Schools files.
16Pentecost & Courtney (Architects), "Lakewood Junior 
High School," undated (1957), Norfolk Public School Files.
17"School Construction and Site Acquisition Program," 
25 March 1958, Norfolk Public Schools Files.
18Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 September 1955.
19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 February 1956.
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course, and instead add new wings to its most overcrowded, 
but existing, facilities.20
One of the schools marked for immediate construction 
was a combination elementary-junior high for Black pupils in 
the Oakwood-Rosemont section, where a large number of the 
N.A.A.C.P. plaintiffs lived. In a letter to City Manager 
Thomas Maxwell, School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker hinted 
at the need for the combination school:
Negro junior high pupils attend Jacox, which 
is approximately seven miles from the section in 
which they live. The nearest junior high is 
Norview.21
Virginian-Pilot reporter Luther J. Carter went even further 
when he surveyed the proposed building program with an eye 
cocked towards the desegregation suit:
One obvious effect of a combination school 
would be to accommodate some Negro junior high 
pupils who might otherwise want to attend 
Norview Junior High School, a white school and 
by far the closest junior high to the Oakwood- 
Rosemont area.22
The School Board also pressed its case to build 
"Southside" (i.e., Campostella) Junior High School in the 
Berkley section of the city to accommodate the growing Black
2°Henry S. Rorer, History of Norfolk Public Schools, 
op cit., p. 346.
21Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Norfolk School 
Superintendent to Thomas F. Maxwell, Norfolk City Manager,
13 February 1957, Norfolk Public Schools files.
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
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population in that portion of the city.23 Again reporter 
Luther Carter noted the changing racial composition of the 
city as a motive for the proposed facility: "School
officials have noted a pronounced tendency for whites to 
leave Berkley, and for Negroes to move in."24
In fact Norfolk had made tremendous advances under the 
Battle funds and C. A. Harrell's $13 million building pro­
gram. By 1953 the Norfolk School Board could say for the 
first time that the cost of educating a white pupil and a 
Black in the city's schools was equal,25 before Harrell's 
reign the city's effort was determined by a complicated 
formula that was weighted heavily upon the percentage of 
total revenues received from Black and white taxpayers. By 
1950, however, the city was actually paying, on the average, 
more to its Black teachers than to its white,26 having 
raised salary of Blacks some 62% since the Organization's 
wartime Council dominated school spending.2-7 In fact 
Norfolk was cited by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North 
Carolina, for its efforts to improve its Black educational 
system. In an article he wrote for Look magazine defending
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 January 1957.
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
25Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 21 August 1953.
26This is due to the fact that 89% of the Black teachers 
held a bachelors degree, while only 75.7% of the white 
teachers held similar certification; Black teachers also 
tended to stay longer, and thus were paid higher on the scale 
because of this longevity.
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 December 1951.
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continued school segregation in the South, a picture of 
Norfolk's newly constructed Young Park School (built in part 
with federal redevelopment funds) bore the caption:
New Negro schools, like this one in Norfolk, 
Va., attest [to] efforts of [the] South to meet 
[integration] problems in its own way.2®
At any rate, the impact of the Supreme Court's de­
segregation decision and the over-reaction of statewide 
political leaders forced a temporary halting and reassess­
ment of school construction plans,29 in spite of the fact 
that the Norfolk school population was growing by 3,000 
students each year.30
The Ledger-Dispatch summed up the attitude of the 
leaders in charge of the local school construction effort:
In recent years Southern states have been 
making great financial outlays to put Negro 
schools on a par with those for white students 
. . . however, once the court's rejection of 
separate but equal theory became known, there 
was no longer any great pressure on local 
officials . . .  to continue the special and 
costly attention to [the] Negro school building 
programs.31
In spite of the official "go slow" attitude of the 
Norfolk City Council, the School Board began to take its
2SSam J. Ervin, Jr., "The Case for Segregation," Look, 
April 3, 1956 (vol. XX, 7), pp. 32 and 33.
29Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1955.
31Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1954.
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first few cautious steps toward compliance with the spirit 
of the Supreme Court decision and toward strengthening a 
base of public support for moderation in dealing with the 
crisis. First, the School Board advanced a proposal to 
create a bi-racial study group to recommend possible courses 
of action. The move was immediately endorsed by the Educa­
tion Association and the Council of P-T.A.'s,32 but 
opposed by the local branch of the N.A.A.C.P. One Black 
leader broke the deadlock with his endorsement of the con­
cept, "There is no harm in studying and bringing integration 
about in an orderly manner." Next the School Board voted 
down the state's proposed 30-days notice clause of teacher 
contract terminations, a step recommended as a preliminary 
to prepare for the eventual school closings in the event of 
court-ordered integration.33 Gradually the School Board's 
commitment to keeping schools open and complying with the 
spirit of the Supreme Court decision began to win it both 
accolades from the international press and a few denuncia­
tions from Southern writers. Typical of the positive 
reaction was this statement from the Roanoke World News;
[The Norfolk School Board has supplied] 
the first official word of calm in Virginia's 
heated integration debate. In so doing it 
has broken the solid front of opposition to 
the Supreme Court's decision and decree.34
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 June 1955.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 June 1955.
34Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 11 July 1955.
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Norfolk School Board Chairman W. Farley Powers appeared 
somewhat embarrassed by the sudden notoriety and stated:
I do not want to get into any controversy 
[with the rest of the state]. We might make 
some preliminary moves [to keep-schools open], 
but we must abide by state law.35
School Superintendent Brewbaker was equally aware that 
Norfolk's progressive attitude marked it in some sections of 
the state as a "hotbed" of liberalism because:
We have been conscious that a change [from 
segregation] is inevitable. We have not been 
trying to think up ways to circumvent the 
ruling.36
Indeed the rest of the state appeared to occupy their 
time by thinking up legal angles to circumvent the even­
tuality of the Supreme Court's ruling. Richmond News Leader 
editor James J. Kilpatrick happened upon the century-old 
doctrine of "interposition", whereby the state was supposed­
ly able to "interpose" its own authority between that of the 
federal government and its local political subdivisions, and 
the interposition craze was begun. The state's official 
reaction was the Gray Plan— named for State Senator Garland 
Gray of Sussex County who chaired the parent legislative 
committee— that provided numerous ways for the state to 
"interpose" its authority and so block integration. The 
plan called for a state pupil placement board that would
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 June 1955.
3sNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 11 July 1955.
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take over the pupil assignment duties of the local school 
boards; the scheme, ostensibly not based upon racial 
considerations, allowed the state to assign students to a 
given school on the basis of individual health, aptitude, 
availability of transportation, and "the welfare of the 
particular child as well as the welfare and best interests 
of all other pupils attending a particular school." The 
Gray Plan also called for special tuition grants of public 
funds to the parents of school children who attended private 
schools, parochial establishments, or public schools in 
another jurisdiction, as well as an amendment to the 
compulsory attendance laws whereby no child would be forced 
to attend a desegregated school. Few politicians and only 
the Virginian-Pilot of all the state's newspapers opposed 
the Gray Plan. Provisions within the plan that would have 
allowed local subdivisions to desegregate on a local option 
basis if the federal courts persisted were scrapped by the 
Legislature when Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., the scion of 
the Organization, pointed out the need for all local 
governments to stand together in "massive resistance" to the 
dictates of the Supreme Court. In response, the Legislature 
passed the Stanley Plan, which required the Governor to 
close any school under court order to integrate and cut off 
all state funds from any school district which tried to 
reopen in spite of the Governor's interposition.37
3’7Dabney, pp. 532-539.
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While the rest of the state was reeling under the 
bombast prompted by the Gray Plan, the Stanley Plan,
Senator Byrd's Massive Resistance, and Kilpatrick's Doctrine 
of Interposition, the citizens of Norfolk had another plan 
with which to contend: the Summers Plan. Under Duckworth's
rule, Councilman Ezra T. Summers was the closest thing 
Norfolk had to a maverick politician or independent voice on 
the Council.3® In July of 1955, Summers introduced a sur­
prise proposal whereby the city could achieve court-ordered 
integration if it ever came under a court order: the first
step would be to have every parent in the school system, 
both Black and white, fill out an intention card listing the 
names and ages of their school-age children and whether or 
not they wanted them to attend an integrated or segregated 
school. The School Board would then compile this informa­
tion and determine how many schools it would have to operate 
on an all-white, all-Black, or integrated basis, and then 
assign each pupil to the school of his parent's choosing. 
Obviously the unwritten key to the Summers Plan was the hope 
that under such a framework, few parents, especially white 
ones, would choose to send their children to integrated 
schools; those that did would be duly punished by isolating 
all the "trouble-makers" in just a few schools that drew not 
from any discernible neighborhood, but rather from a city- 
wide constituency. Of course unofficial pressures and 
economic sanctions could be applied to any white parent who
3SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 March 1956.
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unwisely chose to send his children to an integrated school; 
if no white parents chose integrated schools, then no 
schools would be integrated. Local politicians, including 
Duckworth's city manager, who should have known better, 
jumped on Summers' bandwagon by extolling the plan as "in 
keeping with the Supreme Court's decision" because it did 
assign every child to the school of his or her choice.39
Obviously the Summers Plan added little positive 
thought to the discussion of the day, but it does indicate 
the political mood of obfuscation and deceit that ruled. 
There were people in Norfolk who understood the Supreme 
Court decision and its ramifications, but by and large they 
refused to believe that Norfolk schools would have to be 
integrated or that public schools would have to be closed. 
They placed too much faith in the hands of local and state 
politicians who could promise them a plan, any plan, no 
matter how ill-conceived and contrived, to circumvent the 
Supreme Court's ruling.40 The true leaders of public 
opinion in Norfolk— the business and civic elite— had been 
so quashed by their recent political defeat and expurgation 
at the hands of the Organization that they sat idly by while 
the forces of irrationality gripped their city. The clear, 
small voice of reason provided by the School Board was all 
too often left howling in the wilderness as the public 
rushed to seize each new political panacea.
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 July 1955.
40Jane Reif, Crisis in Norfolk, op cit., p. 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 0
Undaunted by the political bombast of the period, the 
Norfolk School Board went quietly about its business, hoping 
to keep a low profile and so avoid confrontation with the 
Organization leaders that dominated the rest of the city 
government. Taking a page from the old People's book on how 
to deal with impending problems, the Board went ahead with 
its plans to appoint a bi-racial committee to recommend 
action; then it commissioned an exhaustive study— the Stiles 
Report as it came to be known— of the Board, its policy, 
practices, and the future needs of the Norfolk school 
population. When local politicians pointed frantically to 
the need to stand toe to toe in Massive Resistance with the
rest of the state— as one local legislator did with this
rhetorical outburst concerning the Southside counties with 
their heavy concentrations of Black population:
Their house is on fire. They want us to
send firetrucks to help them. I think it is our
Christian duty to help put out the fire for them 
[by opposing desegregation].41
— the School Board resisted their impassioned pleas with 
great aplomb. School Board member Paul Schweitzer pointed 
to how greatly Norfolk's situation differed from that of the 
Southside:
There are only thirty per cent Negroes in 
the Norfolk School system . . . geographically 
located so that they are well taken care of in 
their present schools. If we adopt a gradual
41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1955.
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plan of integration, there would be so little 
you wouldn't notice it.
School Superintendent Brewbaker echoed this theme:
There would be few Negroes in white schools 
because of existing "residential segregation 
. . . I think we are all in favor of segregation 
. . . It is just a question of what is the best 
plan . . . .I'm not in favor of integration,
I'm in favor of carrying out the Supreme Court 
decree with the least harm to pupils . . . and 
to the schools.42
Other school officials pointed to the Navy, N.A.T.O., and 
government service as liberalizing influences that had 
exposed many Norfolk students to a variety of cultures 
without undue harm. One principal stated that about one- 
third of his students had already attended integrated 
schools elsewhere without problems.43 In fact, when 
Norfolk Catholic High School was integrated by the Catholic 
diocese following the Brown decision, the event passed 
without comment from the press or protest from the 
public.44
The School Board's air of official calm had bought a 
year of grace from legal pressures to integrate; the Board 
had hoped to use that year to prepare the public for calm 
compliance with the desegregation dictates, but time and 
events had conspired against it to block this intention.
42Ibid.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1956.
44Jane Reif, op cit., p. 2.
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Unlike its counterparts in other parts of the country, the 
Black community in Norfolk had not rushed into court to 
force immediate integration of the schools; instead they had 
followed the more temporizing course of petitioning the 
School Board to desegregate.45 The threat of court action 
of course lay behind that petition, but it was an important 
first step towards finding a peaceful solution to the 
desegregation controversy. Unfortunately the School Board 
could not respond in kind: too much had transpired in the 
year since that initial petition had been filed. Instead, 
the new state laws and overt political hostilities conspired 
to block any authority the Board might have had to volun­
tarily comply. The Coronado and Broad Creek controversies 
had bred a climate of racial mistrust and resentment— a 
feeling that cut off all previous channels of communication 
that existed between the races. Unfortunately, and without 
choosing such a course, the Board was now locked into a 
larger political confrontation in which neither side could 
afford to accept defeat. Similarly, any opportunity the 
Board might have had to defuse the approaching crisis with 
token gestures of appeasement was now gone. The year of 
grace had passed, and only the courts could now decide the 
outcome.
In the mounting atmosphere of racial tension that now 
prevailed, the local chapter of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People began to step up the fire
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 July 1955.
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power of its assault upon the city's racial institutions. 
Accordingly, attorneys Victor Ashe and Hugo Madison formally 
abandoned the petition process and filed their school 
desegregation suit in Federal Court in May, 1956,46 almost 
two years to the day after the landmark Supreme Court 
ruling. Their suit reflected the changing mood of the Black 
community: a majority of the petitioners were from the
still racially tense Oakwood and Coronado sections of the 
Norview area; most of the rest were from the transitional 
neighborhoods of Atlantic City and Broad Creek, where racial 
boundary lines were not yet clearly drawn.47
In spite of this late start, litigation in Norfolk 
quickly proceeded, and was soon two or three steps ahead of 
that in the rest of the state. Part of the reason for this 
fast pace was Federal Judge Walter Hoffman's no-nonsense 
approach to litigation in his court. Even though he had 
strong local credentials, Hoffman was rapidly earning a 
reputation as a distinguished jurist who would not brook the 
obfuscation and delaying tactics employed elsewhere. For 
their own part, the local N.A.A.C.P. attorneys pressed 
vigorously on the case, obviously encouraged by the fact 
that Hoffman had already struck down segregated barriers in 
the city's parks43 and public transportation systems.49
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 May 1956.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 July 1955.
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1956.
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 April 1956.
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The School Board closely followed this judicial trend, 
and so proceeded cautiously under the assumption that 
Norfolk's schools would similarly soon be under court orders 
to integrate. The Board appeared in all its pronouncements 
to be fully prepared to operate a desegregated school system 
under such auspices. The City's political leaders, however, 
were cognizant of the fact that integrated classrooms, no 
matter how slight their impact might be upon the functioning 
of the local school system, were diametrically opposed to 
the policies of the state government:
Norfolk is already looked upon with 
suspicion by some sections of the state; if we 
are forced by Federal Courts to be the first in 
Virginia to integrate, it would be held against 
us by the rest of the state for the next twenty 
years.50
Norfolk faced the very real possibility that the state 
would act to close down its public schools indefinitely 
rather than see them integrated, just as Virginia had done 
when nearby Sea Shore State Park fell under a court order to 
desegregate.51
Since there had as yet been no shred of sympathy for 
Norfolk's predicament, the School Board sought a closed-door 
audience with Mayor Duckworth, the City Council, and the 
city's legislation delegation; its members hoped to develop 
some plan of action that would protect the city from
s°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 May 1956.
slJane Reif, p. 1.
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political reprisals from the rest of the state. Norfolk's 
only real hope in this regard lay in taking the final 
decision to desegregate out of the hands of the local School 
Board and passing the onus back to the state for resolution; 
thus, if the state government could be forced to take the 
blame for ordering desegregation of Norfolk's schools, then 
there would be no reason for imposing economic sanctions or 
exacting legislative retribution against the city for 
complying. To Norfolk's political leaders the threat of 
reprisals from the rest of the state was very real, and one 
that they feared more than the authority of the federal 
courts: the confrontation at Little Rock had not yet taken
place, and no one knew just how forcefully the federal 
government would move to back up its court orders to 
integrate. On the other hand, the city's desperate wartime 
financial experience provided ample evidence of just how 
devastating the consequences of reduced state funding could 
be to the city's economy.
Simply put, Norfolk's plan was to ask the state to 
"interpose" its own sovereignty between the federal courts 
and the Norfolk School Board. To Norfolk's leaders there 
appeared to be a great deal of logic behind this suggestion:
We can't put a window in a school without 
the state telling us what size it must be, and 
on a matter as far reaching as segregation, the 
state should be willing to stand up to it. This 
is clearly a matter in which the state should 
tell us what to do.52
S2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 May 1956.
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Accordingly the meeting broke with the resolve that 
the city would request a special session of the General 
Assembly in order to assure timely enactment of the 
necessary legislation. Public pronouncements of Norfolk's 
interposition plan were highly touted by members of the 
State Legislature and City Council in attendance; almost 
immediately the School Board beg.an to back away from the 
inflammatory language emanating from the closed-door 
session. Members of the Board felt that interposition 
really meant "imposition"— that the plan only gave the rest 
of the state a chance to impose its more conservative, 
provincial philosophies upon the errant liberalism of its 
urbane sister city— and that shutting down the Norfolk 
School system was a step the rest of Virginia might be 
willing to take, especially if Norfolk alone were to bear 
the consequences. This was a move the School Board meant to 
resist at all cost: they had been charged with the
responsibility of running the largest school system in 
Virginia, and running the schools meant keeping them open 
under any circumstances, even if the rest of the state 
disapproved. Members of the Board, therefore, attempted to 
soften the impact of the city's interposition plan by 
stating that Norfolk was merely seeking "the advice and 
guidance" of the State Legislature. They recognized that 
under current state laws they were "unable to act alone"53 
in the face of court-ordered desegregation, but a spokesman
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 May 1956.
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stressed that the Board "wants to conform to state policies, 
but the continued operation of public schools here is of 
utmost importance."54
The Board's reluctance to back Norfolk's interposition 
plan publicly was the first sign of a coming confrontation 
between the appointed members of the School Board and the 
elected officials that made their appointments. Unlike the 
Council, the members of the Board were not responsible to 
any particular partisan constituency, and not dependent upon 
popular re-election for continuance; they were thus free to 
choose the course they felt was best for the community 
without all the posturing and puffery of the politicians. 
Partly for this reason, researchers all across the South 
were reporting that appointed school boards dealt far more 
moderately with the desegregation crisis than did their 
elected counterparts.55 In Norfolk the Council had a 
particular reason to mistrust any evidence of independence 
emanating from the Board: in the past the Council had used
the Board as a convenient dumping ground for business 
leaders from the People's ranks who still deserved special 
recognition and appointment because of their high standing 
in the community. Up to then the School Board had been a 
relatively powerless body— the decision to close schools or
S4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 13 May 1956.
5SSee Robert L. Crain, et al. , The Politics of School 
Desegregation: Comparative Case Studies of Community
Structure and Policy-Making (Chicago: Aldine, 1968).
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keep them open in violation of state law had never before 
been an issue— and Council's strict control of the budget 
and spending served as a powerful check on even the most 
errant body. In the past there had been very little danger 
in stacking the School Board with key business leaders 
closer to the People's persuasion than the Organization's 
own philosophy— membership on the Board carried the requi­
site high community status of such an appointment without 
any of the spoils potential of the city's Housing, Planning, 
Zoning, or various Inspection Appeals boards— and the 
Council felt that a display of strong business support for 
public education was important for the city. Finally, the 
Council had sometimes employed the tactical strategy of 
blaming the School Board for community ills when it came 
time for reelection, and had thus always sought to avoid 
placing any of the Organization's faithful in such a role.
It was this scapegoat role that most concerned Norfolk's 
Council now: they feared that the public pronouncements of 
the Board indicated a willingness, however reluctant, to 
serve as a whipping boy for the whole state and accept 
desegregation if it were so ordered by the courts. Thus the 
move to embrace the philosophy of interposition may be seen 
as a timely ploy to subvert the authority of the local 
boards and place control of the decision to resist desegre­
gation back into the hands of more partisan operatives at 
the state level.
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In spite of the School Board's apparent willingness to 
accept court-ordered desegregation, it nevertheless pressed 
vigorously its legal efforts to resist such an eventuality. 
In private the Board may have been willing to defy the 
state's authority, but in court it argued forcefully that 
public school segregation was a valid exercise of the 
state's police powers to protect its citizens, and was 
therefore legal. Similarly it indicated that the Board 
itself was an agency of the state and thus subject to the 
same privileges, protections, and immunity from suit as the 
state. Further the Board contended that the N.A.A.C.P. suit 
was filed against the wrong party: technically the Board
lacked the legal jurisdiction to establish and maintain a 
school system on its own and merely served in an advisory 
capacity to the City Council, against whom the suit should 
have been brought. The Board's final argument carried a 
little more weight: the court lacked jurisdiction in this
dispute, it contended, since only people duly qualified for 
admission to the public schools and whose request for 
transfer between schools had been denied could legitimately 
prove harm.56 This was a telling point, since the Brown 
cases had been brought on behalf of Black school children 
who had applied to white schools and then been denied that 
the "equal opportunity" to attend the school of their 
choice; the Norfolk case, however, had been brought by 
leading Black citizens who were petitioning the court to end
56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 June 1956.
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a perceptible public wrong; none of the Norfolk petitioners 
could show a personal harm.
The members of the School Board knew, however, that 
they were merely buying time with their legal arguments, and 
that in a few months the N.A.A.C.P. would return to court 
with the right defendants duly enjoined and the proper mix 
of plaintiffs able to prove injury by rejection of their 
transfer applications. The Board's legal maneuvering had 
bought enough time to forestall school integration in 
Norfolk for one more school year;57 they knew it would 
take this long for the Board to receive, deliberate, and 
then ultimately reject the petitions. Their spirited 
defense was enough to keep the state politicians off their 
back for one more year; in the meantime they had begun to 
develop a plan of their own which might take some of the 
pressure off of the N.A.A.C.P. desegregation suit. The 
School Board approached the Council with a request for an 
additional $15 million building program, much of it ear­
marked for adding cafeterias, libraries, music centers, re­
source areas, multi-purpose classrooms, and other facilities 
to existing Black schools.5® School Board member Benjamin 
J. Willis was candid enough to comment on the sudden 
upgrading of Black schools: "The better their [i.e., the
Black] facilities, the less pressure their argument will
57Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 3 July 1956.
58Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
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have."59 One of the schools marked for immediate con­
struction was a combination elementary-junior high for Black
pupils in the Oakwood-Rosemont section, where a large number
of the N.A.A.C.P. plaintiffs had been located. Virginian- 
Pilot reporter Luther Carter surveyed the proposed building 
program with an eye cocked towards the desegregation suit:
The School Board has indicated that when all
appeals against the federal court order have
been exhausted, it will attempt to minimize its 
effect by using a plan for gradual desegrega­
tion. [The Oakwood-Rosemont combination school] 
would appear to be in line with this policy. 
Superintendent Brewbaker also indicated that 
eventually a combination junior and senior high 
might be needed in the area [to further ease 
desegregation pressures].50
As part of the overall plans for expansion, another junior 
high school (Campostella) was being rushed to the drawing 
boards to accommodate the growing Black population in the 
Berkley section of the city.61
The Norfolk School Board's proposed building program 
was not meant as another legal gimmick to head off school 
desegregation; instead it indicated a thorough acceptance of 
the reality that such a court order was imminent, and the 
fact that the Board was merely trying to soften the impact 
of shattered traditions. Theirs was a moderate approach 
and, as such, it put the Board in opposition to most of the
59Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 January 1957. 
6°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 March 1957. 
6a-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
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state's senior political leaders who felt that the day of 
integration could be forestalled forever. There was some 
hope as well that by giving the Black community their own, 
top-quality schools, even in the remote areas far removed 
from their existing, segregated schools, the School Board 
would be relieving some of the pressures to integrate from 
that quarter. The certain appeal of such a sensible plan 
was not, however, apparent to the local politicians. City 
Councilman Ezra T. Summers, ever the most vocal of an 
otherwise close-mouthed Council, issued a strongly worded 
statement supporting the state's Massive Resistance efforts 
and advocating a "go-slow approach" in local school building 
programs "until the integration disputes are settled." 
Summers' insistence that the matter "should be studied more 
carefully"62 dealt a death blow to the School Board's con­
struction plans. The rest of the Council was more diplo­
matic in their rejection; instead they asked the Board to 
revise its plan "to what we can afford" in light of the 
precipitate rise in school bond interest rates now being 
extended to Southern school systems threatened by 
desegregation. Then, as a final slap at the School Board, 
the Council indicated that it was prepared to go ahead and 
borrow money at those same inflated interest rates in order 
to construct other capital improvements that might attract 
additional state and federal funding.63 The School Board
62Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 May 1956.
63Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 19 December 1956.
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made their best case before the Council— they brought 
surveys indicating that 97% of Norfolk's parents and 93% of 
nonparents favored increasing school funding64— but it was 
still rejected outright. The inference was clear: the
Council had higher priorities for spending than granting 
money to Black schools just in case the court really ordered 
desegregation.
There was nothing inherently wrong with the School 
Board's plan: it had been based upon the soundest and most
moderate judgement of the time; it relied upon professional 
growth surveys indicating that the schools and improvements 
would be needed anyway, even if the school system was 
permitted to remain segregated. What was wrong was that the 
Board's plan had come too late; the city had just paid an 
exorbitant price to annex a large section of Norfolk County, 
and the Council could legitimately point to the fact that it 
had a pressing financial need to extend full municipal 
services to this area as soon as possible.65 This was 
reason enough to block a costly school building program that 
was, at best a stopgap effort to defuse the desegregation 
crisis and, at worst, a reckless gamble to lure potential 
Black plaintiffs away from the N.A.A.C.P. suit with the 
promise of building and expanding their own segregated 
neighborhood schools. Norfolk had already made a precipi­
tate effort in the last decade to bring its Black schools in
64Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 15 February 1957.
65Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 17 December 1956.
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line with their all-white counterparts and so offer equal, 
although segregated, facilities for both races. The city 
could ill afford the Schools Board's building proposal, the 
Council argued, especially if integration could be averted 
through other, less costly means.
Politically as well the School Board's move came too 
late: the calm racial attitudes that prevailed in Norfolk
in the summer of 1956 had, by the winter, taken a nasty 
turn, and the city's white residents were giving ample 
evidence that they were no longer willing to buy off the 
Black community with promises of separate but equal 
facilities. A shift in the desegregation stance of the 
city's legislative delegation was the best bellwether of 
this changing attitude. In the summer, the bulk of the 
delegation had stood behind the School Board's stance to 
keep the schools open, even if desegregated. The legis­
lators went so far as to vow to fight the governor "in 
opposition to any measure designed to deprive Norfolk's 
schools of full financial support."66 A year later they 
would back down from this moderate posture and declare that 
they held only minor differences with the governor; they 
disagreed on the tactics of how best to fight court-ordered 
desegregation, but both the governor and the local legis­
lators were in full accord that integration must be fought 
with every legal means available.67 Within a year of that
66Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 July 1956.
^ Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 8 June 1957.
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statement they had gone full circle from opposition to 
support of the Governor's efforts to close public schools 
and cut off state funding as means to show Virginia's 
Massive Resistance to integration.6s
One reason for this apparent shift in public opinion 
was the growing impact of the N.A.A.C.P. legal victories: 
in the spring of 1956 Norfolk's public schools were but one 
target in the scatter-shot legal approach of the local 
N.A.A.C.P. as they rushed to achieve integration. By the 
fall, however, N.A.A.C.P. court action had forced all of the 
area's parks, recreation centers, and public transportation 
facilities to either desegregate or close indefinitely. To 
many, the public school system now stood as the last bastion 
against a fully integrated society, and the N.A.A.C.P.'s 
unrelenting legal pressures to crack this barrier as well 
was causing increasing bitterness in the white community. A 
feeling was growing that Norfolk needed more time to adjust 
to changes that had already taken place, and that continuing 
the battle to desegregate the schools was only making racial 
moderation more and more difficult.
It was inevitable in the growing climate of racial 
antipathy that new groups would emerge to capitalize on this 
force and direct it to serve their own needs. Formerly the 
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties had 
been a predominantly Southside effort by small businessmen 
to combat desegregation in that area; now, however, the
68Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
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Defenders were gaining increasing acceptance in all parts of 
the state. The Defenders were not the hood-wearing, night 
riders like their counterparts in the White Citizen's 
Councils farther South; instead they had made every effort 
to establish in Virginia a legitimate and gentlemanly 
interest group, and one that clearly carried much weight 
among the leadership of the Byrd Organization.69 Locally 
the Defenders had rallied around the banner of the State's 
Rights Party and were backing fellow Virginian T. Coleman 
Andrews for President; they had established a political 
headquarters to test public opinion, and, having found it 
favorable, now planned to mount major challenges along 
Massive Resistance lines to the city's legislative delega­
tion.70 One other event at about the same time indicated 
an escalation in both the rhetoric and expertise of race 
politics. Just as the city's business and civic elite were 
kicking off their traditional fall Community Fund drive, 
Norfolk was inundated with hate pamphlets aimed at one of 
its beneficiary organizations. After a hasty series of 
meetings, the business community was forced to drop the 
Urban League from the drive for its supposed support of 
"race-mixing." Although the local origin of the pamphlets 
was unknown (the Defenders disavowed any responsibility), 
the pamphlets were traced back to publication by a wing of
S9Virginius Dabney, pp. 531-533.
7°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1956.
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the Christian Nationalist Party, renowned experts on 
"rabble-rousing and sensational hate-mongering. "'7X
success of their organizational efforts, and the mounting 
hostilities directed at the N.A.A.C.P. were giving rise to a 
climate of political desperation. All around racial 
barriers were falling under the onslaught of litigation; 
with them were crumbling institutions of long-standing 
importance in the white community. The hate groups were 
preparing to fan the flames of racial unrest into a 
dangerous political force. The School Board had been re­
buffed in its efforts to moderate the desegregation dispute 
with an exorbitant building program aimed at lessening the 
impact of desegregation. The city's legislative delegation 
had once stood firm in their opposition to closing Norfolk's 
schools even if the courts ordered integration; now they 
were backing away from that stance and instead were 
preparing to vote for legislation that would turn over the 
control of the city's schools to the very state politicians 
most disposed to shut them down. The liberalizing forces of 
the People's group were no where to be seen; they had been 
beaten back to their board rooms and counting houses, and 
now only emerged to take part in lackluster deliberations on 
relatively unimportant boards and advisory commissions.
Even the old warhorses of the Organization had accepted a 
diminished role in governmental affairs; they had been
~71Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 October 1956.
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beaten back by the People's group, lost interest, and now 
had resigned themselves to a backseat position as the price 
of going along for the ride. The entire city looked instead 
to the one person who had emerged as the strong man in all 
municipal deliberations.
Of all the major politicians in the city, only Mayor 
Duckworth had been truly silent on the desegregation crisis. 
At first the public assumed that the School Board and the 
Organization's legislative delegation accurately represented 
his thinking on the subject, but the vacillation of the 
local legislators and the dispatch with which the School 
Board's building proposal was dismissed gave rise to the 
belief first that there was some middle ground between the 
two, and finally lead to wide speculation that Duckworth, 
too, had plans to save the city from integration.
By this time Duckworth was firmly in control of the 
city and able to direct its growth towards attainment of his 
own ends, and, since he had spent so much time erecting the 
edifices designed by C. A. Harrell and the People's adminis­
tration, he was impatient to get. on with the task. Like 
Harrell, Duckworth had a vision of a New Norfolk, but unlike 
Harrell and unlike the Silkstocking crowd, Duckworth had 
shown little commitment to the city's past and little 
compassion for its people. He saw himself as a manager, 
both of the city's politics and its physical plant. His 
attachment was thus to Norfolk's structures, its adminis­
tration, its political Organization, and its efficiency— the
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bricks and mortar of city growth. It was a subtle distinc­
tion, but one that would not be lost in the years ahead.




As the city's chief politician and highest elected 
official, Mayor W. Fred Duckworth remarkably had not yet 
spoken out on the subject of school integration. Most 
people supposed that, because of his political affiliation 
with the Organization, his personal sentiments rested with 
those who preached resistance at all cost, yet he had 
endorsed none of the myriad scenarios of resistance that had 
already been proposed by Governor Stanley, Senator Byrd, the 
Defenders, the Gray Commission, Councilman Summers, James J. 
Kilpatrick, and others. He had never been directly caught 
up in the rhetoric of interposition, and had been remarkably 
tolerant of others who spoke up in an attempt to relate the 
city's official position. In an administration prized for 
its closed-mouth unanimity, it was remarkable to witness the 
School Board left free to pursue its own moderate course 
while Councilmen like Ezra Summers veered off in more 
extreme tacks. Most observers conceded that Duckworth was 
at least opposed to undertaking the expense of the School
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Board's building and modernization program, but even in this 
regard there were those who felt that his resistance to the 
concept was only temporary, and that the Mayor was only 
withholding his approval as a bargaining chip in some 
grander design: as yet the city lacked the clout to force
the Black community to accept such a proposal as a token 
victory short of desegregation.
By the winter of 1956 the Mayor had already built his 
reputation as a consummate politician and a powerful force 
in any endeavor touching municipal government. In a matter 
as far reaching as school integration, the Mayor oddly had
as yet advanced no opinion. Although no one knew what
course of action Duckworth proposed to follow if the city's 
schools were really faced with the threat of court-ordered 
integration, most citizens assumed that he would act as 
dramatically as he had already done in almost every other 
field of municipal action. In fact, the Mayor had effected 
such an overwhelming personal presence in every sphere of 
government that the citizens, once so actively involved 
during the days of the People's rule, had by now been lulled
into a state of civic withdrawal. The machinery of
municipal government appeared to roll on so smoothly with 
Duckworth in control that the watchful eye of the public had 
long ago deserted its overseeing position.
Duckworth had apparently achieved the promise of his 
1950 Harmony Slate: he had united professional expertise,
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business acumen, and political savvy into a single, concen­
trated focus of power that carefully balanced the concerns 
of both the business community and the Prieur Organization. 
His new political force, and this was by all rights a 
personal victory, was obeisant to neither the Silkstocking 
Crowd nor the Organization, although it took its cues from 
both camps. Duckworth had found in action and accomplish­
ment the common ground that united these two once opposing 
forces. The only real challenges to Duckworth’s administra­
tion had come from the Black community: P. B. Young’s
councilmanic candidacy, the setback at Broad Creek Shores, 
the bombings in Coronado, the racial unrest in Brambleton, 
and the court challenges of the N.A.A.C.P. The Mayor, 
however, had gained the near-unanimous backing of the city's 
banking, business, civic, and political leaders, and in the 
six years since he had come to power under the Harmony 
coalition, not a single effective voice had been raised in 
opposition to his authority; he and his councilmanic running 
mates swept to election victory year after year against only 
token, gadfly resistance from the white community.1 One 
measure of the depth of Mayor Duckworth's support may be 
read in Norfolk's West Side voting precincts, the tradition­
al stronghold of the city's Silkstocking establishment,
-̂Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 April 1958.
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where now the Mayor and his slate were running up electoral 
majorities that ran as high as ten-to-one.2
A number of reasons existed to explain the Mayor's 
enormous personal success. Foremost among them was the fact 
that both time and events had been good to Norfolk, and as a 
result the city was enjoying a period of unparalleled growth 
and prosperity. The city's financial success, and the 
unquestioned sense of security that such engenders in the 
general populace, had helped to b about what one 
observer termed the "Era of Good Feeling" in Norfolk's 
history.3 The citizens were now proud of all that had been 
accomplished in the decade since the war, and the public 
controversy and conflict that had characterized the planning 
stages under the People's government were now forgotten as 
the reality of new highways, tunnel connections, annexa­
tions, redevelopment, and related municipal facilities began 
contributing to the city's enormous growth and prosperity.
Just as the careful, cautious, consensual approach of 
the People's group had been perfect for the planning 
process, Mayor Duckworth's forceful dominance of city policy 
was ideally suited to the current building stage. City 
government functioned smoothly, almost too smoothly, under 
the Mayor's firm leadership, and clearly he maintained 
control over every phase of municipal operation. No longer
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1958.
3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 July 1961.
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were Council meetings the long, drawn-out affairs that 
characterized the People's sessions; instead Duckworth's 
Council met in his office with a select assemblage of 
advisors for a dress rehearsal. At these private "pre­
sessions" those in attendance hashed out the controversies, 
arranged the compromises, and made all of the city's real 
decisions. Then, after all potential differences had been 
ironed out, the Council would emerge for its public session, 
a performance that ran, not surprisingly, as smoothly as if 
every member had a script: rarely was there a dissenting
vote, unnecessary discussion, or less that unanimous 
approval of even the most far-reaching policy decisions.4
In council-manager cities such as Norfolk the mayor is 
granted very few official powers beyond those of the other 
members of the council; Duckworth, however, had added a 
considerable repertoire of unofficial executive and legisla­
tive powers to the traditional ribbon-cutting capacities of 
a weak mayor. Although lacking in official veto, budgetary, 
or appointment powers, Mayor Duckworth had parlayed his 
position as presiding officer into unquestioned authority 
over the rest of the Council. Council's private 
"pre-sessions" had helped to strengthen his unofficial grip 
on city policy, just as the smooth and polished public 
performance of the Council had helped to heighten the sense
4Pretlow Darden; Robert L. Mason; and Harold Sugg, former 
reporter for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, interview by author, 
Tape recording, Roanoke, 17 August 1979.
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that he alone was firmly in control. This same sense of 
domination carried over as well into other phases of 
municipal government. No longer were the city's appointed 
boards and commissions functioning as the cutting edge of 
public participation in municipal decision-making; Duckworth 
had a strange habit of dropping in on the public session of 
such boards, "suggesting" a desired course of action, and 
then hanging around until he was satisfied that his 
instructions had been enacted.s
In a city that traditionally experienced a rapid turn­
over of both its top elective and appointive officials, the 
Mayor quickly emerged as one of the few stable personalities 
in the administration of municipal affairs. By 1956 almost 
all of the city's department heads, appointed board members, 
and legislative delegation had been replaced since the 
People's reign, and only Duckworth and Vice-Mayor George 
Abbott had served more than four years on the Council.6 
Ironically, both the People's government and the Organiza­
tion's administrations that had preceded them had shied away 
from placing even the informal powers of the city's weak 
mayor position into the hands of a single individual such as 
Duckworth for too long a period of time: the office had 
shifted from Richard Cooke to Pretlow Darden at midpoint in 
the People's tenure in order to better promote the
5Pretlow Darden.
6Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 September 1956.
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appearance of popular democracy that they craved.-7 The 
Organization had followed a similar practice, but political 
considerations figured foremost in their decision to 
frequently rotate the seat: experience had proven that the
increased exposure that came with the office made the 
incumbent mayor the most vulnerable candidate when facing 
re-election. Duckworth, however, apparently experienced no 
such qualms about either elective vulnerability or charges 
of authoritarianism. By 1956 he had held the office of 
Mayor longer than any other person since the city manager 
form of government had been instituted in 1918,® and he 
gave no indication that he would be the least bit willing to 
surrender his authority at any time in the near future.
Duckworth held far more than just the policy-making 
functions of municipal government within his grasp; in a 
very real sense he managed the day-to-day activities of city 
hall as well. Already operating under his fifth9 city 
manager since he had taken office six years earlier,10 the
7Pretlow Darden.
BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 September 1956.
9People's Manager C. A. Harrell resigned under pressure 
eighteen months after Duckworth's election; Public Safety 
Director Henry George served as Acting City Manager for eight 
months before receiving official appointment to the post in 
September, 1952; Sherwood Reeder died in office six months 
after succeeding George on July 18, 1955; S. C. Morrisette 
filled in for the interim until Thomas F. Maxwell was 
appointed on February 15, 1956.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 February 1956.
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city's department heads had learned to function smoothly 
under the constancy of his leadership, channeling their 
information directly to the Mayor's office in a route that 
circumvented the authority of the city manager and the rest 
of the Council. In this skewed hierarchy the manager served 
as little more than the Mayor's chief municipal adviser, a 
rule which both irritated and exasperated the incumbents.
In these circumstances Norfolk was lucky to attract Thomas 
F. Maxwell to the post. Maxwell, although a man of many 
talents that would ordinarily have recommended him for 
higher status, suffered one debilitation that would forever 
limit his rise beyond Norfolk's debased position: Maxwell 
was a binge alcoholic who could only survive at the top in a 
closed and protective society like Norfolk's where the 
periodic abandonment of his position made very little real 
difference to the administration of city government.
Maxwell, however, had a wizardry with budgetary policy, 
fiscal planning, money management, and federal grantsmanship 
that made him both an invaluable addition to the Mayor's 
staff at this time and an important municipal asset as the 
city passed through its building phase of postwar 
growth.1:L
Thus, in spite of the lack of official authority 
traditionally associated with his position, Mayor W. Fred
^Robert L. Mason; Harold Sugg; and L. Cameron Gregory, 
former reporter for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, interview by 
author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 20 July 1979.
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Duckworth functioned as a strong mayor in an otherwise 
nonpartisan, professional, council-manager form of govern­
ment; if all this power concentrated in one public official 
and a handful of advisers disturbed the citizens of Norfolk, 
Virginia, they gave little indication of such unrest. 
Occasionally a newspaper editor would level a mild rebuke at 
the Mayor:
The Administration in which Mayor W. Fred 
Duckworth has been the leading figure, has shown 
both good and bad points in its career. Its 
early weaknesses were a tendency to settle many 
questions at the euphemistically named 
"informal sessions" and a tendency to take 
sometimes too lightly the recommendations of 
qualified administrators and especially 
appointed commissions and agencies.12
Most citizens, however, apparently regarded such 
indelicacies as the natural consequence of having a 
strong-willed and effective leader at the helm. The Mayor's 
very personal style of leadership and his extremely 
hierarchical chain of command served in marked contrast to 
the spirited popular participation that characterized the 
People's regime. A surfeit of popular advice and consent 
had appeared to bog down the People's government in the 
planning process; Duckworth's "bulldozer drive and 
directness"13— the words themselves would prove prophetic 
— however, seemed quickly to cut through the preliminaries,
12Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 March 1956.
13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 July 1961.
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and get on with the work at hand. As long as the Mayor 
continued to comprehend the full scope of municipal affairs 
and carefully weigh the true consequences of his actions, 
the people seemed to mind little if a few of the niceties of 
democratic decision-making were bulldozed in the process. 
Indeed, the major accomplishment of the Duckworth adminis­
tration to date was "its ability to undertake large pro­
grams" and bring them swiftly to their conclusion,14 and, 
as long as the Mayor continued to focus the broad powers of 
municipal government towards obtainable objectives, the 
citizens seemed to care little if he wielded those powers 
somewhat dictatorially.
Two examples of the city's planning process under 
Mayor Duckworth help to illustrate both the enormous control 
of the Mayor and the shifting emphasis of developmental 
priorities under his administration. The primary emphasis 
of city planning under the People's government had been the 
modernization and revitalization of Norfolk's downtown 
commercial center— the "New Norfolk" of which they boasted. 
Considering the size of the city, Norfolk had never had much 
of a real downtown, and even in the People's era merchants 
of the area's fragile commercial strip were already feeling 
the press of competition from more residential shopping 
centers. Originally Norfolk had been a city built around 
its waterfront, but hard times had befallen its shipping-
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 March 1956.
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support industries— the ship chandlers, sail makers, 
blacksmiths, repair and machine shops, rope and rigging 
merchants, tarpaulin manufacturers, and naval hardware 
brokers— since the demise of sailing ships and intracoastal 
shipping, and the downtown had shifted two blocks away from 
the rotting wharves and crumbling warehouses that bespoke 
the heyday of this seaport existence. The once prosperous 
and active waterfront area had fallen almost completely into 
disuse, and the city's remaining commercial strip gave ample 
evidence of its former residential origins: the classic
lines of Georgian and Victorian houses rose above the 
polished marble and glass facades of first-floor business 
establishments; narrow streets and winding alleyways now 
clogged with the through traffic they were never designed to 
carry; church spires stood in lonely vigil over neighbor­
hoods without residents.13
Because the downtown commercial center was already 
struggling to overcome its competitive handicaps, further 
expansion in the commercial sector was not felt to be 
practical; instead the city's Silkstocking planners looked 
to development of the downtown's non-commercial advantages 
as the only hope for its crowded, misplaced businesses. For 
this reason they looked to expansion of the city's cultural 
and waterfront potential as a way to keep customers in the
13Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan For The Central 
Business And Financial District, (Norfolk: Planning
Commission, 1956), pp. 19-20.
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vicinity of downtown shops.16 The only problem lay in how 
best to stimulate a cultural renaissance and waterfront 
recovery program. At the time, redevelopment laws forbade 
the taking of commercial or industrial areas,17 even those 
that were abandoned and delinquent in tax payments,16 and 
so the planners were forced to seek the kind of appropriate 
municipal expenditure that would best stimulate private 
construction. For this reason they turned their attention 
toward two theme-oriented extensions to the downtown, both 
of which combined a minimum of already necessary public 
expenditure as an attraction to similar private develop­
mental efforts.
The first proposal focused on a Cultural Center to be 
located just to the northwest of the existing downtown 
commercial strip. The major cultural attractions to the 
center already existed with the Norfolk (Chrysler) Museum at 
one end and the city's Center Theater/Civic Auditorium com­
plex at the other end of the designated area; in addition, 
the Planning Commission had convinced the Library Board to 
relocate the Norfolk Public Library to new facilities to be 
built in the center. The area already possessed an urbane
lsNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 May 1956.
17Housing and Home Finance Agency, Slum Clearance Under 
The Housing Act of 1949: A Preliminary Statement To American
Cities (Washington, D.C., 1949).
16Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan For The Central Business
And Financial District, op cit., pp. 19-20.
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and international feeling, enhanced by the classic lines of 
the Georgian and Federal architecture of the neighboring 
Ghent and Freemason Street areas. The nearby Smith Creek 
Marina and the Hague Yacht Basin, replete with its foot­
paths, bridges, and waterfront park, was a popular haven 
both for boaters who followed the Inland Waterway and others 
looking for a respite from the fast pace of urban living.
The Commission hoped to build on this recreational quality 
of the area by relocating the city's Confederate Monument, 
Norfolk's obeisance to its Southern heritage, to a mini-park 
to be constructed in the middle of the Cultural Center, 
hoping that it would serve to attract lunch hour picnickers 
and pedestrian traffic to the area. A second benefit of the 
mini-park would be that it would help to re-channel traffic 
into the downtown area in a more acceptable pattern; at the 
time, five of the city's main downtown commuter streets 
— Olney Road, Llewellyn Avenue, Duke, Boush, and High (now 
Virginia Beach Boulevard) Streets--met in the middle of the 
proposed Cultural Center and wound their way tortuously into 
the main downtown commercial district.19
The Planning Commission hoped to use this new Cultural 
Center, replete with its library, museum, parks, theater, 
marina, and modern traffic connectors, to attract other 
similar cultural enterprises into this common area. The 
planners hoped that trade delegations and N.A.T.O emissaries
19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 December 1951.
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would relocate to the area into a consulate's row, thereby 
continuing the international flavor already imparted by the 
Hague and nearby Ghent neighborhood. The Commission was 
already hard at work trying to encourage some of the city's 
leading charities and civic organizations to seek adjacent 
sites, and its members were confident that once the Cultural 
Center began to take shape, that a major convention hotel 
would buy a site in the area. The Silkstocking businessmen 
and the various boards and commissions associated with the 
planning of the center were trying to use their contacts to 
convince some of the city's major enterprises to relocate 
their corporate headquarters in the vicinity. The city was 
even reserving a site adjacent to the museum and proposed 
public library that could be used in the future for a 
municipal aquarium or naval museum.20
Plans for the Cultural Center were ambitious, but they 
seemed realistic enough considering the constraints of the 
period; the planners had every reason to believe that local 
businesses, restaurants, sidewalk cafes, and specialty shops 
would be attracted by the combination of public and private 
construction, fleshing out a new vitality to an area just 
outside of the narrow confines of the existing downtown 
commercial strip.21 The public funds necessary to support 
such an undertaking were not large, and those earmarked for
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 December 1951.
21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 July 1952.
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library construction and street improvements were necessary 
regardless of the success of the rest of the project. 
Enthusiasm for the plan was especially strong during 1951 
and 1952, while C. A. Harrell was still manager, and before 
the People's movement had wholly subsided from its position 
of advisory importance at City Hall.
At about this time the same planners were casting 
about for a parallel proposal to improve the city's 
deteriorating waterfront area; they knew that here, too, a 
similar combination of public expenditures for parks and 
promenades, plus the right kind of private investment, could 
attract a contingent of outdoor cafes and specialty shops.
A number of proposals were being bandied about, including 
designs for a seawall, amphitheater, small boat marina, 
highrise luxury apartment buildings, new City Hall/Civic 
Center complex, naval museum, private housing developments, 
cordon bleu seafood restaurant, a seafood market, and a 
bazaar.22 The most promising proposal for waterfront 
development came from the Norfolk Port Authority, a creation 
of the old People's Administration. Members of the 
Authority hoped to unite many of the aspects of earlier 
proposals around a single, two-staged development that would 
both attract new investment and encourage improvements to 
existing properties. Phase One of their project focused on 
the construction of a huge concrete pier that would extend
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 August 1956.
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far enough out into the main shipping channel to accommodate 
the loading and unloading of even the deepest draft vessels. 
Space along the pier would be rented out to shipping and 
freight forwarding concerns, and on the shore, as part of 
Phase Two of the project, a large quay would be built to 
facilitate drayage. The quay would be broad enough to 
accommodate specialty shops, travel agents, seafood vendors, 
a produce market, small restaurants, and outdoor cafes.23
Plans for both these projects— the Cultural Center and 
the harbor quay— advanced just as rapidly as they would have 
under the People's Administration; the city's volunteer 
boards and commissions proceeded in a vacuum just as if they 
had the same grant of power and responsibilities as before. 
The Port Authority began buying up property at the foot of 
Commercial Place and West Main Street and aggressively began 
to line up prospects interested in leasing space along the 
pier; local merchants and out-of-town investors alike had 
contacted the Authority to inquire about commercial oppor­
tunities along the quay.24 The Planning Commission was 
moving just as aggressively to line up prospects for its own 
development at the other end of the downtown area: the 
Salvation Army, the Union Mission, I.B.M., and other leading 
corporate and charitable enterprises had been successfully 
recruited to locate in the Cultural Center. Thus, by the
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 May 1956.
24Ibid.
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time Council was approached for approval, both projects were 
well off the drawing boards and fast becoming a reality.
No official reason was ever given for the rejection of 
either proposal; in fact, the Council seems never to have 
docketed the items or given them public audience. In spite 
of widespread enthusiasm and the editorial endorsements of 
the Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Dispatch, both projects were 
accorded a low profile, back-burner status that was unusual 
for such full-blown and well-planned undertakings. The only 
official action that was ever taken on either project con­
cerned the Library Board's request to relocate the main
library to a new site in the Cultural Center: for four
years the Council delayed consideration of the project, and 
then finally announced in August of 1956 that the Cultural 
Center was "a long-range undertaking [that] has been 
accorded a lower priority" than other city projects.25 It
was a heavy blow to all those who had pinned their hopes on
an East Ghent commercial revival, and even though portions 
of the project still survived independent of the others, the 
idea for a Cultural Center in downtown Norfolk was dead.
The Port Authority, too, was forced to shelve its plans, and 
settled later for less expensive arrangements far removed 
from the downtown financial district.26
2SNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 August 1956.
2SIt was either a stroke of genius or just a lucky
accident that the plans for the downtown waterfront facility 
were so precipitously scrapped at this time, for the freight
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Thus, by the winter of 1956, every major program of 
renewal or revitalization left over from the People's 
administration had either been fully activated or quietly 
put aside; the powers that controlled city hall had shifted 
dramatically in the decade since the rise of the Silk- 
stocking Ticket. No longer were the city's volunteer 
boards and commissions, or the business and civic elite they 
represented, a power in the planning and decision-making 
process; no longer were the more rancorous conventions of 
popular democracy— public hearings, open council meetings, 
and issue review committees— essential to the city's policy­
making apparatus. It had been years since the city manager 
had functioned as Norfolk's chief executive; instead Mayor 
Duckworth and a handful of advisors ran every phase of 
municipal government, exerting the same sort of ironclad 
grip on the city's political structure as well.
The appearance that the city ran so smoothly under the 
Mayor's direction was no accident; Duckworth had made a 
special point to eliminate any opportunity for factionalism 
or opposition on the Council before such could emerge. In 
fact, except for Organization stalwart George Abbott, who 
posed no threat to Duckworth's continued direction, no other 
councilmen had stayed in office long enough to develop a
handling utility of the project would have been rendered 
obsolete by the enormous space and specialized equipment 
needs of modern containerization. See Hammer, Green, Siler 
Associates, Economic Potentials in Downtown Norfolk,
(Norfolk: Planning Commission, 1970), p. 11.
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personal following. Councilmen and city managers came and 
went at city hall so rapidly during this era that one could 
easily see why Mayor Duckworth, even if he had not been a 
forceful leader, would be quickly recognized by the citizens 
as the only stable force in the city's administration. 
Councilmen were chosen from the broad ranks of independent 
but small-time businessmen— insurance agents, real estate 
brokers, wholesalers, and shopkeepers— who were successful 
overachievers in their profession, but who exhibited no 
remarkable capacity for autonomous action; none came to city 
hall with any special following, gleaned either through 
prior municipal experience, volunteer service, or through 
leadership in the business or civic community, and each owed 
his advancement to office entirely to Mayor Duckworth and 
those around him.
The circumstances behind an individual1s selection to 
elective office at this time remain clouded, but obviously 
the unofficial nominating process that took place was 
shrouded in sufficient secrecy to preserve both the politi­
cal viability of the chosen and the continued domination of 
the selectors. Perhaps because selection of his 1950 
Harmony Ticket had been engineered by some considerable 
behind-the-scenes maneuvering, Duckworth and those around 
him apparently never really trusted the popular election 
process to elevate men of good standing and high ability to 
the Council. Two old standbys of the Byrd Organization were
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employed in Norfolk to tightly control the nominating and 
elective processes: first, the official slate of Duckworth-
endorsed candidates was held in secrecy until announcement 
at the last moment before the filing deadline, thereby 
eliminating those Organization hopefuls who had been passed 
over in the unofficial nominating process. Secondly, those 
who ran for elective office were not always those who 
served: Mayor Duckworth and those around him perfected the
Organization's "planned incumbency" scheme whereby a trusted 
incumbent would stand for re-election and mysteriously 
resign so that a carefully selected successor could fill the 
slot without risking the perils of popular election; the 
newcomer would then have the advantages of an incumbent's 
experience and exposure when he stood for re-election in his 
own right two years later. Advancement by appointment had 
become a time-honored tradition in Virginia— most of the 
state's congressmen, senators and other top office-holders 
had advanced at least once in this manner27— and it quick­
ly became a hallmark as well of Norfolk City government: 
thus in 1953, newcomer Roy B. Martin, Jr., was selected to 
fill the seat vacated when Councilman James M. Williams 
resigned; Lewis L. Layton similarly took over in 1956 when
27In one of Virginia's most famous examples of planned 
incumbency, former U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., took over 
in December, 1964, the Senate seat his father vacated after 
having won re-election the month before. Norfolk's Clerk of 
the Courts William L. "Billy" Prieur very nearly took office 
under similar circumstances when his predecessor announced 
his resignation on Election Night.
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incumbent Robert F. Ripley stepped down shortly after 
winning re-election;28 and Linwood F. Perkins was appoint­
ed in early 1957 when Councilman Ezra Summers died in 
office.29 Norfolk was so obviously by-passing the popular 
election process that the editors of the Virginian-Pilot 
targeted the Duckworth administration for their lack of 
political decorum:
[The newcomer] is in no way responsible for 
it, but the changeover had one disconcerting 
aspect. Quite obviously the Councilmen, and 
some others, too, knew in advance that [the 
incumbent] would resign. But the intention was 
not made public until a successor had been 
agreed upon. It is a sounder procedure to give 
the voters a little advance notice before 
selecting a successor to a man they elected to 
office. Settling the whole problem behind 
closed doors is not good procedure even if 
the result, in all other respects, is 
satisfactory.30
Most observers conceded that Mayor Duckworth had the 
final word in the unofficial nominating process that 
selected candidates for municipal office in Norfolk. This 
was no mean achievement when one considers the enormous 
control exerted by Billy Prieur and his Organization during 
their heyday, but Prieur had apparently lost interest in 
municipal affairs since the near demise of his Organization 
during the tenure of the People's administration. Instead,
2BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 February 1956.
29Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 26 June 1957.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 February 1956.
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like many other of his contemporaries in the statewide Byrd 
Organization, he had resigned himself to a lesser role.
Local experts point to Prieur's acceptance of an increasing­
ly moderate and independent-acting, "Young Turk" legislative 
delegation as a sign of his lessening involvement in the 
candidate selection and election process.31 The Young 
Turks were so named because they were mostly men in their 
early thirties, who, although they were members of the Byrd 
Organization, sometimes refused to back the old Byrd 
hierarchy. Most were war veterans or urban legislators like 
Norfolk's own Walter Paige, Theodore Pilcher, Toy Savage, 
and Jack Rixey, who had on several occasions bucked the 
Organization establishment in order to support issues of 
urban concern or racial moderation. In one sense they well 
represented Norfolk's own urbane constituency, and were thus 
good choices for the city, but in another sense, the Billy 
Prieur of the 1930s, one of Harry Byrd's chief lieutenants 
and an Organization stalwart, would never have brooked such 
independence.
All across the state the Organization was in decline 
and, especially in its urban areas, was giving way to new 
leadership groups such as the Young Turks or Duckworth's 
businessmen's coalition. Prieur, who had always preferred 
the seclusion of the back room to the spotlight of public
3Robert L. Mason, Harold Sugg, L. Cameron Gregory, and 
others.
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recognition, was now apparently content to accept a partner­
ship role with Duckworth that placed the Mayor in the lime­
light. No one is really sure who held the upper hand, if 
indeed either party dominated the arrangement, for both men 
had powerful egos, and neither would have allowed himself to 
play a secondary role. It seems more probable that 
Duckworth and Prieur, both conservatives, were in basic 
agreement on most major matters, and that each held his own 
unchallengeable dominion. Prieur, who had by now made peace 
with Congressman Porter Hardy, controlled State and Federal 
patronage; Duckworth, on the other hand, controlled munici­
pal policy without interference from the Organization.32 
The Organization in Norfolk seems to have evolved away from 
the potential for corruption that existed during the boom 
period of the war years, and, once battered by the municipal 
housecleaning during the People's administration, now seemed 
content to concentrate on the less important "favors" of 
city government that kept its machinery alive: controlling
patronage appointments, government contracts, permit 
variances, ordinance enforcement, and overseeing promotions, 
especially in the more political agencies, like the Police 
and Fire Departments.33 With a strongman like Duckworth
32Claude J. Staylor; Harold Sugg; Robert Mason; 
and L. Cameron Gregory.
33Claude J. Staylor; and John F. Estes, former Police 
officer, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk,
20 September 1979.
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at the helm of city government, the Prieur Organization now 
seemed both unable and unwilling to challenge the authority 
of the Mayor, thus giving him free reign to direct basic 
policy as he wished.34
If the people were worried about the fact that all 
this power, both political and governmental, was rapidly 
concentrating in the office of their Mayor, they gave little 
indication of such concern. By and large, those advanced by 
Duckworth and his advisors to both political office and 
appointive positions were men and women of good character 
who were probably more representative of all the people in 
the city than the selections of the Silkstocking crowd. If 
a special danger existed in so establishing W. Fred Duck­
worth as a benevolent dictator, it would come from one of 
several quarters: first, the Mayor and his advisors might
lose touch with the public will; they had spoken so long on 
behalf of the citizenry in making all of the city's 
decisions that they might now discover that they had lost 
the ability to listen, and, in so losing touch, risk running 
contrary to the will of the people on some critical issue. 
Second, because the Mayor had been such an aggressive 
spokesman and the people were so obviously content to sit 
back silently, there was a danger that if a small and vocal 
minority ever became really well organized, then the Mayor 
might over-react to their pronouncements, as if all the
34Robert L. Mason; Harold Sugg; and Claude J. Staylor.
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people had spoken. Also, the famous Duckworth temper might 
intrude upon the Mayor's otherwise sound judgement. Already 
city hall was abuzz with murmured rumors about those indivi­
duals, even respected members of the city's business and 
professional society, who had dared in even a minor way to 
oppose the Mayor or one of his programs, only to find their 
livelihood suddenly threatened.35 Stories also existed 
about how even senior city officials who had attempted to 
question a Duckworth decision had been publicly humiliated 
by the Mayor in a tirade of verbal abuse.3® These, 
however, were only petty examples of an even greater danger; 
so far no one knew just how far the Mayor might go in a fit 
of pique to destroy a political opponent or some other, 
greater threat to his administration. Earlier in the decade 
the Black community had experienced a pattern of mayoral 
revenge for their political deviation, and the Broad Creek 
Shores controversy had shown that Duckworth was not opposed 
to employing the official powers of the city to punish his 
opposition, but these actions only hinted at the even 
greater dangers that lay ahead now that Mayor W. Fred 
Duckworth had achieved full domination over every phase of 
Norfolk's municipal operation.
35Gordon Dillon, "An Exceptionally Talented Lad," Article 
One I, no. ii (May, 1970), pp. 17-19.
36Harold Sugg.
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Finally, there was the danger that, in spite of all 
his power and demonstrated skills, Mayor Duckworth had not 
yet put his authority to work on any of his own programs.
C. A. Harrell and the People's administration had left 
behind a very precisely planned and carefully orchestrated 
program of action, and Duckworth's success in bringing those 
plans to reality had brought him much well deserved popu­
larity and unparalleled economic stability to the city.
Now, however, the People's program was past— Redevelopment 
Project One was drawing to a close, the last units of public 
housing were under construction, the bridge-tunnel connector 
to Portsmouth was open, the ambitious annexation program was 
complete, hundreds of new classrooms had been added to the 
school system, new water and sewer works were already on 
line, revamped health, housing, sanitation, and building 
codes were being enforced, and the area was going through 
the greatest building boom in its history,3"7 and if Duck­
worth had an agenda of his own, it was a secret as closely 
guarded as the announcement of his running mates in the next 
councilmanic election. Now that all these projects were 
complete, and the People's follow-up phase of development 
had been rejected, Norfolk was about to enter into a new 
stage of growth that would carry Mayor Duckworth's distinc­
tive and, as yet, undiscernible stamp. The danger, of 
course, was that all the powers he had amassed by building
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 March 1955.
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to the People's blueprint might somehow be perverted by some 
as yet unseen factor— his propensity for revenge, his 
inability to discern the true voice of the people, or, in 
the face of some great public silence, that he would be 
prompted to over-react by a vocal and well-organized 
minority now that he was both the architect and the builder.
Now at the peak of both his political and municipal 
power, Mayor W. Fred Duckworth was preparing to launch at 
last his own program of development, only this time there 
was no fanfare, no minority advisors, no citizen involve­
ment, and no prior publicity. That was not his style; the 
Mayor moved in a more deliberate and purposeful manner. He 
was unhampered by either the open accessibility or the 
frenzy of participatory democracy that had so preoccupied 
his predecessors as to bog them down in the form, instead of 
the substance of government, and thus they had lost the 
ability to continue. The Duckworth style involved instead 
both the acquisition of power and the display of its use, 
and he had done well in both regards, having constructed the 
base for unparalleled personal control from the blueprints 
left over from the People's administration. The Building 
Era was now past, and the last of the People's programs was 
either completed or put away forever. The Cultural Center, 
the planned waterfront development, and the harbor quay had 
all been tabled; instead Norfolk's priorities under 
Duckworth would now shift away from developing its assets
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and turn toward destroying its liabilities. Chief among 
those liabilities, of course, was the impending school 
desegregation crisis, now bottled up in the federal courts 
on a string of technicalities that could snap at any moment. 
Since Mayor Duckworth had not yet spoken out on the 
desegregation issue, few residents could have guessed that 
in the coming months he would attempt to deal so directly 
with the crisis, using the powers of city government to 
oppose the threat of forced integration as if it were just 
another political rival. The stakes in such an undertaking 
were frighteningly high— the desegregation controversy was 
more than just a collection of human opponents, it 
represented the single most overwhelming force of the coming 
decade. Few people, however, were visionary enough at that 
time to discern just how powerful that force would become, 
and all across the Commonwealth the state's political 
leaders were hastening to erect paper barriers and legal 
obstacles to divert the onslaught of desegregation.
Duckworth alone emerged with a plan carefully contrived to 
construct more permanent breastworks, and had his plan 
succeeded, it probably would have been imitated all across 
the nation. Still, few men anywhere in municipal government 
were in a better position to hazard such a venture: Mayor
W. Fred Duckworth was riding high on the crest of a wave of 
municipal accomplishment, partisan consensus, and personal 
leadership; he had obtained absolute control over every
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phase of his city's governmental machinery, and he had 
subdued almost every source of potent opposition. Even so, 
the risk was just apparent enough that the Mayor saw fit to 
hedge his bets in secrecy and couch his plan in the guise of 
the People's priorities. This was a masterful stroke: no
matter how comprehensive the endeavor, if it failed, he 
would be able to step clear from its liabilities and disavow 
the complicity of his involvement.
Redevelopment leaped suddenly to the forefront of 
municipal policy, just as it had during the heyday of the 
People's administration, and events began to move rapidly—  
too rapidly for the citizens to fully comprehend either 
their significance or their comprehensiveness. In December 
(1956), the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
announced the commencement of two new undertakings, both 
begun after the Mayor had forcefully suggested their 
initiation.38 N.R.H.A. Project Two would concentrate on 
clearing just over 37 acres of blighted housing in the 
Lamberts Point section of the city,39 providing vital 
growing room to the Norfolk Division of the College of 
William and Mary and Virginia Politechnical Institute (now 
Old Dominion University), finally enabling it to break out 
of the narrow confines of its two-year preparatory and trade
sspretlow Darden.
39Norfolk Redevelopment And Housing Authority, Annual 
Report to the City Council, (Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1974). p. 39.
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school curriculum. The second project proposed to bulldoze 
90 acres in the Atlantic City portion of Norfolk,40 the 
chief beneficiary of which would be Norfolk General 
(Sentara) Hospital, another popular but badly landlocked 
public institution. Before that phase of the project could 
even be approved, an additional 45 acres were added to the 
Atlantic City proposal to accommodate long-standing People's 
plans to improve adjacent health, highway, and tunnel 
facilities.
In marked contrast to Redevelopment Project One, no 
public housing was planned for either the Atlantic City or 
the Old Dominion (N.R.H.A. Project Two) Project, even though 
the two areas combined were more than twice the size of the 
People's N.R.H.A. Project One, and the Atlantic City area 
alone contained close to a 1,000 dwellings.41 As a matter 
of fact, the Redevelopment and Housing Authority was just 
beginning to embark upon another venture which would destroy 
an additional 2,600 dwellings— units that would have been 
perfectly suited as temporary public housing and ease the 
relocation of refugees from the Atlantic City and Old 
Dominion Projects. By annexation, Norfolk had acquired the 
468-acre site of Broad Creek Village, a temporary war 
housing project still occupied by the families of government
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 December 1956.
41Frank Sullivan, "Norfolk's Redevelopment Story," 
Norfolk XVI: 7 (November, 1954), p. 9.
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the Navy,42 the Redevelopment and Housing Authority was in 
the process of razing those dwellings to make room for a 
mammoth industrial park,43 thereby compounding even 
further the relocation problem.
Bulldozers were still roaring through the dwellings in 
the Atlantic City, Broad Creek, and Old Dominion Projects 
when the N.R.H.A announced a fourth venture, the Downtown 
Redevelopment Project. In a carefully concerted attack the 
Authority swept bare more than 200 acres in the oldest part 
of the city.44 The central focus of the assault was 
Norfolk's notorious East Main Street sin strip, where once a 
vast array of bars, honky tonks, amusement palaces, tattoo 
parlors, flophouses, and burlesques had entertained the 
fleet and brought disrepute to more legitimate downtown 
businessmen. More than 400 commercial structures would fall 
in this massive attempt to wipe out a repugnant merchandis­
ing industry, and an additional 485 residences would be 
razed without the addition of any new public housing units 
for their evacuees.45
With the initiation of these four near-simultaneous 
endeavors— the Atlantic City, Old Dominion, Broad Creek, and
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1954.
43Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Annual 
Report To The City Council (1974), op cit., p. 39.
44Ibid., p. 15.
45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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Downtown Projects— the city was casting aside a sizeable 
portion of its developed land— more than 800 acres were 
scheduled for clearance— in exchange for new opportunities 
for growth. This new phase of redevelopment was unques­
tionably the Mayor's: although none of the four projects
were new ideas to his Administration— all four had been 
kicked around, along with numerous other proposals, among 
the various planning and advisory commissions— the enormous 
scope of this undertaking was Duckworth's invention,46 the 
size of the projects, the simultaneity of the endeavor, the 
speed with which they were undertaken, and even the ration­
ale for such dramatic action all derived their impetus from 
his character. In just pure size, this new phase in 
redevelopment was staggering: the four projects encompassed
an area ten times the size of N.R.H.A. Project One, which 
itself was twice the size of any development that New York 
or any other city had attempted.47 More than 20,000 
people, almost a tenth of Norfolk's population,48 would be 
forced to flee the bulldozers in this new phase of demoli­
tion. More than 4,000 residential structures, many with 
several apartment, and more than 500 commercial structures 
would be razed in this unprecedented series of projects.
4SPretlow Darden.
47Architectural Forum, op cit., p. 132.
48Based upon an analysis of census tract data for the
four areas involved. See U . S . Bureau of the Census, U . S .
Census of Population: (1950), op cit.
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The rapidity with which all four projects were under­
taken was almost as startling: less than nine months lapsed
from the announcement of the Atlantic City Project to the 
time that demolition work actually began in earnest; the 
N.R.H.A. began tearing down structures in Broad Creek almost 
as soon as it took title to the land from the Navy. By 
marked contrast, Project One had been three years in the 
planning phase before the Council had made the first 
appropriation, and then another full year passed before 
demolition work actually began. Also by comparison, no 
formal plan existed for what would be done in the areas once 
they were cleared. Although the official explanation for 
all four projects was that they were desperately needed to 
provide room for industrial expansion, downtown development, 
and growth of the city's municipal, educational, health, and 
transportation facilities, no blueprints or scale models of 
such enterprises were trotted out for public display.
Either the Mayor felt no need to "sell" the projects in this 
way, or else he really did not have any firm commitments yet 
for new hospital wings, educational structures, industrial 
facilities, or commercial ventures. N.R.H.A. Project One 
was one-tenth the size of the new undertakings, and it had 
still taken six years under the Duckworth administration to 
complete, and this in spite of the fact that it was vastly 
over planned in comparison to the new proposals.
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In spite of the fact that plans for redeveloping the 
projects were at best only loosely formulated, the Duckworth 
administration had good reason to rush them off the drawing 
boards and into the demolition stage as quickly as possible. 
The rationale behind this seeming impulsiveness was not 
based upon any immediate demand for cleared land, for, 
indeed, the Mayor had never placed a very high priority upon 
the drudgery and precision of community planning; his forte 
was quick and dramatic action, and the singleness with which 
N.R.H.A. pursued condemnation in these projects was no 
exception. Ironically the administration that had built its 
reputation upon building to the People's specifications 
would now turn to rapid demolition of property before new 
plans for its use could be fully drawn, but the simple truth 
remains that new construction lagged far behind in the list 
of municipal priorities. The new focus was upon clearing 
land where existing uses were seriously threatening the 
continued prosperity of the city. It is easy to see why the 
sleazy bars and honky tonks, the festering slums, and the 
seedy business houses scheduled for removal in the Downtown 
Project were undesirable land uses, but why would a city 
suffering an acute shortage of adequate and sanitary housing 
units (the 1940 Census had demonstrated that 40% of the 
city's housing stock was either "dilapidated" or contained 
inadequate sanitation facilities)49 suddenly turn to
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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destroy more than 3,500 units with decent plumbing? Why, 
too, would a city desperate for low-cost housing units, 
especially for its Black residents, suddenly propose to 
bulldoze more than 4,250 such units without planning any 
additional housing, either public or private?
Each of the projects poses an interesting contradic­
tion to sound planning practices. Broad Creek Village, for 
instance, was unquestionably an ideal site for future indus­
trial development, but it would take years to fill the 468- 
acre site. In the meantime the area was occupied by 2,600 
individual family homes, all less than 15 years old and all 
equipped with modern sewage and sanitation facilities. 
Although the homes had been built by the Navy during the war 
as demountable units, prefabrication was becoming more and 
more the rule in new home construction. Uncertainty about 
the future of the village had unquestionably contributed 
markedly to its decline, but the area still showed signs of 
health and usefulness as a solid working-class community. 
Broad Creek Village had served a very unique and successful 
purpose as a settlement of wartime government housing, but 
shortly after the Korean War the Navy sought to sever its 
relationship as landlord and turn that function over to 
public housing agencies like the Norfolk Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority. Since N.R.H.A. Executive Director Larry 
Cox had already gone on record as opposing the continuation 
of Broad Creek Village as either low income or public
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housing,50 the area resident were bitterly opposed to a 
N.R.H.A. takeover. Since the property was technically in a 
portion of Norfolk County still slated for annexation by the 
city of Norfolk, the residents fought vigorously to have the 
Navy turn it over to either the county or to some sort of 
tenant-sponsored mutual ownership organization. The 
N.R.H.A. publicly persisted in its desire to demolish the 
entire tract, and this bitterness between the tenants and 
the new landlord helped to speed the deterioration of the 
village once the N.R.H.A. actually did take over management. 
Angry residents blamed the deterioration upon the Housing 
Authority for failure to perform simple maintenance duties, 
but the condition can just as easily be traced back to the 
residents themselves, who, because of uncertainty over the 
area's future, failed to maintain the same level of upkeep 
as they had when the future of the project was secure under 
federal auspices.51
Hurricane Hazel struck in 1954 just as the N.R.H.A. 
was taking title to the property,52 but the debate over 
which agency had responsibility to repair the damage, 
including more than 30 carloads of missing shingles,53 
soon became a moot point. Once the N.R.H.A. assumed full
5°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 July 1955.
slNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1955.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 August 1954
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 June 1958.
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control, it began closing off certain sections and preparing 
them for demolition. The sight of barricaded streets, 
vandalized properties, and boarded-up buildings panicked the 
residents into agreeing to the total rezoning of the 
property for industrial use. They hoped that by agreeing to 
the rezoning and the eventual demise of the entire site that 
they were actually buying time; they hoped that the N.R.H.A. 
would change course and institute a program of gradual 
removal as prospects for industrial development solidi­
fied.34 Their hopes, however, were short-lived; within 
three years most of the residents had been driven out.55
It really makes very little difference who created a 
slum out of Broad Creek Village, for by the time the 
bulldozers actually began to roll through the area, blight 
had become rampant. What had once been a valuable assem­
blage of relatively new housing units— all with two to three 
bedrooms, hardwood floors, deep sash windows, modern plumb­
ing fixtures, and sturdy interior constructions— had 
degenerated quickly into a full scale slum, replete with 
vandalized and deserted buildings, piles of rubbish, and the 
look of despair that generally characterizes areas slated 
for demolition. In its heyday--during the war and the years 
immediately following when its survival had been certain—  
Broad Creek had been an ideal working-class community: it
54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1955.
55Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 June 1958.
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had almost no crime, the neighbors looked out for one 
another, shared a sense of purpose, and felt compassion and 
kinship with one another— in short it exhibited a remarkable 
unity of spirit and sense of community. By the end of the 
war it had lost its appearance as a military camp, and 
residents worked feverishly to tend their gardens, improve 
their dwelling, and save up enough to purchase their own 
unit. Although out in the county, Broad Creek natives felt 
that they had their own little city unto themselves: it had
its own schools, churches, parks, playgrounds, stores, and 
commercial areas— and for more than 5,000 people it was 
"home,” for many their first real home. No wonder that its 
residents fought so bitterly against the city's plans to 
tear the structures down; they could not believe that with 
all the newly-annexed farm land, Norfolk could not find a 
better place for industry than on top of their homes. 
Ironically, today, more than 30 years after Broad Creek 
Village was razed, many of its original "slum" dwellings 
remain in other parts of the city: many of the residents
refused to have their units torn down, and so bought them 
from the Housing Authority for a couple of hundred dollars, 
and then paid to have them moved to other sites.56
Broad Creek Village was not, however, the only area of 
the city where residents blamed the N.R.H.A. for precipitat­
ing its decline by spreading rumors of destruction. When
56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1979.
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Norfolk first began talking back in 1949 about wholesale 
redevelopment of the city's aging neighborhoods on the 
fringe of the downtown, Atlantic City was one of the few 
predominantly white neighborhoods mentioned in the early 
speculations.5-7 Founded around the cotton mill, Fort 
Norfolk, the seafood industry, and the Smith Creek marinas, 
Atlantic City had been one of Norfolk's first suburbs, 
predating Ghent, its richer cousin across the Hague (Smith 
Creek), by almost a decade.
Since Atlantic City contained the industries that 
supported the carriage set who lived in Ghent, most of its 
dwelling units were working-class row houses or multi-family 
structures. These lent themselves easily to over-crowding 
and exploitation by nonresident landlords during the 
critical housing shortage that prevailed throughout World 
War II and the years immediately following, but these 
conditions were prevalent in even the city's finest 
neighborhoods. As rumors of its redevelopment spread, 
however, those same property owners were understandably 
unwilling to undertake major repairs or improvements, and 
the area took on many of the appearances of a "blighted" 
neighborhood.53 Atlantic City, however, should have been 
just the sort of neighborhood that the city's revamped 
health, housing, and building codes were supposed to
S7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 October 1949.
5sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.
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rehabilitate; indeed, in the two years before the Atlantic 
City Project was formally announced, more than a thousand 
homes in the city had been rehabilitated.59 Much of the 
housing scheduled for removal in the Downtown Projects had 
unquestionably deteriorated beyond repair: census tract 
studies indicate that more than 80% of the units had 
inadequate plumbing facilities, that 96% were built before 
1920, that 94% were without any form of central heating, and 
that the median contract rent in 1949 had been only $14.51 
per month.60 The Atlantic City Project, however, proves a 
sharp contrast: in 1949, at a time when the severe housing
crisis in the community had precipitated subdividing many 
older homes into multi-unit apartments, almost a quarter of 
the Atlantic City homes were still single family, free­
standing houses; another fourth were free-standing duplexes, 
a popular building style in many older neighborhoods; and 
close to 20% of the homes were less than 30 years old. In 
addition, more than 70% of the units had adequate plumbing 
(two apartments that shared a bathroom, a common practice in 
many areas of the city, were downgraded in the census report 
as having inadequate plumbing facilities). More than half 
of the units had central heating, and the median contract 
rent was $34.86, more than twice the value in the structures
59Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 October 1956.
soU. S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Census of Population: 
1950, vol. Ill, Census Tract Studies, Chapter 38 (Washington,
D.C., 1952). p. 22 (census tract 42).
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torn down in both the Downtown Redevelopment Project or 
N.R.H.A. Project One.61 Undoubtedly a number of struc­
tures in the Atlantic City project had deteriorated beyond 
rehabilitation, even by today's standards in which restoring 
older, central city homes has become so fashionable, but 
many of the deficiencies noted in the census studies were 
not only in keeping with existing city codes, they were also 
common practices during the wartime and postwar housing 
crises locally.62
Ironically, Atlantic City was chosen by the Norfolk 
Health Department for a major code enforcement initiative 
precisely because of the overall quality of its structures 
and the fact that they were so salvageable. Since federally 
funded redevelopment projects required that the locality 
rehabilitate one housing unit for each unit torn down, 
Norfolk had adopted one of the first comprehensive minimum 
housing codes in the country. Because Norfolk was only the 
second city in the nation (the other was Baltimore) to 
attempt large scale enforcement of its code, the Health 
Department was looking for a neighborhood that was good 
enough to salvage, but not so bad that code enforcement 
efforts would make little difference. After careful 
analysis of the 1950 census data and some preliminary field
61Ibid., pp. 21 and 22 (census tracts 35, 39, and 42).
62see Marvin W. Schlegel, Conscripted City, op cit., 
pp. 20 - 50.
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work, the Health Department chose Atlantic City for the 
first concentrated housing code enforcement effort in the 
country. When the staff of the Health Department met with 
N.R.H.A. Executive Director Larry Cox, they were told that 
the Housing Authority had no plans to begin any redevelop­
ment activity in Atlantic City for "at least five to ten 
years," and that were other areas of the city rated a much 
"higher priority."63
According to G. D. Monola, the former Director of 
Environmental Health who led the code enforcement project, 
the only badly deteriorated section of Atlantic City lay 
along the site of Brambleton Avenue. Because this area had 
mixed commercial, industrial, and residential uses, rental 
units had been allowed by absentee landlords to degenerate. 
Black families displaced by Project One had begun moving in 
to this section, but because it was separate from the other 
residential blocks, there was none of the violence or strong 
community reaction that had occurred in Brambleton or 
Coronado. In short, Atlantic City had "integrated without 
any difficulty . . . without any fanfare, any publicity, or 
any Klan activity." Moreover, the fact that Blacks were now 
moving into these units meant that they could command higher 
rents, and the landlords were thus more willing to make the 
investments necessary to bring the dwellings up to code.
63G . D. Monola, former Director of Environmental Health, 
interview by author, Norfolk, 3 April 1991.
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For this reason, the sudden announcement of the entire 
demolition of the neighborhood caught both the residents and 
the Health Department by surprise. The code enforcement 
project had just been completed, and nearly every dwelling 
unit had been brought up to the city's new minimum housing 
code, some at considerable cost to the property owners. 
According to Monola, the Health Department had been meeting 
regularly with the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority, and the Authority had not mentioned the possible 
demolition of the neighborhood until the plans were 
announced in the press. The fact that the Housing Authority 
had used the Health Department surveys as justification for 
the demolition helped to deepen the rift between the two 
agencies. Although there were a "surprisingly large number 
of owner occupied dwellings" in the area and most of the 
dwelling units were well worth saving, especially now that 
they had been rehabilitated, the Housing Authority persisted 
in its effort, against the advice of the Health Department, 
to push for demolition of the entire area. Even though a 
building could meet all the requirements of the city's 
minimum housing code and still have major defects, the 
Health Department felt that the Housing Authority had gone 
overboard in its rush to expand the project beyond the 
fairly restrictive area of blight along the present site of 
Brambleton Avenue. Block after block where only a few de­
fects were listed were included in the project, but because
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these were lumped together with the worst cases, the area 
just did meet the minimum requirement of five defects per 
dwelling to qualify as a federally funded redevelopment 
project.
Thus, in an ironical twist, the Atlantic City housing 
units that had been rehabilitated as a result of N.R.H.A. 
Project One, were then torn down in Norfolk's second phase 
of redevelopment. Residents were furious with the Health 
Department, especially when they learned that the appraisal 
of their property from the N.R.H.A. was less than the cost 
of the improvements required by the Health Department to 
bring the dwelling up to the minimum housing code. The 
Health Department's code enforcement effort suffered as a 
result of the public uproar, and disagreements over the size 
and scope of the Atlantic City project eventually led to a 
severe split between the two agencies; no longer would the 
Health Department help in the housing rehabilitation efforts 
of the N.R.H.A.,64 and even today the city and the Housing 
Authority operate separate housing rehabilitation units with 
overlapping authority, mission, and purpose.
Obviously after eight years of rumored destruction and 
the general state of despair and disrepair that follows such 
rumors, portions of the Atlantic City neighborhood were in 
danger of becoming a slum. The Norfolk Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority pointed to the Health Department surveys
64G. D. Monola.
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as proof that it had higher incidence of tuberculosis, 
venereal disease, juvenile delinquency, dilapidated housing, 
racial unrest, crimes, fires, and rat infestation than other 
neighborhoods in the city,®5 but the residents complained 
that all of these had come to the area since the talk of 
redevelopment:
It seems that considerable time and effort 
has gone into preparing reports by various 
functions of the city government to show that 
Atlantic City has been a detriment to the rest 
of the city. If it was such a blight on our 
city, and its effects [were] so far reaching as 
to affect the whole city, wouldn't this fact 
have been so outstanding that it would speak for 
itself without having to be figured [in such a 
way so as] to prove it?s®
Few citizens and even fewer organizations were willing 
to take up these cries, however, and oppose the project.
Only those most affected by demolition— the owners of 
private homes, apartment buildings, or commercial property 
in the target area— showed any inclination to fight. The 
most vigorous opposition to the Atlantic City Project came 
not from the residents, but rather from yachting enthusiasts 
and environmentalists who opposed the closing of the Smith 
Creek Marina by the proposed low-level Brambleton Avenue 
bridge.®7 Replacing the old two-lane drawbridge with a
®sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 June 1957. 
®®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.
67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1957.
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broad fixed span was, however, one of the few really neces­
sary proposals in the entire project: Norfolk desperately
needed another thoroughfare connecting the downtown with the 
Hampton Boulevard corridor, and the proposed Brambleton 
Avenue route clearly offered the best planning alterna­
tive.6® Moreover, almost all of the really deteriorated 
dwellings in Atlantic City could have been demolished by 
careful placement of this one highway project alone. The 
rest not only could have been spared, they were worth 
saving.69
Other aspects of the Atlantic City Project were either 
too vague for thorough assessment, too long-term in their 
design, too haphazard in their application, or else so 
incompatible with the other developments as to be strikingly 
ill-conceived. The project area itself was a strange 
configuration that zigged and zagged its way from Clairmont 
Avenue in West Ghent to Monticello Avenue in downtown 
Norfolk, never stretching more than just a few blocks in 
width (see Figure 2 on the next page). The lines were 
purposely drawn to exclude certain blocks, specific 
commercial structures, and even single residences from 
demolition while the area around them was completely
68See Charles K. Agle, A Master Plan For The Central 
Business And Financial District, op cit., and Norfolk City 
Planning Commission, Major Highway Plan, Part I, Major 
Highways and Streets, (Norfolk, 1950).
69G. D. Monola.
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leveled. The 700 block of Yarmouth Street, for instance, 
was spared by an odd gerrymandering of the district, while 
the neighboring 700 blocks of Botetourt, Dunmore, and Duke 
Streets were slated for removal. All the waterfront 
property along the southern edge of Smith Creek was slated 
for demolition while the rotting wharves, sagging ware­
houses, and crumbling storage facilities on the Elizabeth 
River just a block away were spared.
Outside of the close to 40 acres that would be used 
for hospital, public health, highway, and tunnel facilities, 
the rest of the project seemingly had little reason for 
inclusion. Plans for their use were as yet unspecified, but 
the N.R.H.A. speculated that the remaining 95 acres would 
provide a basis for industrial sites, semi-luxury 
apartments, and improvements along the Hague (Smith Creek) 
waterfront,-70 yet none of these uses was fully compatible 
with the realities of the site: the proposed path of the
Brambleton Avenue thoroughfare swung too close to the 
southern border of the Hague to render all but a corner on 
each edge of the remaining waterfront property unsuited to 
these purposes. If the area was ever to have a real future 
as a highrise or luxury housing development, the sites along 
the Elizabeth River not yet scheduled for clearance would be 
far better suited. Similarly, the 56 acres that were set 
aside for light industry in the project, had little hope of
■^N.R.H.A., Report, op cit., p. 12.
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FIGURE Z. Atlantic City Redevelopment Project.









attracting prospective customers when realistically compared 
to the 468 acres of prime industrial land being opened up in 
the Broad Creek site. In addition to major rail and highway 
connections, the Broad Creek Industrial Park was close to 
both the central business district and the rapidly shifting 
population center of the Tidewater region; its sheer size 
meant that a number of related manufacturing, assemblage, 
and storage facilities could all be located in close proxim­
ity. The Atlantic City Project offered instead a number of 
smaller, odd-shaped parcels of land, all of which carried 
the higher taxation rate and building restrictions inherent 
in a downtown location.
In sharp contrast to earlier People's endeavors, 
planning of the public expenditure portion of the project 
was more than just vague, it was counterproductive. Only 
the proposals for highway facilities and tunnel access ramps 
were fully conceived before demolition began. It was true 
that Norfolk's hospital and public health needs would grow 
in coming years, but the Atlantic City Project proposed to 
clear in 1957 land for expansion of the medical center 
complex that would not be occupied for at least twenty years 
in the future.71 At the other end of the project the 
N.R.H.A. was condemning the land around the Norfolk (now
71The present sites of the Tidewater Red Cross, Tidewater 
Rehabilitation Institute, Mental Health Center, and Eastern 
Virginia Medical School were cleared fifteen to twenty years 
or more before their construction.
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Chrysler) Museum upon which the People's planners had once 
hoped to build the Cultural Center extension of the downtown 
business district. Because of the city's extensive involve­
ment with the Downtown Redevelopment Project— more than 200 
acres in the heart of the city's commercial district were 
swept bare and "only a dozen buildings were left standing, 
giving the downtown the appearance of having been ravaged by 
a massive air raid"72— the library, monument park, civic 
center, naval museum,73 and other public expenditures were 
needed instead to help fill in the hole left by demolitions 
further downtown. The land where once the People's planners 
hoped to attract a consulate's row, charity organizations, 
convention hotel, outdoor cafes, and specialty shops was 
given over instead to long-term parking lots, open fields, 
and misplaced convenience stores. Hopes for a Cultural 
Center and other orderly expansions of the central business 
district were decimated by the sudden oversupply of vacant 
land that now ringed the downtown.
Clearly there was no immediate need for all the vacant 
land that had suddenly been made available through the 
enormous scope of this redevelopment activity. Although 
each of the four projects had a noble purpose at its
72John C. Schmidt, "Norfolk: A City Remakes Itself," 
Baltimore, March 1959 (N.R.H.A. reprint), p. 6.
73Plans for a naval museum, which was to be built at the 
foot of St. Paul's Boulevard near the Omni Hotel property, 
collapsed more than a decade later.
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heart— expansion of industrial, highway, tunnel, education­
al, or medical facilities— none evidenced any of the signs 
of precision and clarity of purpose which so completely 
characterized the endeavors of the People's Administration. 
When one considers the tremendous destructive force un­
leashed upon the city in these four new undertakings, the 
more than 800 acres scheduled for clearance, the 20,000 
individuals to be uprooted, the demolition of whole communi­
ties, the heavy financial burden that would be carried even 
far into the future, and the tremendous urgency with which 
the whole affair was undertaken, it becomes obvious that 
some underlying ulterior motive must knit these projects 
together into a unified plan of action, and that, whatever 
the objective, immediate demolition of properties that had 
somehow become offensive was granted a far higher priority 
than redevelopment. Mayor W. Fred Duckworth had proven 
himself to be too skillful at administrating the city's 
affairs during the Building Phase of municipal growth to so 
lose control during the Bulldozer Era; he had shown too 
great a mastery of power politics not to be brokering some 
sort of deal with these developments.
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FIGURE 3. Norfolk's Black,. Mixed Race, and Transition Neighborhoods, (.from 1950 U, S, Census figures)
1. T1tustown / Carney Park
2. Oakwood / Rosemont
3. Uptown
4. Berkley
5. U. S. Navy Housing





6. O.D.U. / Lambert's Point
7. Atlantic City 11. Coronado
8. Downtown 12. Broad Creek Park
9. Brambleton 
10. (Broad Creek Shores)
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FIGURE 4. Norfolk's DualSchool System, Circa 1954 (Norfolk Ledger-Oispatch, 18 May 19^4).
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The process of planning and redevelopment had come 
full circle in Norfolk: what had begun under the People's
administration as a noble attempt to build the great city of 
the future had become corrupted by more pressing political 
and social concerns. Thus Norfolk, because it was the very 
first city in the country to attempt redevelopment and among 
the foremost to initiate urban renewal on any large scale, 
also became one of the early leaders at manipulating its 
exemplary purposes to serve a more personal, partisan end. 
Redevelopment in Norfolk had fallen from its position as 
part of an overall program of community improvement and had 
instead become but one weapon in the arsenal of a powerful 
political leader, one who was willing to employ this new 
tool to chastise his enemies, reward his supporters, and 
otherwise strengthen his grasp on municipal government.
Mayor W. Fred Duckworth was not so much trying to rebuild 
Norfolk as attempting to redesign it in a more personally 
acceptable form; in so doing he was guided as much by the 
vagaries of redevelopment law as he was by more salient 
considerations.
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Although Norfolk's four new redevelopment projects 
proposed massive new public and quasi-governmental facili­
ties— new hospital, public health, educational, highway, 
tunnel, and municipal structures— all of these, and in fact 
most of the other elements associated with the renewal plans 
could have been achieved without subjecting the city to the 
tremendous destruction necessitated by redevelopment.
Norfolk already had the power under its grant of eminent 
domain to acquire private land for just such public uses, 
but the city was attracted by the additional grant of 
authority offered by redevelopment legislation. Under 
redevelopment, a city could legally acquire private 
property, clear it, and then resell it to new and different 
private owners. This was supposed to correct the misuse of 
valuable urban land, but, instead, it encouraged cities like 
Norfolk to acquire more land than they could ever use. 
Redeveloping an area, as opposed to just condemning the land 
necessary for public facilities, actually rewarded a city 
for expanding the scope of its public works proposals: 
first, it allowed them to acquire huge tracts of valuable 
private property that they could never have otherwise 
obtained; secondly, the cities were paid by the federal 
government in matching funds to clear the land for reuse; 
finally, redevelopment cost the city no more than it would 
have spent anyway on its smaller scale public works 
projects. Thus, although it had plans to use less than a
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third of the acreage in the Downtown and Atlantic City 
projects for public facilities, Norfolk, because it could 
qualify the entire area as redevelopment projects, was able 
to acquire close to 200 acres of additional land on the edge 
of the central business district, including some of the most 
potentially valuable commercial and waterfront sites in the 
city. In addition, in purchasing, clearing, and redevelop­
ing this land, the city did not have to put up a penny more 
than it would have had to spend anyway on the necessary 
public facilities.1
Thus redevelopment, because it gave the city these 
vast tracts of highly valuable land, was a boon both to the 
business community who sought their re-use and the power 
brokers who controlled their eventual disposition. The 
Atlantic City and Downtown Projects were an immediate hit 
with the leaders of Norfolk's Silkstocking establishment for 
a number of other reasons. Just as in N.R.H.A. Project One, 
redevelopment destroys unwanted uses of land, and it was 
easy to see why the old People's planners would have dreamed 
of wiping out the "uglies" contained in the two project 
areas: the Downtown site contained some of the city's worst
slums that, because of their close proximity to the central 
business district, would forever impede further commercial 
expansion in the downtown area; in addition, the city's
xPretlow Darden; Roy B. Martin, Jr.; and Francis 
Crenshaw.
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notorious East Main Street sin strip and red-light district, 
Norfolk's most repugnant reminder of the shady days of its 
wartime past, were likewise targeted for demolition; by 
contrast, the housing and small commercial establishments in 
the Atlantic City area were not nearly as deteriorated or as 
offensive as those downtown, but the Silkstocking crowd had 
never been happy with having this deteriorating working- 
class community so close to the prosperous in-town estates 
of the Ghent neighborhood, Norfolk's most prestigious real 
estate development and the home of most of its Silkstocking 
establishment. The declining fortunes of the Atlantic City 
area had already begun to affect real estate values in the 
neighboring Ghent communities, and the N.R.H.A. Commission­
ers, one of the last bastions of the old People's rule, felt 
that the demolition slated for the area was the only way to 
"save" Ghent from similar deterioration.2 Similarly, the 
Old Dominion Project helped to create a convenient buffer 
zone between the working-class community of Lamberts Point 
and the wealthier subdivisions of Larchmont and Edgewater.
Some of the members of the old People's coalition 
undoubtedly had been in on planning at least a portion of 
Norfolk's new endeavors: since 1950 the People's Planning
Commission had been proposing an additional access route to 
the downtown area by linking Broad Creek Road (now 
Brambleton Avenue) with an extension of Hampton Boulevard;
2Pretlow Darden.
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the Elizabeth River Tunnel Commission had been lobbying 
almost as long for an additional underwater link with 
Portsmouth at its Pinner's Point terminus;3 the massive 
municipal Health Department that had been so much a part of 
the People's cleanup and code enforcement campaigns had been 
in desperate need of expanded facilities for some time; and 
for more than a decade a general consensus had prevailed 
among the business community that the fate of any New 
Norfolk would be invariably linked to proposals to expand 
the city's two-year college and its general hospital into 
vast urban educational and medical centers. Indeed, the 
list of those who served on the governing bodies of Norfolk 
General Hospital and the Norfolk Division of the College of 
William and Mary/Virginia Politechnical Institute State 
University during these planning years very nearly matches 
any comparable listing of Norfolk's power elite during the 
People's administration. Not even the United Fund, the 
traditional civic endeavor of the Silkstocking establish­
ment, could match the drawing power of these two popular 
institutions: at least five N.R.H.A. commissioners had
served on the hospital's board; two city managers, two 
judges, one state senator, one city councilman, one school 
superintendent, three N.R.H.A. commissioners, two newspaper 
publishers, two Planning commissioners, and one former
3see Norfolk City Planning Commission, Major Highway 
Plan, Part I, Major Highways and Collector Streets (Norfolk, 
1950.)
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governor of Virginia had served in a similar capacity for 
the fledgling precursor to today's Old Dominion University.
A number of other factors were involved in any re­
development project, and in these four new endeavors 
particularly, that were immediately attractive to large 
segments of the business community. Redevelopment, 
especially when it was attempted on such a grand scale, was 
obviously good for business because it brought an infusion 
of new jobs, new revenues, new developmental opportunities, 
and numerous other spin-off and multiplier effects to the 
local economy. Some businessmen would obviously profit 
directly from the projects, either because they owned 
property affected or because their own enterprise would 
participate in some stage of the work. Those firms directly 
involved in demolition, construction, contracting, building 
supply, and related activities, including many enterprises 
owned by the power elite of the People's era, favored these 
new redevelopment proposals; the lawyers who would handle 
the condemnation proceedings, the real estate experts who 
would handle the appraisals, and a host of bankers, building 
and loan executives, real estate agents, and other pro­
fessionals who stood to gain by having so many new people 
suddenly on the move. Others looked forward to unloading 
failing properties that might otherwise have been difficult 
to sell: slum housing faced with major renovations under
the beefed up health and housing codes, landlords in the now
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fading red-light district, expanding industries and 
commercial enterprises that needed to unload outmoded and 
obsolete facilities, and sagging retail establishments faced 
with heavy competition from suburban shopping centers.
Others saw the massive clearance operation as a way to save 
their properties by placing open space barriers between 
their own establishment and deteriorated areas. Some would 
gain by the new development possibilities already under 
consideration— the new medical center complex, for instance, 
would enhance the practice of every Tidewater physician, 
attracting many of them to new office facilities within 
close proximity— while others felt that they would gain by 
participating in the design of future uses for the massive 
tracts of cleared acreage that were still uncommitted.
The myriad economic benefits of redevelopment were 
readily apparent to all who had participated in N.R.H.A. 
Project One: both to Mayor Duckworth, who had played a role
in bringing it to a conclusion, and the People’s planners 
who had participated in its design. N.R.H.A. Project One 
had provided an unparalleled economic boost to the area, and 
its well conceived Tidewater Drive industrial mini-park was 
filled almost before it opened.4 No one doubted that 
Norfolk would continue with new redevelopment proposals, and 
new ideas were eagerly bandied about in the business 
community--some of that speculation may in fact have made
4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 March 1956.
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new redevelopment projects necessary by hastening the 
decline of neighborhoods under consideration. There were 
also, however, some very solid reasons why no individual 
businessman or corporate entity would want to oppose the 
projects under consideration, no matter how far-fetched or 
ill-conceived they might be. Duckworth had never been an 
easy man to confront, and now, with the very special powers 
inherent to redevelopment, any person who openly sought to 
oppose the Mayor, his programs, or his policies would be 
committing an act tantamount to social and financial 
suicide. With so much of the Downtown and neighboring 
Atlantic City residential and commercial properties 
scheduled for clearance— 326 acres with more than 500 
commercial and 700 residential structures— four powerful new 
economic weapons fell into the hands of those who controlled 
the city.
Foremost among these was the power to determine the 
exact boundary lines of the project areas, and, by 
inference, to decide which structures would be exempt.
Since few solid commitments for private development and even 
fewer irreversible proposals for public facilities existed 
at the time of demolition, the N.R.H.A. had tremendous 
leeway in determining which structures would fall and which 
would be spared. Initial plans showed that only 90 acres in 
the Atlantic City area would be cleared,5 but later it was
5Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 December 1956.
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expanded,6 and then enlarged again7 to include an addi­
tional 50 acres of predominantly commercial properties. The 
final shape of the project zigged and zagged its way all the 
way from Clairmont Avenue in the heart of West Ghent to 
Monticello Avenue in the middle of downtown (see Figure Two, 
page 227), purposely avoiding a few commercial structures 
such as the newly built Greyhound garage facilities on 
Colley and Brambleton Avenues, and just as randomly 
including others for demolition. The Tidewater Construction 
Company, the largest commercial establishment effected, was 
ultimately so bitter about its inclusion that it departed 
Norfolk forever for headquarters beyond the city limits.® 
Secondly, the city had considerable leeway in 
determining the acquisition value of land scheduled for 
demolition. In most cases a flat fee, without regard for the 
actual condition or value of the structure, was offered by 
the city for all buildings in a certain class. Those whose 
buildings were equal to or below the value offered were 
obviously satisfied; those with more valuable properties 
faced the costly prospect of hiring an attorney and 
additional appraisers in order to undergo a prolonged legal 
battle. One local attorney, a member of an old line family
6Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 17 February 1957.
7Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Annual 
Report to the City Council (1974), op cit., p. 39.
aNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1957.
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with solid connections into the Silkstocking establishment, 
was willing to fight condemnation and appraisals of business 
properties, but in case after case he found local appraisers 
unwilling to buck the city: they knew that if they attested
to the true value of the properties in question, then they 
would never get any appraisal work from the city again.9
Corollary to the ability to fix the value of the 
building was the power to actually drive down the worth of 
property under consideration, a not uncommon complaint from 
the Broad Creek10 and Atlantic City Projects.11 Robert 
A. Caro tells in The Power Broker how New York handled 
recalcitrant property owners who attempted appeal low 
appraisals: bulldozers moved in to demolish uncontested
properties, leaving the holdouts stranded in a vast 
wasteland of rubble and debris, replete with swirling dust 
storms and unguarded excavations. Electric, sewer, gas and 
water lines to remaining homes were cut by city workers. 
Hordes of scavengers and looters descended upon the area to 
pick the remaining buildings clean. Each day the holdouts 
had to fight their way through an increasingly tortured 
course of rubble, muggers, and derelicts. Still one 
resident held out until the city tore down an adjoining 
building with which he shared a common wall: he dropped the
9see Gordon Dillon, op cit.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1955.
i:LNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.
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appeal and packed his family before his own home 
collapsed.12
Additionally, redevelopment gave the city considerable 
leverage with the local banks and lending institutions. The 
National Bank of Commerce (later Virginia National Bank, and 
now SOVRAN Bank), the locus of power for the Silkstocking 
crowd— its officers and board of directors included two 
former People's Councilmen (Cooke and Darden), two N.R.H.A 
Commissioners (Kaufman and Darden), three Planning Commis­
sioners (Hofheimer, Nicholson, and Miles), and numerous 
other bluebloods of the Silkstocking crowd, including John
S. Alfriend, Frank Batten, Charles F. Burroughs, E. T. 
Gresham, John S. Jenkins, Jr., Harry Mansbach, Hunter 
Phelan, Dan Thornton, and Richard F. Welton, III;13 a year 
later Duckworth was added to the board14— kept a sizeable 
chunk of both the city and N.R.H.A. funds, which ran 
somewhere between four and five million dollars at this 
time.15 In 1970, the first year that such reports were
12Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the
Fall of New York (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 880-884.
13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 August 1957.
14Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 9 June 1959.
15Mr. Lewis Conrad of the City Auditor's Office reports 
that between 1957 and 1958 the city kept a balance on hand of 
between $2,582,817.92 and $3,235,531.16 in four banks, one of 
which was The National Bank of Commerce; the city rotated its 
funds monthly from bank to bank. Mr. James E. Smith, 
Controller for the N.R.H.A., puts the N.R.H.A. 1958 daily 
funds at about $1,500,000; funds were kept separately for 
each redevelopment project and housing development.
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made available to the public, the N.R.H.A. kept more than a 
million dollars of its funds in that bank, while most of the 
other banks had less than a tenth of that amount. One 
establishment lawyer willing to oppose the N.R.H.A. not 
surprisingly found that his business clients were refused 
bank loans because "they had the wrong lawyer."16 For 
most other attorneys, realtors, wholesalers, appraisers, 
contractors, and building supply houses, the lure of fat 
fees, healthy commissions, and the purchasing power of the 
N.R.H.A. and other city agencies was enough to assure their 
support.
Finally, the city was afforded considerable leeway 
over the disposition of land once it had been cleared. 
Redevel- opment land suitable for business use was 
considerably cheaper than competitive sites that would still 
have to be cleared; thus the power to establish a pecking 
order to decide which business or corporate entity would be 
rewarded with prime building sites was an important 
motivator in the effort to drum up support. Whether or not 
the city actually ever used its considerable powers over 
commercial proper-ties, finances, and land disposition on 
any grand scale to force compliance and cooperation really 
makes very little difference; there were those like the 
establishment lawyer mentioned above who suffered for their 
token opposition to the Mayor's redevelopment programs, and
16Gordon Dillon, op cit., p. 18.
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evident to all other members of the city's commercial and 
professional establishment. The fact that those powers, 
containing both awards for cooperation and punishments for 
opposition, existed in a virtual political vacuum and lay in 
hands that were not above using such powers to excise what­
ever was deemed objectionable, was enough of an incentive 
for at least tacit support in these undertakings. Business­
men, especially those with influence that stretched beyond 
the realm which the Mayor could ordinarily reach, soon found 
that cooperation with Duckworth's new redevelopment pro­
posals could be a mutually profitable agreement; those who 
opposed the city or its agencies for whatever reason, faced 
the prospect of certain defeat anyway and probably consider­
able needless hardship. Those who might have spoken out to 
oppose plans so loosely formulated and so obviously capri­
cious needed no other incentive to remain silent.
Thus, when the Mayor ran into heavy opposition from 
the Atlantic City residents,17 he quickly scheduled a 
second public hearing which was packed, as one reporter 
described it, with members of "the leading business and 
financial interests representing organizations who [sic] 
foster the overall needs of the city."18 With the backing 
of the Silkstocking establishment assured, the Atlantic City
lvNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1957.
lsNorfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Annual 
Report to the City Council (1974), p. 47.
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Project was pushed through over the cries of its residents. 
Similar support enabled the Mayor to crush opposition to 
both the Downtown19 and Broad Creek Projects.20 The 
earlier warnings of Norfolk's two daily newspapers— "the 
powers of a housing authority should be zealously guarded 
and used only in proven cases as a last resort21"— the 
traditional spokesmen of the business community, were now 
hushed. Neither paper spoke to the vast uncertainties or 
incongruities in the projects; instead the Ledqer-Dispatch 
praised the vision of the proposals:
This will be a dramatic second stage in a 
process that is giving much of Norfolk a 
splendid new look. But the really important 
factor— and the one which is encompassed in the 
very phrase "slum clearance"— is the ugly old 
look which the city is casting off.22
Even in its saddest editorial lament, a poignant piece 
that bemoaned the passing of a portion of the Atlantic City 
area that had "a Greenwich Village flavor" and a "Bohemian 
and cosmopolitan character," the Virginian-Pilot added that:
Change must come and better things for the 
whole downtown area will be wrought through the 
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No where did either paper question why so many acres had to 
be leveled so quickly, especially when so few solid commit­
ments for new construction were evident; either the access 
to information was really limited to the official press 
releases, the editors were afraid to undertake an expose 
when so much of the city lay in ruins and the city's future 
was irrevocably tied to the success of the projects, or 
else, as one editor later revealed, a reporter really was 
measured by what he knew but couldn't write.24
The sad truth is that a local newspaper would never 
want to reveal the compelling motivation behind these four 
new redevelopment endeavors, nor would any scion of the 
business establishment seek to oppose the urgency of the 
projects. More was involved than a pressing need for new 
public service facilities, more than a desire to provide 
growing room for popular institutions, more than longing to 
destroy deteriorated or unwanted properties, and more than 
just a desire to build a new and exciting city. The actual 
size and shape of the Downtown and Atlantic City Projects 
were in part dictated by the requirements of the federal 
enabling legislation. Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 
forbade the taking of land for non-residential uses, unless 
the area acquired was: "(a) a slum, deteriorated or
24Robert L. Mason.
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deteriorating area, and (b) is predominantly residential in 
character."23
In order to acquire the vast tracts of light indus­
tries, warehouses, flophouses, honky tonks, and commercial 
properties as proposed, the project borders were made to zig 
and zag their way through just enough slum housing to quali­
fy the entire area as both "deteriorating" and "predominant­
ly residential in character." The Broad Creek development, 
since it was not technically a redevelopment project at all 
but rather a gift from the Navy, was not bound by the same 
restrictions. The housing included in the Downtown Project 
was undoubtedly one of the worst slums in the city— more 
than 85% was badly deteriorated by U.S. Census estimates—  
but Atlantic City was no slum, in spite of massive efforts 
by the N.R.H.A to prove otherwise. The Atlantic City 
neighborhood may have been in danger of becoming a slum, and 
it might thereby legally qualify for clearance under the 
U. S. Housing Act, but Norfolk still had a number of other 
bona fide ghettos that should have merited first considera­
tion for clearance long before Atlantic City; instead, the 
area should have been a prime contender for neighborhood 
rehabilitation and restoration, and not demolition.
Premature talk of redevelopment and over-hasty speculation 
about clearance had produced a dramatic change in the
25Housing and Home Finance Agency, A Guide to Slum 
Clearance and Urban Development (Washington, D.C., 1950), 
p. 7.
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neighborhood— not a change in the housing or the living 
conditions, but nevertheless enough of a change in the 
character of its residents to vault the neighborhood to the 
top of the list of priorities for clearance under the 
political conditions that existed in the Norfolk of 1957. 
This same change in the character of population, not so much 
the need for the space or the condition of the buildings, 
was what doomed Broad Creek Village and the Lamberts Point 
neighborhood in the Old Dominion Project as well. In spite 
of the fact that the Atlantic City, Broad Creek, Downtown, 
and Old Dominion Projects meant the almost simultaneous 
uprooting of more than 4,000 families and the destruction of 
a large percent of the city's lower-end, middle-income 
housing stock (probably close to eight percent of the city's 
total housing stock), the simple truth is that the political 
leaders that controlled Norfolk had no interest in preserv­
ing these neighborhoods in their existing character, regard­
less of the condition of their structures; and, in fact, 
were in a hurry to demolish them as quickly as possible.
A similar situation existed with Norfolk's schools. 
Although the city had at least three schools still in 
service that were built before the Civil War (i.e., J. C. 
Smythe, Lott Carey, and John B. Goode), these buildings 
would see almost two more decades of service. Instead, 
Norfolk was proposing to tear down Broad Creek26 and
26Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 21 December 1957.
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Benmoreell2-7 elementary schools, both barely more than 
twelve years old; close Pineridge Elementary28 (it would 
reopen several years later), built within the last decade; 
and convert the Patrick Henry Elementary School for use as 
administrative offices.29 Although Benmoreell and Pine­
ridge were wood frame buildings that were erected as 
"temporary" structures during the war years, they were still 
serviceable, especially if funds were invested in their 
upkeep. Pineridge was a concrete block structure built in 
1947 that sat on a ten acre site at Sewells Point and 
Progress Roads. It contained 19,500 square feet, 15 class­
rooms, eight demountable classroom units, an art room, 
library, and multipurpose room.30 Both Pineridge and 
Broad Creek were in the rapidly expanding Tanners Creek 
section of the city just annexed from Norfolk County where 
the School Board had just been told it needed to add the 
equivalent of four new schools a year for the next ten 
years.31 Patrick Henry Elementary, built in 1892 and
27Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of Schools, 
to John Corbell, Clerk of the City of Norfolk, 7 May 1956, 
Norfolk Public Schools Files.
2SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 February 1956.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1960.
3°Memorandum from Philip A. Steadfast, Director of the 
Norfolk Department of City Planning, to Paul Smith, Assistant 
Superintendent for Business and Finance, 27 January 1976, 
Norfolk Public Schools files.
3XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1955.
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expanded in 1920,32 was being converted to office use even 
though the School Administration had been saying for several 
years that it wanted to move out of the downtown area to a 
site closer to the center of the district.33 Why would it 
now acquiesce to such a drastic plan of school closings, 
demolition, and reuse?
The reason why may best be seen in the Atlantic City 
neighborhood: the 1950 Census revealed that it was the only
predominantly white neighborhood in the city where Black 
families comprised more than ten percent of the popula­
tion;34 since that time the newspapers noted "the changing 
character of the neighborhood from white to Negro."35 
Premature talk of redevelopment had helped to break down the 
already tenuous color barrier, and landlords who refused to 
make major improvements to property threatened by demolition 
found they could still charge full rental fees to Black 
families because of the housing crisis in the Black 
community. One contemporary news account described the 
situation this way:
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 August 1957.
33Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of 
Schools, to Sherwood Reeder, Norfolk City Manager,
8 August 1955, Norfolk Public School files.
34U. S. Bureau of the Census, (1950), op cit., p. 22; 
and Norfolk Chamber of Commerce, "Population and Housing 
Survey," Norfolk XVI: 7 (November, 1954), pp. 10 - 20.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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The talk in Atlantic City is that property 
owners are realizing higher rentals from Negros 
than they had in the past from whites. "A lot 
of them are partitioning the interiors (into 
additional units) to get a lot more money," one 
resident says.3®
The fact that Atlantic City was a transition neighborhood 
going through a dramatic change in its racial make-up was 
underscored in a caption to a Virginian-Pilot photograph: 
"I've no idea where I would go . . . but I won't live with 
Negroes all around me."37 Years later former Mayor and 
N.R.H.A. Commissioner Pretlow Darden would admit that the 
Atlantic City Project was undertaken, at Mayor Duckworth's 
insistence, in part to "protect" the nearby Ghent area,38 
still the city's chief Silkstocking neighborhood.
Similarly the Lamberts Point neighborhood, a predomin­
antly white settlement, showed, even in 1950, a small 
concentration of Blacks in the vicinity of the college;39 
by 1957, this small Black community had expanded due to the 
sgueeze put on the Black housing market by redevelopment, 
the city's general population explosion, and the lack of 
homes built especially for the Black community. Broad Creek 
Village had begun its existence in 1943 as a Navy housing 




39Norfolk Chamber of Commerce, op cit.
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integrated the armed forces after World War II, a number of 
Black families began to appear in the project. As 
uncertainty about the project's future increased in the 
1950s, so also did the small percentage of Black population, 
isolated at first only in one small corner of the 
community.40 A similar situation existed in the 
Benmoreell Navy Housing Complex on Hampton Boulevard just 
outside of the Norfolk Naval Base: although a relatively
small number of Blacks were shown living there in the 1950 
Census,41 their numbers had grown as whites gained other 
housing opportunities in the growing number of private, 
whites only, developments which ringed the base. The 
housing shortage for Blacks had cracked the previous racial 
barriers in the Berkley section of the city, and the School 
Board noted with dismay "the pronounced tendency for whites 
to leave Berkley, and for Negroes to move in."42 The 
Downtown Project areas, which had been predominantly Black 
for decades, still housed at least 19 white families.43
Thus, one of the major reasons for Mayor Duckworth's 
sudden and massive reliance upon the powers inherent in 
redevelopment was to accomplish the one thing that neither
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 January 1958.
41U. S. Census of Population, (1950), op cit., census 
tracts 9 and 11.
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1956.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 January 1958.
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the courts nor the legislature, nor any political leader, 
local or national, could promise: Mayor Duckworth was
attempting to replace de jure (i.e., segregation mandated by 
"Jim Crow" laws) with de facto (i.e., the separation that 
occurs more naturally as a result of one's choice of 
residence in a predominantly Black or white neighborhood) 
segregation. The Duckworth Plan proposed to do more than 
just control urban blight, it aimed to wipe out all of the 
city's transition neighborhoods where indistinct color lines 
had failed to produce two distinct neighborhood school 
communities, the one Black and the other white.
The concept of geographic proximity and neighborhood 
schools is essential to understanding the mastery of Duck­
worth's approach. The U.S. Supreme Court had been carefully 
lead to its finding that separate schools were inherently 
unequal by meticulous documentation of three instances:
1. The Brown case involved the child of a Black 
minister who was living in an otherwise all-white 
neighborhood. Because Linda Brown was forced by state law 
to attend an all-Black school farther from her residence 
than the all-white school attended by her neighbors, the 
U. S. Supreme Court ruled that this separate treatment of 
Black students living in white neighborhoods was unequal, 
and therefore unconstitutional.
2. A companion case involved Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, which had no public high school for Black pupils.
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Because attendance at the county high school was restricted 
to whites only (Blacks were bused to an adjoining county), 
the Court ruled that in such instances where no public 
schools existed for Blacks, then the doctrine of separation 
was unequal and therefore unconstitutional.
3. Other companion cases involved school systems 
where lawyers could show by a preponderance of statistical 
evidence— per-pupil expenditures, teacher salaries, quality 
of textbooks, age of physical plant, support facilities, and 
the like--that the Black schools were clearly inferior to 
those for whites only. In such instances, the Court ruled, 
where separate schools are demonstrably unequal, then the 
laws requiring such separation are unconstitutional.44
Thus a careful reading of the legal situation at the 
time revealed that segregation was safe from attack as long 
as the city had enough high quality Black schools closer to 
all of the city's Black residents than were the white 
institutions.
Norfolk was no longer worried that its Black schools 
could be found inherently inferior to its white institu­
tions: the city had made vast strides at improving and
up-grading its Black schools, even to the point where its 
Black teachers were better paid, more educated, and more
44Milton Finkelstein, Hon. Jawn A. Sandifer, Elfreda S. 
Wright, Minorities: U.S.A., (New York: Globe Books, 1971),
pp. 123-130.
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experienced than the white teachers.45 Indeed, writing in 
February, 1957, U. S. Federal District Court Judge Walter 
Hoffman commented on Norfolk's success in achieving a 
"separate but equal" dual system of education:
The sum and substance of the School 
Superintendent's evidence is that the City of 
Norfolk has substantially complied with the 
"separate but equal" doctrine, which was 
applicable prior to the decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education. The City of Norfolk is to 
be commended for its rapid strides in bringing 
about an equalization in physical equipment, 
curriculum, teacher load, and teachers' 
salaries. If the "separate but equal" doctrine 
were now in existence, there would be no 
grounds for relief to be afforded these [Black] 
plaintiffs.46
Mayor Duckworth was worried, however, that a close 
scrutiny of the city's neighborhoods would reveal several 
areas where color lines were indistinct or where Black 
students actually lived closer to the all-white school than 
the Black school they were attending. The Duckworth Plan 
aimed simply at stomping out any potential variance to the 
de facto segregated school concept tentatively still 
approved by the Supreme Court because it was based upon 
geographic proximity rather than state law. Top priority 
among those schools that would have been forced to integrate
45Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 13 December 1951.
46Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. v. School Board of the 
City of Norfolk, et al., Civil Case No. 2244, U. S. General 
District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, reprinted in 
Race Relations Law Reporter 2: 2 (April, 1957), p. 338.
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on the basis of neighborhood proximity was the Patrick Henry 
Elementary School in the Atlantic City section of the city. 
The Virginian-Pilot underscored the Mayor's concern in this 
regard:
The increase of Negro population in Atlantic 
City in recent years is reflected in Patrick 
Henry School, which would feel the highest 
proportionate integration of the thirteen 
Norfolk white schools in "fringe" districts. 
Recent figures indicated that there would be 50 
Negro pupils to 300 white pupils at Patrick 
Henry in the event of desegregation.4"7
Thirteen of the plaintiffs in the N.A.A.C.P. school 
integration suit lived closer to Patrick Henry Elementary 
School than to the Black institution they were attending 
when the suit was filed in May of 1956.4S When the 
Atlantic City Project was announced, the case had just 
finished its discovery phase, and Judge Hoffman was 
preparing to order the integration of Patrick Henry 
Elementary, which had previously served just the white 
students in Atlantic City.
According to the testimony of the Division 
Superintendent, there are some localities in the 
City of Norfolk, which will create individual 
problems in the elementary school system, 
particularly at the Patrick Henry School and the 
Gatewood School where the percentage of white to 
colored students would be approximately four to 
one, with the preponderance of the student body 
being white, which allocation is based upon the
4VNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
4BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1958.
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one, with the preponderance of the student body 
being white, which allocation is based upon the 
assumption that the school children are assigned 
only in accordance with normal geographical 
consideration.49
Judge Hoffman obviously realized that the Norfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority was rushing to reduce 
the impact of his decision to integrate Patrick Henry 
Elementary:
. . . .  as to the Patrick Henry School, there is 
a redevelopment and housing plan now in its 
early stages which, if carried through to its 
completion, will substantially reduce the number 
of colored children who would ordinarily be 
assigned to [the] Patrick Henry School.50
Not even Judge Hoffman realized the speed with which 
the Housing Authority would undertake its planned demolition 
of the project area. Although the project was not announced 
until December (1956), its boundaries were not really set 
until late May (1957); even so, by the start of the 
1957-1958 school year, demolition had been extensive enough 
that more than two-thirds of the Patrick Henry classrooms 
stood empty.51 By the time the crucial 1958-1959 school 
year was ready to begin, the school had closed entirely.52
49Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. , v. School Board of the 
City of Norfolk, Va., et al., op cit. p 339.
5°Ibid., p. 339.
51Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 August, 1957.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1958.
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Five other plaintiffs in the N.A.A.C.P. suit lived 
closer to the all-white Gatewood School in the Berkley 
section of the city than to one of the Black schools there; 
by the time the 1958-1959 school year was about to begin, 
the Gatewood School, the other school that Judge Hoffman had 
indicated would experience extensive integration,53 had 
been shifted to the Black school system, thereby relieving 
that threat as well. The political powers that governed 
Norfolk at the time were well aware, as was the Virginian- 
Pilot, that such actions dissipated the strength of the 
N.A.A.C.P.'s argument:
The significance of a plaintiff's proximity 
to a school has been pointed up repeatedly in 
other places where desegregation was ordered 
. . . Two elementary schools that formerly faced 
the prospect of desegregation apparently don't 
any longer. Gatewood School, now white, will 
become a Negro school next fall. For five 
plaintiffs, it was the closest school. Patrick 
Henry School is nearest for thirteen plaintiffs, 
but this school will be converted to administra­
tive uses.54
The other nine plaintiffs in the original N.A.A.C.P. 
complaint lived closer to a Black school than a white 
one,55 thereby giving the School Board "legitimate" 
reasons for denying their applications for transfer. The
S3Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. , v. School Board of the 
City of Norfolk, Va., et al., op cit. , p. 339.
54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
SBIbid.
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N.A.A.C.P. suit had been filed in May of 1956,ss and only 
the city's headlong rush into redevelopment of the Atlantic 
City area had averted the immediate threat; bulldozer 
diplomacy had achieved the desired result in less than two 
years' time from conception to completion.
The Mayor and his advisors were well aware that under 
current state law, if even one of Norfolk's 46 elementary 
schools were forced to open with mixed classes, then state 
funds, which then accounted for one-fourth of the local 
school budget, would be cut off to all 46 schools in that 
category.57 Although their precipitate actions in the 
case of Patrick Henry and Gatewood Elementary Schools had 
temporarily "saved" at least the elementary school system, 
they were not in the least disposed to take any chances: 
for this reason Pineridge Elementary School in the Broad 
Creek section was closed,58 and Henry Clay Elementary 
School in the Downtown area59 and Broad Creek Village 
School60 were torn down as a result of the other 
redevelopment projects. The School Board, whose earlier $15 
million school building program had been rejected because of 








10 February 1956. 
3 January 1958.
21 December 1957.
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back to the drawing boards for a quick, and less costly, 
revision. Their revised $5.5-million proposal included an 
immediate go-ahead on the combined elementary, junior, and 
senior high school for Blacks in the Oakwood-Rosemont area 
and cutting back the proposed additions and improvements to 
existing Black schools by 40%.61 The Oakwood-Rosemont com­
bination school was clearly designed to alleviate the triple 
threat of integration to Norview Elementary, Junior, and 
Senior High schools in the newly annexed Tanner's Creek 
District. Mayor Duckworth was anxious that the School Board 
dispense with the preliminaries and get on with the building 
"as rapidly as possible." A Virginian-Pilot reporter quoted 
the Mayor's rationale:
This is the school that the School Board 
promised the court it would build by this fall.
Let's go ahead with it as rapidly as we can.62
The only other area that might possibly be effected 
immediately by court-ordered integration lay in the Lamberts 
Point section of the city. Although six of the original 
N.A.A.C.P. plaintiffs attended the Smallwood Elementary 
School (Black), all lived closer to that school than to 
nearby Madison or Larchmont elementary schools (white).63 
Nevertheless, the city's Old Dominion Redevelopment Project
63-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 March 1958.
62Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 January 1959.
63Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 May 1958.
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(N.R.H.A. Project Two) would bulldoze 40 acres in the area, 
wipe out the transition neighborhoods, and re-establish 
readily identifiable color lines in that community. Thus, 
of the more than 500 Blacks that were determined to 
"threaten" the sanctity of the white segregated school 
system in the winter of 1956,54 fast action towards 
redevelopment and school construction had alleviated the 
legal standing based upon geographic proximity of all but 
about 40 of the potential plaintiffs, and none of these as 
yet posed any immediate threat in current litigation. 
Duckworth's plan to make de facto segregation a permanent 
substitute for de jure segregation appeared to be a master­
ful success: only Black students in the tiny Bollingbrook
community (near Suburban Park School) in the Granby district 
and secondary students in the Titustown and Benmoreell areas 
remained as yet unaffected by changes already instituted.
Of the 16 schools potentially threatened by a court order to 
integrate based upon the theory of geographic proximity, two 
(Patrick Henry and Broad Creek Village) were in the path of 
the redevelopment bulldozer, another (Benmoreell) was to be 
torn down by the city for a park, two (Robert Gatewood and 
John Marshall) had been transferred from the white to the 
Black school system, one (Pineridge Elementary) had been 
closed, three others (Norview Senior High, Norview 
Elementary, and Norview Junior High) had been spared by the
64Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 February 1957.
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Rosemont combination school then under construction, and 
four others (W. H. Taylor Elementary, Blair Junior High, 
Maury High School, and James Madison Elementary) had been 
rescued from much of their potential threat by an aggressive 
redevelopment program (see Figures 5, 6, and 7, on the 
following pages).
Mayor Duckworth's plan to achieve total de facto 
segregation was in full keeping with the political realities 
that then existed in Virginia. The School Board, the City 
Council, the city's legislative delegation, and other savvy 
political leaders knew full well that if Norfolk took any 
action towards potential compliance with the impending 
desegregation litigation.- then such action would "provoke" 
the rest of the state into a "Stop Norfolk" movement that 
could have dire consequences for the city.65 Political 
leaders knew that the city's best hope lay in delaying the 
eventuality of such a decision long enough so that a number 
of other localities would be forced into the "same boat" as 
Norfolk, and thereby form the impetus for a more realistic 
approach by the rest of the state. A crisis hitting several 
localities simultaneously, most political leaders believed, 
would build up quick political pressure for the governor to 
convene the legislature in a special session to enact some 
sort of "reasonable" plan for gradual desegregation. The 
city's best hope in the winter of 1956-1957 was to hold out
6SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 March 1957.
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FIGURE 6. FROM DE JURE TO DE FACTO: SCHOOL RESREGATION IN NORFOLK, 1956-1958 
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Figure 7. Impact of De Facto Segregation and School Locations
A Benmorell G Pineridgea Madison X Norview Junior, Senior andc Patrick Henry Y Maury High
D Marshall Z Blair Junior
B Gatewood 1 Rosemont Elementary/Junior
F Broadcreek 2 Coronado Elementary
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long enough for cases already pending against Arlington, 
Charlottesville, Newport News, Prince Edward County, and, 
hopefully, other localities to achieve a simultaneous 
decision.66 The Norfolk case, which was decided by Judge 
Walter Hoffman on February 12, 1957,67 was by then winding 
its way through the appeals process to the Supreme Court, 
but local legal experts privately doubted that legal 
maneuvering could stall desegregation for the one more year 
it would take the cases in other cities to catch up.6S 
The emergency state laws that established the state pupil 
placement board had already been declared unconstitutional 
in the Norfolk case, and that decision had been upheld by 
the U. S. Supreme Court.69 It seemed that in the winter 
of 1956-57 that there was little the city could do to 
forestall desegregation of its white public schools in the 
fall (1957)--at least a full year before any other locality 
would be faced with a similar crisis— except sit back and 
accept the calumny of the rest of the state.
Thus, the Duckworth Plan, although no such proposal 
was ever publically announced, was introduced within this 
atmosphere of political panic; there was no announcement of 
any concerted program to achieve anything other than the
66Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 March 1957.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 February 1957.
6BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 March 1957.
69Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 October 1957.
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publicly espoused goals of the various redevelopment pro­
jects and school building programs, nor was there any wide­
spread understanding of just why the city was taking these 
particular steps; nevertheless, a certain calm prevailed 
among the citizenry that "something" either would be or was 
being done to avert the crisis, regardless of the cost of 
such a diversion. The immediate action— the time between 
the first public hearing to the first demolition was less 
than six months— on the Atlantic City Project and the 
transfer of the Robert Gatewood Elementary School to the 
Black system solved the crises at hand by frustrating the 
14 litigants who would most definitely have been assigned to 
white schools during the 1957-58 school term. With the 
state pupil placement legislation declared unconstitutional, 
a local board policy of denying transfer, regardless of the 
race of the applicant, to a school at a greater geographic 
proximity was just enough of a legal loophole to delay 
speedy enactment of Judge Hoffman's order. It was a 
brilliant ploy, and one that won an additional one year 
reprieve for the Norfolk Schools.70 That extra year gave 
the city time to plan for additional delays by using the 
powers of redevelopment and the policy of school con­
struction to forestall additional transfer requests based 
upon geographic proximity; until this was achieved, the 
School Board was clearly instructed to deny all requests for
70Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6 9
transfer from a Black to a white school, even if faced with 
court order to do so.71
At its very least the Duckworth program of concerted 
redevelopment and school construction helped to buy time 
before the city had to face the eventuality of school 
desegregation; at its very best, the plan would lessen the 
impact of school desegregation upon specific areas targeted 
by the N.A.A.C.P. suit, and thus make it possible for the 
court to diffuse that impact as thinly as possible among all 
the schools in the city— a step that was crucial in leading 
to the eventual compliance with and acceptance of desegrega­
tion. In all likelihood, the general public, given the 
political climate and emotional conditions of the day, would 
probably have concurred with his program had they been given 
a chance.
The important thing from the point of view of history, 
however, is that the public was never given a chance to 
approve or disapprove the overall program; neither were the 
people given an opportunity to understand or disregard its 
consequences. Duckworth's Plan had been carefully hand­
crafted in a political vacuum of his own construction. The 
Duckworth political strategy of pre-session dress rehearsals 
and "briefing" sessions for the Council, of the "planned 
incumbency" method of denying voters a reasonable voice in 
selecting freshmen councilmen, of "mayoral government" that
73-Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1958.
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disregarded the advice of citizen boards and professional 
authorities alike, of one-party dominance that crushed 
opposition and stifled constructive dissent, and of "strong­
man rule" that promoted one elected official above all 
others, had produced a dictatorial climate of consent that 
would permit whatever the ruling powers, benign or other­
wise, wished. The public was removed from its far more 
active role under the People's administration, and can 
hardly be held culpable for the failures of the Mayor's 
policy. Redevelopment projects, especially, had to fulfill 
federal requirements that the affected individuals had been 
provided a full opportunity to be involved in the planning, 
design, and implementation of the program.72 Norfolk, 
however, was extremely remiss in this regard, and its 
officials preferred to run the city as much like a company 
as they could— as if they were the board of directors, major 
decisions could be made in secrecy, and no one else mattered 
very much.73 The people, however, seemed to care very 
little one way or another about the crucial decisions that 
faced the city; so long as they were spared the gory details 
of complicated policy decisions, they would approve by 
inertia whatever actions, no matter how drastic, were 
undertaken to preserve the status quo.
72Luther J. Carter, formerly City Hall and schools 
reporter for the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, interview by author, 
Tape recordeing, Washington, D.C., 12 January 1991.
73Ibid.
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As for the business community, their consent was 
assured from the outset. Redevelopment was too good for 
business in general and too important an economic boost for 
the Tidewater area as a whole to be opposed. The Mayor was 
simply enacting their most far-fetched dreams, although with 
a speed, a scope, and an urgency they may not have under­
stood. Surely there were those among the business community 
who fathomed the true motivation behind the Duckworth 
redevelopment proposals, but these same leaders knew how 
disastrous a school confrontation would be for the city.
The state had backed the city against the wall on desegre­
gation: the federal courts would not allow it to continue
public education as before, and yet the state would not let 
it retreat towards token integration. Credit is due Mayor 
Duckworth because he at least found a way to break out of 
that corner. Probably no one, not even the Mayor, expected 
redevelopment to provide a permanent solution to the prob­
lem, but it did supply the city with a grant of additional 
powers that might help him negotiate some sort of settlement 
short of desegregation with the Black community. At the 
very least, the Duckworth Plan answered the court direc­
tives, bought additional time for the city to work out a 
more permanent solution, and gave the Mayor flexibility to 
deal with both the crisis at hand and the rebuilding of the 
city. No one in the city's business or political leadership 
really expected that Black children would ever attend white
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schools in Norfolk,74 and so nobody suspected how much the 
city had traded for what would turn out to be a temporary 
fix. Ironically, by advancing such a far-reaching program 
under these less than honorable motivations, the Mayor had 
finally achieved the promise contained in the moniker of his 
1950 Harmony Ticket: the city's business establishment and
its political organization were at last joined together in a 
consensus on municipal directions--more united than they had 
been at any time since Fred Duckworth had assumed control of 
its destiny.
74Robert L. Mason.




In spite of the apparent success of the Mayor's rede­
velopment program to prevent school desegregation, a number 
of factors began to appear which would serve to harden 
Norfolk, and especially its established business and poli­
tical leadership, into a stronghold of Massive Resistance.
In that context, and to everyone's surprise, Mayor W. Fred 
Duckworth turned out to be a "very Massive Resister,"1 and 
did something few would have suspected: he lost all touch
with reality.2 For several years since the Brown decision, 
the local chapter of the statewide Massive Resistance 
support group, the Defenders of State Sovereignty and 
Individual Liberties, had labored to establish a respected 
political force that could be counted on to endorse the Byrd 
Organization when it advanced ardent segregationists, but 
also to oppose it when it backed lukewarm or local option 
resisters. In spite of its penchant for lost causes, such 
as the T. Coleman Andrews Separatist Party 1956 Presidential 
bid, the local Defenders had carved for themselves a small
1Pretlow Darden.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 July 1975.
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following among the city's retail merchants and small 
businessmen, the major component of their parent, statewide 
effort. It had been pushed in the past dangerously close to 
the fringe of accepted political behavior, but it had always 
fought its way back to the core of this small constituency: 
when one of its local members was found to be distributing 
"hate sheet" literature, the Defenders passed a resolution 
condemning such actions.3
The logic of the Defender's argument was powerfully 
convincing for most of Norfolk's white citizens: they be­
lieved that the U. S. Supreme Court had made an "unconstitu­
tional" decision in the Brown case, thereby substituting 
"judicial legislation" under pressure from the N.A.A.C.P. 
for the more legal process of constitutional amendment.
This "unconstitutional" decision posed a grave threat, they 
believed, to the powers of all state governments, the time- 
honored tradition of state control of public education, and 
the right of the majority to create the society of their 
choosing. Since a majority of the people in the country so 
obviously favored a continuation of segregated schools, they 
argued, the Brown decision really worked to undermine rule 
by the majority in favor of the interests of a few. The 
Defenders backed their claim of an "unconstitutional" court 
decision with a supporting document signed by three-fourths
3Forrest P. White, M.D., unpublished, untitled, and 
undated (1959) article, Norfolk Committee for Public Schools 
files, Old Dominion University Archives.
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of the state supreme court justices in the country. A vast 
majority of Norfolk's white voters apparently agreed with 
the Defender's unconstitutional-court-order sentiment; it 
was the second part of their logic they resisted: the
Defenders felt that closing the South's public schools in 
defiance of court orders to integrate was the only proper 
way to show public opposition against such dangerously 
political decisions.4 As long as there was no real threat 
of either integrating or closing Norfolk's schools, the 
people of Norfolk were not committed to this course of 
action; the Virginia Legislature, however, had adopted this 
stance in choosing the Stanley Plan of Massive Resistance 
over the Gray Commission's local option proposal of 
moderation.
Partly as a means to test the depth of Massive Resist­
ance feeling in Norfolk, the Defenders fielded a three-man 
slate in the June (1957) Democratic Primary to challenge the 
Organization's more moderate legislative delegation. The 
race provided a perfect test of conflicting philosophies: 
the Organization regulars included a strong Young Turk 
contingent of urban progressives, had been supporters of the 
more moderate Gray Commission local option plan to comply in 
part with court-ordered desegregation, and had opposed the 
Stanley Plan, endorsed by the Defenders, to close desegre­
gated schools. Lieutenant Colonel J. Addison Hagan, Jr.
4Ibid.
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(U.S.M.C., Retired), a Byrd Organization irregular who had 
served a stint in the Virginia House of Delegates following 
the war, headed the Defender ticket, which included Harvey 
E. White, Jr., a young attorney, and Frank R. Ford, a 
downtown jeweler.5 The incumbents did their best to avoid 
the Massive Resistance issue, preferring instead to tout a 
more moderate platform which included poll tax repeal, 
budgetary reform, and liberalization of the state's archaic 
liquor laws.5 In spite of the considerable strength of the 
Prieur Democratic Organization and the backing of the 
business community, the Defender's ticket of Hagan-Ford- 
White waged such a vigorous campaign that the incumbents 
were afraid. The final outcome of the tally hinged on late 
returns from a few questionable voting precincts; Colonel 
Hagan vehemently maintained that Billy Prieur stole the 
election by stuffing the ballot boxes to insure victory.7
The attitude of the Norfolk voters was clearly harden­
ing against moderation, and a position of defiance that 
included the sacrifice of closed schools was gaining in 
popularity. When the issue emerged again five months later 
in the Virginia gubernatorial race, public opinion had come 
full circle. The Democratic candidate was J. Lindsay
5Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 April 1957.
GNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 29 March 1957.
7J. Addison Hagan, interview by Dr. James Sweeney, 
Transcript, 25 January 1977, Old Dominion University Archives.
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Almond, a formidable campaigner fully able to take advantage 
of this rising tide of defiance: he was universally recog­
nized as having been the legal brains behind the Stanley 
school-closing Plan of Massive Resistance. Almond had given 
up a seat in Congress to fill in as the state's Attorney 
General; he had won re-election twice to that position, and 
was now impatient to move up to Virginia's highest office. 
The Organization's nod probably would have gone instead to 
State Senator Garland Gray, author of the state's more 
moderate local option plan of compliance. Senator Gray had 
hardened his own resistance and had backed away from the 
plan that bore his name, but Almond's full-blown entry into 
the Democratic Primary forced him to withdraw. The 
Republicans again nominated Ted Dalton, their most popular 
and attractive candidate in almost 80 years. Four years 
earlier Dalton had come within just a few percentage points 
of defeating Governor Stanley, admittedly a less formidable 
opponent than Almond. Dalton's platform was a paragon of 
moderation, calling for repeal of the worst of the Massive 
Resistance laws and otherwise preventing school closings. 
Almond, however, campaigned with the full Massive Resistance 
bombast, calling for hardline defiance all the way to the 
school house door.
The race was a classic contest of public sentiment on 
the desegregation question: both candidates were strong
campaigners who enjoyed solid party backing. Almond,
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however, swept to an easy victory, pulling more than 60% of 
the vote. Dalton had been swamped by events far beyond his 
control: when President Eisenhower sent federal troops to
Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce court-ordered desegrega­
tion, all hope of a Dalton victory faded forever. Although 
no one in Virginia really wanted to close public schools, 
Almond's Stanley Plan did promise a way to prevent integra­
tion without having to face a similar threat of armed troops 
in Virginia.®
The intervention of federal troops into the Little 
Rock school crisis obviously had a profound effect upon 
local residents. Whereas only a few months earlier most 
Norfolkians apparently were prepared to accept a minimum of 
desegregation in order to keep the public schools open, now 
a number of indicators pointed to the fact that a majority 
had begun to prefer instead school closings to even token 
integration. The sight of bayonets, rifles, and uniforms 
had seemed to underscore the argument of the resisters that 
the South was at war with the federal courts, and that any 
tactic which by-passed or postponed a similar confrontation 
in Norfolk was acceptable. Almond tallied an "impressive 
majority" in the city by campaigning almost exclusively on 
his Stanley Plan to circumvent federal court-ordered 
desegregation. The local legislative delegation, too, began
®Virginius Dabney, Virginia: The New Dominion, op cit., 
pp. 538-540.
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to back away from their own earlier position of moderation 
in favor of a hardline posture.9 They were obviously aware 
that not even ballot box finagling could have saved them if 
Little Rock had occurred just before their own Democratic 
primary race against the Defender slate. Just before that 
primary they had pledged their willingness to go "head-to- 
head" with the governor to prevent a funds cutoff or school 
showdown in Norfolk;3-0 now, less than a year later, they 
were promising to let Governor Almond "have a perfectly free 
hand, even if it means closing our schools."3-1 The 
strength of the Defender's challenge, Almond's impressive 
showing in the city, the opposition to the events in Little 
Rock, and an emerging sense of defiance on the part of the 
citizenry had convinced the Norfolk legislative delegation, 
among the most moderate in the General Assembly, to support 
a hard-line stance of Massive Resistance that would obvious­
ly have been personally repugnant to every one of them only 
a year earlier— events were moving rapidly to a showdown in 
Norfolk. No wonder that, taken in this context of defiance, 
the Mayor's Plan of immediate and selective redevelopment of 
vast segments of the city was accepted by all those in a 
position to guess its true intent.
9Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
3-°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 July 1956. 
13-Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 14 May 1958.
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One other factor was cited as contributing to the 
shift of the local legislators: the unrelenting legal pres­
sure still being applied by the N.A.A.C.P.'s attorneys.12 
Any thought of congratulatory action on the Mayor's part for 
avoiding a Little Rock in Norfolk in 1957 quickly faded; the 
N.A.A.C.P. refused to back down. Duckworth's Plan and his 
obvious willingness to employ the myriad powers of 
redevelopment against the homes of Black litigants had 
bought time, but the N.A.A.C.P. was not intimidated into 
dropping its case. Instead Duckworth's actions forced a 
rethinking of the strategy, and the N.A.A.C.P. went right 
ahead with its plans to enlist new plaintiffs, and so 
continue the earlier challenge. If the N.A.A.C.P. had erred 
in its initial effort, the mistake was because the first 
litigants were drawn from only a few isolated neighborhoods; 
second, it had concentrated its legal attack upon desegre­
gating the city's elementary schools, the one educational 
institution most closely bound by the geographic confines of 
a single neighborhood. The Mayor had won the first round 
because he was willing to demolish the threatened areas and 
their neighborhood schools. The N.A.A.C.P. was determined 
to win this round by avoiding the neighborhood schools.
Since the Mayor had not yet shown any inclination to 
destroy the city's larger and more costly secondary institu­
tions, the N.A.A.C.P. apparently decided to aim its second
12Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
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legal assault at Norfolk's white junior and senior high 
schools. This tactic seemed appropriate for a number of 
reasons. First, the assault seemed to block the Mayor's use 
of the redevelopment weapon: each secondary institution
served too many students and too wide a geographic area to 
make it a target for either closing or urban renewal. 
Although the city had shown its willingness in the Atlantic 
City and Broad Creek Projects to attack predominantly white 
neighborhoods, a new redevelopment effort of any great 
magnitude was probably out of the question. Second, the 
wide geographic area encompassed by each secondary institu­
tion meant that there were potentially hundreds of litigants 
for whom the argument of geographic proximity could be made. 
Third, the Black community had never been entirely happy 
with the challenge at the elementary level, partly because 
it involved younger children who would be less prepared for 
the personal hardships and even dangers inherent in integra­
tion, and partly because it involved the destruction of 
strong neighborhood loyalties and personal ties. The 
assault on secondary schools would involve older students 
who could more easily be prepared physically and mentally 
for the rigors involved. The Black community could solidly 
support such a move because it involved the impairment of 
fewer Black neighborhood loyalties. There was only one 
Black high school and two Black junior highs in the city, 
and to most segments of the Black community (and even some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 8 2
in the white) the most insidious form of racial discrimina­
tion was evident in the lines of Black youths that were 
forced to queue up at an early hour for long bus rides 
across town to these institutions. The decision to partici­
pate in litigation was one that the secondary students could 
make for themselves: many would rather face the personal
dangers involved in integration than face the prospect of 
six years of crosstown busing. Finally, there were elements 
in the white community that might be more sympathetic to 
breaking down the doors of segregated secondary institu­
tions than in an assault on the city's primary schools: the
white students involved might be more open to new ideas and 
less tied to the attitudes of their parents than their 
younger brothers and sisters in the elementary schools; the 
parents might be less protective of older students because 
they were better able to handle themselves; and the bastion 
of the neighborhood school, so important to both the Black 
and white communities, would be by and large protected by 
expanding the concept to include racial as well as 
geographic neighbors.
The N.A.A.C.P. had instituted a brilliant legal maneu­
ver, and one which it sensed would be ultimately successful. 
Duckworth, however, was not disposed to give up so easily; 
he could foresee doom if the N.A.A.C.P.'s plans were carried 
out, and so, with the powers of redevelopment useless 
against this new and fortified threat, he began to seek new
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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means of racial intimidation to force the Black community to 
withdraw from the litigation. By late spring of 1958 the 
pressure upon him had become so intense that he did some­
thing few who knew him would have suspected: he lost his
grip on reality,13 ordinarily an ever-present personal 
resource, and became embroiled in a prolonged name-calling 
battle with the Black community. As an elected official 
whose public credibility was at stake, the Mayor was bound 
to lose such a battle, ever if he won all the skirmishes: 
his personal invective, whether spoken openly or in the 
private companionship of cronies, had no place in the local 
political arena. At the outset, however, his political 
position and personal power were so entrenched and his 
dominance so insured that the reaction of the white 
community was hidden behind a veil of silent assent.
The opening shots in the verbal battle were fired by 
the Mayor when a group of traditional Black leaders 
approached the Council in June of 1958 with a request to 
establish a bi-racial advisory commission to reverse the 
deterioration in race relations that had taken place in the 
preceding months. It was a simple request, and one with 
which the old People's government would have complied 
forthrightly. Dr. Lyman Brooks, the president of Norfolk's 
Black state college and a figure of gentility highly 
regarded by both the Black and white communities, rose to
13Robert Mason.
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present the petition.14 Before he could get through 
reading the first lines of his request, however, the Mayor 
felt prompted to utter a prolonged racial slur which 
included the inference that there were "too d— n many Blacks 
behind bars and not enough at the tax counters."15 The 
Mayor's off-color remark at the usually staid and highly 
predictable Council session clearly caught the press and 
spectators off guard. Most, including the news reporters 
present, pretended not to hear the invective, and Dr.
Brooks, much to his credit, refused to argue the point, but 
the affront came in for some mild criticism at the hands of 
the Virginian-Pilot editorial writers as "an unwelcome and 
irrelevant note that is not a politically sound one."16
If Mayor Duckworth had hoped to provoke an outburst 
from the Black leadership and so turn public reaction 
against them, he was sadly mistaken. Instead, his off-color 
invective only served to strengthen the resolve of the 
Blacks to air their grievances before a broader representa­
tion of the white citizenry. Newspaper reporters who sought 
a response from Dr. Brooks, found only this staid response:
The fundamental thing that is disturbing to 
me is that there really are no relations between 
the races in Norfolk. I'm not sure Norfolk 
people know where they stand on this . . . .
14Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 June 1958.
15Norfolk Virginian-Pilot , 12 June 1958.
16Ibid.
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Richmond, is considered to be a more conservative 
city, yet Negroes are on all the important 
commissions in Richmond . . . .  Norfolk has no 
police officer above the rank of patrolman, and 
there are no Negroes on any policy-making 
commission under city government [i.e., the 
School Board, Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority, Planning Commission, Port Authority, 
etc.], except the Recreation Commission, which 
is purely advisory.17
Dr. Brooks, always a powerful force in arranging con­
ciliation between the races, was clearly trying to point the 
way towards several symbolic shifts that could be made 
immediately to placate the Black community and help resolve 
the current racial impasse. Indirectly, by pointing the 
finger at city hiring and appointment practices, he was 
laying the blame for nonexistent racial communications at 
the feet of the Mayor and his political organization. P. B. 
Young, Sr., who had served on a number of advisory boards 
and bi-racial special commissions during the People’s reign, 
noted other causes of concern:
The deterioration in race relations--in 
business, government, welfare agencies, the 
Community Fund, school administration--has been 
noticeable since the Supreme Court decisions 
began banning segregation in public schools and 
public parks. . . . [other factors which should 
share the blame are] the current housing 
shortage, difficulties in obtaining credit for 
[Black] construction, and the activities of the 
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If Duckworth had thought that his hard-line attitude 
would force the Black community to back away from school 
desegregation, then he had erred significantly; in fact, the 
uproar caused by his prejudicial slur only served to unite 
the Black leadership more closely than ever before behind 
the goal of attaining desegregated schools. In the absence 
of other symbolic goals befitting their rank and standing in 
the community (such as Black elected officials, judges, top 
city administrators, or appointees to the major boards and 
commissions), the desegregation of Norfolk's public schools 
in direct defiance of the wishes of the Mayor and the Prieur 
Organization that had fought so hard against them, obviously 
took on new meaning for the city's Black leaders. A group 
of prominent Black ministers responded to Duckworth's retort 
by opposing his desire to have Blacks "waive their civil 
rights" as a condition to restoring racial harmony; other 
Black leaders joined them in repudiating the Mayor's 
attempts at bi-racial "bargaining."19 The N.A.A.C.P., 
the group targeted by Duckworth as the villains of racial 
disunity, declined comment in the white press, and, instead, 
redoubled their efforts to attain Black plaintiffs for their 
litigation. Before the Mayor's action, they had obtained 44 
Black requests for transfer;20 after the imbroglio, they
19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 June 1958.
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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were able to sign up more than 100 plaintiffs,21 in spite 
of the fact that the School Board was releasing the names of 
all such litigants for publica-tion22— an action that 
clearly subjected them to the dangers of verbal abuse, 
intimidation, and possible physical assault.
The Duckworth Plan of combining redevelopment demoli­
tion with targeted school construction appears to have been 
undertaken to achieve two ends. The plan had the effect of 
moving to replace segregation by law (de j ure), which was 
then falling under court attack, with de facto segregation 
(in fact), by demolishing and otherwise realigning those 
previously all-white segregated elementary schools threaten­
ed by integration from the small Black populations living 
within their geographic boundaries. The N.A.A.C.P.'s 
brilliant reversal of strategy in the shift of its legal 
focus upon the city's white junior and senior high schools 
had rendered the Mayor's Plan useless towards this end.
Each secondary school drew from too large a neighborhood for 
redevelopment to be successful, and each school was too 
large and expensive to tear down or relocate; nor could the 
Mayor realistically consider transferring such schools to 
the Black community without facing widespread revolt from 
white school patrons. Even though only six schools were 
involved in the N.A.A.C.P.'s renewed legal assault, more
21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1958.
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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than 10,000 white students, cutting across every neighbor­
hood and stratum of society, would be effected. Also, the 
courts would never have permitted the construction of Black 
mini-high schools, because such schools would clearly have 
been educationally unsound without the necessary expense of 
the support facilities required for accreditation.
The second, and more tangential, possible impact of 
the Duckworth Plan was to discourage future applications for 
transfer from the Black community to white schools. In this 
the tactic had clearly failed, but whether this was because 
of the Mayor's abrasive remark or because the Black communi­
ty was really united behind its younger, more aggressive 
leaders remains unknown. At any rate, the effects of racial 
intimidation, both official and unofficial, had failed to 
pressure the N.A.A.C.P. into withdrawing its suit from the 
courts. As a final stab toward such an end, the School 
Board, under the tutelage of Ben Willis, regarded as the 
most conservative of the Duckworth appointees,23 delayed 
the reappointment of every Black teacher in the school 
system,24 but this action, also failed to produce the 
desired panic.
The Black community had rallied firmly around the 
N.A.A.C.P. and its efforts to desegregate the city's
23Forrest P. White, M.D., untitled, unpublished, and 
undated (1959) article, op. cit.
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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secondary schools; the harshness of the Mayor's attitude and 
the viciousness of such racial intimidation had precluded 
any hope of an out-of-court appeasement with symbolic 
gestures--something that might have worked in part at some 
earlier date. By the summer of 1958, the Black and white 
communities could be perceived to be locked in a head-to- 
head struggle over school desegregation from which there 
could be no retreat. Far from discouraging new litigants, 
the harshness of the struggle had produced 151 new plain­
tiffs, all but one of whom fell into the category of living 
closer to the white secondary school to which they had 
applied.25 In the Black community these litigants were 
treated as though they were crusaders engaged in a holy war. 
The Journal and Guide hailed the new plaintiffs in a 
euphoric photo-essay:
Study these faces . . . for they are the 
faces of the future. These young boys and 
girls, with their parents' permission of course, 
are the brave, pioneering, far-seeing, and 
ambitious types who always figure in progress.
Having read about the trials and tribula­
tions of others attending for the first time 
previously all-white schools— in Little Rock, 
Charlotte, Nashville, for instance— they still 
chose to obtain their constitutional right to a 
non-segregated education.
They may or may not gain their goal 
immediately. But they, or others who follow 
them certainly shall— or democratic government 
shall have become a mockery, and law and order 
under a system of court-interpreted law shall
25Norfolk Virginian-Pilot , 30 August 1958.
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have ceased to exist effectively in the United
States of America."2®
Now that the integration of at least some of Norfolk's 
secondary schools seemed assured--the new legal action was 
certain to be successful and the goal of integrated schools 
now seemed beyond negotiation for the city's Black leader­
ship— public opinion began to coalesce around three separate 
philosophical responses. The Defenders firmly believed that 
closing the public schools in defiance of a court order to 
integrate was necessary to show united opposition to the 
Supreme Court's dangerously political decisions. If the 
South held solid in its efforts to resist the Court's 
encroachment upon state's rights and individual liberties, 
then, they argued, the federal government would be forced to 
back down. There were not enough troops, the Defenders 
argued, to force integration in every Southern community; 
they didn't want trouble here in Virginia, and that was why 
the state's political leaders had endorsed their idea to 
close the threatened public schools rather than invite 
conflict. As one of the first communities in the South to 
be faced with the probability of court-ordered integration, 
Norfolk stood at the brink of an historic moment. If 
Massive Resistance worked here, the Defenders argued, every 
other community across the South would be heartened. In 
light of the prominence of the city's position, the closing
2SNorfolk Journal and Guide, 30 August 1958.
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of the school house doors was a "small sacrifice" to pay for 
the freedoms of the majority.
Maybe the schools will be closed for a time, 
maybe for a whole year. But it's a mighty small 
sacrifice to pay to prevent integration and 
discourage the federal courts from further 
encroachments on state's rights.
We can teach them [the children] just as 
well in private schools; maybe better, because 
we'11 have a little more control over what 
they're going to learn . . . .  When we close the 
schools in September, I say to mothers, don't 
start squawking.27
Thus as a "temporary" substitute for those public schools 
that might be forced to close in September, the Defenders 
had formed the Tidewater Education Foundation to operate 
segregated alternative schools for those students who found 
themselves locked out of public classrooms. The T.E.F. 
offered a way for parents to support the concept of segre­
gated public education for a nominal fee without sacrificing 
the schooling of their children. In addition, the T.E.F. 
would be free to make its pitch to the community at large, 
unfettered by the essentially negative political image of 
the Defender's name. If the "small sacrifice" the public 
was expected to bear was to grow into more than a year's 
duration, as most Defenders believed it would, the T.E.F. 
was prepared to buy up the closed public schools for a 
nominal fee and reopen them as segregated, private
27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1958.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 9 2
institutions. To help defray the cost of private schools, 
the state had enacted legislation to provide substantial 
"tuition grants" to students forced to attend integrated 
schools.23
The great majority of Norfolk citizens, however, did 
not yet seem ready to accept the extreme measure of Massive 
Resistance proposed by the Defenders and the T.E.F. system 
of surrogate private education. The epitome of the city's 
moderate opinion even as late as the summer of 1958 was 
expressed by School Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer who, when 
he contemplated the possibility of closing all of the city's 
white public schools, proclaimed: "I just can't imagine 
36,000 children out on the streets. It's just impossible to 
imagine. Let's don't lose our faith yet."29 There were 
two scenarios of how a school lockout could be prevented: 
the first was the rather pollyanna belief that "it couldn't 
happen here"— that either some event or, as before, some 
means would be found to further delay or defray the 
imminence of the legal challenge. Nothing as dramatic as 
Mayor Duckworth's Plan of selective redevelopment was 
envisioned in this scenario, but the full appeals process 
had not yet been exhausted, the court order was not yet 
absolute, and some legal gimmickry was still possible.
2BSee Benjamin T. Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance 
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1961).
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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Others believed, as did Joseph Leslie, editor of the Norfolk 
Ledqer-Dispatch,30 that the public schools would have to 
be closed, but only for a brief period of time. These 
people held that the decision to close public schools in 
defiance of court orders to desegregate was a powerful 
political weapon that, once wielded with resolve, would 
force both the courts and the Black community to withdraw 
and accept some other symbolic victory short of desegre­
gation. This was the essence of the Massive Resistance 
theory: that once the white community stood solidly against 
integration, even going so far as to accept private school 
alternatives, the crisis could not continue, and Congress, 
the courts, the President and the state authorities would 
seek to ameliorate a settlement. Local Organization 
chieftain Billy Prieur, the bulk of the state's Byrd 
Democratic leadership, and the majority of the Norfolk 
business community apparently held this belief.31
There were others in the city who felt, however, that 
a school crisis was both more imminent and more long-lasting 
than most people suspected. They feared that the crisis 
could not be as easy to resolve as the Organization 
promised. Foremost among their ranks was Lenoir Chambers 
and the rest of his editorial staff on the Virginian-Pilot. 
Once Norfolk closed its schools, they argued, the city faced
3°Robert L. Mason.
31Ibid.
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a far more difficult confrontation than it might otherwise 
have experienced: the Black community would not back down,
the courts would not relent, and the city would be forced to 
submit to a greater federal authority over its public 
schools once they were reopened. The biggest effect of such 
a school closing effort, they argued, would be the targeting 
of Norfolk as a national scapegoat for 300 years of Southern 
culture:
If our schools are closed, not only our 
children suffer, but the entire city will be 
severely damaged economically.
Norfolk's black eye on the national scene as 
a result of closed schools would be one of the 
most disastrous effects. Norfolk is in the 
market for industry . . . but industry would not 
likely come to a city with a closed school 
reputation . . . .
The closing of any schools, and the dis­
organization of the school program might have a 
disastrous effect on the Community Chest . . . 
naval facilities . . . efforts to attract 
industry . . . and every aspect of the economic 
well-being of our city.32
The only hope that the anti-resistance forces could 
offer was that the public schools could survive a minimum 
amount of integration: accepting a few Black students would 
neither dilute nor destroy the education program of the 
white majority. Only in this way, they argued, could the 
city take its school system out from under the authority of 
the federal courts and continue its economic growth
3^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 June 1958.
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undeterred. The most important action the people of Norfolk 
could take, the anti-resisters argued, would be an out­
pouring of public support for the school system regardless 
of its racial purity.33 The School Board had labored for 
almost four years to achieve this end, but as yet there had 
been no such showing of public support for the schools, even 
if desegregated. At the beginning of the summer (June, 
1958), a small group had approached the Mayor with the idea 
of forming a pro-school organization; they envisioned a 
group of prominent white citizens who would be willing to 
openly commit themselves to continuing public education at 
all cost. In general, the Mayor indicated that he favored 
the formation of such a group— he felt that such a white 
citizen's organization could prove useful if the schools 
were really closed at a later date34— but he was ardently 
opposed to those who now sought its establishment, and thus 
rebuffed their efforts as premature.
Duckworth had good reason to back away from this 
particular organizing party; most of those who approached 
him would be unacceptable to the bulk of Norfolk's white 
citizenry. The founding group of the Norfolk Committee for 
Public Schools was well aware of the dilemma faced by their 
organization; many of the organizers had worked prominently
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1958.
34Robert L. Stern, board member, Norfolk Committee for 
Public Schools, interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 
22 April 1978.
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in the city's various inter-racial activities, and they knew 
all too well that they would immediately be accused of 
trying to force integration on the public schools if they 
surfaced as the leadership of such a group.35 If the 
Committee was to be successful as a pressure group, then it 
would have to be prepared to abandon its leadership to a 
more representative assemblage; it would have to actively 
recruit members who personally favored segregation, but who 
preferred a continuation of public education even more 
ardently.
Still the organizers felt that the founding of such a 
group in June of 1958 was crucial to the fate of the city. 
Few people had given any real thought as to what their 
response would be if Norfolk's public schools actually were 
closed for a prolonged period of time. The court decree 
ordering desegregation, and therefore forcing a closing 
under state law, could come at any moment; yet most resi­
dents, if they thought about the impending crisis at all, 
were so unrealistic in their approach to the subject that 
they were still busy trying to discern new legal tactics to 
circumvent the court's authority. Even the city's ordinar­
ily savvy and well-informed political and economic leader­
ship clung naively to the belief that somehow a strategy 
would be found to stall the decision for another year or 
two. The pro-school advocates saw that in the summer of
35White, op cit.
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1958, only the Defenders were seriously making plans to 
prepare for a prolonged school closing, and the T.E.F.'s 
concept of private, segregated academies as an alternative 
to desegregated public education was abhorrent to those who 
now sought the Mayor's support. They knew that the Massive 
Resisters had shown themselves to be too powerful in the 
last elections not to be taken seriously in the event of a 
school showdown. Unless there was some sort of competing 
pressure group capable of orchestrating a strong showing of 
support for keeping the schools open, they reasoned, then 
Duckworth and the rest of the state's political leaders 
would be forced to bow to the Defender's push to close 
schools in defiance of federal authority. The pro-school 
advocates knew that they themselves could not lead such a 
movement if it were ever to have a chance of success, but 
they hoped to establish the framework through which other, 
more moderate and established elements in the community 
could respond when the appropriate time arose. In this 
sense, the secretive founding of the Norfolk Committee for 
Public Schools was not premature: if the moderates were
ever to speak out in time to prevent a dismantling of the 
city's system of public education, then, the founders 
believed, they would have to be prodded by Norfolk's liberal 
elements; otherwise, the natural inertia of the citizenry, 
the superior political power of the Defenders, and the 
prevailing belief that the conflict would somehow quickly
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resolve itself, would all work instead to prolong the 
impending crisis.36
In the climate of malaise that prevailed, however, it 
would be difficult for the pro-school advocates to discern a 
locus of moderate support. The one group that should have 
been most aware of the approaching confrontation, the School 
Board, was burdened by conflicting loyalties that rendered 
its leadership impossible. On the one hand, the Board 
members were each deeply committed to continuing quality 
public education, part of the rationale for their appoint­
ment; on the other hand, however, they also owed their 
advancement to a political organization itself actively 
advocating Massive Resistance defiance. Initially the 
School Board had adopted a moderate posture that was 
designed to make compliance with a desegregation order 
possible for the white community to accept. Right after the 
Brown decision their response had been: "If we adopt a
gradual plan of integration, there would be so little, you 
wouldn't notice it."3’7 But that position of moderation 
had become increasingly difficult to maintain in the charged 
racial atmosphere that had emerged in the last few years. 
Back in 1956 the board had endorsed an old People's concept 
and formed a bi-racial advisory council to study the
36White, unpublished article.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1956.
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integration problem,33 but by the summer of 1958, that 
early spirit of racial cooperation had totally vanished.
The N.A.A.C.P.'s new legal ploy had shifted the burden of 
defending white Southern culture more squarely onto the 
School Board than before, yet its members were becoming 
increasingly aware that at least some of the 151 Black 
litigants would slip through whatever screening criteria the 
Board could legally impose. If even one Black were assigned 
to a white secondary school, then, under the state's Massive 
Resistance laws, all such secondary institutions in the city 
would be closed.39 School Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer 
deftly summed up the situation faced by the Board that 
siammer: "It is obvious that this irresistible force of [a]
court order is about to collide with this immovable object, 
the state."40
In spite of its earlier willingness to accept a 
minimum of integration if it became necessary to save the 
schools, there was every indication now that the School 
Board intended to follow the policy established by Mayor 
Duckworth and the city's political leadership and resist 
court-ordered integration at all cost. Surely the Organiza­
tion expected the Board to resist; the city's legislative 
delegation had completely reversed its moderate stand of
3aNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 August 1956.
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 May 1956.
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 June 1958.
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compliance after examining the appeal of the Defender-backed 
candidates,41 and there was every reason to believe that 
the School Board, a similar assemblage of progressive 
individuals not noted for their independence, would do 
likewise. If differences between the School Board and the 
more conservative City Council existed, they were not made 
public, and, in general, the school program progressed with 
the solid backing of the Council. In July, School Board 
Chairman Paul Schweitzer was cordially reappointed without 
any indication of differences with the Organization.42 
That the School Board had in the past been overly aggressive 
in its building proposals seemed to have been generally 
forgiven by the Organization as the natural error of a 
volunteer citizen group not charged with overseeing a 
broader range of municipal responsibilities. In any event, 
the School Board's more modest scaled down building proposal 
now seemed to fit closely with the city's overall plan to 
achieve de facto segregation in the schools, even if the 
publicly stated intent of the Board's proposal was "to mini­
mize the effect of integration by using a plan for gradual 
desegregation"43— a sentiment that on the surface seemed 
to vary widely from the Mayor's intent. Even the Board's 
earlier posture of moderate compliance— a stance that
41Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 March 1958.
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 8 March 1957.
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generated quite a favorable response from the local press, 
some national attention, and more than a little notoriety 
among the Southside extremists44— seemed to have been for­
given as the pronouncements of the Silkstocking holdovers 
then on the Board; a majority of the School Board had been 
replaced with Duckworth appointees since that time.
Subsequent statements by the School Board had been 
issued jointly with the Council and the city's legislative 
delegation, both of whom had at one time similarly vowed to 
keep Norfolk's schools open at all cost.45 To the best of 
its ability the Board had cooperated in every way with the 
Council and its efforts to delay, avert, and even sabotage 
the eventuality of school desegregation during the summer of 
1958. It waited until mid-August to render its decision on 
the N.A.A.C.P.'s transfer applicants, and even then, under 
pressure from the Federal Court to make a determination, 
rejected all 151, using both rational logic and subterfuge 
to do so. It rejected 62 applicants because the individuals 
had failed to submit to the follow-up interviews or testing 
program required of all who sought transfers within the 
school system; another 60 were determined to be unsuited for 
transfer because of low test scores, poor grades, or a 
record of "too frequent transfers;" 34 applicants who 
requested transfer to schools in the Norview area, where
44Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 July 1955.
45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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racial intimidation and bombings had taken place, were 
denied because of the district's past history of racial 
disturbance: "The Board is of the opinion that integration
there would renew such conflicts and produce grave adminis­
trative problems within the school system— all to the 
detriment of good education and the public welfare." Four 
other applicants were denied admission to Maury High, Granby 
High, or Blair Junior High Schools because the Board 
believed that: "The isolation which would be caused by such
an assignment would be detrimental to educational progress 
and may well cause emotional instability and even detriment 
to health."45 Only one of the potential transfers was 
rejected because it came from a Black living closer to a 
Black school than a white one.47
The Board's decision did not, however, last very long; 
in less than two weeks the Court rejected its rationales of 
"potential racial tension" and "probable isolation" of a 
Black student in an otherwise all-white school. Thirty- 
eight applicants fell into these two categories, and their 
transfer folders were once again turned over to the Board 
for appropriate assignment. The Board now had one more 
chance to find new excuses for rejecting these applications. 
A slight modification in the district lines for the pro­
jected Rosemont School, the Black combination elementary,
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 August 1958.
47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 August 1958.
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junior, and senior high school that was the focus of the 
Mayor's de facto segregation plan, brought a majority of the 
38 applicants within that school's assignment area. Al­
though School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker was forced to 
admit to the Court that the district lines for Rosemont were 
hastily redrawn only "after he had learned the addresses of 
the applicants involved [in the litigation],48 Judge 
Walter Hoffman allowed the Board to deny the transfer 
requests of all the petitioners so affected. The Board was 
thus able to manipulate district lines to accommodate all 
the remaining litigants challenging the city's elementary 
schools, but when every possible readjustment was made, 17 
Black secondary students still retained an unchallengeable 
right to legally request a transfer to the white school 
closer to their homes than the Black school they were 
presently attending. Finally, acting "against the Board's 
better judgement, but pursuant to the law as interpreted by 
the Court,"49 Norfolk School authorities, under threat of 
legal duress, were forced to accept these final 17 appli­
cants just days before the 1958-59 school year was scheduled 
to begin.
Ironically, the most important decision ever made by 
the Norfolk School Board took place not in a public meeting, 
but rather in a private home. Because board member Francis
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
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Crenshaw had just undergone an emergency appendectomy, the 
rest of the board gathered around the bedside of his West 
Ghent home to discuss their options. No one was willing to 
go to jail, although Ben Willis apparently wanted to explore 
this possibility. Since City Attorney Leonard Davis had 
been forced to withdraw from representing the Board (because 
of the possible conflict in representing the City Council), 
the Board was also without legal counsel, except for 
Crenshaw, an attorney who specialized in redevelopment and 
maritime law. Still, its members all knew that Hoffman's 
threat to send them away to the nearest federal prison for 
contempt of court was not an idle one. Gradually they came 
to the conclusion that in the long run integration would be 
easier to accept if the assignment of Black pupils to white 
schools came from fellow Virginians and not an officer of 
the federal court.50
By dragging the decision out over as long a period as 
possible, the Board was actually preparing one more ploy to 
delay the implementation of the assignments. A motion was 
immediately filed asking for a postponement on the grounds 
that "Norfolk was wholly unprepared at this time for 
immediate compliance," and that the Board needed additional 
time to arrange for the security of the transferees and to 
otherwise "prepare" school officials, patrons, teachers and 
students for "the sudden shift" in the traditional pattern
5°Francis Crenshaw.
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of Southern education.51 Their plea was based on the hope 
that the violence and uproar precipitated by similar court 
action in Little Rock would be reason enough to dissuade the 
local court from imposing its will upon a community still 
unprepared for implementation. Even though Judge Hoffman 
felt that he could not accept the argument at this late 
date, he did assure the Board that if, on appeal, the U. S. 
Supreme Court ruled favorably or even called for further 
arguments on the matter, he would entertain a subsequent 
motion to re-transfer the 17 final applicants back to their 
original Black schools for one more year. The School Board 
delayed for two more weeks the scheduled opening of the 
city's schools while the Supreme Court pondered their 
appeal.52
When seen against this backdrop of legal stall, foot- 
dragging, and delay, the statewide vilification of the Board 
is hard to comprehend. Only after every conceivable court­
room maneuver had been exhausted and its members seriously 
threatened with criminal contempt citations, had the Norfolk 
School Board voted to assign Black students to a white 
Virginia school. Even so, the state's political leaders 
rushed to heap abuse on the Board for making the assignment 
"voluntarily;" their objection was that the Board, itself--a 
group of Virginia citizens duly empowered by the state and
51Ibid.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 September 1958.
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local laws--had accepted the transfers rather than leaving 
the task to the Court, viewed by most as an illegal usurper 
of the state's authority. This was a crucial distinction in 
Virginia's interposition argument: Governor Almond, the
Organization's calmest and most reasoned spokesman, stated 
that the courts had the "power" to make such assignments, 
but lacked the "constitutional authority" to do so. Local 
school boards, he continued, were restrained by the state's 
Massive Resistance statutes from making such assign­
ments.53 In Almond's scenario, the Organization had every 
right to curse the Board because, when given the chance to 
obey one governmental authority and defy the other, Norfolk 
school authorities chose to follow the dictates of the 
federal court, and thus ignored sovereignty of the state of 
Virginia. More than that, the Board's action threatened to 
undo the Organization's tenuous interposition logic and 
deflate the rhetoric of Massive Resistance.
That the Board made this very deliberate decision 
without at least some degree of calculation on the part of 
at least a few of its best informed members seems improba­
ble. There was one major difference between the Norfolk 
School Board and the posture of the Byrd Organization, both 
its statewide leadership and its local affiliate: the
appointed members of the Board were willing to operate the 
city's schools even if integrated, and the elected
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 September 1958.
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politicians were adamantly opposed to such a course. To the 
Board, the assignment of 17 Black students to six previously 
all-white junior and senior high schools was the type of 
minimum of integration— "so little you wouldn't notice 
it"54— that both the Council and the city's legislative 
delegation had once said they could abide.55 The politi­
cal climate had changed drastically since the Council had 
assented to such moderation, and it was no longer willing to 
support those sentiments now. Norfolk had come to the point 
where there were only two courses of action open to the 
city: either to open the public schools on an integrated 
basis, or close them indefinitely. The Council now agreed 
with the leaders of the statewide Byrd Organization that 
closing the public schools in defiance of the court's 
authority was the only way to teach the federal government a 
lesson; the School Board felt that such a course would be 
highly destructive, both to public education and to the 
Southern culture in general. For this reason, the Board 
purposely acted in such a way as to undermine the state's 
intention to interpose its authority in a show of Massive 
Resistance. The School Board was composed entirely of 
individuals who personally preferred segregation; they had 
made every effort to resist assigning Blacks to previously 
all-white schools in Virginia until forced to do so by the
54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 January 1956.
55Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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federal district judge, but once having done so, they were 
determined to abide by that ruling in order to preserve the 
public educational system they held even more dearly than 
segregation. This was the basis for the underlying dis­
agreement that existed from this point onward between the 
individual members on the School Board and the Norfolk City 
Council.
The Norfolk School Board represented an unlikely pair­
ing of individuals destined for such heroics, and consider­
ing the climate of casual malaise that then characterized 
the majority of the population, their action in defense of 
public education in the city could well be termed "heroic." 
It was not a blueblood Silkstocking group, although most of 
its members bordered on the periphery of the city's business 
and financial establishment. There were no First Citizens, 
no bank presidents, no major industrialists or corporate 
entrepreneurs; only one had achieved any renown for his 
charity work, and only one was even active in the Chamber of 
Commerce. Just as they had for most of the city's other 
independent boards and commissions, the People's appointees 
had long ago been replaced by respectable, but politically 
unknown, small businessmen and professional people who owed 
their advancement entirely to Mayor Duckworth and the 
Organization Council. An examination of its membership 
revealed a group of prosperous individuals striving for 
respectability in a city which, in spite of its size, still
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carried much of the atmosphere of a small town: Chairman 
Paul Schweitzer operated an industrial pump manufacturing 
firm; Benjamin Willis owned a plush carpet and salon 
furniture establishment founded by his father; W. Farley 
Powers was a top executive with one of Tidewater's few large 
industrial concerns; Francis N. Crenshaw practiced maritime 
and redevelopment law; William P. Ballard managed the family 
seafood business; and Mildred J. Dallas had retired as an 
executive with a local automobile agency.56
These were just the sort of small business and pro­
fessional leaders who had the most to lose by provoking an 
open confrontation with the dominant political forces of 
both the state and municipal government: they depended too
heavily upon government contracts, professional fees, 
inspections, and regulation to lightly defy such authority. 
On the integration question in particular, they had the most 
to lose if they or their business establishments became the 
target for boycott or vigilante activity. In short, they 
were not the sort of individuals who ordinarily stand alone 
against such authority, yet stand alone they did, in 
defiance of both a well-established political order and a 
highly passionate vocal minority.
5SBiographical information comes from the following 
sources: Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 16 February 1960; Norfolk
Ledger-Dispatch, 29 May 1961; Norfolk Ledger-Star,
1 September 1964; Norfolk Ledger-Star, 22 December 1972; 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 February 1963.
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The School Board's singular act of courage set in 
motion a variety of forces which now vied for public accept­
ance; at the same time, because it held out the hope of yet
one more reprieve from the courts, the action made it
difficult for any coherent plan of action to win that
endorsement. For Mayor Duckworth, the two week delay in the
scheduled opening of the schools provided one more opportu­
nity to pressure Norfolk's Black leadership into withdrawing 
the final 17 litigants. Both publicly and privately, the 
Council used every resource at its disposal to force some 
sort of compromise from the Black community,57 but racial 
antipathies had progressed too far in the last few months 
for the city's Black leadership to accept any sort of token 
remuneration now that victory appeared so close at hand. 
Although this time the Norfolk newspapers, fearing reprisals 
against the individuals involved, declined to print the 
names and addresses of the 17 approved transferees, the 
Journal and Guide suffered no such qualms: all 17 were
featured in a photo-essay that praised their courage and 
pioneering spirit, although recognizing that, under the 
realities of Virginia's massive Resistance school closing 
laws, they "may not gain their goal immediately."58
In the weeks leading up to the School Board's defiant 
action, the organizers of the fledgling Norfolk Committee
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 19 May 1960.
ssNorfolk Journal and Guide, 30 August 1958.
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for Public Schools had begun to move their group into a more 
public posture. Quietly they had begun the task of contact­
ing the city's respected and conservative citizens— the 
cream of the city's business and civic elite--asking them to 
join, or even form themselves, a pressure group that would 
work to keep the schools open in the face of court-ordered 
integration. The two week delay in the scheduled opening of 
schools gave the Committee the opportunity it sought to 
organize an out-pouring of public support for keeping the 
threatened schools open. They hoped that now that a 
moderate position of court compliance had been adopted by 
the School Board, it would be easier for the rest of the 
business community to follow that lead. The Committee 
organizers were convinced that the Governor would have a 
hard time closing the schools in any community where he felt 
strong opposition from the conservative business 
establishment, and this thought gave new impetus to their 
push for membership. Most of those approached, however, 
were sympathetic to the cause advanced by the organizers, 
but still unwilling to come forward publicly at this time. 
Typical was the reaction of one well-known civic leader:
I'm with you one-hundred percent; however, 
you know my position. If I place myself in the 
forefront of your movement, it might harm my 
organization. Come back when you get your first 
hundred business leaders, and I'll be glad to 
join.59
S9White, unpublished article, p. 3.
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Other community stalwarts found similar reason for 
refusing to join the Committee: businessmen were worried 
about possible economic reprisals against their firms; 
executives did not want to face loss of position or pres­
tige; municipal and state employees feared pressure from the 
Byrd Organization; doctors, lawyers, realtors, and other 
professionals worried about losing clients; ministers did 
not want to face divided congregations; civic workers wanted 
to avoid pressure from their governing boards; naval 
officers were concerned about the effect upon their careers; 
federal workers were specifically instructed by the Health, 
Education, and Welfare headquarters in Washington that this 
was a "local affair" and that they should not play a public 
role; and everybody was concerned about the subtle social 
pressures and ostracism that might be applied against anyone 
who deviated from the silent norm and took a vocal stand one 
way or the other. Many of the community leaders approached 
by the Committee urged the group to wait longer before 
making any public move; they might help once the schools 
were actually closed and the hardships were real, but the 
time was not yet right, they felt, for going public with 
such an organization.60 As long as the Supreme Court had 
not yet ruled on the School Board's appeal, and as long as 
there was still some hope of gaining another reprieve, the
6°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1958.
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risk of public exposure was still too great for the great 
bulk of Norfolk's citizens to step forward and oppose the 
closing of the city's schools.
The Committee, however, was in a hurry to expose 
itself and launch a legitimate pressure group before the 
schools were actually closed. They saw that, in spite of 
the atmosphere of acquiescent hesitancy that blocked their 
movement, the Defender-backed Tidewater Education Foundation 
was boasting a membership that had passed the 2,500 mark. 
Although that group as well could not count any members of 
the city's Silkstocking establishment among their ranks, the 
T.E.F.'s claim to respectability was enhanced by the 
leadership of attorneys like James G. Martin, Harvey E. 
White, and Robert Boyd, by merchants like W. I. McKendree, 
Frank R. Ford, and by educators like William J. Story, Jr., 
and Hal J. Bonney, Jr.61 The organizers of the Norfolk 
Committee for Public Schools surveyed this roster and de­
cided that the public had to be offered a calm and rational 
choice that stood in opposition to closed schools and 
Defender-sponsored private education. It was apparent to 
them that the city's white secondary schools would be closed 
by the Governor, and that the students who formerly attended 
those institutions would be locked out of a public education 
because of the 17 Black transfer applicants, the minimal
6XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 September 1955, and other 
sources.
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amount of integration the city's leadership seemed earlier 
ready to accept. The hardship would not be isolated to a 
single group or cluster of neighborhoods; it would be 
universal, cutting across every social and economic line.
The city's schools had already been closed voluntarily for 
two weeks in the slim hope that the courts would prevent a 
more permanent lockout; the Committee organizers hoped that 
going public with a pressure group now, even if premature, 
would snowball enough support to prevent further disruption 
of the school year.
Most of those business and civic leaders who had 
earlier indicated support for such a group were invited to 
attend an organizational meeting at a private residence in 
the prestigious Larchmont section of the city. The meeting 
was a dismal failure to all those who had worked to 
establish the group: the few citizens who had any claim to
the city's social and financial elite stood on the front 
porch of the residence, showing their private sympathy for 
the cause but also indicating their reluctance to join the 
proceedings inside that would be made public. There were no 
bank directors present, no Silkstocking corporate execu­
tives, no leading merchants, no elected officials, no member 
of the naval, federal, or state bureaucracies, no major 
religious or spiritual leaders, and only a handful of 
interested professionals or small businessmen were in 
attendance. By and large it was the same individuals who
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had pressed from the outset for the establishment of a 
pro-school organization who now attended. The enormity of 
the crisis, the School Board's courageous act of halting 
compliance, the Virginian-Pilot's stirring editorial 
endorsements of philosophical support, and the seeming 
finality of their appeal--less than a week remained before 
the Governor would be forced to act— had failed to 
appreciably swell their ranks. The Committee was left with 
a small group of active and concerned citizens, respectable 
but carrying no great weight in the community, and who felt 
that the issue was now so great and the demands so pressing 
that they must push ahead and expose themselves alone to 
whatever risks were involved in founding such an organiza­
tion of public advocacy.62
Since the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools was 
still too liberal, too Jewish, too unsophisticated, and too 
carpetbagger in nature ever to have any hope of convincing 
the city's business and financial leadership to go public 
with their concern, the group wisely set its sights on a 
lesser appeal. In a statement to the press, the Committee 
announced instead its intent to form a parent's lobby in 
support of public education and to finance legal efforts to 
block the closing of the schools. Still convinced that the 
formation of even a scaled-down organization was not pre-
62Forrest P. White, M.D., unpublished article, p. 4; 
Robert L. Stern.
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mature, the founders issued a carefully worded statement 
that detailed its philosophy and reason for existence:
Private schooling cannot replace public 
schools on a broad scale without serious and 
lasting disruption of the educational facilities 
of the community. Private schools cannot be 
legally maintained with public funds under 
public direction, nor can they be held 
accountable to local government or the general 
public.
We believe that under the Federal Court 
orders only two courses of action are open to 
Norfolk: either proceed toward minimum 
compliance with the Federal Court order or to 
begin the destruction of the public school 
system. The Norfolk Committee for Public 
Schools believes that the first course will be 
far less destructive than the latter.63
The Committee chose as its president Reverend James C. 
Brewer, minister of the Norfolk Unitarian Church, hoping 
that having a minister at the head of the organization gave 
credence to its appeal, even though the Unitarian Church was 
held in less than orthodox esteem by the staunchly Baptist, 
Methodist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Lutheran 
congregations in the city. The Committee chose one of the 
few businessmen in attendance that night, Irving F. (Buddy) 
Truitt, the head of a small real estate and insurance firm, 
to be first vice-president; Mrs. Eugene D. Kidd, the wife of 
an independent insurance agent and head of the Stuart 
Elementary P.-T.A., as second vice-president; Mrs. Robert H. 
Thrasher, the wife of a local psychiatrist and an active
63Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 September 1958.
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civic worker, as secretary; and Dr. Forrest P. White, a 
pediatrician, as treasurer of the Committee. Real estate 
broker Ellis James, Professor Robert L. Stern, high school 
government teacher Margaret White, Mrs. Joseph Commander, 
and "another member who requested that his name not be 
disclosed"64 rounded out the executive board. It was not 
a prestigious assemblage— reporter Luther Carter once 
referred to the organization as "mostly a grouping of 
'little people,'"65 an assessment that was true even by 
the Committee's own standards. The un-named board member, 
Dr. Mason C. Andrews, a prominent gynecologist, the only 
person with any real standing in the Silkstocking community, 
felt that he could best serve the Committee in attracting 
people of equal prominence if his name were not released to 
the press. The group was so desperate for a link to the 
city's civic and business leadership that it grudgingly 
accepted the unusual arrangement, even though it infuriated 
others on the board who felt that Dr. Andrews had gone be­
hind their backs in removing his name from publication.66
The Norfolk Committee for Public Schools, just like 
the School Board and the editors of the Virginian-Pilot, had 
vastly overestimated the public's capacity to either compre­
64Ibid.
65Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1959.
66Forrest P. White, M. D., unpublished article, pp. 4-5; 
Robert L. Stern.
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hend the gravity of the situation the city faced or resist 
the scapegoat fate to which Norfolk had been condemned by 
the state's political leadership. Events proceeded at such 
a rapid pace that the desperate pleas of all three for sup­
port of their efforts to keep the schools open were rendered 
moot. The final legal hurdles were quickly overcome, the 
last-ditch appeals for yet one more delay denied, and on 
September 22, 1958, in accordance with Virginia's Massive 
Resistance Laws, the doors of the city's six previously all- 
white junior and senior high schools remained locked while 
those of its segregated elementary institutions opened for 
the fall semester. There were no closings in the city's 
parallel Black school system, and there all twelve grades 
opened as usual. In all, close to 10,000 white and 17 Black 
students had been locked out of their classrooms, and 
neither the Governor nor the President could offer much 
prospect of an early resumption of classes.67 The best 
the Governor could offer was the vague hope that somehow a 
loophole could be found around the legal obstacles that 
prevented opening the unaffected grades in the closed 
schools,63 but under state law, once a single Black 
student was assigned to a white classroom, all other grades 
in that class across the entire city must close as well.69
67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 September 1958.
6BNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 26 September 1958.
69 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 March 1957.
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Even with the school doors actually padlocked, how­
ever, few citizens were willing to discuss the implications 
or project the consequences of such drastic measures; even 
fewer seemed willing to gather to talk about what should be 
done. The majority of Norfolk's leaders apparently still 
dismissed the idea of a prolonged school closing as "scare 
talk," and promptly banished such thoughts from polite 
conversation. Most appeared to cling to the belief that the 
Byrd Organization had somehow outsmarted the federal 
authorities by daring to close the schools, and that soon 
either the courts or the Black community— they did not 
really care which —  would back down.70 The realities of 
the confrontation that had taken place the year before in 
Little Rock, or the relative success of school integration 
efforts in such cities as St. Louis, Charlotte, Nashville, 
and Washington, D.C., remained far from their thoughts.
"The best of the Southern leadership" and "the majority of 
Southerners" that the Virginian-Pilot had promised would 
rise up to abide by the authority of the courts71 were 
nowhere in evidence. The cream of the city's civic and 
business elite, at one time so vocal in determining the 
course of their city's direction, remained completely 
silent, abandoning the stage entirely to the Mayor, the
7°Robert L. Mason.
71Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 May 1954.
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Organization, and others who shouted encouragement from the 
periphery. Instead, prejudice— the unreasonable adherence 
to the conventions, traditions, and mores of the past—  
reigned supreme, replacing even civic pride and boosterism 
as the single underlying force behind every phase of 
municipal policy.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IN PURSUIT OF A MANDATE
Norfolk's was not the only educational system effected 
by the state's school closing laws the--schools in Prince 
Edward County, Charlottesville, and, to a lesser extent, in 
Arlington and Front Royal were closed as well— but Norfolk 
was by far the largest scale test of the state's Massive 
Resistance plan to replace integrated public institutions 
with a system of private, segregated academies, financed in 
part by public funds.1 There was never any question that 
Prince Edward County, the birthplace of the Defenders of 
State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, would prove how 
well Massive Resistance could work on a small scale. There 
the Defenders were well organized and a respectable segment 
of the community; when Blacks attempted to desegregate the 
only public high school in the county, Prince Edward Academy 
opened its doors to almost all the county's white secondary 
students. Even when the county high school was finally 
reopened after years of courtroom litigation (the Prince 
Edward suit had been a companion case with the Brown v.
xfor a more detailed report on Massive Resistance 
elsewhere in Virginia see Benjamin Muse, Virginia's Massive 
Resistance, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press,
1961); Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools: Prince Edward
County, Virginia, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of
North Carolina Press, 1965); and Eley, op cit.
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Board of Education decision), most of the county's white 
students continued on at the Academy.
Of all Virginia's small cities, Charlottesville was 
perhaps the poorest choice from a political perspective for 
the Organization showdown over school integration: because
of the strong influence of the University of Virginia, 
education was too highly prized and people too independent 
for Massive Resistance to succeed there. Under ordinary 
circumstances, Norfolk, too, with all the liberalizing 
influences provided by its naval, N.A.T.O., shipping and 
port facilities would have been an equally poor choice for a 
Massive Resistance showdown. Richmond, with its close ties 
to the Southside, the Organization, and its capital-of-the- 
Confederacy heritage, would have provided a much more 
malleable citizenry. The leadership dynamics in Norfolk, 
however, gave Massive Resistance a far greater opportunity 
for success than most would have thought possible: in spite
of its size, the city had a generally small and in-bred 
leadership that was usually united in its aversion to 
outside authority— a fact that had made Norfolk unpopular 
with the Byrd Organization and the State Legislature. 
Duckworth, one of the few outsiders to be truly accepted by 
all levels of Norfolk's society, had come to occupy a unique 
place of leadership in the city. First chosen as a 
compromise candidate to bring harmony between the warring 
business and political factions of the city, he had
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succeeded beyond all expectations in that mission, winning 
both the respect and the loyalty of the Organization and the 
Silkstocking crowd in the process. In the years since he 
had come to power, Duckworth had employed his consummate 
political, financial, and managerial powers with such 
success that he had become not just the leader, but the true 
focal point of the community. In short, Norfolk was far 
from typical for cities its size: few other municipalities
anywhere in the nation were so completely dominated by the 
personality of a single individual or had dissent so 
thoroughly silenced by his restraints.
Public education in Virginia was under attack in the 
Norfolk crisis at its weakest link: the secondary school.
Historically, since little more than basic skills was all 
that was necessary for comfortable survival in the agrarian 
economy of the Old Dominion, Virginia was among the last 
states in the nation to support the concept of universal 
public education, and certainly among the most reluctant to 
fund any more than an offering of minimum competency. 
Alongside its impoverished system of public education, 
however, thrived a highly structured system of private 
preparatory schools and semi-public universities, such as 
the College of William and Mary and the University of 
Virginia, to which the average graduate of the state's 
public schools could hardly aspire. Thus public schools in 
Virginia helped to reinforce a sort of social caste system
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that allowed the state's leading citizens to follow this 
parallel education tract in part underwritten by scarce 
public funds, and often at the expense of the more uni­
versal, public school system. The growth of the secondary 
school movement in the state can be traced back to the 
appearance of an urban middle class just before the turn of 
the century, but even as late as 1958, several rural 
counties still lacked their own public high school— a major 
reason why the Old Dominion consistently ranked near the 
bottom of any measurement of education quality in the 
country. Even in urban areas such as Tidewater, secondary 
education was not universal, and was still the property of 
the middle class. Mandatory school attendance laws did not 
apply beyond the age of 14, and because wartime and Depres­
sion era drop-out levels had run unusually high, a notice­
able percentage of the urban middle class had been forced to 
forego secondary schooling. The median education level for 
adults in Norfolk, with one of the finest public school 
systems in the South, was still less than tenth-grade, and 
more than one-fifth of the city's teenage population over 
the age of fourteen had already dropped out of school.2
It is against this backdrop of closed leadership, one- 
man politics, and spotty support for public education in
2U.S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Population, 
1950, vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, Part 46, 
Virginia, chapter B (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government,
1952), p. 46 - 47.
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general and secondary schools in particular that the concept 
of Massive Resistance had its most important test in 
Norfolk, Virginia. In one sense the Defender's plea for 
support had a great deal of validity: if Massive Resistance
could be made to work here, it would be successful all 
across the South; Norfolk was not just their first large 
scale test, the time, the circumstances, and the leadership 
dynamics of the city offered Massive Resisters at least a 
reasonable chance to score a major victory for their cause. 
Since public schools were still open for elementary 
students, only a small percentage of the city would actually 
be locked out of public classrooms. Of these, perhaps as 
many as one-fifth would drop out of high school anyway. 
Another group could successfully make the shift to one of 
the city's fine private preparatory schools— including the 
Norfolk Academy, Carolton Oaks (now Norfolk Collegiate), 
Garrison-Williams, Country Day, and Norfolk Christian— all 
of which were then undergoing an unprecedented building 
boom, prompted in part by the school desegregation crisis.3 
The Navy was concerned enough about the permanency of the 
closings that it, too, was drawing up plans to expand its 
own school system to a series of off-base institutions for 
military dependents.4 Another group of secondary students 
could be expected to transfer to other segregated public
3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 December 1958.
4Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 January 1959.
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schools in nearby communities (estimates put this figure at 
more than 500 students)5 or leave the area entirely to live 
with friends or relatives in other parts of the country.
Thus, although close to 10,000 secondary students 
would actually be locked out of public classrooms in 
Norfolk, the maximum load to be carried by the Tidewater 
Educational Foundation and any other substitute system of 
private schooling would actually be less than 5,000 pupils 
once the Navy's off-base schools began operation. The 
T.E.F. hoped that the traditional lure of the enhanced 
status of private schooling and the chance to strike a blow 
at outside intervention would provide a strong incentive to 
prospective patrons. For the first time many of the city's 
middle-class residents would be able to afford the luxury of 
private schooling for their children now that the state 
provided a $250 per child per semester tuition grant to such 
students— one of the hallmarks of the Massive Resistance 
package of legislation.® Armed with this additional 
attraction, the T.E.F. began to plan ambitiously for the day 
when Norfolk's schools would be closed. Even before the 
lockout was final, T.E.F. President James G. Martin 
announced that the group was prepared to educate as many as 
4,500 students, and more if the need arose. The T.E.F. had
5Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
®Forrest P. White, M.D., "Tuition Grants: Strange
Fruit of Southern Integration," South Atlantic Quarterly, 
Autumn, 1960.
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made arrangements to rent the public schools in nearby South 
Norfolk for less than three dollars a month per student.
The T.E.F. had found a powerful ally in William J. Story,
Jr., the South Norfolk School Superintendent and a member of 
the State Board of Education; Story had agreed to start his 
city's schools one hour earlier so that the buildings could 
be cleared by 2 P.M. for the T.E.F.'s private schools. The 
group's major effort, however, focused upon a day school to 
be operated at Bayview Baptist Church; other buildings 
across the city would be utilized as the need for more 
facilities arose.7
In spite of its optimism, the T.E.F. faced an enormous 
logistical problem in its effort to provide private replace­
ments for even half of the city's closed secondary institu­
tions. Norfolk employed a whole staff of school administra­
tors, supervisors, principals, and teachers to struggle with 
just the sort of transportation, textbook, personnel, 
guidance, curriculum, accounting, and property maintenance 
problems that awaited the handful of paid staff members and 
volunteer committees at the T.E.F. This shortcoming was 
continually paraded before the public by Lenoir Chambers and 
the editorial staff of the Virginian-Pilot:
Substitute private schools are by their very 
nature "inferior education". . . . [They would] 
be hurriedly makeshift, even if adequate 
teachers, adequate facilities, or accreditation
7Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 September 1958.
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could be found . . . .  providing public educa­
tion is the duty of the American government.®
Even if the public had been willing to overlook the 
administrative shortcomings of the T.E.F., their ambitious 
plans to replace the closed, integrated public secondary 
schools with a private system of segregated academies were 
crushed by forces that had been up to now only incidental to 
the struggle.
One of the first such blows came before the schools 
had even closed: there were early indications that certain
religious denominations which could have served potentially 
as both a power base and alternative source of educational 
facilities for the forces of Massive Resistance, were 
instead solidly aligned against school closings. The 
Catholic Church was among the first to speak on the national 
level in urging compliance with the dictates of the U. S. 
Supreme Court; locally, Norfolk Catholic High and its feeder 
parochial elementary schools had been successfully inte­
grated for a number of years. Six Black graduates were 
preparing that year to march for the first time in Norfolk 
Catholic's commencement exercises.
One other religious group, the Jewish community, stood 
at the forefront of those who acted at every level in oppo­
sition to the closings of public schools. The historically 
strong Jewish belief in the importance of public education
®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 September 1958.
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was a sustaining force behind the Committee for Public 
Schools and other efforts on the part of individuals to 
oppose Massive Resistance; leaders in the Jewish community, 
however, feared retaliatory actions taken against them as a 
minority if they assumed, as a group, any public role in the 
conflict, and they were effective in quashing any public 
statement on the part of synagogues or other established 
Jewish groups.9
The big break in the battle against Massive Resistance 
came when the Protestant denominations began openly to align 
their forces against those who sought to dismantle public 
education. The first step came in the summer of 1958, when 
the Norfolk Presbytery voted nearly unanimously to support 
the dictates of the federal courts; additionally, the 
Presbytery cautioned its member churches against allowing 
their facilities to be used for alternative private school 
classes, even if the public schools were actually 
closed.10 Other Protestant denominations, including the 
Lutherans and the bishops of the Episcopal Church, quickly 
followed suit with similar instructions for their congre­
gations. Methodist and Baptist organizations had a more 
difficult time following through with similar strictures for 
their own churches; Bayview Baptist and a number of other 
Southern Baptist facilities figured strongly already in the
9Jane Reif, Crisis In Norfolk, op cit., pp. 1, 9.
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 7 August 1958.
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T.E.F.'s game plan of resistance. The Norfolk Ministerial 
Association, however, a Protestant organization largely in 
the control of Methodist and Baptist clergymen, acted 
courageously even when their individual churches were 
reluctant to act. The day after Norfolk's schools were 
closed, 66 of the city's 74 Protestant clergymen met to sign 
a statement requesting that city and state leaders take 
immediate steps to reopen them.11 Next, the group sent 
representatives before Mayor Duckworth and the Council to 
repeat their request to reopen the schools on a local-option 
integrated basis.12 The ministers, however, realized that 
they spoke as individuals, and not as official representa­
tives of their church boards or their congregations, and 
many later faced increasing hostility from their churches as 
a result of their convictions. One Methodist leader, Dr. 
Edgar A. Potts, chairman of the Ministerial Association, 
faced immense personal hardship and abuse from the hands of 
his church board and congregation; others saw their assign­
ments cut short and their careers jeopardized because of 
their actions.
At any rate, the ministers found themselves aligned 
with another even more vocal professional group in their 
effort to reopen the public schools. Although several 
teachers were active in the formation of the Committee for
i:LReif, pp. 9, 10.
12Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 1 October 1958.
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Public Schools, as a group Norfolk educators resisted 
efforts to take a public stand before schools were actually 
closed. Attorneys for the School Board successfully 
persuaded the Norfolk Education Association not to make any 
statement that might put them in conflict with the city's 
political leadership; instead, the N.E.A. unanimously passed 
a resolution which affirmed its full backing of the School 
Board and its efforts to comply with the federal courts,13 
a statement which only indirectly hinted at its antagonism 
against Massive Resistance. After the schools were closed, 
the N.E.A. voted by a better than five-to-one majority to 
petition the City Council to reopen the closed schools under 
local authority (i.e., without state funding) on an 
integrated basis, if necessary.14 Individual teachers 
then joined with the more active of the city's ministers to 
establish private tutoring groups in a number of private 
homes and churches, not as substitutes for public schools, 
but rather to prepare students for reopened schools. As 
many as 3,500 students were eventually involved in these 
"parlor schools" that included facilities at 23 churches 
across the city.15
School authorities and Education Association officials 
quickly became concerned that these "parlor schools" could
13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 September 1958.
14Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 3 October 1958.
15Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 13 October 1958.
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degenerate into replacements for public schools, and thus 
accomplish the same end as the T.E.F. proposal. Addition­
ally, they feared that support for public school teachers, 
who were still receiving full pay at state expense,xs 
would wane if educators were discovered making money as a 
result of the school crisis.
A survey by the Virginian-Pilot found that many teach­
ers served the informal tutoring groups without pay and that 
the maximum salary appeared to be about $150 a month. The 
N.E.A. accordingly adopted a resolution that recommended a 
salary of only $50 a month for this extra work. The 
Education Association made sure that the public understood 
its resolve to close these informal tutoring groups as soon 
as the public schools opened, regardless of whether or not 
the schools opened on an integrated basis.17 In addition, 
the N.E.A., in an effort to put pressure on the city's 
elected officials, voted to withdraw from the stopgap 
schools at the end of the semester, even if schools were not 
yet open. The N.E.A. feared that its members' efforts to 
continue teaching even during the school crisis might tend 
to make parents complacent, and thus less prone to push for 
quick reopening of the closed schools.1®
16Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 2 October 1958.
17Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 November 1958.
lsNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 October 1958.
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Individually the teachers struck an even more direct 
blow at the forces of Massive Resistance. Efforts by the 
Tidewater Education Foundation to informally recruit public 
school teachers for its private facilities were continually 
rebuffed by the School Board, the School Administration, and 
the teachers themselves. Finally, out of desperation,
T.E.F. President James G. Martin, IV, went to the Mayor for 
help. Duckworth intervened and assured the T.E.F. an 
audience with the teachers;19 Norfolk's out of work edu­
cators listened quietly while Martin made his pitch for 
their help. Then, one by one, they quietly left the 
auditorium; only one of the 450 stayed behind to sign up. 
Governor Almond's pronouncement that teachers could still 
draw full state pay while teaching private school classes 
failed to produce converts among the city's professional 
educators;20 they were determined in their resolve to 
resist any effort that might undermine the public school 
system. The one teacher who stayed behind stated that she 
was "just curious" to hear the rest of the T.E.F.'s offer; 
she, too, refused to sign on as a recruit.21
The teachers' unanimous rejection of the T.E.F.'s 
employment proposal was a bitter defeat for that organiza­
tion, the Defenders, and all those state politicians who
19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 October 1958.
21Reif, p. 6.
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favored Massive Resistance. Even Mayor Duckworth, because 
he had so greatly committed himself by granting the T.E.F. 
an amicable audience before the teachers, felt personally 
rebuked by their defiant walkout.22 The Tidewater Educa­
tional Foundation resolved to go forward with its plans 
anyhow, hoping to start small but pick up teacher support as 
the crisis continued. A handful of retired school teachers, 
fundamentalist ministers, and bored housewives were 
recruited to serve as their temporary educational staff.
Late in October, more than a month after the public schools 
had actually closed, the T.E.F. opened its Tidewater Academy 
with only six instructors and less than 60 students; plans 
for expansion of its facilities at Bayview Baptist Church 
were contingent only upon its ability to find additional 
qualified teachers.23 Fewer than 1,000 students accepted 
the T.E.F.'s invitation to attend night classes in South 
Norfolk;24 for the great majority of those students who 
wished to continue their education in spite of the school 
closings, the tutoring groups led by their former teachers 
offered the only acceptable alternative. Norfolk teachers, 
by unanimously rejecting the financial rewards that would 
accompany a defection to the T.E.F., had almost single- 
handedly destroyed any chance that the Defenders, Mayor
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 October 1958.
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
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Duckworth, or the Byrd Organization could ever make Massive 
Resistance work in the city.23
With the tutoring groups in full session, Norfolk's 
secondary students had an appropriate forum through which 
they could remain permanently in the public eye, constantly 
reminding the city's leaders that they intended to stick 
with the concept of public education no matter what might be 
the political cost in shattered traditions. Most students 
tried to remain visible in their school clubs and related
activities, just as if the schools themselves had never
closed: football teams played a full schedule that fall
before the usual complement of parents, cheerleaders, 
students, and onlookers; marching bands continued to play 
on, even though their uniforms and instruments were still 
locked inside the school buildings; Granby High wrestlers 
continued individually to dominate the state competition, 
even though they were barred from participation as a team. 
From the very first school leaders all across the city took
up the cry of "School At Any Cost" and put it in the form of
petitions— "not as segregationists or integrationists, but 
as students who want an education, we ask you to please keep 
our schools open"— rallies,26 banners,27 and letters to
25Robert H. Mason.
26Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 September 1958.
27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 September 1958.
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the Mayor,23 each time drawing attention to their desire 
to reject substitute segregationist academies in favor of a 
continued hope for a return to public education.
The strong outpouring of support shown by parents for 
the tutoring group concept indicated that the mothers and 
fathers of those students also preferred to wait for the 
public schools to reopen, even if integration were present; 
for them, tutoring at the hands of qualified educators, even 
without the proper facilities or necessary textbooks avail­
able, was much preferable to sending their children to un­
accredited private institutions with uncertified personnel. 
These parents, however, found it difficult to express any 
form of united expression of their sentiments. Two years 
earlier, as a part of their program to sap the vitality from 
the pro-school movement, the Defenders had taken control of 
the Norfolk City Council of Parent-Teachers Associa­
tions,29 and then successfully defended that takeover from 
moderates hoping to dilute the P.-T.A.'s "hardline" segrega­
tionist stance.30 W. I. McKendree, president of both the 
Defenders and the P.-T.A. Council, led a move to disband the 
individual P.-T.A. units at the closed schools in order to 
further dilute parental opposition to the Defender's Massive 
Resistance plans. The wrangling that took place between the
2SNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 26 September 1958.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 March 1957.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 March 1957.
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segregationist officers and the pro-school parents erupted 
at every school P.-T.A. across the city, and in all but one 
case, the parents eventually forced some sort of statement 
in favor of reopening the closed schools,31 but not before 
the struggle had taken a heavy toll in terms of both time 
and energy. On that score at least the Defenders had 
effectively blocked off any channel of united opposition, 
successfully stifling both the timing and the mechanism for 
such a response.
For those who still hoped to mount some sort of 
citizen lobby in support of keeping the schools open, the 
Norfolk Committee for Public Schools appeared to be the only 
logical alternative remaining. Rebuffed in their efforts to 
attract Silkstocking backing, the Committee had redoubled 
its efforts to. recruit the ministers, the teachers, the 
student leaders, the parents, and the other school patrons 
who seemed more willing to speak out. Within a week after 
its formation was publicly announced, the Committee had been 
able to announce over 3,000 supporters committed to "non­
violent means to insure a peaceable transition to desegre­
gated education."32 This group, although large enough in 
size to rival the more established Defender's organization 
and thereby claim a legitimate position in the public eye, 
was hardly powerful enough to influence the outcome of the
31Reif, p. 8.
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 September 1958.
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crisis through sheer numbers alone. Even after it had 
opened a downtown headquarters, passed out handbills on 
street corners, run newspaper advertisements, deluged public 
officials with correspondence, and politicked in every 
conceivable fashion,33 the Committee had only managed to 
double its size to 6,000 members34— hardly enough to dodge 
its integrationist stereotype, a label that destroyed any 
effectiveness it might have had as a pressure group.
A similar fate had befallen each of the groups that 
had attempted to speak out against Massive Resistance. Once 
Norfolk's schools were actually closed, the impetus for 
public action seemed to fade in the inertia of the general 
"wait-and-see" attitude that gripped the people. In this 
climate of public apathy, any group that broke the silence 
to speak out must, of necessity, be extremist, and it 
thereby cut itself off from the citizens it hoped to lead. 
The ministers had spoken out bravely in favor of compliance 
with the court and against church support for private 
academies, but without the power of their congregations 
behind them, they could no longer speak for the city's 
religious community. In their unanimous rejection of the 
T.E.F., Norfolk's teachers had acted courageously, but by 
establishing their own private tutoring groups they were 
accomplishing in large measure what the Defenders had sought
33Reif, p. 5.
34Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 October 1958.
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to establish: a segregated alternative to integrated public
schools. The tutoring groups that had sprung up in private 
homes, church buildings, and empty store fronts were 
actually contributing in a large part to the apathy of the 
parents and the students themselves. The general public 
tended to overlook the crowded quarters, the shortage of 
textbooks, the total lack of libraries and supportive 
materials, audio visuals, laboratories, maps, and the like, 
and saw instead the makings of an even finer education for 
their children— they witnessed instead a classroom situation 
that consisted of only a small number of motivated students, 
dedicated teachers, and a high degree of individual 
attention. These were educational commodities that could 
only be found among the most expensive and exclusive private 
preparatory schools, and now everywhere across the city they 
could be found for less than fifty dollars a month.35 
Parents began to see how much their children were learning 
in spite of the makeshift quality of such institutions, and 
a very real danger existed that they would now decide that 
maybe private schools were better after all. Leaders of 
student groups and parent organizations who still favored 
public education at any cost found that they could not be 
heard as long as the tutoring groups remained in operation; 
their best efforts to rally support produced only hollow 
resolutions that lacked the backing of the large body of
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 November 1958.
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public school students, parents, and patrons who had the 
greatest stake in continuing universal public education.
In Norfolk no one had as yet been forced to pay the 
price for closing the public schools. The Virginian-Pilot 
continued to hammer away editorially at the long-term 
economic disaster that awaited the city--loss of industry, 
naval ship reassignments, rejection by business prospects, 
forfeiture of major shipyard contracts, and the like— but 
these were intangible expenses that had not yet hit home for 
the average citizen. The Pilot went on to estimate that the 
minimum cost of operating a public school system in the city 
without state funding and control would mean at least a 
one-third rise in local real estate taxes and a concomitant 
drop in federal impact aid funds36 (which were still 
channeled through the state government before being routed 
to the city). As long as tutoring groups continued, 
however, with their primary form of subsidy coming from the 
state's obligation to honor the teaching contracts of the 
instructors in the closed schools, the more direct costs of 
rising taxes and increased local support for education 
seemed distant and unreal. As long as no one had to pay 
directly for Massive Resistance, the great majority of 
Norfolk's citizens remained silent and aloof from the 
struggle, preferring instead to allow others to incur the 
risks inherent in active participation.
36Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 October 1958.
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In this atmosphere of public malaise, the Norfolk 
Committee for Public Schools saw little hope for success if 
it operated, as just another local pressure group; instead it 
vowed to seek other means through which to reopen the closed 
schools. With its effectiveness compromised on the local 
level, it turned its attention toward convincing state and 
national leaders. A delegation from the Committee talked 
with Governor Almond and urged him to return the closed 
schools to local control. The Committee's audience with the 
Governor, although unsuccessful in its stated aim, did point 
the way to an even more effective course of action. The 
Governor's response that only the courts could reopen the 
closed schools,37 strengthened the Committee's resolve to 
add class action litigation to its rapidly diminishing 
arsenal. The Committee hoped to obtain a Norfolk attorney 
for their suit, but quickly discovered that no local lawyer 
was willing to risk his livelihood in such a venture. With 
much reluctance, the Committee turned to outside sources, 
and finally induced Edmund D. Campbell of Arlington to take 
the case; once the certainty of the suit was assured, local 
attorney Archie Boswell agreed to associate with Campbell in 
the Committee's behalf. On October 27 (1958), a class 
action suit was filed in federal court on behalf of the 
Committee for Public Schools; the suit named Governor 
Almond, the School Board, and others as defendants in its
37Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 23 October 1958.
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efforts to reopen the schools.33 The suit was filed on 
behalf of 33 white parents and their children (a total of 89 
plaintiffs),33 but realtor Ellis James took the biggest 
risk in lending his name to the proceedings. The state was 
already testing the legality of the school closing in 
Harrison v. Day, a "friendly" suit filed in the Virginia 
Supreme Court,40 but James v. Almond, the Committee suit, 
went far beyond this rather limited action. The plaintiffs 
in James v. Almond claimed in federal court that the closing 
of Norfolk's six previously all-white secondary schools had 
deprived them of equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.4x
The sudden shift of the Norfolk Committee for Public 
Schools into the field of litigation obviously caught the 
N.A.A.C.P. off guard. The N.A.A.C.P. was quick, however, to 
realize the historic significance of the action: James v.
Almond was the first lawsuit of its kind to be filed by 
white litigants in the South. If the Committee was willing 
to take the lead with this sort of intensive legal action, 
the N.A.A.C.P. would trust them enough to withdraw its own
38Reif, p. 6.
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1959.
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 October 1958.
4XEdmund D. Campbell and Archie L. Boswell, Brief for 
Appellee, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, No.
7848 (James v . Almond), Norfolk Committee for Public Schools
files, Old Dominion University Archives.
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litigation to a secondary position. When its own suit was 
filed a few days later, it was entered only as companion 
litigation to the Committee's action.42
On another score, however, the N.A.A.C.P. was un­
willing to back off, even during the height of the crisis: 
it refused to let up on its quest to enlist new transfer 
applicants for the 1959-60 school year. The N.A.A.C.P. was 
thus signaling its intention to keep up the long-term legal 
pressure to desegregate Norfolk's schools, thereby refusing 
to negotiate any sort of token settlement short of integra­
tion. Duckworth and the Council, however, were redoubling 
their own efforts to force the Black community to withdraw 
the 17 pending transfer applicants. At one Council session 
Duckworth turned to a group requesting the reopening of 
schools and stated, "If you gentlemen want to help, you 
could talk to the fifteen families of the seventeen Negro 
children and try to get them to withdraw . . . .  Then we 
could open these schools tomorrow."43 Councilman Abbott 
then stated the Organization's position, "In other words, 
we've got seventeen Negro children who are keeping 10,000 
white children out of school." Duckworth followed by laying 
most of the blame on the N.A.A.C.P., and said he felt that 
they:
42Reif, p. 6.
43Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 1 October 1958.
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. . . did not truly represent Norfolk's colored 
population. The City has demonstrated what 
Norfolk's colored people mean to it by spending 
millions on slum clearance and schools, yet 
Negroes here pay less than five per cent of the 
taxes and make up seventy-five per cent of the 
jail population.44
The Mayor's unfortunate repetition of these inflam­
matory sentiments— a similar remark back in June had rallied 
the Black community behind its more extreme leadership in 
the N.A.A.C.P.--reveals a lot about both his famed intemper­
ance and the sense of helplessness he felt in the crisis.
It also demonstrates a fatal flaw in the Mayor's thinking 
that tended to view complex issues in their most simplistic 
terms, especially casting the people behind those issues in 
the role of either supporters or detractors. For Duckworth 
there was no middle ground— no way to be both independent on 
principle but supportive on the issues--and this made it all 
the more difficult for the School Board and other leaders in 
the community to take a stand before the Mayor had publicly 
committed himself one way or another. Duckworth, although 
he was an excellent leader, was a poor coalition builder, 
and the fact that he had achieved up to now a broad base of 
support in the white community was more a result of his 
forcefulness than any diplomatic bent. For their own part 
the Black community refused this time to be goaded by his 
remarks; those who were frustrated by the school closings
44Ibid.
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had not yet found a suitable target for their enmity, and 
the city's Black leadership did not want to challenge the 
Mayor in a name-calling contest that might further 
jeopardize the tenuous racial harmony that still generally 
prevailed. The Mayor probably would have been delighted to 
have such sharply defined antagonists, but except for the 
N.A.A.C.P.'s new litigation, the city's Black leadership 
seemed perfectly content to pull back from the struggle then 
going on in the white community. One of their most promis­
ing efforts in this regard was an attempt to focus the 
attention of their own constituency upon efforts to prepare 
the 17 Black transfer students for the realities of inte­
grated classrooms. The Black community started a separate 
tutoring group for these "pioneers" and spared no effort in 
their attempt to prepare them for the challenges of the 
future. The curriculum, taught by a bi-racial staff, 
covered more than just the necessary academic subjects: the
students were coached in dress, poise, etiquette, psycho­
logical preparation, self defense, and a whole host of other 
skills that would make for a smooth transition to integrated 
schools.45 Mrs. W. T. Mason, chairman of the project, 
told the students, "When you sought entrance to white 
schools, you left your childhood behind."46
4SWomen's Council on Inter-Racial Cooperation, "How 
Norfolk's Closed Schools Were Reopened," panel discussion, 
Norfolk, February 25, 1959.
46Reif, p. 25.
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When Norfolk's public schools were first closed back 
in late September, each of several groups— the Committee for 
Public Schools, church and ministerial associations, school 
teachers, student leaders, and parent organizations— tried 
valiantly but unsuccessfully to arouse the sort of community 
reaction required to prompt a speedy reopening. Each group 
failed, not so much because their own actions were meaning­
less or by themselves unsuccessful, but because the public 
refused to budge from the shelter of its complacency. As 
the weeks of closed schools wore on into late October, even 
these tiny voices of activism in opposition to Massive 
Resistance subsided. The public grew more and more rest­
less, yet it lacked a target upon which to focus. As the 
weeks of closed schools continued, the attention of the 
public began to shift away from Massive Resistance and the 
petty competition for popular support among its activist 
organizations; instead it began to focus on the more subtle 
clash of values in the political arena. Massive Resistance 
was not dead in Norfolk, but the decision of the school 
teachers to open their own tutoring groups had managed to 
forestall the hard choices the citizens would eventually 
have to make. Now, however, other groups had decisions 
thrust upon them that would bring them more and more into 
the focus of the controversy. Neither the School Board nor 
the Council had wanted Norfolk's schools closed, and both
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had done everything in their power, sometimes even going 
beyond the authority of their office, to prevent the impasse 
that had developed. Differences that existed in the 
methodology of their separate approaches to the problem had 
earlier revealed some possible obstacles to continued 
harmony once the city's schools were actually closed, but by 
and large such differences were kept well hidden from the 
general public.47 The School Board's fleeting act of 
bravery in defiance of the state's political hierarchy had 
all but gone unnoticed locally in the crush of events that 
followed. No one but the Southside's most rabid segrega­
tionists had really wanted martyrdom for the Board, and such 
a spirit of wanton self-sacrifice would have been required 
if its members were to seriously consider defying the 
federal court, thereby risking a jail term for contempt.
The average citizen cared very little from whom the actual 
integration assignment orders had come, the federal courts, 
and not the School Board, would forever carry the blame.
The Council, too, could have overlooked the Board's defiant 
initiative had not more public differences surfaced once the 
certainty of closed schools was assured.
A fundamental ideological disparity existed between 
the members of the Council and the School Board that made 
continued harmony between the two groups impossible once the 
future of the city's public schools was really threatened.
47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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The members of the Norfolk School Board ascribed to the 
theory that integrated public schools were better than no 
schools at all, and better even than any substitute system 
that could be offered in the private realm. To this end the 
Board proposed almost immediately that the City Council join 
it in petitioning the Governor to relinquish state control 
of the city's closed secondary schools. This was the one 
loop-hole in the state's Massive Resistance plan whereby a 
closed public school could reopen, albeit on an integrated 
basis. Local control, however, meant loss of state funding 
and a considerable increase in the local tax rate.48 Thus 
observers were not surprised when the Council rejected the 
Board's plea,4® and submitted instead an alternate plan of 
its own, requesting Governor Almond to reopen the closed 
schools on a segregated basis--something he obviously could 
not do without being in direct conflict with the authority
of the federal government. Mayor Duckworth next devised a
complicated scheme whereby the Governor would have to close 
only those grades actually under court orders to integrate; 
students in the unaffected grades could then be reassigned 
to other public schools in the city. Because Norfolk was 
then operating on a split-year system, with graduations in 
both January and May, Duckworth felt that the city could 
open the second semester (the "H" sections) of the eighth,
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 October 1958.
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 4 9
ninth, tenth, and eleventh grades. Since Blacks had not 
been assigned to the twelfth grade, schools could have 
opened for seniors and the "H" sections— roughly 40% of the 
white students locked out of classes. Governor Almond and 
the state superintendent of schools quickly lined up the 
neighboring school systems of South Norfolk, Norfolk County, 
Portsmouth, and Princess Anne County to accommodate the 
remaining students in the "L" sections of each grade.50 
Although no one knows whether their opposition was based 
upon operational considerations, conscientious objections, 
or, as one press report indicated, legal grounds,51 the 
Norfolk School Board apparently refused to participate, and 
the plan died without implementation.52 Regardless of its 
reason, the Board's refusal to participate helped to 
increase the level of the conflict with the Mayor and the 
Council. The Board had felt all along that the people of 
Norfolk would not stand for closed schools, and that any 
proposal, such as this new bypass plan, that sought to 
either prolong the crisis or else shift the burden of closed
5°Mayor W. Fred Duckworth, Letter to Governor J. Lindsay 
Almond, 6 October 1958, Box 136 (Litigation, Norfolk: School
Segregation, 1958), Executive Department papers of Governor 
J. Lindsay Almond, 1958-1962, Archives, State Library, 
Richmond.
51Such a plan probably would have constituted "separate 
treatment" of the students involved. Federal Judge John Paul 
had indicated in the Charlottesville and Warren County cases 
that "if the state is going to abandon public education, it 
must abandon it completely."
52Christian Science Monitor, 8 October 1958.
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schools from a community responsibility to an isolated 
hardship destroyed their goal of providing quality public 
education.53
Mayor Duckworth found himself torn somewhere between 
the School Board's desire for segregated public education 
and the Organization's demand to make Massive Resistance 
work. He was too pragmatic a politician to think that those 
17 Black students would somehow taint the education of the
10,000 whites locked out of their classrooms, but he was 
also too savvy to attempt to oppose the Organization on its 
best issue in decades. The School Board, however, repre­
sented a very powerful portion of his own personal coalition 
of businessmen and Byrd Machine backers, and its sentiments 
in favor of public education very probably accurately 
expressed the sentiments of the majority of the business 
community. The School Board and the editorial writers of 
the Virginian-Pilot probably represented the still private 
concerns of the Silkstocking community, more than even 
Duckworth would have cared to admit. Thus the Mayor was 
faced with the first real conflict within the harmony 
coalition since its formation eight years earlier. Although 
he had shown a great deal of racial intolerance in both his 
remarks and his policies, Mayor Duckworth was above all else 
a sharp politician, and the Organization had already shown 
that race-baiting was good politics. He had not overtly
53Francis Crenshaw.
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committed himself to promoting the Organization's Massive 
Resistance plan, only to giving the Defenders a fair hearing 
in the absence of public schools; to do otherwise, in light 
of the Defender's past record of electoral appeal, would 
have been bad politics.
The public was probably unaware of the full ramifica­
tions of Duckworth's dilemma, but they were knowledgeable 
enough to know that the Mayor was the key to any resolution 
of the current crisis: both the School Board and the
Massive Resisters needed his support to prevail. The School 
Board's request that the Council join it in petitioning the 
Governor to return the schools to local control brought this 
behind-the-scenes conflict to the forefront of public 
attention. Local control meant public schools, but it also 
meant integration; a denial of the Board's request would 
prolong the school closing and promote Massive Resistance. 
The political risks of joining the Board in its petition 
were enormous: it meant bowing to the N.A.A.C.P., the
federal courts, and the Committee for Public Schools; it 
meant forfeiting forever the support of both the Defenders 
and the Old Guard of the Organization; if the appeal were 
successful and schools were reopened without state funding, 
the Mayor would be personally responsible for a huge 
increase in local taxes; and finally, such an act would 
place the Mayor far beyond any course of action that the 
public had as yet indicated it would approve. To deny the
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Board's request, however, would risk provoking the ire of 
the School Board, the patrons of the public schools, the 
editors of the Virginian-Pilot, and probably the 
Silkstocking element of the business community. Seen in 
this context, the Mayor1s attempt to avoid the question by 
calling upon the Governor to reopen the closed schools on a 
segregated basis comes as no surprise. The Mayor's bypass 
plan was just another smoke screen tactic to stall the 
issue, but the decision would not go away; the School Board 
and the Virginian-Pilot continued to press the question, 
firm in their resolve to use every opportunity to witness 
for public education. The fact remains, however, that the 
issue was not as clear-cut as the Board made it appear: 
once the Council joined it in petitioning the Governor to 
return the schools to local control, nothing guaranteed that 
the Governor would then honor their request. State law was 
just vague enough on the point that the Governor was under 
no obligation to make any response at all. If this were so, 
then the School Board was urging a course that might poten­
tially isolate the Mayor and the Council from their coali­
tion of support, divide the community, and then make them 
appear ineffective for attempting such a futile gesture.
The simplest solution to their dilemma would be for the 
Governor to indicate ahead of time that he would refuse any 
such request for local control, but when a delegation of 
local officials sought a preliminary indication of his
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disposition, the Governor "just grinned."54 Almond was 
also too good a politician to commit himself and risk 
alienating his own coalition of supporters.
Mayor Duckworth, however, had discovered another 
solution, and one that would not only legitimately stall the 
issue for at least another month, it would also take him 
permanently off the hook: he would let the people decide
the question in an informational referendum. The Mayor, in 
announcing the Council's decision to delay action on the 
School Board's request until after the referendum, explained 
his rationale:
. . . such a referendum is a prerequisite to any 
city action on the current school crisis . . . .  
Governor Almond was elected by an overwhelming 
majority to do exactly what he has done [i.e., 
close the schools faced with integration]. I 
think the only way to impress the Governor is to 
let the same voters show him what they want done 
now.5 5
His emphasis on "the same voters" was part of the 
brilliance of the tactical ploy: since this was an off-year
for elections in the state, the referendum would come at a 
time when only 46,000 individuals— less than a fourth of the 
city's adult population— had their poll taxes paid up to 
date; nor was there any time to either register new voters 
or to allow delinquent accounts to be brought up to date.
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958. 
N̂orfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 October 1958.
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The question was to be put to the same conservative and 
established electorate that had given a two-to-one mandate 
to Governor Almond and Massive Resistance the year before. 
Secondly, since the referendum "was purely informational in 
nature, "the vote would not decide anything; the Council 
would be free at any time to disregard the outcome if it 
felt so inclined.56
The Organization was clearly the beneficiary of the 
Mayor's decision: their constituency would be the ones who
would decide the issue; less than a sixth of the voters 
would be Black;57 Navy personnel and others new to the 
area would be disenfranchised by the poll tax and pre­
registration requirements, and the short time frame would 
not allow the pro-school forces an opportunity to mount much 
of a campaign of opposition. Further, it put the School 
Board, the Committee for Public Schools, the editors of the 
Virginian-Pilot, and the school patrons in the unenviable 
position of having to oppose both the Mayor and the concept 
of popular democracy. The School Board, realizing that it 
had been outflanked by the maneuver, attempted to pull back 
from a clash with the Organization: it refused to attack
either the Council or the referendum, and instead chose only 
to complain about the additional 30-day delay inherent in 
the straw vote procedure. In an editorial entitled "In
56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
57Ibid.
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Principle, Wrong; In Practice, Confusing" the Virginian- 
Pilot eloquently expressed the frustrations that the Board 
chose only to vent in private;
[The referendum tactic] demonstrates an un­
willingness to exercise the leadership in city 
government which Norfolk has learned over the 
years to expect as the mark of councilmanic duty 
and obligation. It runs directly counter to the 
views and formal recommendations of the Norfolk 
School Board, [and] thereby digs a deep and 
ominous chasm between these two bodies . . . 
resort to it is not municipal statesmanship. It 
is refusal to face unpleasant but unavoidable 
facts.5S
Lawyers for the Committee for Public Schools were even 
more direct in their attempt to expose the ploy: "The
referendum is a device to get Council off the hook. I know 
it's a hot potato . . . They don't want to stand up and be 
counted."S9 The vote and the closed electorate were, 
however, only a part of the overall plan: Duckworth and the
Norfolk City Council wanted to make sure that the voters—  
their constituency— would have to face the same tough 
decision that the School Board demanded. When the final 
version of the proposition was drafted, the actual question 
was weighted with the code phrase "Integrated Basis as 
required by the Federal Court" that would make a clear-cut 
decision difficult:
ssreprinted from Reif, p. 17.
S9Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 12 November 1958.
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Shall the Council of the City of Norfolk, 
pursuant to State Law, petition the Governor 
to return to the City control of schools, now 
closed, to be opened by the City on an 
Integrated Basis as required by the Federal 
Court?60
Voters were to check "For Petitioning the Governor" or 
"Against Petitioning the Governor," but the decision did not 
stop there. Also on the ballot was a section labeled "For 
Information Only, Not To Be Voted On:"
In the event the closed schools are returned 
to the City of Norfolk, and are re-opened 
Integrated by the City, it will be necessary, 
because of the loss of State Funds, for every 
family having a child or children in Public 
Schools from which State Funds are withheld, 
to pay the City a substantial Tuition for each 
child in or entering such Public Schools.61
The pro-school advocates who had hoped to rally voter 
support in favor of opening the closed schools now found 
that task impossible: the time frame was too short to mount
an effective campaign; the electorate was too closely allied 
with the Organization; and the question was now both too 
confusing and too emotionally charged for voters to make a 
meaningful choice. The loaded ballot meant that the 
opponents of Massive Resistance would first have to 
undertake a highly organized and well financed effort to 
re-educate the populace before they could tackle the issue
6°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 November 1958.
61Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 5 7
in the referendum. The teachers, the ministers, the 
Committee for Public Schools, the School Board, and even the 
editorial staff of the Virginian-Pilot were incapable of 
such a monumental undertaking.
The Committee for Public Schools saw how hopeless its 
task had become, and turned its efforts instead to legal 
actions that might block the referendum. Two suits were 
filed— one challenged the legality of such a purely informa­
tional action where no binding decision would be rendered; 
the other hoped to strike the "For Information Only" portion 
of the ballot on the grounds that the concept of charging 
tuition fees for public schools was contrary to state 
law--but both efforts were expeditiously struck down by the 
local and State Supreme Court justices.52 The School 
Board must have also been frustrated by the Council's 
decision to weigh the question against their recommendation, 
for they apparently openly considered campaigning in favor 
of petitioning the Governor. Mayor Duckworth got word of 
the Board's intent, and publicly lectured them on the 
virtues of neutrality in such a heated question:
The Council is maintaining a "hands off" 
policy on the referendum. We don't have any 
idea of politicking one way or the other. I 
would like to suggest that the School Board do 
the same.53
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 November 1958.
53Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 October 1958.
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School Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer tried to respond that 
"politics has never entered into the Board's decisions," but 
both of the city's newspapers picked up the tone of the 
exchange as an attempt to rebuke the Board and get them back 
into line.64 Even though it backed down from its intent 
to campaign openly on the issue, the School Board still 
chose a course that was independent from the Mayor: instead
it put itself on record as opposed to charging any form of 
tuition fee. Public schools are an essential community ser­
vice, members reasoned, the cost of which must necessarily 
be borne by the entire public, and not just those who bene­
fit directly. To the Mayor's charge that he was "politick­
ing" with even this stance, Schweitzer answered, "I don't 
intend to be involved in politics. I intend to inform the 
public of the facts and let them make up their minds."65 
Board member Benjamin Willis, a Duckworth appointee thought 
to be the most conservative of the group, was even more 
contemptuous of the Mayor's attempt to silence their 
collective conscience; "I'll wear no man's muzzle," was his 
reply, "it is the School Board's duty to inject itself into 
the controversy."66
The referendum issue had left the members of the 
Norfolk School Board more isolated than ever before: they
64Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 October 1958.
65Reif, p. 19.
66Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 30 March 1960.
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were not quite at war with the Council and the city's 
political leaders, but they were certainly further out on 
the limb of opposition than any other group of successful 
businessmen had been in almost a decade. They were cut off 
as well from the rest of the business community: not a
single financial or commercial leader of any note had been 
willing to join them, the teachers, the Ministerial Associa­
tion, or the Committee in any action which might threaten 
the Organization's Massive Resistance program. Norfolk 
under Duckworth had always prided itself on the unanimity of 
its business and political leaders, and now the School Board 
threatened to disrupt that hard fought harmony in the middle 
of the most intense crisis that coalition had faced. The 
pressure on its members to remain quiet and play a receding 
role was intense,67 but unanimously they rejected this 
course as a matter of conscience. They knew that the 
referendum would be a disaster for the closed schools; not 
because the concept of public education would be rejected, 
but rather because the election would only further delay the 
inevitable decision to comply. In the meantime the forces 
of Massive Resistance would have a chance to claim some sort 
of mandate— a unanimity of popular defiance that the Council 
obviously hoped would impress the federal courts and hasten 
their retreat. Instead the Board saw it as a futile 
gesture: the lesson of Little Rock was clearly that the
S7Ibid.
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federal government had no intention of withdrawing. Still 
the Board hoped that by opposing only the references to 
tuition payments that they had chosen a moderate position 
somewhere between the two competing demands: they were not
instructing the voters to vote "For" integrated schools, but 
neither were they advocating a decision "Against" the con­
cept of public education. In reality they were attempting 
to be true moderates on an issue in which there could be no 
moderation, and each step they took brought them closer to 
the moment of choice between further confrontation or 
compliance. School Board member Benjamin Willis thought 
that the Board should resign and abandon its collision 
course--"I feel the School Board has served its usefulness," 
he said, but Chairman Paul Schweitzer was more philosophic: 
"You follow the detour, take the bumps, and hope that you'll 
soon be back on the good road again."ss
At any rate the six individual members of the 
Norfolk School Board seemed willing to risk both their 
political futures and their business ventures over what each 
must have felt was a matter of conscience. Each had 
personal reasons for choosing this independent course, but 
all six were obviously sustained by a common and overriding 
belief in the merits of public education, and in a way each 
provided a powerful, living testimony to that ideal. Paul 
Schweitzer, the chairman and most visible spokesman for the
6BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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Board, possessed the least formal, but perhaps the most 
valuable educational experience. Schweitzer had grown up on 
a ranch in Arizona, where most of the farmhands in the 
community were Mexicans; although he never attended college, 
he had, in his own words, experienced an "integrated" educa­
tion: "My sister and I were the only gringos in that little
one-room schoolhouse . . .  it was a lonely experience.1,69 
Board member W. Farley Powers was born and raised in a log 
house in the impoverished coal mining counties of Virginia's 
Southwest; hard work and a solid devotion to learning had 
been his only escape from the deprivation that surrounded 
him.70 William Ballard had grown up in an equally 
impoverished Eastern Shore region of the State where he was 
employed by the family fish and oyster packinghouse. After 
working his way first through high school and then college, 
he returned to raise the family business into one of Tide­
water's leading employers.71 Ben Willis, too, had been 
forced to work his way up from the loading docks of the 
family business, and although, as the heir to his father's 
posh furniture salon, his upbringing had been much more 
typical of the rest of Norfolk's business and social elite, 
he owed his fortitude and personal philosophy to something 
his father had taught him: "There are two things you cannot
69Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 16 February 1960.
7°Norfolk Ledger-Star, 22 December 1972.
71Norfolk Ledger-Star, 1 September 1964.
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compromise— principle and equality."'72 Francis Crenshaw, 
probably the most worldly of the six, brought an equally 
important perspective to the Board: growing up as the son
of a Navy captain, he had lived in most of the port cities 
on both the East and West Coasts, and had actually attended 
integrated schools in New England.-73 Mrs. Mildred Dallas, 
the only woman on any of the city's major boards and commis­
sions, was also the only educator in the group. Although 
she had finished a successful career as an executive with 
one of the downtown automobile agencies, she had retired to 
establish her own private kindergarten in the fashionable 
Lochaven section of the city.
Thus, although they shared a common background in the 
center of the city's civic and business elite, all six 
members of the Norfolk School Board evidenced a profound 
commitment to concepts of equality and public education— a 
conviction strong enough to endure the sense of helplessness 
and isolation they now faced. Although publicly in favor of 
petitioning the Governor and privately opposed to even 
putting the decision to a vote, the School Board neverthe­
less backed away from openly campaigning on the issue— Mayor 
Duckworth's scolding had produced at least that much 
compliance— abandoning instead that cause to the Committee 
for Public Schools and the other zealots of the pro-school
~72Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 February 1963.
’73Francis Crenshaw; Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 29 May 1961.
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movement. In spite of the fact that the odds were heavily 
stacked against them, the Committee still nursed vague hopes 
that Duckworth and the Organization had blundered by putting 
the issue to a vote: they hoped that the privacy and
anonymity of the polling booth might allow for a surprising 
outpouring of support in favor of reopening the schools. It 
was a remote possibility, but the Committee nevertheless 
prepared 50,000 guide ballots, numerous handbills, and a 
massive newspaper advertising campaign to promote a vote 
"for" public schools. Even as they pushed legal efforts to 
block the loaded wording on the ballot, the Committee under­
took its own "for information only" campaign, zeroing in on 
the potential economic disasters that lay ahead if schools 
remained closed; secondary themes included the warnings that 
the city's public school system would "be crippled for a 
generation" and that Norfolk's children were forfeiting 
"their American birthright of a free education."74
The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual 
Liberties led the forces that urged a vote "against" the 
resolution--the Council remained true to its pledge to stay 
out of the contest once it had drawn up the ballot.75 In 
one sense it was a classic struggle between the liberal 
Committee and the ultra-conservative Defenders, but the odds
74From guide ballots, handbills, and newspaper 
advertisements, undated (November, 1958), Norfolk Committee 
for Public Schools files, Old Dominion University Archives.
75Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 November 1958.
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were too heavily stacked against the resolution to make it 
either a meaningful contest or a fair fight. The wording on 
the ballot, the nature of the electorate, the short duration 
of the campaign, and the tacit opposition of the Organiza­
tion all doomed the Committee's efforts to failure before 
they had even begun. The only surprise in the results was 
the paucity of the turnout: only 21,000 people— less than
half of those eligible, and only a tenth of the city's adult 
population— showed up to cast a ballot in the most important 
electoral contest in a decade. The referendum to petition 
the Governor to reopen the closed schools lost by a healthy 
3-to-2 margin, the same figure by which U. S. Senator Harry 
F. Byrd and Governor J. Lindsay Almond had defeated their 
recent anti-Organization opponents. Only 3,600 Black 
voters— still less than half of those eligible— turned out 
to help the pro-school forces; their presence, however, 
helped to dilute the harshness of the 2.5-to-l rout that the 
Committee suffered in the white precincts.76 Even so, the 
vote was much closer in the Silkstocking strongholds on the 
West Side than in the blue collar neighborhoods in the 
northern, eastern, and central portions of the city.77
5Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 19 November 1958.
N̂orfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 November 1958.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
A VERY MASSIVE RESISTER
The people had spoken, or so it seemed; the message of 
their mandate was, however, indistinct. On the one hand, 
they appeared to endorse a continuation of the school 
closing strategy as a means to avoid federal pressures to 
integrate; on the other hand, they gave no indication of 
just how long they would support such tactics. The message 
was clouded by the fact that as yet no one had really 
suffered greatly from the closings: the establishment of
tutoring groups and the heightened sense of community 
involvement and shared emergency had helped to mask the fact 
that the burden of Massive Resistance fell disproportion­
ately upon the young, the poor, and the transient population 
not represented in the established electorate. The people 
had not, as spokesmen for the Defenders claimed, endorsed 
Massive Resistance: the tutoring groups themselves and the
dismal patronage attracted by the T.E.F.'s offering of 
segregated private academies gave substantial testimony to 
the fact that Norfolk parents at least wanted the education 
of their children to continue in the public realm. If there 
was any significance at all to the election, and any meaning 
to the events that fall that preceded the contest, it was
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that most citizens were still waiting for some sort of 
dramatic action that would resolve the crisis— the scenarios 
proposed by both the T.E.F. and the Committee for Public 
Schools were found unacceptable— and that most were hoping 
unrealistically for a return to segregated public education 
— the one option not available. In short, the people of 
Norfolk had not gone so far as the Governor surmised as to 
reject forever the idea of racially mixed schools;1 they 
just were not prepared to accept them yet.
The one man who bore the heaviest responsibility for 
reading these auguries was Mayor W. Fred Duckworth, and both 
time and events were conspiring in such a way as to insure 
that his judgment of the referendum's relative importance 
would be clouded by other, largely political, considera­
tions. Far from lessening the pressures upon him to act, 
however, the referendum had served instead to focus new 
attention upon his response, thereby helping to underscore 
his sense of helplessness in the face of outside forces. 
Governor Almond had already declared that he had "no weapons 
left" to forestall integration from future court orders,2 
and those around Duckworth saw this as an opportunity to 
promote his ascendancy. The referendum and the voters' 
support for the school closing policy was viewed positively 
by the state's political leaders, and Duckworth was fast
-̂Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 November 1958.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 January 1959.
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becoming the chief beneficiary of such acclaim. One savvy 
political commentator summed up Norfolk's newly won respect 
among the state's conservative camp in this fashion:
A gleam has replaced the old suspicious look 
when you mention Norfolk in the politically 
potent domain called the Virginia Southside.
It's because of a new feeling that Norfolk is 
not going to bow easily to school integration.
And that gleam shows when the name of Norfolk's 
frank-talking mayor comes up. The word most 
often heard in describing his actions is that he 
has "guts."3
Increasingly the eyes of the state's political leaders 
began to turn away from the staid and passive elegance of 
the governor's office to the energy and dynamism of 
Norfolk's mayor; there was no question that they liked what 
they saw. Almond had won office by portraying himself as 
the brains behind Massive Resistance, but now it Duckworth 
who was seen as the guts, and his blunt-spoken "go-getter" 
image proved a sharp contrast to the rolling rhetorical 
rodomontade that characterized Almond's style. Almond 
appeared to be the consummate silver-haired patrician, the 
type Virginians had always sought for higher office, so it 
was ironic that now, in crisis, they should turn to Duck­
worth, the epitome in appearance of the urban political boss 
with his stocky, even pudgy, five-foot, ten-and-a-half-inch 
frame, replete with bright, intent eyes and jowly visage.4
3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 January 1959.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 September 1954.
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Even his trademark, the ever present cigar and cigar holder, 
was more big city stoagie than the plantation havana of the 
gentile; he smoked three a day,5 but unlit, all three did 
double duty as the maestro's baton of Duckworth's furious 
pace of action: "he thinks fast and calls the shots
quickly— sometimes with a suddenness that is startling— "is 
how one reporter described him, going on to add that he "can 
snap with a voice which is some where (sic) between a bark 
and a bite." It was this very openness— "he's no diplomat, 
but he lays his cards on the table face up— "6that was now 
getting him attention from Virginia's most ardent segrega­
tionists: they sensed a steely harshness in his opposition
to federal authorities that seemed lacking in Almond's calm 
demeanor. In short, Duckworth, not Almond, appeared now to 
be the politician who had the potential to emerge as the 
hero of Massive Resistance, and already his name was being 
bandied about by political insiders across the state as a 
possible contender for gubernatorial nomination.7 Local 
Organization chieftain Billy Prieur had begun to cart him up 
to Winchester for regular sessions with Senator Byrd, 
reportedly both to underscore the importance of Norfolk's 
continued resistance and to explore the possibilities of 
advancing the Mayor's political career. For the first time
5Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 5 September 1960.
sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 September 1960.
^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 January 1959.
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Fred Duckworth himself was entertaining ambitions that 
stretched beyond municipal service, and he was eager to 
parlay this potential new statewide following into the 
Organization's nod for governor.®
All of this political speculation— as yet only the 
talk of insiders who thrive on such badinage— led Duckworth 
to misinterpret the results of the referendum as both a 
personal endorsement of his policies and a call to arms for 
further resistance. For the time being, however, the vote 
seemed to both solve all his present problems as well as to 
promote new opportunities: first, it relieved the Council
of having to make any decision at all on the School Board's 
appeal for gubernatorial intervention; secondly, it seemed 
to mend a potential rift in his business/organization con­
stituency by allowing the people, and not the politicians, 
to rebuke the School Board for entertaining thoughts of 
surrender; it had bought him time in which to establish that 
cool and rational citizen response to the crisis was 
possible; and finally, and perhaps most importantly, it had 
convinced the rest of the state of the solidarity of 
Norfolk's resistance to school integration, relieved the 
pressure from the Southside to overreact, and bought time in 
which to effect a purely local decision. Unfortunately 
personal ambitions and political pressures seemed to blind 
the Mayor to the beneficial escape-valve qualities of the
aPretlow Darden, Robert Mason, and others.
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referendum, and led him instead to an overreaction in behalf 
of the cause of Massive Resistance. Mayor Duckworth 
possessed a marvelously analytical mind that was well suited 
to the rough and tumble realm of urban politics: he now
sized up the situation in terms of potential obstacles, 
options, and sources of opposition, and then proceeded one 
by one to clear the obstacles and opposition from the path 
that blocked his choice of options.
Chief among those obstacles was the threat still posed 
by actions before the courts. It was not the Harrison v.
Day "friendly" suit brought to test the legality of the 
state's laws, nor even a continuation of the N.A.A.C.P.'s 
integration litigation, that most observers feared; instead, 
the Committee For Public Schools' James v. Almond action 
appeared to be the challenge upon which the fate of Massive 
Resistance hinged; this entreaty, wholly unexpected by both 
Duckworth and the Organization, had Governor Almond and the 
legal experts concerned. Almond knew that the state could 
not continue to offer public secondary education to Black 
students in Norfolk, but not to whites, and that this 
challenge by white parents would ultimately sink the 
interposition logic of Massive Resistance. Duckworth, 
however, was not inclined to accept defeat so easily, and 
instead, began to lay the groundwork for a plan that would 
undermine the Committee's action. At the first Council 
meeting after the referendum Duckworth proposed a "cut-off
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of funds" clause in the School Board budget slated to begin 
January 1 (1959), thereby reserving for the Council the 
right to "change or cancel the unexpended portion" of school 
funds at any time during the year, even prohibiting specific 
expenditures if it wished. There were several reasons for 
such a ploy: first, it brought the independent-acting
School Board more directly under Council's control by giving 
the Council the power of month-to-month approval of every 
facet of the School Board's budget.® The message to the 
Board was clear: Duckworth would not stand for any further
rift in his political coalition, and any future independence 
would be immediately rendered useless by Council's new 
funding control. Secondly, the measure was in part designed 
to retaliate against the errant teachers who had undermined 
the Organization's Massive Resistance strategy. According 
to reports, Duckworth, who had personally intervened to set 
up the meeting, was still smarting from the teachers' rude 
rejection of the T.E.F.'s offer or employment. The funds 
cutoff move now gave the Council the power to directly 
jeopardize both the salary and the job security of the up­
start teachers still under contract. When School Superin­
tendent J. J. Brewbaker expressed his concern that the 
measure might hamper both current personnel and future 
recruitment efforts, "I hope we don't do anything to 
encourage teachers to look for other jobs— we have good
®Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
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teachers," Mayor Duckworth snapped, "With what some of them 
have done . . .  I would have to disagree with you."10
These two retaliatory aspects of the funds cutoff 
measure were, however, only secondary to other more pressing 
considerations. With the added power, Council now directly 
controlled a potential solution to its legal dilemmas. In 
the event that the ruling in the Committee For Public 
Schools' James v. Almond suit went against the city, the 
Council could close the remaining white junior high as well 
as the city's Black junior and senior high schools, a move 
that would put Norfolk's case in uncharted legal waters. No 
court had yet ruled that a municipality was required to 
offer secondary education to its citizens; in fact, Virginia 
Attorney General Albertis S. Harrison had already ruled that 
the Supreme Court's Brown decision had struck down the 
entire state constitutional mandate to provide public 
schools at all, because the establishment of a public 
educational system was entirely conditional upon the schools 
being segregated.11 The legal arguments in the James v. 
Almond case turned upon the fact that the city was providing 
public secondary schools for some and not all of its 
patrons; if the city were to close the remaining secondary 
institutions, the ploy would at the very least tie up the 
legal efforts to integrate the schools for several more
10Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
lxNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 November 1958.
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years,12 perhaps giving the Organization enough time to 
permanently salvage its Massive Resistance plan to sub­
stitute private, segregated academies for integrated public 
schools.
Closing the city's Black junior and senior high 
schools was at this time, at least, a last resort and only 
an ancillary aspect of the proposal. The major purpose of 
the clause was not to stand as a legal dodge, but rather to 
serve as the most formidable in a series of power plays 
designed to pressure the Black community into finally with­
drawing their integration efforts. Up to now the School 
Board had been able to stand effectively as a buffer between 
the Mayor and the Black community, insulating the Black 
educational system from political reprisals. Now that the 
School Board had been short-circuited out of direct control 
of any portion of the city's school funding, the entire 
Black educational system was dangerously exposed to 
reprisals. Councilman Lewis Layton renewed the Mayor's call 
for a Black withdrawal from integration efforts, and was not 
above dangling the potent threat of such a fund cut-off as 
the new cutting edge of that demand. As if to back up that 
threat with immediate action, Council proceeded to slice 
$200,000 from the budget of the Department of Public 
Welfare, the burden of which would fall disproportionately
12A similar maneuver in Prince Edward County was not 
definitively broken until 1963. See Bob Smith, They Closed 
Their Schools, op cit.
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upon the city's Black citizens. In spite of the Governor's 
response that he was opposed to such retaliatory measures, 
Duckworth wanted the Black community to know that this time 
he meant business: "The only way schools can reopen now is 
by getting the cooperation of the colored citizens."13 
The Black community knew full well that the Mayor1s threat 
was no idle bluff: he had both the inclination and the
capacity to carry it out. "We could do nothing less in the 
light of the school referendum,"14 was Duckworth's care­
fully worded analysis of the Council's authority to affect 
such a cutoff. The threat was real enough: unless the
N.A.A.C.P. withdrew all legal efforts to integrate the 
city's schools, the Black community would be faced with at 
best a prolonged shutdown and, at worst, a permanent closing 
of its secondary school system and additional retaliatory 
encroachments upon its elementary schools. The enormous 
progress in Black education that had taken place in Norfolk 
in the twelve years since the People's group first took over 
the city government would now come to an abrupt halt, and 
was even in grave danger of retrogressing. Was the Black 
community willing to trade the future of an entire genera­
tion of its young people for the expanded educational 
opportunities of 17 youths? The Mayor was betting that they 
would not.
13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
14Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 January 1959.
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The Mayor's fund cutoff proposal was a direct result 
of the lopsided referendum victory, a growing awareness of 
his own personal political aspirations for higher office, 
and an increase in the hostile attitudes of a few of the 
state' most powerful and most ardent segregationists. The 
referendum had helped to quiet much of the rabid rhetoric 
emerging from Virginia's Southside, but some overt and 
highly visible steps to preserve the legal facade of Massive 
Resistance seemed necessary to appease former Governor Bill 
Tuck and others who had been roused by the Virginian-Pilot's 
editorial policy and its continued coverage of the pro­
school advocates. Duckworth had come under increasing 
pressure, in spite of his own growing personal popularity 
with these resisters, to prove that Norfolk was not a 
"hotbed of integrationists" as Tuck and his cohorts were 
charging.15 The funds cut-off measure was designed in 
part to appease these sympathies, as well as to buy the city 
enough time to negotiate some sort of out-of-court settle­
ment of the issue. Tuck and the rest of the Southside's 
Massive Resisters represented a powerful political force in 
the Organization— one with which even a Mayor lacking in 
ambition for advancement would have to deal in order to  ̂
secure continued state funding for the tunnels, highways, 
bridges, institutions, and other projects that were so 
crucial to Duckworth's development desires— and they were
15Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 November 1958.
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not above threatening to cut off state funds earmarked for 
any political jurisdiction which bowed to court-ordered 
school integration: "If Norfolk won't stand with us, I say
let them stand alone" was Tuck's philosophy.16
Within this context of threatened Southside retribu­
tion a minor incident took on even larger proportions in the 
Mayor's post-referendum posture of defiance. The plight of 
Norfolk's white secondary school students had begun to 
attract national media attention, and Duckworth heard that a 
C.B.S. film crew from Edward R. Murrow's "See It Now" series 
was in town to film a Committee for Public Schools' rally. 
Duckworth personally called School Board Chairman Paul 
Schweitzer to have the Board deny the Committee's rental 
permit to use public school buildings for its meetings.17 
The prospect of national coverage of a pro-school rally in a 
Norfolk public building was one that would have strong 
negative repercussions among the Southside's resisters.
When the School Board, apparently caught off guard by the 
sudden order, asked for clarification, they were told that 
"the Council did not want the schools used by this or any 
other group discussing the problem of integration,"xs and 
that the Council was merely expressing its "concern for the
16Ibid.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958. 
lsNorfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 26 November 1958.
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safety of persons who might attend such meetings."19 The 
Mayor was so determined to establish a new policy that 
excluded the Committee For Public Schools from the trappings 
of official sanction that he risked angering the local 
Defenders chapter which met regularly— in fact met the very 
week of his order— at Suburban Park Elementary School.20 
Even so, the policy apparently achieved its desired end: 
the rental fees were refunded, and the Committee was forced 
to scurry to secure private quarters for its rally, which 
was eventually held, greatly deflated by the sudden shifting 
of locations, at the Y.W.C.A.
The Mayor's quick action on both the funds cutoff 
measure and the pro-school rally so soon after the refer­
endum— both moves were accomplished within a week of the 
voting— earned him accolades of praise from the Organization 
hierarchy and the Southside cheering section. Both actions 
not only point to how futile opposition to the Mayor had 
become, but also to just how long the crisis might continue. 
More and more Duckworth, and not Almond, appeared to be the 
man fully in charge of the situation, and the School Board, 
the teachers, the Committee For Public Schools, and the 
others who preached moderation realized just how little 
influence they had left in that corner: in attempting to
convince the Mayor of the rightness of their cause, they had
19Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
2°Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 26 November 1958.
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become his enemies, outcasts whom he sought every opportu­
nity to harass and harangue. Moreover, no immediate end to 
the crisis appeared to be in sight: no movement could
realistically occur until January, when the Council assumed 
control of the School Board's funding, the court cases were 
slated for resolution, the Black community would have to 
respond, the tutoring groups were scheduled to cease,21 
and the School Board threatened to resign if overruled on 
its opposition to the Mayor’s funds cut-off proposal.22 
Norfolk had reached an interim period: the flurry of
activity that followed the first weeks of closed schools had 
all but died away; closing the schools was no longer a novel 
approach to preventing integration— the doors had now been 
locked for more than three months, and the federal govern­
ment showed no signs of the quick surrender promised by the 
proponents of Massive Resistance. Onlookers could not agree 
whether the citizens were really "complacent" or just 
"frustrated" by their lack of power to influence the outcome 
of the crisis,23 but regardless of the true nature of 
their attitude, Norfolk was remarkably quiet for a city with
10,000 students out on the streets, and the future of both 
its public educational system and continued racial harmony 
at stake.
21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 October 1958.
22Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
23Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 October 1958.
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In the air of official calm that prevailed, Norfolk's 
rumor mills worked overtime, helping to shift the focus of 
attention away from the political arena that was now 
involving a different cast of characters. Increasingly the 
focus of parents and civic leaders began to turn away from 
the student leaders towards a different type of student— not 
the ones who attended the tutoring groups, lead protests, or 
were active in school clubs and organizations. The citizens 
became more and more concerned that the effect of the school 
closings and the Lost Class of 1959 could be measured in 
terms of greater casualties than just classes missed, 
athletic competitions canceled, and college plans postponed: 
they feared that it could be tallied as well in the sudden 
upsurge of teenage unemployment, hostility, delinquency, 
crime, pregnancy, forced marriages, dropouts, and the like 
— the type of effects that have a more lasting impact upon 
the future of the community. Lenoir Chambers and the 
editorial staff of the Virginian-Pilot began to hammer away 
at this theme as well as the long-term economic ruin that 
lay ahead. Washington continued to sound ominous notes 
about the crisis' potential impact upon naval contracts, 
personnel assignments, and billeting arrangements— the Navy 
was obviously reluctant to make assignments to a community 
that lacked full public education— but these warnings seemed 
to go unheeded. Rumors spread about officers who had 
requested transfer, ships that had been reassigned,
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development prospects frightened away, and the growing 
likelihood of Congressional retaliation.24
In spite of these dire warnings that the under­
pinnings of Norfolk’s economy were severely threatened, the 
full impact of the school crisis had not yet hit the 
business community as had been predicted. Local business 
leaders and economic trends were still pointing as late as 
January of 1959 to a bright outlook and a rapid recovery 
from the national slump that characterized the later years 
of the Eisenhower administration.23 Even so, elements 
within the business community never gave up their attempt to 
attract the old elements of the People's group to the 
pro-school camp. When efforts to add such leaders to its 
own organization failed, the Norfolk Committee For Public 
Schools attempted to establish an independent advisory board 
of community elites, but even this effort proved hopeless: 
only lawyer Archie Boswell, insurance broker L. Jerome 
Taylor, industrialist William L. Shepheard, City Park 
Commissioner Fred Heutte, artist Kenneth Harris, and 
gynecologist Mason C. Andrews enlisted in the organization. 
Other notable progressives in the community such as lawyer 
Henry E. Howell, Jr., and entrepreneur Albert Hofheimer 
refused to allow their names to be associated with even this
24Reif, pps. 11-12, 21-22.
25Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 January 1959; 4 January 
1959; 15 January 1959.
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group.26 In October lawyer Archie Boswell and School 
Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer joined with psychiatrist 
William F. Blair and Lewis W. Webb, Jr., provost of the 
junior college that was the precursor to Old Dominion 
University, in an effort to get the Norfolk Chamber of 
Commerce to take a positive stand opposing the school 
closings. After a stormy session that included discussion 
of the closings' impact upon the Navy and industrial 
recruitment efforts, the Chamber's Education Committee 
passed the resolution by a twelve-to-four vote. Dr. Herman 
M. Williams, Assistant School Superintendent, expressed the 
fears of the educators in attendance:
Frankly, I feel that secondary education in 
Norfolk is doomed. I feel that the leadership 
in the State of Virginia has never been behind 
public education; they have primarily supported 
private schools. That is the reason Virginia 
ranks 45th in education [out of 48 states].27
The Chamber, however, refused to act on the resolution, just 
as it had when Barfield's Civic Affairs Committee requested 
a similar response a month later. Barfield pleaded with the 
Chamber to take a stand "in this unprecedented civic 
disaster in order to furnish this community with the strong 
leadership and guidance it so urgently needs."28
2SReif, p. 5, and other sources.
27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 October 1958.
2aNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 January 1959.
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Over and over again the editorial pages of the 
Virginian-Pilot echoed the theme that Norfolk's business 
leaders must put a stop to the school crisis, that it had 
gone on long enough, and that the city's future as a major 
naval base was threatened;29 even so, not a single leader 
of the old People's group, not a single major corporate 
executive or civic leader, dared to take up the challenge. 
The only corporate voices that were heard came from outside 
the city, although some, like the president of the Norfolk 
and Western Railroad, former governor and president of the 
University of Virginia Colgate Darden (brother of Norfolk's 
former Mayor),30 political leader Francis Pickens 
Miller,31 and other statewide industrialists,32 had a 
special relation-ship with the city. Only a young Frank 
Batten, publisher of the Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Dispatch 
newspapers, was willing to travel from Norfolk to join with 
three dozen business leaders from across the state to meet 
with Almond and urge him to reopen the closed schools.33 
Most of the rest of Norfolk's business and civic 
establishment remained quiet on the issue, giving Duckworth
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 17 January 1959 and 1 
January 1959.
3  ODabney, p. 537.
33~Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 7 December 1959.
32Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 December 1958.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 September 1990
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a free hand with which to negotiate with the Black 
community.
In spite of the fact that almost every element of the 
white populace stood poised against them— or at least seemed 
prepared to silently assent to the closing of their schools, 
too, in retaliation— the Black community refused to back 
down from their integration efforts: they were prepared to
choose desegregated institutions over no schools at all.34 
Thus on January 13, 1959, Mayor Duckworth announced the 
intention of the Norfolk City Council to close down after 
February 1, all grades above the sixth— an additional 1,914 
white pupils and 5,259 Black students would be locked out.
A small band of ardent open-the-schools advocates made an 
emotional plea at the session for Council to "think it over" 
before taking this drastic step.35 The editors of the 
Virginian-Pilot lamented that this was "the cruelest blow of 
all to the Norfolk public schools," and the executive board 
of the Norfolk Committee For Public Schools once again made 
an ardent plea for a show of support of public education 
from the Silkstocking community:
Community leaders and organizations should 
speak out [now] for a reopening of schools.
The time has come for the business and civic 
leaders to take a public stand. So far the 
"First Citizens," the bank directors, the 
owners and executives of business and industry,
34Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 11 December 1958.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 14 January 1959.
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the Chamber of Commerce, the Civic Clubs, and 
the great majority of professional men have not 
[yet] been heard from.35
Ironically the first crack in the wall of solidarity 
came not from any of these sources, but rather from within 
the Council itself. For the first time in the history of
the crisis, a single councilman split from the pack and
voted "No" to a Duckworth directive. Councilman Roy B. 
Martin, Jr., a Duckworth appointee with a six-year tenure, 
caused a ripple of surprise and then glee to break over the 
pro-school advocates; their pleas had been heard. Martin, a 
top executive with Foote Brothers food wholesalers, cited 
economic concerns as the reason for his opposition:
I sincerely feel we are headed for a 
definite backward step economically if we do not 
straighten out our school situation, not further
impair it. My strong apprehension about the
economic future of Norfolk impels me to vote 
"No."37
Years later Martin would indicate that it was the punitive 
nature of the measure, as much as the economic considera­
tions, that made it objectionable: "It was stupid from my
point of view to enlarge the problem by closing more 
schools."3B
36Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 14 January 1959. 
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 14 January 1959.
3SRoy B. Martin, Jr.
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The unofficial silence had at long lost been broken, 
but there was no flood of Silkstocking sentiment to seize 
upon this opportunity for expression. The business communi­
ty remained just as silent as before, failing even in this 
eleventh hour opportunity to back one of its own in an 
action of raw courage and seeming political suicide.
Instead of serving as the rallying point for a groundswell 
of business opinion against the Mayor's retaliatory tack and 
in favor, at long last, of the principles of public 
education, Roy Martin stood as alone in moderation as the 
School Board had once found itself. "The middle of the road 
is a thin yellow line where you get hit from both sides," 
one political observer later noted,3® and nobody felt that 
aphorism more keenly than Roy Martin.
Martin's vote, although a seemingly useless act of 
defiance that failed to stir an outpouring of Silkstocking 
support for reopening the schools, was not as suicidal as it 
may have first appeared. Martin, although at 37 the 
youngest member of the Council, was fast emerging as the one 
representative of the Duckworth coalition with his head 
closest to the ear of the people and his heart closest to 
the throb of the business community. The editors of the 
Virginian-Pilot were determined that his action not stand 
alone as an isolated incident, and therefore promoted the
39Henry E. Howell, Jr., The Wit and Wisdom of Henry 
Howell (Norfolk: Howell for Governor Campaign, 1973).
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apparent split in unprecedented news and editorial coverage 
for a single council vote. The pro-school advocates--the 
teachers, ministers, Committee For Public Schools, P.-T.A.'s 
and their sympathizers— who up to that point had carried the 
banner of opposition to Massive Resistance alone, took 
heart. If Martin was willing to risk his political career 
on a single vote, they figured, then he must have sensed 
some new surge of sentiment stirring from the populace. For 
this reason, they planned a flurry of activity, unmatched 
since the first weeks of the closings, to probe this new 
development.
The Virginian-Pilot, too, sensed the change, and 
attempted to crystallize the situation:
At present Norfolk may be likened to a bus 
coming down a narrow mountain road in the 
command of drivers who have misread the road 
map, neglected to read the warning signs, and 
who are cheered on by a group of front-seat 
passengers who don't know what they are doing 
. . . Norfolk's task would be difficult under 
any leadership . . . but the difficult task is 
horribly compounded when the leadership acts on 
vain and dangerous assumptions. There will be 
hope when— but only when— a lot of silent, 
unhappy people screw their courage to the 
sticking point and speak and act.40
The first shots in the new barrage were fired at a 
regular meeting of the Granby High School P.-T.A. Granby 
had now been closed four months, but suddenly 450 people 
jammed a standing-room-only meeting to demand a more vocal
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1959.
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opposition to the Mayor's school closing plan. The result 
was the first resolution by a Norfolk group opposing the 
retaliatory measure against the city's Black schools.41 
The most telling fusillade in the new barrage came not from 
the closed secondary schools, but rather from an unexpected 
corner. The Bay View section of the city had been famous 
known for its strong Massive Resistance sentiment in the 
past,42 its Baptist church had served as the initial home 
of the Tidewater Education Foundation, and the Bay View 
P.-T.A. had been one of the first strongholds captured by 
the Defenders in their attempt to seize control of the 
city's Parent-Teachers Associations.43 Even though only 
26 Bay View seventh-graders would be affected by the cut 
off, a crowd of angry parents at a packed meeting of the Bay 
View P.-T.A. shouted down the objections of W. I. McKendree, 
president of both the T.E.F. and the Bay View P.-T.A., and 
voted unanimously to pass a resolution opposed to closing 
any more schools.44 The editors of the Virginian-Pilot 
were astounded: "in these dark days, the action of the Bay
View P.-T.A. lights a candle of hope." In all, five city
P.-T.A.'s voiced "full scale protests" in the next few days 
against the Council's funds cut-off proposal, but because
41Norfoik Virginian-Pilot, 15 January 1959.
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1959.
43Norfoik Virginian-Pilot, 18 January 1959.
44Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 January 1959.
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Bay View was so widely known as a stronghold of Defender 
sentiment, the Virginian-Pilot took its action as a cue to 
ask, "Has The Counter-Revolution Begun?"45
The next salvo was fired by the School Board, a group 
that had been relatively silent since it had been stripped 
so unceremoniously of its financial power. In an action of 
silent defiance, the Board served as the Committee For 
Public School's star witnesses in the James v. Almond suit. 
In the irony of legal maneuvering, the School Board had been 
named as a codefendant along with the Mayor; now, under 
cross-examination by the Committee's lawyer, the Board 
members backed up each of the Committee's claims of economic 
and educational hardship. Perhaps even more important, the 
School Board now took two remarkable actions that brought it 
almost into a position of direct confrontation with the 
Council— a conflict which publicly at least it had sought up 
to now to avoid. First, Board Chairman Paul Schweitzer was 
authorized to issue a carefully worded statement that 
skirted on the edge of open defiance by indicating the 
Board's displeasure with Council's new school closings:
The School Board is interested in educating 
the children of Norfolk . . . our first obligation 
to the community is to get our schools back to 
operation in an orderly manner at the earliest 
practicable date."46
4SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 18 January 1959.
46Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 January 1959.
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Next the Board gave every indication that it would 
like to lose the new suit brought by the Committee For 
Public Schools to block the funds cut-off measure. Although 
the Board and the Council had both been named as defendants 
in the action, City Attorney Leonard Davis, the individual 
responsible for their joint defense, withdrew from the case, 
leaving the Council alone to face the courts.47
A new harshness in the Mayor's attitude had brought 
about the situation where the School Board and one of his 
own Council members were willing to risk open disagreement; 
for the first time they understood just how far Duckworth 
was willing to go to make Massive Resistance work in the 
city, and the prospect frightened them. At the very time 
most Norfolk residents were beginning to entertain thoughts 
of reopening the schools, Duckworth was calling selected 
members of the School Board and the City Council to a secret 
strategy session at his home. There, Duckworth, Vice-Mayor 
George Abbott, and Organization head Billy Prieur— Roy 
Martin was not invited, although presumably he heard about 
its content from others in attendance, indicated both their 
willingness and their intention to close every school in the 
city, if necessary, in order to prevent integration.4®
This was no idle threat to induce the Black community 
to recapitulate, this was to be the city's policy in the
47Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. 25 January 1959.
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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months, and even years, ahead, and the prospect of even more 
closed schools and a continuation of hardline resistance 
frightened the Board members present almost as much as 
Duckworth's next announcement: he was then holding for
Council's consideration an offer by the T.E.F. to buy up the 
city's closed school facilities and operate them on a 
private, segregated basis.49 This was the final step in 
the total abandonment of public education that anyone with 
any pretensions of moderation had to oppose: with the
schools closed, their buildings sold, teacher salaries cut 
off, and the low-cost tutoring groups phased out, it would 
be only a matter of time before enough of both the teachers 
and the students accepted Massive Resistance, reopening the 
public schools on a private, segregated basis with the 
assistance of the State's generous tuition grants. There 
was no question that Duckworth and the Organization had at 
their disposal the machinery that would make Massive 
Resistance work in Norfolk, and the fact that they both had 
such a capability and were apparently willing to utilize it, 
was enough to make both the School Board and Councilman Roy 
Martin revolt in spite of the risks they might incur as a 
result of their defiance.
Events now began to proceed at such a rapid pace, how­
ever, that they quickly outstripped these two hopeful signs 
of protest. On the same day that the School Board was
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
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announcing its opposition to the funds cut-off plan, the 
entire legal structure of the school-closing tack was being 
struck down in separate actions before State and Federal 
Courts. Both the State's "friendly" Harrison v. Day action 
before the Virginia Supreme Court and the Committee For 
Public Schools' more far-reaching James v. Almond suit filed 
in Federal Court proved disastrous for the proponents of 
Massive Resistance.50 The court decisions, however, only 
spoke to the issues presented in the fall, and failed to 
address the new obstacles presented by the funds cut-off 
plan. The courts only served, therefore, to cut out all 
middle ground between an immediate re-opening of the closed 
schools on a desegregated basis or the more permanent 
closing that Duckworth now envisioned. Thus, the courts 
could prevent any type of evasive scheme to keep the de­
segregated schools closed, but only so long as Norfolk main­
tained a school system with public funds. Duckworth was 
thus free to enact the next phase of Massive Resistance.51
The fact that both the Federal District Court and the 
Virginia Supreme Court handed down their decision on exactly 
the same day was no accident. In early December (1958)
U. S. District Judge Walter Hoffman had run across Chief 
Justice Eggleston of the Virginia Supreme Court on a golfing 
outing in Princess Anne County. Judge Eggleston drew
5°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 20 January 1959.
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Hoffman aside and inquired as to whether the three-judge 
federal court then impaneled to hear the James v. Duckworth 
case had reached a decision. Hoffman replied that it had, 
and that he was writing the opinion, which was being 
prepared for release on December 22 (1958). Eggleston 
indicated that the Virginia Supreme Court was also readying 
its decision in Harrison v. Day, but that the justices were 
split, and the dissenters would not be ready with their 
opinion until January 19 (1959). Hoffman took the hint, and 
signaled that he would delay his opinion until January 19. 
Judge Eggleston nodded, and departed with a smile.
We both knew it was better for Virginians to 
hear it [the death of Massive Resistance] from 
their own court. Judge Eggleston never said 
which way his court had decided (and I never 
indicated which way mine was going), but I knew 
what he wanted, and which way the [state] court 
was leaning when he said he was writing the 
majority opinion.52
Now that the courts had finally acted, the issue of 
more comprehensive school closings came in for a new round 
of response. In a fiery speech to a statewide radio and 
television audience, Governor Almond made the Organization's 
position known. In a flamboyant prelude the Governor 
referred in lurid terms to the:
52Walter E. Hoffman, U. S. Federal District Judge, 
interview by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 8 March 1991.
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. . . livid stench of sadism, sex immorality, 
and juvenile pregnancy infesting . . . mixed 
schools . . . .  Let me make it abundantly clear 
for the record now and hereafter . . .  I will 
not yield to that which I know to be wrong . . . 
we have just begun to fight!"53
Congratulations poured in from Senator Byrd, legis­
lative leaders, and hardcore resisters in every corner of 
the Commonwealth, all expressing their desire to lead 
Norfolk into yet another round of school closings, legal 
obfuscation, and delay.
Almond's rhetorical resistance, however, failed to 
convince President Eisenhower to back down now that his 
courts had spoken. Although he allowed that Norfolk's 
overall problem was "very difficult," the President stated 
that he was really more concerned with the plight of the 
sons and daughters of federal workers, naval personnel, and 
others more directly in his charge. His staff had 
researched the issue and thought that the Federal Government 
could provide government-sponsored schools only for the 500 
or so dependents actually living on the base; the rest would 
be locked out of classrooms just like their civilian 
counterparts.54 The editors of the Virginian-Pilot were 
impressed at how well the President had been briefed on the 
local dilemma, but they were even more concerned that 
Congressional leaders might take the opportunity to punish
53Dabney, p. 542.
54Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 January 1959.
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the city by cutting off its federal impact aid funds.55 
Although Representative Thomas Ashley of Ohio had introduced 
a bill to reduce federal establishments in any area where 
the public school system had been abandoned,56 this effort 
was balanced by the fact that other Congressional leaders 
were considering legislation that would provide additional 
funds and facilities to educate the off-base Navy dependents 
in Norfolk.5-7
Public reaction in Norfolk to the fast-breaking chain 
of events was loud and angry, even if its message was 
unclear. At a stormy session of the Council following the 
courts' pronouncements, Mayor Duckworth found for the first 
time that he was unable to conduct the city's business. In 
a city inured to years of meaningless Council sessions that 
served only as a rubber stamp for private agreements from 
the informal pre-session, a strange event took place: an
angry crowd, three-fourths of whom were women, was deter­
mined to prevent the Council from enacting its usual show of 
empty democratic pageantry. The entire meeting was 
repeatedly interrupted by clapping, catcalls, boos, and 
laughter from a rowdy crowd of onlookers; finally, after 35 
minutes of this verbal assault, Duckworth adjourned the 
meeting in disgust. Only two people had officially
55Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 January 1959.
56Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 January 1959.
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 January 1959.
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addressed the Council in the interim: Norfolk artist
Kenneth Harris, a Duckworth relative by marriage, and 
another spokesman for the Stuart Elementary P.-T.A. both of 
whom spoke against the fund cut-off proposal.58
The Norfolk School Crisis had long been the focus of 
national media attention— the Christian Science Monitor 
(8 October 1958), Boston Globe (12 October 1958), New York 
Times (4 January 1959), and other of the country's leading 
newspapers prominently featured the struggle; Governor 
Almond's picture adorned the cover of Time magazine 
(22 September 1958) in an issue that featured the Norfolk 
crisis as its lead story; and the Friendly World Broad­
casting Company of Philadelphia had carried a special 
half-hour broadcast to its 350 radio affiliates across the 
country59— but now an event took place on prime time 
national television that helped to crystallize both local 
attitudes as well as national opinion. At the height of the 
turmoil and just two days after the court rulings, C.B.S. 
television ran an Edward R. Morrow/Ed Friendly production 
entitled "The Lost Class of '59: The Norfolk Story" at
eight P.M. Wednesday, January 21. This was the end result 
of the filming that had taken place in late November, in 
spite of the difficulties faced by the crew— Mayor Duckworth 
refused to be interviewed and then blocked filming at public
5BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 January 1959.
59Reif, p. 22.
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school locations. Even so, the production was remarkably 
objective,60 seeking to portray speakers from both sides 
of the issue in a town-meeting type of forum. The Norfolk 
Committee For Public Schools had been asked to provide 
speakers representing their viewpoint, and had wisely chosen 
students, teachers, and parents instead of their own 
organizational leaders. The program also featured a segment 
that brought the viewers up to date on the recent legal 
developments, including a telling interview with a resolute 
Governor Almond. In spite of the factual documentary 
presentation of the hour-long program, the chief impact, for 
local residents at least, was emotional. Portions of the 
program that focused poignantly on the hardships of the 
locked-out students— how the closing had fragmented the 
goals and ambitions of the best and the brightest and doomed 
their less achievement-oriented classmates to the dismal 
prospects of teenage unemployment and listlessness— were 
instrumental in shaping half-formed local opinions: for the
first time Norfolk really saw its crisis as it was viewed 
by the rest of the world.61 For those businessmen who had 
up to now been relatively unconcerned about the city's loss 
of national reputation, the prime time exposure, the docu­
mentary objectivity, the emotional impact, and Edward R. 
Murrow's reputation for honesty helped to project an urgency
6°Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 22 January 1959.
61Reif, p. 22.
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to the crisis that was not present before: slowly the
realization dawned that the Organization had brought the 
city to the brink of a municipal disaster unlike any it had 
faced since the postwar People's revolt, and that if the 
gimmickry of closed schools continued, a decade of municipal 
reform, national leadership, social concern, and vital fence 
building with the Navy would be destroyed, along with the 
city's reputation and its hopes for a secure future.
Events had taken place so rapidly that week of January 
19-23, 1959--first, the advancement of the funds cut-off 
measure; next, the occasion of two simultaneous court orders 
striking down the legal framework of Massive Resistance; 
followed by the sight of the Governor vowing further resis­
tance; Congress and the President publicly advocating 
altered appropriations ahd possible financial retaliations; 
and finally, the prime time appeal of the Edward R. Murrow 
production— that the state’s political leaders, including 
Mayor Duckworth, apparently lost touch with the changing 
mood of the people. The politicians were still preparing to 
take their cue from the results of the November referendum 
and a quiet December of public acquiescence— they assumed 
that the people still wanted to fight court-ordered integra­
tion to the bitter end, even if it meant more school 
closings along the way.
Something, however, had happened to the public mood, 
and more and more individuals were apparently now ready to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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quit the fight. No one is really sure which event, or even 
which combination of events, triggered the shift, but for 
the first time a massive change was evident. To many of the 
city's business leaders it was the finality of the State 
Supreme Court's— a Virginia, and not a federal court—  
decision: "My own court had spoken— I had divorced myself
from the U. S. Supreme Court and I had given up any alle­
giance I had to it--that's when I was willing to lay down 
the fight."62 For others it was the spectacle of the 
Governor in full red-faced harangue in combination with the 
personal losses portrayed by "The Lost Class of ’59" that 
finally brought home the realization of how Norfolk must 
appear to the rest of the nation.63
In spite of the surface tranquility that had descended 
upon the city the weekend that followed the furious pace of 
fast-breaking events, a strange hubbub of activity was 
taking place in a number of subterranean circles. Mayor 
Duckworth was plugged into a statewide hookup of frantic 
political leaders scurrying to help plot the Organization's 
next step. A bloc of Southside legislators headed by State 
Senator (and later Governor) Mills Godwin was attempting to 
devise by telephone a series of desperation measures which 
would block the reopening of the desegregated schools.
Among the plans under consideration was a ten-day school
62Pretlow Darden.
63Reif, pp. 21 and 22.
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holiday until the Legislature could meet, a proposition to 
close every school in the state until each could be 
selectively re-certified by a state safety inspector, a 
statute that would make it a felony offense for courts to 
assign pupils to any school without the backing of the 
state's pupil placement board, a repeal of the state's 
compulsory attendance laws, and an amendment to the Virginia 
Constitution that would allow local jurisdictions to close 
down their own schools. There was even a proposal that 
paralleled Mayor Duckworth's fund cut-off plan, only 
reaching out to a statewide application.64 It was just 
this sort of frantic activity— the high-level phone calls, 
the hurried conferences, the official entreaties, and the 
speculative nature of the various schemes being advanced—  
that blinded Duckworth and the Byrd Organization leadership 
to more subtle murmurs in the rest of the community.
Another factor seemed particularly to influence the Mayor in 
his deliberations: Duckworth reported receiving somewhere
between 50 and 100 phone calls that weekend threatening 
violence or to "blow up the schools" if they reopened 
integrated. Whether the calls were local or were a part of 
some Southside plot to shore up his continued resistance 
makes very little difference: by the time the weekend
closed, Duckworth had fully committed himself to initiating 
another round of school closings, racial intimidation, and
64Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 January 1959.
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legal obfuscation. The specter of violence and the fear of 
a cut off of state funds if Norfolk bowed to integration 
were the reasons he publicly cited for that commitment."*
The rumor mills worked overtime in Norfolk that week­
end, but besides reports of political intrigue and specula­
tive legislation, they buzzed with the excitement that some­
thing big was going on in the business community. The 
grapevine had it that a downtown meeting had been held 
between the Navy's top brass and some gilt-edged Norfolk- 
ians, the remnants of the old Silkstocking crowd; in it, 
supposedly, the Navy issued an ultimatum: either open the
schools or lose the fleet. Other rumors had it that two 
powerful local financial leaders were called to an urgent 
conference in Richmond with representatives of the state's 
largest banking and mortgage interests; reportedly they were 
told that the school situation had to be cleared up before 
serious economic repercussions were felt.GO Regardless of 
the veracity of these rumors, they do express some very real 
fears that were circulating among the city's civic and 
financial elite: now that the courts had finally spoken,
business leaders were afraid that the Navy and the federal 
government might take some retaliatory action if the city 
continued its posture of defiance; others could see that 
efforts to attract new industry were already falling apart;
65Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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and financial experts had their eye on the collapse of local 
bond issues in the Northern mortgage markets. The substance 
of these realizations lent credence to the rumors and may 
well have formed the basis for what followed.
The Tuesday editions of the Virginian-Pilot and Ledger- 
Dispatch carried the most dramatic evidence of the shift in 
public opinion that had taken place that weekend. There in 
the front sections of both papers was a full-page 
advertisement, really an appeal to reopen the schools now 
and avoid further resistance, that by itself was both a 
trend-setter and the most important single event in the 141 
days of the Norfolk School Crisis. The advertisement 
carried the following message signed by 100 of the city's 
most prominent business, financial, industrial, and civic 
leaders:
While we would strongly prefer to have 
segregated schools, it is evident from the 
recent court decisions that our public schools 
must either be integrated to the extent fully 
required or must be abandoned. The abandonment 
of our public schools system is, in our opinion, 
unthinkable, as it would mean the denial of an 
adequate education to a majority of our 
children. Moreover, the consequences would be 
most damaging to our community. We, therefore, 
urge the Norfolk City Council to do everything 
within its power to open all public schools as 
promptly as possible.67
A front page, banner headline and the accompanying story 
proclaimed the appeal to be "the first time a large segment
67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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of the Norfolk business community has taken a public stand 
in the city's school crisis." The editorial page hailed the 
event as "a new clear voice . . .  a striking and welcome 
change . . . .  a striking new development."
Even though the petition was officially addressed "to 
the City Council" and a group spokesman protested that:
The petition is not intended in any sense 
to be critical; [it offers instead] positive 
support for the opening and preservation of our 
public schools. We think it is Norfolk's only 
realistic alternative.
This disclaimer was not enough to prevent the public 
perception of the document as a personal affront to the 
Mayor, his power, and the course of action he had chosen. 
This was the first time in his eight-and-a-half year tenure 
of office that any concerted group of businessmen had ever 
tried to publicly influence a Council decision, much less 
move so forcefully and so openly to oppose its authority.
As a further sign of the intended insult, the signers had 
handed over the petition to attorneys for the Norfolk 
Committee For Public Schools so that it could be introduced 
that very day as evidence in the Committee's new James v. 
Duckworth effort to block the Mayor's plan to implement 
further closings.68 Even so, former Mayor Pretlow Darden 
and a representative group of the signers had gone to see 
Mayor Duckworth on Monday to soften the blow before the
6BIbid.
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appeal was made public. Their recollection of the conversa­
tion only underscores the Mayor's anger and his helplessness 
at having been double-crossed:
Darden: We're doing something good for the 
city and good for you . . .  it gets you off the 
hook because these schools have got to be 
opened.
Duckworth: You've stabbed me in the back!
Darden: Well, you can always say if you want
to that a bunch of these— whatever you want to 
call us— got this thing up without your know­
ledge. Would you like to see it?
Duckworth: Hell, no! I don't want to see it!
I don't want to see it if I can't do anything 
about it.®9
Even though the signers referred to themselves 
innocuously as the Committee of One Hundred, the appeal 
marked the re-emergence of the People's group, long since 
buried in the onslaught of Massive Resistance and Organi­
zation politics. The petition had all the markings of an 
old People's production: the inspiration for it came from
former People’s Mayor Pretlow Darden in collaboration with 
Frank Batten, the young president of Norfolk Newspapers, 
Inc., the parent company of the Virginian-Pilot, the Ledger- 
Dispatch, and WTAR radio and television stations. Darden 
and Batten had hand-picked the group that would be eligible 
as signers, and then personally carried it to the chosen, 
going first to their old allies from the Silkstocking days.
69Pretlow Darden.
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Former People's campaign chief Charles Kaufman had polished 
the wording of the final draft of the statement,70 exactly 
as he had done for every major campaign announcement a dozen 
years before. Besides Darden and Kaufman, the list was 
spotted with names of those activists and appointees who had 
helped to lend credence to the People's crusade: John S.
Alfriend, Richard D. Cooke, Jr., Charles F. Burroughs,
George A. Foote, C. W. Grandy, Henry Clay Hofheimer, John S. 
Jenkins, Jr., Clarence B. Robertson, Dan M. Thornton, Thomas 
H. Wilcox, and J. Rives Worsham.71 More than anything else, 
however, was the fact that the Committee of One Hundred was 
the purest representation of the city's blueblooded finan­
cial elite that had surfaced in a decade— a veritable roster 
of the Norfolk banking and business fraternity, highlighted 
by the realization that at least ten of the signers lived 
not in Norfolk, but in nearby Virginia Beach.
The statement by the Committee of One Hundred was both 
an opinion-maker and the most important milestone in marking 
how far public sentiment had shifted in the past week. Once 
the city's major business and financial leaders had so open­
ly crossed the power and authority of the Mayor, it was both 
safe and fashionable for others who had been long silent to 
breathe a sigh of relief and express their own pro-school 
sentiments. Typical of the community's gratitude at the
7°Darden.
71Pretlow Darden.
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eleventh-hour conversion of its former Silkstocking leader­
ship was the action of one downtown florist who sent a red 
rose to each of the signers. Typical, too, was the appeal 
of 35 of the city's young business and civic leaders— too 
young to have been a part of the People1s regime, and were 
thus left off the official roster of One Hundred— who ran 
their own advertisement the next day so that their voice 
could be counted. This new appeal was the work of Harvey L. 
Lindsay, Jr., who spiced the text with references to the 
specific fears of the business community: that further
resistance would lead to the loss of valuable educators, the 
withdrawal of Navy ships and airplane squadrons, and the 
massive failure to attract new industry and investment to 
the area.72
One example helps to underscore both how committed the 
Mayor was to the Organization's course of continued resist­
ance and just how opposed he was to the surrender sentiments 
expressed by the Silkstocking crowd. The same day that 
Pretlow Darden and the others approached him with their 
appeal, but well before the existence of their effort was 
made public, Mayor Duckworth had the perfect opportunity to 
turn the statements to his own personal and political 
advantage. The Committee For Public Schools had brought 
suit against the Mayor and the members of the City Council, 
seeking to enjoin them in its James v. Duckworth litigation
72Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 0 6
from cutting off the School Board's funds and closing more 
schools. Armed with the still-secret knowledge of the 
Committee of One Hundred, Duckworth could have appeared as 
the initiator of that appeal by withdrawing the city's de­
fense in the suit, thereby conceding the issue and effec­
tively dropping the school closing plan. Instead, he chose 
not to abandon the suit, but argued all the more forcefully 
in favor of the funds cut-off authority, specifically 
detailing his fears about potential racial violence if the 
schools were allowed to reopen.-73
The Mayor had badly miscalculated if he had hoped that 
the usual plodding pace of litigation before the federal 
courts would give him time to reconsolidate the Organiza­
tion's political power and position. With unprecedented 
speed, Federal Judge Walter Hoffman— a local with strong 
ties to the Silkstocking establishment— ruled against the 
Council the very next day, the same day that Norfolk 
citizens were reading in their papers about the Committee of 
One Hundred. The very existence of the Silkstocking appeal, 
and the fact that the One Hundred had turned it over to the 
Committee For Public Schools to strengthen their legal 
position, may have played an important part in negating, as 
far as Judge Hoffman was concerned, the Mayor's fears of 
racial violence; in any event the evidence that a substan­
tial portion of the community now favored a reopening of the
~73Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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schools enabled Hoffman to permanently enjoin the City 
Council from any action which might withhold funds or 
otherwise interfere with the School Board's plans to reopen 
the closed institutions.74
The speed and impact of this new ruling was a shocking 
reversal for the Mayor, doubly so because it increased the 
perception that the Silkstocking crowd had fought him and 
won. Even so, the Mayor was not entirely defeated: he
still had two courses of action open, either of which would 
preserve his status as the hero of Massive Resistance and 
advance his standing with the statewide Byrd Organization. 
The Defenders were urging him to declare the closed school 
buildings as surplus and quickly sell them to the T.E.F 
before they could be reopened by the court.73 The Organi­
zation was apparently urging him to defy Judge Hoffman, 
continue to withhold the school funds, and appeal the 
ruling. Such a course would risk a contempt of court 
citation and possible imprisonment, but this was a prospect 
that the Organization actually relished, and was even then 
urging upon Governor Almond as well.76 The sight of a 
political leader behind bars to preserve the freedom of 
choice rights of the majority was just what the Organization 
wanted to promote its Massive Resistance cause celebre: if
74Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
75Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 28 January 1959.
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Duckworth would but risk personal martyrdom, they would 
treat him to national media attention, public prayer vigils, 
certain canonization in the Organization's ranks, and an 
endless stream of little old ladies, housewives, and mothers 
bearing baked goods and other wares for the jailed hero.77 
On the other hand, there was no guarantee that the Mayor 
could get a majority vote on Council if he chose either 
route: Roy Martin's opposition a week before had been the
purest political gamble— a bet that had paid off already in 
the flurry of following events, and there was every reason 
to expect additional resistance in the changed political 
atmosphere that existed since the Committee of One Hundred 
went public. Finally, the Mayor's decision may have been 
clouded by the fact that the School Board had publicly 
announced its intention to open the schools anyway, even if 
the Council continued to withhold funds in defiance of the 
courts: the Board apparently had enough surplus funds, coal
and other supplies left over from before to open for a few 
days even without Council's support.VB
It was these latter considerations— Duckworth could 
not risk losing a bitterly split vote on his own Council for 
a point that would be rendered useless anyway by the School 
Board— that probably weighed heavily in his decision to at 
last abandon the struggle. In spite of the dire warnings of
77Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 June 1964.
~7BNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 January 1959.
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Senator Harry F. Byrd that his Organization would be "wiped 
out" if Virginia gave in to integration,79 Massive Resist­
ance was over, at least in Norfolk. The Mayor bitterly 
refused to discuss the matter further, flatly telling all 
comers to an historic Council session that marked the end of 
his own resistance: We [the Council] have been taken out of
the school business [by the courts]. Anyone who came here 
to talk about schools can go to the School Board."30 Thus, 
there was no obstacle to the schools reopening immediately 
that Monday, February 2 (1959), as the Board had hopefully 
proclaimed earlier in court. Mayor Duckworth, in admitting 
defeat, was doing his best to retain whatever was left of 
his old businessman's/organization coalition in spite of the 
setback.
If Duckworth’s fall from the heights of municipal and 
political power was dizzying, it was no less dramatic than 
Governor Almond's sudden about-face on Massive Resistance. 
Almond, usually possessed of a calm and rational demeanor 
punctuated by both a thorough knowledge and deep apprecia­
tion of the law, was also on occasion given to stentorian 
bombast on the order of what one observer labeled "Orange 
County [Virginia] Courthouse, circa 1910 (when William 
Jennings Bryan's influence was running high)."sx These two
^ Richmond Times-Dispatch, 4 August 1974.
8°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 January 1959.
slDabney, p. 539.
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facets of his personality— his keen legal sense and his 
equally cutting rhetorical style— had collided. Almond had 
been the studious legal brains behind Governor Stanley's 
legislative efforts to block integration, and had been 
marvelously effective at creating a solid legal facade for 
the state's circumvention efforts. Almond, knowing full 
well that this house of cards he had helped construct would 
one day come tumbling down, had also counseled a delegation 
from the Norfolk Committee For Public Schools that only the 
courts could reopen the city's closed schools. Almond, of 
all people, should not have been surprised to find that the 
state's legislative barriers to integration had collapsed so 
suddenly. On the other hand, Almond was such a maestro of 
segregationist oratory that he had buried the more moderate 
but never-the-less potent challenge of Republican Ted Dalton 
under the verbal fusillades of his stirring rhetoric. The 
Governor's fiery bombast following the double court orders 
to reopen the schools— "We have just begun to fight"— may 
have also been partly responsible for Mayor Duckworth's 
overly repressive reaction. Almond explained in later years 
that he was tired, distraught, and just not thinking clearly 
when he made "that damn speech" in defiance of the court 
orders. He had meant to assure Virginians that he would do 
everything possible to preserve segregation, even though he 
knew a few schools would have to integrate, but the rumble
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of his rhetoric got the best of him.82 In the unfortunate 
opening remarks in which he hoped to express his own 
personal repugnance of integration, he got carried away; by 
the time he got to the conclusion in which he called upon 
the people of Virginia to stand with him in the struggle—  
"be not dismayed by recent judicial deliverances,"83 he 
told them— he had falsely fueled the fires of their 
expectations. There was every reason to think, as many 
leaders in the Commonwealth did, that the Governor was still 
saving one more, as yet unrevealed, legal gambit for the 
present circumstances.84
It was a much quieter and rational Governor who now 
stood before a special session of the Virginia General 
Assembly— only eight days after his rabble rousing rotomon- 
tade, and just two days after Judge Hoffman canceled Duck­
worth's funds cut-off plan— to inform them that he could not 
stop the integration of a few of the state's schools:83 
the best he could do was to try and minimize the racial 
mixing in those schools. The Massive Resisters were 
thunderstruck, and a few even referred to him as "Benedict" 
Almond,88 especially after he threatened the next day to
82Dabney, p. 542.
S3Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 January 1959.
84Dabney, pp. 542-543.
85Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 January 1959.
8SDabney, p. 543.
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veto any of the last-ditch circumventions proposed by Mills 
Godwin and his coterie of Southside legislators.37 
Instead of legal obfuscation, he pressed forward with a more 
moderate program to modify the state's tuition grant 
program, strengthen the prohibitions against violence, 
repeal the compulsory attendance legislation, and establish 
a commission to recommend further proposals.33
With the Mayor's new-found recalcitrance and the 
Governor's solid opposition, Massive Resistance in Virginia 
was finally dead. There was now no legal obstacle to the 
schools opening on Monday, February 2 (1959), as the School 
Board planned. The only real stumbling block lay not in the 
politicians, but in those other individuals who had resisted 
so massively, and who even now were not prepared to drop the 
cause. Duckworth's fears of possible racial violence were 
very real; even in modern, urbanized Tidewater there still 
existed that element of rabble that would stop at nothing to 
prevent or disrupt the integration of Norfolk's schools. 
Fortunately there was also in the city an element that had 
at least part of the scene firmly in control: local report-
ers--the Virginian-Pilot, Ledqer-Dispatch, and Norfolk's 
radio and television newscasters— remained faithful to a 
private understanding not to publish reports of or lend 
credence to rumors of racial violence or intimidation. Even
87Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 January 1959. 
SBDabney, p. 543.
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a cross-burning across from all-white Norview High School 
and within sight of the Black homes in Coronado went un­
reported. Luckily most local citizens were unaware of these 
incidents; this conscious omission of any reference to 
strife or the possibility of conflict on the part of the 
local press was indicative of the stern and cautious 
attitude which public officials and responsible citizens 
generally took in order to avoid the occurrence of "another 
Little Rock" in Norfolk.33
There was at least one other hopeful force moving 
behind the scenes to insure a peaceful resumption of 
classes: the national press had picked up the fact now that
Norfolk— "distinctive among most Southern cities"— had a 
"powerful and articulate group of ’moderates'" who helped to 
balance off the racial hostilities of the Defenders and 
their followers.90 The Silkstocking crowd, relishing 
their re-emergence since the giant splash of their People's 
days, were not now content to sit back and rest on the 
laurels of their newspaper advertisement. Besides lending 
their collective voice quietly to those who were calling for 
an orderly resumption of classes, Norfolk's business and 
civic establishment sought a more active role. They turned 
their efforts to their youthful counterparts in the 
hierarchy of the school's social and service clubs. The Key
s9New York Times, 1 February 1959.
9°Ibid.
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Clubs (Kiwanis-sponsored) of the closed Granby, Maury, and 
Norview High Schools jointly took an advertisement in the 
city's newspapers that pleaded, as their Silkstocking elders 
had petitioned, with the city's youth and adults alike "that 
the orderly reopening be completed as smoothly and as quick­
ly as possible so that we may proceed with our immediate 
objective— to obtain an education."91 On behalf of their 
various student bodies, they pledged to try and solve their 
problems, "In a mature manner and under no condition will 
rowdiness be condoned." "We believe," they predicted, "that 
the students of our respective schools will conduct them­
selves with a dignity that will bring credit to our 
city."92 It was not until later that it was revealed that 
this youthful advertising blitz was secretly financed by a 
single "civic-minded individual."93
Monday morning, February 2, 1959, would prove to be a 
crucial test of Silkstocking diplomacy when schools reopened 
integrated after months of Massive Resistance hysteria.
Were public pronouncements, unofficial news blackouts, 
newspaper advertising campaigns, and even the urgent plead­
ings of student leaders— all evidence of the type of quiet, 
behind-the-scenes manipulation of the city's civic and 
financial leadership— enough to turn away racial hostilities
91Reif, p. 15.
92Ibid.
93Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 5 February 1959.
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that had been building for months? Was the State Legisla­
ture's recent ban on bomb threats and schools violence,94 
as well as the Council's last-minute defeatist appeal "to 
every segment of the community to conduct itself in the same 
peaceful and law-abiding manner that has been one of the 
commendable aspects of this trying time,"9 3 enough to turn 
back the last-ditch defiance which both political groups had 
until recently supported? There was a widespread fear among 
the city's leadership that in spite of all of these pre­
liminary precautions, more still needed to be done to signal 
once and for all the end of Massive Resistance. As the 
representatives of the nation's leading newspapers, maga­
zines, radio, and television networks began to pour into 
Norfolk that final weekend in January, the city's Silk- 
stocking business establishment began to realize just how 
much would be at stake that next Monday morning. One 
single, isolated racial incident, or worse, one random act 
of violence, once it had been permanently etched into the 
headlines of the nation's newspapers, magazines, and nightly 
news broadcasts, could erase more than a decade of concen­
trated effort to restore the city's once-fallen reputation. 
Not since the lusty wartime days of booze, racketeering, 
prostitution, and the sleazy honky-tonks of Norfolk's 
notorious East Main Street sailor town— already undergoing
94Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 4 February 1959.
9SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 February 1959.
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full-scale demolition— would so many eyes be on the city; 
not since the Staylor Raid of 1946 was Norfolk so at the 
mercy of its hoodlum elements.
So much was riding upon peaceful resumption of classes 
on Monday that the city1s leadership dared to approach 
Norfolk’s most effective proponent of Massive Resistance for 
a final symbol of defeat and racial reconciliation. Behind 
the scenes that weekend there was one final effort to 
arrange instead a visual image that would ensure both 
domestic tranquility and the city's good name. Friends, 
business associates, civic leaders, relatives, and even 
minor political kingpins descended upon the Mayor, urging 
him to make the most difficult decision of his political 
career: he must walk, they argued, with the handful of
Black students that were to enroll in the previously 
all-white Norview Junior and Senior High Schools.96 If 
there was to be violence or racial incidents, representa­
tives of the media were betting that they would occur at 
Norview High School, and indeed the crush of cameramen, 
reporters, photographers, and media correspondents that 
would surround that institution on Monday could well 
encourage potential neighborhood troublemakers— identified 
in the local vernacular as "suedes" because of their reputed 
addiction to suede shoes9-7— to show off. There was more
96Pretlow Darden and Robert Mason. 
9-7New York Times, 1 February 1959.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 1 7
than just the reputation of the local toughs, however, that 
had earmarked Norview as the focal point of Monday morning's 
news coverage: the area had been one of the most fruitful
bastions of Massive Resistance sentiment, evidenced by the 
recent cross-burning incidents there; the rhetoric of 
Norview whites was still salted with vague references to the 
bombings and racial strife that had taken place four years 
earlier in the nearby Coronado section; as a newly annexed 
territory, Norview was one of the few areas in the city that 
owed no allegiance to the calm, deliberative progress of the 
Silkstocking reign; and finally, as a composition of largely 
blue collar neighborhoods, the official pronouncements of 
Norfolk's business and civic elite probably counted for less 
there than elsewhere in the city.
The course now urged upon the Mayor by the hourly 
delegations that descended upon his private residence was 
painted in the most pleasing colors possible: one quiet,
dignified walk up the school house steps— in sharp contrast 
to the grandstanding tirades of Arkansas' Governor Faubus in 
Little Rock— once it had been carefully immortalized by the 
electronic eye of the nation's media, would do more to 
promote the city, the Mayor, and even the Organization than 
any other step he could take. Business leaders argued that 
it was the one action that would help to focus positive 
national attention upon the city's cosmopolitan image, the 
integrity of its leadership, its spirit of rejuvenation, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 1 8
its efforts to attract new industry. Political leaders 
argued that both the Mayor and the Organization had the most 
to lose at the hands of the local voters if violence marred 
the resumption of classes. Further, they implored, that 
with such a visual event, the Mayor could upstage Governor 
Almond's split with Senator Byrd, and cut short efforts to 
unify opponents of Massive Resistance into a threat to the 
Organization. Finally, they urged, here was a ready-made 
opportunity for both the Mayor and the city to escape the 
onus of school closings--a chance for Duckworth to prove his 
political resilience, re-establish his rapport with the 
rapidly shifting mood of the people, and solidify his base 
of support in the business community. Unless he took some 
such action to insure the tranquility of the reopening 
ceremonies, the mantle of political leadership in the city 
would pass from him to the School Board, Roy Martin, and 
other "moderates" who personally supported segregation but 
who also had the courage to oppose the final stages of 
racial retribution associated with Massive Resistance.
No one really knows how close Mayor Duckworth came 
that weekend to accepting this unusual reversal: on its
surface the offer was attractive enough, but, it also 
involved a good deal of betrayal of principle and admission 
of guilt. The decision, however, was his and his alone; no 
other political, civic, or governmental leader could sub­
stitute for him and have such impact. Duckworth, however,
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other political, civic, or governmental leader could sub­
stitute for him and have such impact. Duckworth, however, 
would have no part of such a gesture, and no one will ever 
know whether personal pride, prejudicial animosities, devo­
tion to principle, or more mundane political considerations 
figured most prominently in his decision. An increase in 
uniformed police, the heightened visibility of school per­
sonnel, and the welcoming gestures of the principal would 
have to suffice; when school opened on Monday morning, the 
Mayor was no where near the waiting cameras at Norview High.
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EPILOGUE 
A SECOND SCHOOL CRISIS
All was calm as Norfolk's closed junior and senior 
high schools reopened Monday morning, February 2, 1959. In 
spite of the presence of almost a 100 journalists and 
television cameras, most of which were amassed outside of 
Norview High School, there was nothing unusual to report. 
Local reporters noted that there were "a few instances of 
name calling," but that the "windy 26-degree weather 
discouraged parents from lingering." The editors of the 
Virginian-Pilot praised the "display of sanity and poise and 
dignity that made a difficult day a notable one." President 
Eisenhower, who received hourly reports of the progress 
through a special telephone connection in the federal court 
house,1 telegrammed his congratulations to the 63 student 
leaders who had founded the "Back to School, Keep It Cool," 
campaign;2 the New York Times viewed the scene as a "turn­
ing point for integration;"3 and the televised footage of 
orderly students reporting to class stood in sharp contrast
xWalter Hoffman.
2Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 February 1959.
3New York Times, 1 February 1959.
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to events in Little Rock, Mobile, and other points across 
the South.
Thousands of students went back to public 
education . . . with unmistakable eagerness, 
seriousness, and determination . . . they want 
these public schools to remain open and operating 
. . . There was universal calm and acceptance in 
Norfolk today . . . This city should be proud of 
its sons and daughters.4
Norfolk's calmness and good sense were everywhere 
praised across the nation, and at least a small portion of 
its ugly wartime image had been erased. Ironically the 
New York Times credited "redevelopment and public housing 
developments" as being a factor in preserving "comparatively 
good race relations." The story went on to report that "a 
number of handsome new Negro schools have been built [here] 
in the last decade," and then indicated that:
Norfolk is distinctive among Southern cities 
in that it has a powerful and articulate group of 
"moderates" who balance off the Defenders and 
their followers on the school controversy.5
Although the Times obviously had the outpouring of 
public support that emerged after the advertisement of the 
Silkstocking Committee of One Hundred in mind when it made 
this assessment, its appraisal came as somewhat of a shock 
to the Committee for Public Schools and others who had
4Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 February 1959.
5New York Times, 1 February 1959.
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labored without much success during the five months of the 
school closings to provide a counterpoint to the Defenders 
and rally some modicum of support for public education;6 
nevertheless the Times was only one of many publications to 
note that Norfolk was unique in that the critical legal 
action to reopen the closed schools came from white parents, 
and not Black plaintiffs. The only really "powerful and 
articulate" opposition to Massive Resistance came from 
Lenoir Chambers and the editorial staff of the Norfolk 
Virginian-Pilot; as the clear, calm voice of reason in a 
state which seemed bent upon sacrificing public education to 
preserve political principle, he was richly deserving of the 
Pulitzer Prize he received for his efforts to keep the 
school open.
Other researchers have perpetuated the myth that "a 
powerful public school movement organized very quickly" in 
Norfolk to defeat Massive Resistance.7 In point of fact, 
the Committee for Public Schools, the school teachers, and 
others who hoped to spark a pro-school movement were 
relatively powerless until after the closed school were 
reopened, and the Committee of One Hundred, who had played 
almost no role during the controversy, only meant to signal
sRobert L. Stern; Dr. Forrest P. White, M.D., unpublished 
article, op cit.
7Robert L. Crain, et al., The Politics of School 
Desegregation; Comparative Case Studies of Community 
Structure and Policy-Making (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1968), 
p. 231.
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that it was time to surrender in Norfolk, not signal any 
opposition to either Duckworth or the dominant Byrd Organi­
zation.® Ironically, Mayor Duckworth, more than any other 
single individual, was responsible for promoting the ragtag 
elements of opposition during the school crisis into a full 
blown resistance movement a few months later when he misread 
the political auguries that followed the reopening of the 
schools.
It would have been easy for Mayor Duckworth to have 
retreated with grace and blame the collapse of Massive 
Resistance in Norfolk on Governor Almond, as apparently 
Senator Byrd did.9 Certainly he had personally done more 
and gone farther to keep the Massive Resistance movement 
alive in the city than even the staunchest Defender could 
have expected. Even though Pretlow Darden and others in the 
Silkstocking establishment tried repeatedly to counsel him 
to adopt just such a course,10 the Mayor refused to 
retreat from the battle lines he had drawn.
Norfolk, for all its cosmopolitan image, was still a 
Southern city, and its voters especially still harbored 
strong segregationist sentiment. Even as late as the week 
of January 26-31 (1959), the week after the court decisions
®Pretlow Darden.
9Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9 June 1964; Eley, op cit.; 
Benjamin Muse, op cit.
10Pretlow Darden.
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and just before the schools actually reopened, a team of 
researchers from the University of North Carolina found that 
almost 80% of Norfolk's white residents clung to their sup­
port for segregated schools: more than a third still denied
the legality of the federal courts to order desegregation, 
and 40% thought the city should resist further. However, 
only one adult in five thought that continuing segregation 
was a viable option for the city, and there was almost no 
sentiment for sacrificing public education to preserve 
segregated schools.11 Nevertheless it was precisely this 
sentiment that Mayor Duckworth misread.
In commenting on the reopening of schools in Norfolk, 
the New York Times indicated that although a major victory 
for public education had been won in Norfolk with the 
reopening of the schools, this was a "Gettysburg"— a turning 
point that signaled a retreat— and not an "Appomattox," or 
final surrender of the Massive Resistance forces.12 Mayor 
Duckworth and the Byrd Organization seemed bent upon con­
tinuing the fight, even though the tide of war had clearly 
turned against them; what may have been smart tactics in 
support of lost causes proved to be bad politics in Norfolk.
Almost before the national press had departed the 
city, Mayor Duckworth fired the first salvo in what was to
i:LErnest . Campbell, et. al. , When a City Closes Its 
Schools (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina,
1960), pp. 56-61.
12New York Times, 8 February 1959.
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tie a continuing attack against the School Board and its 
efforts to continue public education in the city. At a 
meeting with the Board, the Mayor warned that the Council 
was going to "cut the devil out of the 1960 [school] 
budget," and as to prospects for any more funds for school 
construction, "it will take an act of Congress to get it out 
of us." As part of its strategy to cut the cost of school 
construction, the City Council disclosed a plan to build six 
to eight three-room school houses, each accommodating 90 
pupils (30 per grade) in grades one through three, in the 
eastern half of the city. In commenting on the proposal, 
the Virginian-Pilot editorialized that:
While the plan apparently would slow down 
desegregation of the first, second, and third 
grades through the creation of smaller school 
districts, councilmen stressed it was prompted 
by the need for inexpensive schools.13
Although the educational drawbacks to the plan were 
clearly evident, the School Board found itself having to 
give serious scrutiny to the Council's mini-school proposal. 
Still, it refused to be stampeded into adopting such an 
obviously flawed approach, especially when it held such 
long-term adverse consequences for public education in the 
city. When it appointed a seven-member task force to study 
the Council's plan, the Board made sure that it included a 
representative cross-section of both the Black and white
13Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 February 1959.
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communities.1'1 When this group reported back two weeks 
later, it bot surprsinigly supported instead buildings of 16 
to 20 classrooms as the "ideal" size for a three grade 
primary school.15 The committee nevertheless approved of 
the idea of using smaller primary schools "strategically 
located to relieve crowding" in several areas of the city, 
and then proceeded to list nine such areas already served by 
Black schools (Lindenwood, West, Clay, Goode, Jackson,
Carey, Titus, Bowling Park, and Young Park).16 In the 
end, however, the School Board was forced to bow to the 
financial pressures of the City Council, and several 
"vest-pocket" schools were built for whites over the course 
of the next year: two five-room school houses (Pretty Lake
and East Ocean View) were erected on small lots in the Ocean 
View portion of the city,1-7 and another five-room school 
(Easton) was proposed for the newly annexed area east of 
Broad Creek.18 Two other ten-room schools were also
14Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 February 1959.
15W. E. Campbell, "Report of the Committee Relegated By 
the School Board of the City of Norfolk to Study the Proposal 
for Construction of Small Primary Community Schools," 
(undated, 1959), Norfolk Public Schools files.
16Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 March 1959.
17Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of Schools, 
to Thomas F. Maxwell, Norfolk City Manager, 21 May 1959, 
Norfolk Public Schools files.
18Letter from J. J. Brewbaker, Superintendent of 
Schools, to Thomas F. Maxwell, Norfolk City Manager,
29 May 1959, Norfolk Public Schools files.
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started (Poplar Halls, and Fairlawn) in the Eastern portion 
of the city.19 Also included in the School Board's plan 
was an "emergency ordinance" condemning a 2.5-acre site in 
the Coronado area, "a predominantly Negro section," for six 
demountable classroom units. Reporter Luther Carter noted 
that the hastiness of this action would have an impact upon 
pupil assignment for the next (1959-60) school year:
The opening of the Coronado school will 
have the effect of reducing, if not entirely 
eliminating, the number of potentially qualified 
Negro applicants in Coronado for Norview 
Elementary . . . The proximity of the Coronado 
schools [Rosemont and Coronado] would give the 
School Board a valid reason to assign Coronado 
children there even should they meet the academic 
and other standards for a nearer white school.
The Coronado school will represent a 
modification of the City Council's "little red 
school house" [concept]. [Coronado] . . . would 
not have a cafeteria, auditorium, playgrounds, 
and certain other facilities which have been 
incorporated in larger elementary schools.20
Black leaders were understandably upset by the pro­
posal, and complained that the new school would be both edu­
cationally unsound" and an "obvious attempt to circumvent" 
the desegregation decisions of the courts. When they went 
to the City Council, Duckworth told the Black leaders that 
their complaint "smacked of integration and segregation,"
19Letter from Brewbaker to Maxwell, op cit., 
21 May 1959.
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 July 1959.
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and they "got nowhere."21 The School Board attempted to 
reassure the Black leaders that the "same facilities will be 
lacking at some new white schools now being built." They 
went on to explain that the Board did not want to build a 
large, expensive school since it might be in the path of a 
proposed interstate highway, but that additional classrooms, 
a cafeteria, and auditorium, and other facilities would be 
added to the Rosemont combination elementary and junior high 
school for Blacks in the same area.22 Black leaders were 
not impressed by this defense, and promptly filed suit in 
federal court seeking to enjoin what they determined were 
"makeshift schools . . . constructed for the purpose of 
pursuing the policy of racially segregated schools."23
While it was fighting this battle over the Council's 
"little red school house" proposal, the School Board also 
had to worry that the Mayor would make good on his promise 
to "cut the devil"24 out of the rest of Norfolk's public 
school program. Since school districts in Virginia are 
dependent upon their municipal government for financial 
support, the School Board lacked any taxing or funding power 
of its own. When the City Manager announced his spending 
priorities for the up-coming fiscal year, he proposed a
21Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 July 1959.
22Ibid.
23Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 20 August 1959.
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 February 1959.
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reduction of more than five percent of revenues provided by 
the city. Even a cut of this magnitude was not enough to 
satisfy the Mayor, and the Council proceeded to remove an 
additional 2.5% (a 7.5% reduction).25 When the smoke had 
finally cleared, the Norfolk School Board found that local 
funding support for public schools had dropped by a whopping 
13.4% from the previous year.26 The Mayor obviously 
wanted to eliminate any possibility that the Board might be 
able to provide a raise to the teachers who had helped to 
sabotage his Massive Resistance efforts, a theory openly 
advanced by the Virginian-Pilot.27
Although the authority of a City Council to direct 
school operations in Virginia are relatively limited, Mayor 
Duckworth was finding that he could skillfully use his 
powers of the purse to keep the issue of Massive Resistance 
alive. The effect of any major cutback in local funding 
support would fall disproportionately upon Blacks, since 
most whites could afford to either supplement the education 
of their children or send them to private schools with the 
support of the state's substantial tuition grants.
Moreover, if Mayor Duckworth could keep the white schools in 
the city either small enough to be immune from integration
25Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 May 1959.
26This figure comes from an analysis of the General Fund 
Budgets of the Norfolk Public Schools for the 1958-59 and 
1959-60 school years, Norfolk Public Schools files.
27Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1959.
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threats or else so overcrowded and unattractive that Blacks 
would resist further efforts to desegregate, he could still 
achieve many of the ends of the resisters.
Thus the Board not only had to worry about loss of 
funding support and the pressure to build small, inadequate, 
but integration proof (under the court standards of the day) 
school houses, it also found that the Council was reneging 
on its promise to build the badly needed secondary schools 
that had already been promised. Lansdale Junior High, which 
had been approved by the Council two and a half years 
earlier, completely designed, and accepted by the State 
Board of Education,28 was never built; Lakewood Junior 
High suffered a similar fate. Although there were problems 
with the site at both locations (Lansdale was too close to 
the airport,29 and Lakewood had foundation problems), both 
schools had been promised for the 1959-60 school year. The 
Virginian-Pilot, however, intimated that the delay was 
linked to other, more political concerns:
The State Board of Education approved the 
plans in the fall of 1957, but the project failed 
to move forward. . . . Months went by, and 
nothing happened. It finally became apparent 
that the Council was waiting to see the outcome 
of the impending desegregation crisis.30
2sNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 June 1958.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 October 1959.
3°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 August 1959.
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Additional annexation and the impact of the redevelop­
ment projects closer in town33- was putting a tremendous 
burden on the schools in the eastern half of the city. A 
disastrous annexation decision— Norfolk had sought 33 square 
miles in the western portion of old Princess Anne County, 
but instead had ended up with only 13, a large part of which 
were water system lakes and the airport which it already 
owned— was exacerbating the problem. Norfolk was stuck with 
the students, but none of the schools which served them, and 
this urgent need was in part responsible for the acceptance 
of the "vest pocket" schools being erected in East Ocean 
View, River Forest Shores (Easton), and Fairlawn (See 
Figures 8 and 9 on the following pages).32 The fact that 
the School Board would be facing the new school year with 
reduced funds, badly overcrowded schools,33 and nothing 
but inadequate mini-schools in the works was prompting a 
second Norfolk School Crisis, and one in which the Board 
again found itself pitted against the Mayor and the City 
Council.
Public schools, or at least the quality of public 
education in Norfolk, were again threatened, and once more 
the pro-school forces vowed to do battle against the Mayor
3XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 3 January 1958.
32Frank S. Pace, former City Planning official, interview 
by author, Tape recording, Norfolk, 24 January 1991; Roy B. 
Martin, Jr..
33Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 11 November 1959.
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Figure 8. New School Buildings, 1959
A Easton Elementary D Fairlawn Elementary
B East Ocean View ElementaryE Poplar Halls Elementary
C  Pretty Lake Elementary p  Coronado Elementary
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FIGURE 9 .  SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION S T A T IS T IC S , 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 9  1
Year School Square Feet Acreage Race
1952 Calcott Elementary 58,254 sq.ft. 12.0 White
1952 Lakewood Elementary 58,254 sq.ft. 12.0 White
1953 Bowling Park Elementary 58,254 sq.ft. 12.3 Black
1953 Lindenwood Elementary 40,635 sq.ft. 9.5 Black
1953 Diggs Park Elementary 44,400 sq.ft. 10.6 Black
1954 Young Park Elementary 50,540 sq.ft. 8.0 Black
1955 Suburban Park Elementary 48,919 sq.ft. 15.0 White
1956 Northside Junior High 114,375 sq.ft. 14.5 White
1956 Oceanair Elementary 57,242 sq.ft. 17.7 White
1957 Lansdale Elementary 53,100 sq.ft. 18.7 White
1957 Sherwood Forest Elementary 53,100 sq.ft. 13.3 White
1958 Rosemont Elementary/Junior 40,000 sq.ft.* 13.0* Black
1959 Coronado Elementary 7,500 sq.ft. 2.2 Black
1959 East Ocean View Elementary 10,790 sq.ft.* 1.2 White
1959 Pretty Lake Elementary 10,790 sq.ft.* 1.2* White
1959 Poplar Halls Elementary 22,000 sq.ft.* 17.8 White
1959 Easton Elementary 12,000 sq.ft.* 11.7 White
1959 Fairlawn Elementary 22,000 sq.ft.* 16.4 White
^estimate of size and area at the time of first con­
struction; does not reflect later additions and expansions.
1 W. P. Sullivan Director of Buildings and Grounds,
"Cost Data, Outline Specifications, and Facilities in the 
New Schools Constructed in Norfolk, Virginia, Since 1951," 
February 1956, Norfolk Public Schools Files: Henry S. Rorer, 
History of Norfolk Public Schools, op cit., p. 346; School 
Building Planning Task Force Report, January 1985, Norfolk 
Public Schools Files.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 3 4
and the Organization Council. Not only were the financing, 
building program, and pay policies in jeopardy, the City 
Council had appealed its earlier reverses in federal court, 
and now indicated it had every intention of continuing the 
fight to cut off the funds to both black and white secondary 
schools.34 The School Board was apparently unwilling to 
back the council on this and other anti-education measures, 
because the Mayor and the city's Democratic Organization 
began to advance a bill in the legislature which would 
expand the number of positions on the Board from six to 
seven members, and shorten the terms of service from three 
to two years. The bill would have the effect of allowing the 
Council to immediately replace all six of the Board 
members35 who had worked so diligently to save public 
education in the city during the school crisis. School 
Board member Francis Crenshaw released a statement to the 
newspaper that summed up the politics of the situation:
At the present time, I believe there is a 
difference of opinion between members of the 
school board and the council as to [the] proper 
handling of the integration problem . . . .  The 
legislation pending in Richmond will . . . bring 
the board more closely under councilmanic 
control. I know of no other reason for adding a 
seventh member . . . nor can I otherwise
account for a reduction in the term of office 
from three to two years.35
34Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 2 May 1959.
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 April 1959. 
35Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1959.
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Fortunately this new school crisis found a political 
outlet before public education was damaged irreparably. It 
was in response to public opposition to the effort to fire 
the School Board that Mayor Duckworth let his guard slip in 
public enough to threaten his Massive Resistance coalition. 
When an officer of the Norfolk Committee for Public Schools 
(Mrs. Barr Attaway) inquired whether it was the intent of 
the Council to reappoint the incumbent members of the School 
Board if the bill passed, Mayor Duckworth grudgingly 
replied, "I don't think it's any of your business."37
Although in retrospect the infraction does not seem 
that severe, the pro-school forces immediately seized upon 
the incident as a new cause celebre of municipal reform. A 
flurry of letters to the editor, as well as the editors 
themselves, questioned whether the public did have a right 
to know, and whether such "despotic" behavior was proper for 
a "public servant." Pro-school advocates launched a massive 
tactical campaign to isolate the Mayor, his spirited temper, 
and his legendary disregard for public participation. In 
the heat of the battle, the point was lost that the Mayor 
was addressing the Committee for Public Schools, a long-time 
adversary. Letters to the editor zeroed in on the fact that 
he had been rude to a Southern (white) woman, conduct 
thought to be unbecoming of a public official; others noted
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 April 1959.
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that a visiting government class from Granby High School had 
received a real-life lesson in big city politics.3® The 
slogan "none of your business" was just short enough to fit 
on match book covers, key chains, and other tokens, and soon 
these code words reverberated all across the city.
The pro-school forces probably could not have made the 
issue stick had not the timing of the outburst coincided 
perfectly with the upcoming Democratic Primary for the state 
legislature. Two seats were open because of the retirement 
of incumbents; the Organization, the pro-school forces, and 
the Defenders all had candidates in the race. In addition, 
an incumbent state senator (Edward L. Breeden) was under 
attack by a coalition of Defenders and the most conservative 
elements of the Organization because he had backed away from 
the last ditch efforts to save Massive Resistance.39
The election hinged entirely on the Massive Resistance 
issue, and all sides posed the question of their election 
based upon their view of education in the city.40 On 
election day, the pro-school forces claimed total victory, 
winning both the disputed house and senate seats;41 in 
doing so, they launched the political career of Henry Howell
38Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 24 April 1959; 25 April 1959; 
26 April 1959; 27 April 1959.
39Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 April 1959.
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1959.
4XNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 July 1959.
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and a force of progressivism that would be a major player in 
city and state politics for the next three decades. The 
force included an alliance between the pro-school forces and 
the Black voters of the city, who had up to that point had 
voted solidly Republican.42 The Defenders, on the other 
hand were crushed, and never appeared in Norfolk again as a 
major political force; even the Organization lost, in part 
because it had failed to properly answer charges that one of 
its candidates had been affiliated with the Defenders.43
With champions in elected office for the first time, 
the pro-school forces found that their cause quickly took on 
a more authoritative air. The anti-school policies of the 
Mayor and the City Council soon came under attack from this 
new quarter,44 and it was not long before the Organization 
was in full retreat before a growing coalition that was 
emerging between the "little people" of the pro-school 
forces and the mainstream of its business community.45 
Shortly thereafter, George Abbott, a 17 year veteran of the 
Council seen as the most political of the group, resigned 
from office and was replaced by School Board Chairman Paul 
Schweitzer. Observers saw the move as an attempt to create
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 30 October 1959.
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 19 July 1959.
44Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 22 November 1959.
45Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 October 1959, and
8 December 1959.
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a new "Harmony Ticket" with the business establishment, or 
at least an effort to "cut the ground from under" the 
emerging pro-school forces.46 In spite of this move, 
however, the pro-school forces, now under the leadership of 
Henry Howell,47 endorsed Schweitzer43 and advanced two 
business candidates of their own, both of whom had been 
active on behalf of the pro-school forces during the School 
Crisis.49 Although only the candidacy of Sam Barfield was 
successful, the victory was seen as a direct rebuff to Mayor 
Duckworth, his "dictatorial rule," the Council's actions in 
the desegregation crisis, and the secrecy of the process of 
city planning and governmental decision-making.30 Fred 
Duckworth declined to seek re-election in the next race, and 
the office of Mayor was turned over to Roy Martin, the one 
councilman who had dared to break with the Organization 
during the school crisis in order to support a continuation 
of public education in the city. Norfolk had thus come full 
circle, and although the process of government became more 
contentious as decision-making came more into public view, 
the primacy of councilmanic support for public education was 
never again at issue; the bi-racial coalition of pro-school
4SNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 16 February 1960
^ Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch, 15 June 1960.
4SNorfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 10 June 1960.
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 29 March 1960.
5°Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 15 June 1960.
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advocates, the Silkstocking business elite, and the city's 
Black leadership that emerged to promote educational issues 
following the crisis strengthened and matured into the 
dominant political force for the next three decades.




Bombarded, blockaded, captured, and even plundered, 
Norfolk had endured much at the hands of its enemies over 
its more than 300-year history. But it had also suffered 
just as greatly from enemies within: it had been razed by
the patriots, embargoed by the federalists, undercut by 
intrastate rivalries with the fall-line cities up river, 
terrorized by armed mobs during Reconstruction, and then 
very nearly ruined when disarmament followed World War I .
In between it had been decimated by contagion and conflagra­
tion of all kinds. Through it all, however, the promise of 
prosperity lingered just close enough that its merchants 
dreamed of the day when her fine natural harbor would rival 
the great ports of New York, Boston, Charleston, and Balti­
more. It was the pursuit of that dream that brought its 
citizens the requisite resiliency to bounce back from each 
of the crushing blows of defeat, only to be leveled again.1
At first glance, Norfolk's history during the postwar 
era was not remarkably different from that of other American
xFor a complete history of Norfolk, see Thomas J. 
Wertenbaker, Norfolk: Historic Southern Port (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1962).
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cities. The hustle and bustle of the war years gave way to 
a momentary respite, and then raged on in the frantic growth 
of suburbia. The highways zoomed, the skyscrapers loomed, 
and the babies boomed in the prosperity of America's "Golden 
Years." A tide of reform that swept all across the Sunbelt 
touched briefly on Norfolk's shores at the close of World 
War II,2 lingering just long enough to bring new leadership 
and new competence to city hall, and then rolled on by. The 
civic elite who ruled Floyd Hunter's Atlanta3 in 1950 had 
their counterparts who reigned briefly over Norfolk's 
growth, but then were forced to share power with the 
established politicos, just like their colleagues in 
Denver,4 New Haven,5 New York, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, St. 
Louis, Milwaukee, Baltimore, and Detroit.® While in power 
Norfolk's businessmen elite set in motion a remarkably 
far-reaching plan of action that put the city at the 
forefront of almost every municipal endeavor associated with 
city planning and urban renewal. By the middle of the 
decade, however, the city's leadership had sorted itself
2Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and
Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1981).
3Floyd W. Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel 
Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
4Carl Abbott, op. cit., p. 136.
sRobert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1961).
®Carl Abbott, pp. 251-253.
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into several distinct camps, each with its own focus on the 
issues of greatest concern; just as in New Haven, business­
men focused on redevelopment and economic growth, politi­
cians concentrated on the political arena, and education was 
left largely to the middle class that owed only fleeting 
alle-giance to either the city's big businessmen or its more 
established political leaders.7
Opposition to school desegregation, however, brought 
unity to the leadership of the city, and one man, Mayor W. 
Fred Duckworth ruled preeminent, even if only briefly, over 
almost every sphere of civic endeavor. It is unusual, but 
not unknown for the mayor in a council-manager city to 
assume such power, and the concentration of such authority 
is ordinarily relatively brief and often associated with 
some popular mandate to clean up city hall, initiate major 
reform, rejuvenate the downtown business area, or otherwise 
achieve some long sought public endeavor.8 In Norfolk's 
case, the Mayor's political fortunes both rose and fell with 
the tide of Massive Resistance, and it was in Norfolk that 
the Byrd Organization's highly touted scheme to circumvent 
the authority of the federal courts met its match. Barely a 
year after federal troops had marched into Little Rock, 
Arkansas, to enforce a court order to desegregate, the 
public senior and junior high schools in Norfolk were closed
^Robert Dahl, op cit.
sCarl Abbott, pp. 251-253.
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in defiance of a similar legal mandate. Remarkably nothing 
happened. For five months the schools remained closed, 
locking 10,000 white students out of class. Precisely 
because Norfolk was urban, and just a little cosmopolitan, 
Massive Resistance finally failed. Although predominantly 
Southern in nature, subtle variations in its cultural ethos 
enabled Norfolk to endure its school integration crisis 
differently than other cities in the South: one of its
daily newspapers kept up an unrelenting pressure to reopen 
the schools; a white citizens group formed to initiate
successful legal action; and, under threat of economic ruin,
the city's business elite finally emerged to close the 
curtain on Massive Resistance, at the same time reopening 
the political system to the type of competitive environment
that is more typical of major urban centers.
Thus, two events alone make the history of Norfolk 
during the 1950s remarkable— the intensity of its attack on 
urban blight and the ferocity of the resistance to school 
desegregation— that they are inexorably linked should come 
as no surprise. The rate at which federally funded bull­
dozers gobbled up slums to make way for urban renewal earned 
Norfolk All-American City honors and a lasting place in the 
record books of municipal achievement; at the same time the 
bitter confrontation between the opponents of school 
segregation and the proponents of Massive Resistance won it 
barely a footnote in the history books, and only fleeting
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dishonor on the national scene. The city's reaction to 
these two issue, and, indeed, their very emergence as 
historical turning points, may be traced to the rise and 
fall of two very distinct foci of power— the one economic, 
and the other political— irrevocably tied together in a tale 
of pride and prejudice— the story of how municipal power 
came to serve two very different political ends.
Because, for the most part, Norfolk's history is so 
very ordinary during this period, it may be seen as repre­
sentative of the forces and concerns that faced other areas 
in the Urban South. It is only the scale of its redevelop­
ment activity and the desperation of its school closing 
controversy that make it exemplary as a case study of the 
inter-relationship between the two. Although the story of 
school desegregation and urban renewal in Norfolk may be 
more compelling than in most communities, it is not thought 
to be unique. There is good reason to believe that what 
existed in Norfolk on such a grand scale, could also be 
found in more subtle forms in hundreds of other cities 
across the nation. Norfolk's reaction to school desgre- 
gation in the 1950s was not unique, and, in fact was so 
typical that it may well serve as the model of what occurred 
in other communities. Neither is it unusual that its powers 
of urban renewal came to be employed during this era to 
achieve more political than purely economic ends— that, too,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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is a pattern that has been well documented elsewhere.9 
Only the scope, and not the direction, of Norfolk's response 
is larger and more dramatic than elsewhere. Indeed, the 
very magnitude of this reaction is what makes the story in 
Norfolk so exemplary of the three distinct stages hypothe­
sized at the outset of this work:
1. An Attempt to Make Separate "Equal," 1950-1955.
Like their counterparts across most of the nation, Norfolk's 
leaders were well aware that the system of "separate but 
equal" schools for Blacks and whites, at least as it existed 
in many parts of the rural South, could not long endure a 
withering legal challenge in the postwar era. Partly 
because of the overwhelming presence of the military, which 
had been integrated since 1948, its citizens were also aware 
that the old barriers of segregation were falling. As part 
of a larger mandate to reform every phase of city adminis­
tration, the People's Movement of 1946 deliberately set 
about the task to equalize both the facilities and the 
operation of its dual public school system. Writing in 
February of 1957, U. S. District Court Judge Walter Hoffman 
commented on the success of this effort:
The sum and substance of the School Superin­
tendent's evidence is that the City of Norfolk 
has substantially complied with the "separate
9Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964); Jewell Bellush and Murry
Hausknecht, eds., Urban Renewal: People, Politics, and
Planning (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
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but equal" doctrine, which was applicable prior 
to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 
The City of Norfolk is to be commended for its 
rapid strides in bringing about an equalization 
in physical equipment, curriculum, teacher load, 
and teachers' salaries. If the "separate but 
equal" doctrine were now in existence, there 
would be no grounds for relief to be afforded 
these plaintiffs.10
The progress in Norfolk caught the attention of other 
Southern leaders as well. Writing in Look magazine, U. S. 
Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.), later of Watergate fame, 
commented that new schools for Blacks, like Norfolk's Young 
Park Elementary, gave testimony to the South's effort to 
resolve the disparities of segregation "in its own way."11 
Between 1950 and 1955 Norfolk completed four new elementary 
schools for Blacks (Young Park, Bowling Park, Lindenwood, 
and Diggs Park), three of which were built with federal 
redevelopment funds, and transferred a newly constructed 
junior high (Jacox) to the Black school system. In addi­
tion, it initiated a major building program to modernize the 
other aging Black facilities with new classroom wings, cafe­
terias, libraries, auditoriums, and other badly needed 
improvements. Teacher salaries had been equalized in 1941
10Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. v. School Board of the 
City of Norfolk, Va., et al.. Civil Case No. 2244, U. S. 
General District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, as 
reprinted in Race Relations Law Reporter 2: 2, (April, 1957),
p. 338.
lxSam J. Ervin, Jr., "The Case for Segregation," Look,
3 April 1956, pp. 32-33.
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as a result of a lawsuit,12 and by 1951, Norfolk was 
reporting that it spent more to educate a Black child than a 
white, due largely to the fact that Black teachers, because 
they had more seniority and degrees, were higher on the 
scale than their white counterparts.
Thus, the local record of attention to the fiscal and 
physical aspects of making separate race schools more equal 
is in full keeping with efforts all across the South to 
maintain segregation in a more equitable setting. While the 
Brown cases were under deliberation, most of the states 
where schools were segregated by law (de jure) began a 
deliberate effort to upgrade Black schools, provide addi­
tional funding resources, equalize teacher salaries, and 
otherwise preserve segregation "on a voluntary basis."13 
Just as it was in the forefront of other municipal planning 
endeavors, the fact that Norfolk constructed four new Black 
public schools during this era, helped to continue its 
reputation of progressive achievement.
2. A Transition Period, 1955-1956: from Calmness to
Hostility. A dramatic confrontation over school desegrega­
tion in the South was not necessarily inevitable; most 
Southern leaders reacted calmly to the initial announcement
12Henry S. Rorer, History of Norfolk Public Schools, 
1681-1968 (Norfolk: by author), p. 69.
13W. D. Workman, Jr., "The Deep South," chap. in Don 
Shoemaker, ed., "With All Deliberate Speed" (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 92.
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of the Supreme Court's decision outlawing separate race 
schools. Indeed, they had expected some such determination. 
Only the reversal of the long standing legal tradition under 
attack in the title case, Brown v. Board of Education, 
really caused much consternation. If federal courts were 
truly to follow the letter the decision in Brown, as it 
became increasingly obvious that they would, then it meant 
that school attendance patterns in the South would have to 
be drastically revised so that each child would have to 
enroll in the school closest to his or her home. In 
deciding Brown. the Court left intact the type of segrega­
tion, even though not absolute, that was found most often in 
the cities of the North, West, and Midwest, where separation 
of the races was due to the individual's choice of neighbor­
hood or place of residence, i.e. de facto segregation.
Thus, substantially equal schools that served separate race 
neighborhoods were still permitted by the Court; it was only 
the peculiar circumstance presented by Linda Brown, a Black 
living closer to a white school than a Black one, that was 
actually found unconstitutional.
The doctrine of proximity enunciated in Brown repre­
sented a much greater threat to segregated schools in the 
South than elsewhere, for it meant that, not only would 
Blacks be admitted in fairly large numbers to formerly white 
schools--a situation that was rare enough elsewhere--in many 
Southern communities, because of the high percentage of
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Black population, whites might have to attend nearby Black 
schools, a situation that was not found anywhere else in the 
world.3-4 Part of the reason for the calm initial reaction 
from Southern leaders to the early pronouncements of the 
Court was the feeling that their efforts to achieve equal 
school facilities had been successful, and that segregation 
could continue on a "voluntary" basis. It was only when 
litigation was initiated in their own community and they 
realized the particular problems posed by the doctrine of 
proximity that first panic, and then wholesale opposition to 
the Court, set in.
Norfolk in 1950 was like Orlando and a number of other 
Southern cities in that, in addition to a large central 
slum, Blacks occupied a half dozen or so housing areas 
scattered around town.3-3 In their research on housing 
integration in the 1950s, Karl and Alma Taueber found that 
this pattern was typical of older, more established Southern 
cities, like Charlestown (South Carolina), Washington, 
Baltimore, and New Orleans; newer Southern cities, those 
that boomed after the Civil War (i.e., Atlanta, Birmingham, 
Memphis, and Augusta) were more like their Northern counter­
parts in that Blacks were concentrated almost exclusively in 
single downtown "ghetto." The newer cities could thus adopt
3-4Robin M. Williams and Margaret W. Ryan, eds., Schools 
in Transition: Community Experiences in Desegregation
(Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press, 1954).
15Abbott, p. 93.
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the Northern model of de facto segregation without undue 
hardship; it was only in the older Southern cities, where 
the Black population was more dispersed, that the doctrine 
of proximity meant that large scale integration would be 
required. The Taueber's explained that the "backyard" or 
"alley-dwelling" type of housing arrangement found in the 
older Southern cities, like Norfolk, was due to the fact 
that each major white middle-class neighborhood had its own 
nearby Black residential area from which it could pull 
domestic laborers.16 Residential integration in Norfolk 
may have been even more pronounced than elsewhere, since 
Navy housing, desegregated since 1948, presented additional 
pockets of Black population living in mostly white areas of 
the city. Moreover, the fact that Blacks were spread across 
the city meant that there were transition areas, blocks 
where housing was shifting from white to Black, in a number 
of neighborhoods. It was these areas that posed the great­
est threat to efforts to preserve segregated schools on a 
"voluntary" basis.
The calm reaction of the Norfolk School Board to the 
U. S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Brown v. Board of Educa­
tion cases was held up as a model for the rest of the South. 
There was little concern on the part of the Board that 
schools could be desegregated in the city with a "minimum of
lsKarl E. and Alma Taueber, Negroes in Cities: 
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 23, 48.
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integration"— "so little you'd hardly notice it"— without 
major disruption or problem. The city's Catholic school 
system, including Norfolk Catholic High School, had been 
desegregated without incident at the start of the 1954-55 
school year,17 an the Board had little doubt that the same 
results could be achieved in the public schools. Not until 
the city actually faced litigation to desegregate did the 
city's leaders realize the explosive potential of the 
situation they would face.
Politics and events quickly overtook the official calm 
expressed by the School Board. Virginia's governor 
(Stanley) and many of the state's urban political leaders at 
first expressed sentiments that paralleled those of the 
Norfolk School Board, but the ferocity of the resistance 
building in the rural Southside counties, the Black belt 
that formed the core of the Byrd Organization's voting 
strength, soon forced a retreat from such moderation. 
Hostility to the prospect of school segregation was fed by 
the fact that locally the city's bus system, its state park, 
and other recreation facilities had either desegregated 
voluntarily under the threat of litigation or else under 
force by a mandate from the federal court. The change is 
most apparent in the sentiments of Norfolk's legislative 
delegation, which at first supported the Board's sentiments, 
later wavered, and by 1956 was in full retreat as the
^Southern School News, 1 October 1954.
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delegates faced fierce opposition from the Defenders of 
State Sovereignty and Individual Liberty, Virginia's well 
organized, and for the most part, well-heeled, staunchly 
pro-segregation, pressure group.
The School Board's calm, "Wait and See" attitude soon 
gave way to a quiet reappraisal of its own building effort.
A few additions that were scheduled for Black schools were 
delayed, and the Board began to evaluate the location of a 
number of proposed schools in light of the critical issue of 
residential proximity. A proposal to build a replacement 
for the aging Lafayette School was scrapped, as were at 
least four prospective sites for a badly needed (white) 
junior high school. It seems that some of these sites were 
rejected in part because they were too close to Black 
residential areas to avoid desegregation under the Brown 
precedent (see Figure 1, page 148), but the issue was 
clouded by the fact that Norfolk had also just annexed new 
areas where similar facilities were also badly needed.
Increasingly the School Board in Norfolk found itself 
isolated in both spirit and approach from the rest of the 
city's political leadership. Public reaction to the possi­
bility of school desegregation was stiffening, partly be­
cause the city was finding that it would not be given much 
of a transition period to shift from a segregated to a 
desegregated school system. Any thought that local Blacks 
would be content with separate facilities under the new
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efforts to equalize Black and white education was quickly 
dashed: the N.A.A.C.P. filed a petition with the School
Board seeking desegregated schools shortly after the Brown 
decision was finalized, and once its administrative remedies 
were exhausted, proceeded directly to federal court. U. S. 
District Judge Walter Hoffman was also not inclined to grant 
the kind of delay that seemed customary elsewhere in the 
South, and was preparing to order a couple of elementary 
schools desegregated in the fall of 1957, an event that 
would have put Norfolk on the same collision course as 
Little Rock.
Leaders in Norfolk were much like their colleagues in 
other parts of the South,13 and indeed much of the rest of 
the nation:19 when they saw that legal challenges to 
segregation were emerging in their own community, they 
tended to blame this "interference" on the work of "out­
siders," and failed to see it as a legitimate expression of 
local Black hostility to the institution of segregation. At 
first the N.A.A.C.P. bore the brunt of this attack, and the 
state legislatures especially focused their wrath through 
anti-N.A.A.C.P. laws designed to threaten or intimidate its 
membership. The reaction of the white community to the
N.A.A.C.P. spilled over into other community activities, and
Norfolkians, just like others across the South in areas
18Southern School News, 6 January 1955.
19Williams and Ryan, op cit., p. 237
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thought to be racially moderate, had their own experience 
with hate mail, racist literature, and racial turmoil.
Events were particularly intense in Coronado, a formerly 
white section of the city where the color line had been 
successfully breached. There, Blacks who were attempting to 
break the color line in an established white neighborhood, 
had to face the threat of firebombs, vandalism, hostile 
mobs, and racial taunts. The crisis of housing in the Black 
community, which was in part exacerbated by redevelopment 
activity, was forcing racial change in a few other 
neighborhoods as well. Coronado was but one symptom of the 
problem; similar hostilities were evident in the Brambleton 
and Berkley sections of the city, both of which by the 
mid-1950s had nearly completed their transition to 
predominately Black housing areas, and in the Atlantic City, 
Lamberts Point, and Broad Creek areas on the fringe of the 
downtown, which were just beginning to tip. Just as in 
Coronado, efforts by the Black community to develop new 
homes in the Broad Creek Shores subdivision were met with 
strong opposition from whites in the surrounding areas. In 
fact, the pattern of housing in older Southern cities, like 
Norfolk, where whites and Blacks lived in greater proximity 
to one another, may have been in part responsible for some 
of the growing animosity between the races.
By 1956 race relations in the city, which had been at 
their highest peak a few years earlier, had deteriorated
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badly. No longer were Blacks consulted on major planning or 
development initiatives, and even when controversies arose, 
such as the Broad Creek Shores development, Black leaders 
had so few contacts in city government that they had to turn 
to leaders in the banking and financial community for media­
tion. One Black leader characterized the situation as, "in 
Norfolk, there are no relations between the races."20 The 
School Board, too, found itself just as isolated. In spite 
of the strong personal commitment of its members to continue 
public education in Norfolk at all cost, it was obvious that 
political leaders in both the state and the city were more 
than willing to let public schools evolve into some sort of 
state sponsored private educational system in order to 
remain segregated. Increasingly the School Board was being 
called upon to help hold the line against desegregation. It 
had been willing to do its part in carefully planning the 
location of new facilities, but soon it would be asked to 
play an even larger role. As members of the middle class, 
all of whom had benefitted enormously from public education, 
the Norfolk School Board, like hundreds of others across the 
South, was not willing to participate in the demise of 
public education in the city. Partly because they recog­
nized this difference, political leaders in Virginia and 
half a dozen other Southern states moved to take away from 
the local boards certain of the administrative powers
2°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 June 1958.
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necessary to maintain public schools. Instead they created 
a melange of state pupil placement boards and commissions, 
all designed to "interpose" the authority of the states 
between the Black litigants and the boards.2X
Thus the School Board and political leaders in Norfolk 
had, by 1956, found themselves in the midst of a firestorm 
of public unrest. The community seemed headed on the fast 
track towards a court-ordered desegregation of its public 
schools, yet the state's political leaders were indicating 
that they would not permit even the most minimal form of 
integration. Also by 1956, public opposition to the courts 
had reached a fever pitch. Neither situation was unique to 
Norfolk, although the particular circumstance of its dis­
persed Black population may have leant an extra air of 
urgency to deliberations there. Since the established 
political order cannot long endure such a heightened level 
of public unrest, the leadership in Norfolk, and indeed much 
of the rest of the South, felt obligated to take every legal 
step at its disposal to delay as long as possible the 
eventuality of desegregated schools. One logical assump­
tion is that local leaders in Norfolk and hundreds of other 
Southern communities followed the lead of their counterparts 
in the U. S. Congress and the state legislatures, and began 
to prepare to move beyond rhetoric towards action.
23-Southern School News, February, 1957.
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3. Overt Attempts to Move from De Jure to De Facto 
Segregation, 1956-1960. The doctrine of "interposition" 
that began to emerge in the rhetoric of the politicians 
found its outlet in a host of special state laws designed to 
interpose the authority of the state between the federal 
courts and the local school officials. Most of these laws 
dealt with pupil placement, student transfer policies, 
attendance,22 and financial control of the schools, but it 
is just as logical to assume that local officials followed 
these same legislative trends in their own enactments. 
Gradually the realization began to dawn on municipal offi­
cials all across the South that, because public education 
was much more a community than even a state responsibility, 
the powers of the local school boards and city councils to 
administer public schools were even greater than those of 
the state. Thus, a logical extension of interposition logic 
already being advanced by numerous state leaders enabled 
local officials to discover that their own inherent powers 
to assign pupils, rule on transfer applications, build 
schools, utilize space, draw attendance zones, and otherwise 
administer the day to day operations of the public schools 
could be judiciously applied to preventing or at least 
delaying the eventuality of court ordered desegregation that 
would prove so disruptive.
22Patrick E. McCauley, "Be It Enacted," chap. in Don 
Shoemaker, ed., "With All Deliberate Speed," op cit., 
p. 132.
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Norfolk officials, as well as others across the South, 
quickly seized on these powers and began to take the steps 
that would be necessary to delay segregation. Even though 
data on the attendance zones in Norfolk in the 1950s no 
longer exists, the application of the interposition philos­
ophy at the local level may still be tracked by following 
the fate of the school buildings most directly threatened by 
court-ordered integration. Since the first round of litiga­
tion followed almost exactly the proximity precedent 
established in the Brown v. Board of Education case, by the 
winter of 1956-1957 Norfolk faced the certainty of court 
ordered integration of several of its elementary schools the 
following (i.e., 1957-58) school year. In discussing the 
particulars of the situa-tion, U. S. Federal District Judge 
Walter E. Hoffman noted that the problem of integration 
would be particularly acute at two elementary schools:
According to the testimony of the Division 
Superintendent, there are some localities in the 
City of Norfolk which will create individual 
problems in the elementary school system, 
particularly at the Patrick Henry School and the 
Gatewood School where the percentage of white to 
colored students would be approximately four to 
one in Patrick Henry and eight to one in 
Gatewood, with the preponderance of the student 
body being white, which allocation is based upon 
the assumption that the school children are 
assigned only in accordance with normal 
geographical consideration.23
23Leola Pearl Beckett, et al. v. School Board of the 
City of Norfolk, Va,, et al., op cit., reprinted in Race 
Relations Law Reporter 2: 2, (April, 1957), p. 338.
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Before the 1957-1958 school year ever began, however, 
the Norfolk School Board began its first real experimenta­
tion with applying its inherent powers of school administra­
tion to block the court order. As Judge Hoffman had indi­
cated, the two elementary schools most threatened by court- 
ordered integration were both in transition areas of the 
city. Patrick Henry Elementary was in the Atlantic City 
area, a once proud working-class neighborhood that had 
always maintained some Black housing near the cotton mill 
and seafood packing houses. In recent years, however,
Blacks had begun to move into other portions of the neigh­
borhood. By 1957 50 Black students would have been eligible 
to attend Patrick Henry Elementary under the doctrine of 
proximity24 Even though white students would have 
outnumbered Blacks by better than four-to-one, the school 
was closed, and the building converted to administrative 
offices. Although the School Board had been pressuring for 
several years for additional administrative office space, it 
had sought sites closer to the center of the city.25
Gatewood Elementary was situated in Berkley, another 
working class neighborhood that was somewhat isolated by the 
Elizabeth River from the rest of the city. The Black
24Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957; Norfolk 
Virginian-Pilot 13 February 1957.
25Letter from School Superintendent J. J. Brewbaker to 
H. H. George, Norfolk City Manager, 2 July 1955; and letter 
to Sherwood Reeder, Norfolk City Manager, 8 August 1955, 
Norfolk Public Schools files.
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population, which had once been confined to areas around the 
shipyards, had begun in the previous decade to expand into 
other parts of the Berkley community. Gatewood Elementary 
remained the last white school in the area, but it, too, was
threatened by desegregation, although Judge Hoffman indi­
cated that the ratio of whites to Blacks would have been 
only eight-to-one. Just as it had with Patrick Henry, the 
School Board closed the school to its white clientele,
transferring it instead to the Black school system. Whites
in Berkley would have to commute to some other school across 
the river. In addition to Gatewood, the School Board also 
transferred John Marshall Elementary on the edge of the 
downtown area from the white to Black school systems, since 
it, too, was too close to nearby Black housing to withstand 
a legal challenge. Since Judge Hoffman had already approved 
a similar shift two years earlier when Blacks sought to en­
roll in Thomas Jefferson Elementary in Newport News,26 the 
Norfolk School Board had every reason to feel he would 
approve the same tactic in the current instance. Indeed, 
Judge Hoffman all but suggested a repeat of the strategy to 
the Newport News Board in an opinion written at the same 
time that the fate of Patrick Henry and Gatewood Elementary 
schools in Norfolk was being decided:
[The Walter Reed Elementary School] has 
heretofore been reserved for white children, but
26Southern School News, October, 1955.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 6 1
its location [is] on the fringe of a rapidly 
changing population area wherein the population 
will soon become all colored . . . .  This may 
well resolve itself in the Walter Reed 
Elementary School becoming substantially for 
colored children. I do not know of any 
particular law that prevents the so-called 
gerrymandering of the school areas.2-7
In addition to the power to determine the attendance 
zone and the actual use of buildings, the Norfolk School 
Board found that it also had discretionary authority over 
the size, location, and grade composition of new schools as 
well. The most telling evidence that these powers were used 
to forestall school segregation may be found in the creation 
of the Rosemont and Coronado schools in the newly annexed 
Norview area. Rosemont, which was designed to serve as a 
combination elementary/junior high school, the only such 
combination school in the city, was hastily erected to serve 
the Black population threatening to integrate Norview 
Elementary and Junior High Schools. Not only did newspaper 
accounts of the era clearly discern that the purpose of the 
school was to forestall school desegregation,28 the Black 
community fiercely resisted both the project and fact that 
the hastily constructed building would lack many of the 
essential support facilities present in all of the "white" 
schools recently constructed.29 A school in the Coronado
^ Southern School News, March, 1957.
2SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 July 1959.
29Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 July 1959.
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section was not planned until after the School Board had 
been given the names and addresses of the Black litigants 
seeking to integrate Norview Elementary. After examining 
the documents, the Board discovered that, in spite of the 
Rosemont school, which was then under construction, the 
color lines in the Norview section had continued to change, 
and some of the litigants still lived closer to a white 
school. When first conceived, Coronado was nothing more 
than six mobile classrooms pushed off the back of a truck 
onto a vacant lot,30 that like, Rosemont, was designed 
almost entirely to place a Black school in closer proximity 
to Black litigants than the white school they sought to 
attend. Again, Blacks complained bitterly that this "vest 
pocket" school lacked appropriate facilities, and was only 
being built to counter their litigation.31 Although Judge 
Hoffman discussed the situation at length in his review of 
the progress of desegregation suit in Norfolk, he neverthe­
less felt powerless to intervene as long as the School Board 
could point to a sound pedagogical reason (overcrowding) for 
creating the schools.32 Two other schools, Benmoreell and 
Broad Creek Village Elementary, both of which served
3°Ibid.
31Norfolk Ledqer-Dispatch, 20 August 1959.
32"District Judge’s [Walter E. Hoffman] Statement of 
August 25, 1958," in the case of Leola Pearl Beckett, et al., 
versus the School Board of the City of Norfolk, et al., 
reprinted in Race Relations Law Reporter 3: 5 (October,
1958), pp. 953-954.
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integrated Navy housing projects, were similarly closed, 
even though both schools were little more than a decade old. 
One other school, Pineridge Elementary, also served the 
Broad Creek Village project, and it also closed for a few 
years.
The strategy was even further defined, with the help 
of the more political Mayor and City Council, in the spring 
of 1959, just after the city's previously closed schools had 
reopened. At that time Mayor Duckworth proposed building 
three-room school houses all across the city so that they 
could better serve "the neighborhoods" in question. Almost 
all parties to the affair, including the newspapers,33 the 
School Board,34 and the City Council,35 knew that the 
ploy was simply to build and maintain single race schools. 
Even though the School Board had strong pedagogical reasons 
to oppose these mini-schools as impractical,35 it never­
theless bowed to the dictates of the Mayor, and erected five 
buildings that met his specifications (Easton, Fairlawn, 
Poplar Halls, East Ocean View, and Pretty Lake) in the newly 
annexed Eastern section of the city.
33Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 22 February 1959.
34Francis Crenshaw.
35Roy B. Martin, Jr.
3SW. E. Campbell, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, 
"Report of the Committee Relegated By the School Board of the 
City of Norfolk to Study the Proposal for Construction of 
Small Primary Schools," undated (1959), Norfolk Public 
Schools files.
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We had to build them. . . it was the only 
way we could get any schools at all . . . they 
weren't quite as small as the ones Fred 
[Duckworth] wanted to build.37
Years later School Board member Francis Crenshaw commented 
that these schools were in part responsible for the fact 
that the Eastern portion of the city felt "under served" for 
decades, a grievance that he sensed underlies much of the 
pressure from that area for the current shift to a ward 
system of elections.38
One other reasonable assumption is that city councils 
and other local officials, just like their colleagues on the 
school boards, state legislatures, and the Congress, used 
the powers at their disposal to frustrate and delay court 
ordered integration. The mini-school controversy in the 
spring of 1959 serves as a good introduction to the 
application of municipal powers to dictate school policies. 
The school system in Norfolk, like all of those in Virginia 
and most of the systems in large cities elsewhere, was a 
dependent school district which relied upon the city govern­
ment for a portion of its taxing and spending powers. 
Financing new construction is but one small element of that 
financial power. Although normally unwilling to risk the 
political outcry of involving itself in school affairs, a 
city council nevertheless has the power to appropriate
37Francis Crenshaw.
3SFrancis Crenshaw.
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funds, and thus dictate many of the spending policies of the 
school district. Because it feared independent action by 
the more educationally— as opposed to politically— oriented 
school boards, the state of Virginia passed special legis­
lation that allowed municipal governments to cut off funds 
to operate the schools on a 30-day notice. Several school 
boards, especially those in the rural areas of the state, 
availed themselves of this power.39 The Norfolk City 
Council applied the leverage of this tactic when it voted to 
appropriate school funds on a 30-day basis in the midst of 
the school closing crisis.40
Another aspect of financial control may be found in 
the size of the local appropriation: after the school 
closing controversy, the City Council intimated that it 
would cut off local funding for schools because of the way 
it had been opposed by the School Board and the teachers 
during the crisis.41 Later the Council made good on at 
least a portion of its threat by substantially reducing the 
School Board's budget, thereby denying it the ability to 
provide a raise to the teachers who had opposed Massive 
Resistance.42 Finally, the Council sought permission from 
the legislature to replace the incumbent Board members in a
39Southern School News, August 1955.
4°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 November 1958.
41Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 21 February 1959.
42Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1959.
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thinly veiled move to enlarge the membership and reduce the 
term of office.43
In addition to the ability to directly influence the 
operation of the schools through their powers of appoint­
ment, financial control, and capital funding, local govern­
ments also have considerable heretofore unrecognized author­
ity to dictate the shape and size of school districts and 
attendance zones through their powers of urban renewal. The 
Broad Creek Shores controversy provides an interesting case 
in point: by the time the area had been annexed into the
city (January 1, 1955), a group of Black developers had 
already platted the Broad Creek Shores subdivision and had a 
number of houses under construction. Although faced with a 
fait accompli, the city of Norfolk nevertheless moved 
through its powers of eminent domain to seize a large tract 
on the northern edge of the property, thereby isolating the 
Black development from nearby white neighborhoods. Although 
the stated purpose of the purchase was to buy up land for a 
park and possible school expansion, neither was ever built 
on the site; the land was eventually used for the National 
Guard armory and an industrial park. Much later Councilman 
(and later Mayor) Roy B. Martin, Jr. would indicate that the 
armory was placed there "in order to block the Black 
development,"44 a theory that confirms reports in the
43Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 April 1959.
44Roy B. Martin, Jr.
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Black press of the era.45 Even though there is no other 
direct testimony to the fact, appearances at least suggest 
that the city similarly used the placement of Old Dominion 
University, Interstate 64 and 264, and other park, recrea­
tional, and industrial parks as both a buffer zones between 
racially diverse neighborhoods and as a natural barrier to 
maintain separate race school districts. Although confirma­
tion of such a theory must be left to other researchers, use 
of the powers of city planning and eminent domain to block 
desegregation has long been hypothesized.46
Perhaps the most damning indictment of the use of 
municipal powers to achieve de facto segregation comes from 
the former head of Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) in 
the 1950s, who accused Southern cities of using their powers 
of urban renewal to break up integrated low-income neighbor­
hoods in order to more clearly draw the color lines:
Where, in a few Southern cities, there had 
been a protest against this, a compromise was 
sometimes reached involving proposed re-use [of 
the land] for other than residential purposes. 
Thus a slum formerly housing both Negro and 
white families was proposed as the location for 
industry or a public institution. Urban renewal 
too often seemed to be an instrument for wiping 
out racially integrated living.4-7
45Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 August 1955.
4SWillie and Greenblatt, op cit., p. 189.
4-7Robert C. Weaver, "The Urban Complex," chap. in Jewel 
Bellush and Murry Hausknecht, eds., Urban Renewal: People,
Politics, and Planning (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967),
p. 94.
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Although he did not mention any city by name, Mr. 
Weaver could well have any number of projects undertaken in 
Norfolk during its second phase of redevelopment. Just as 
N.R.H.A. Project One was carefully conceived, thoroughly 
planned, and meticulously implemented, Norfolk's second 
phase of redevelopment, begun after 1956, was rushed, 
haphazard, and poorly planned. Humanitarian concerns were 
foremost in the minds of the planners of N.R.H.A. Project 
One: public housing in the form of modern garden apartments
in well designed neighborhoods replaced some of the worst 
slums in the nation, and development was implemented in 
carefully conceived stages so that residents were moved 
first to public housing units away from the site during 
demolition, and then moved back to their old neighborhood, 
once it was reconstructed. In spite of the size and scope 
of the endeavor, the entire took project took only about 
five years to complete from the time the bulldozers first 
began to roll.
The Atlantic City, Downtown, Broad Creek, and Old 
Dominion Projects stand in sharp contrast to the careful 
planning and precision of N.R.H.A. Project One. Under 
either a remarkable coincidence, or as part of a much larger 
deliberate plan of action, at almost exactly the same time 
that federal Judge Walter Hoffman was ordering the desegre­
gation of Patrick Henry Elementary School in the Atlantic 
City portion of the city, the Norfolk Redevelopment and
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Housing Authority was announcing that it planned to demolish 
the entire neighborhood. The coincidence theory is hard to 
swallow, especially since closing Patrick Henry Elementary, 
an action already taken by the School Board, did not remove 
the threat to segregated schools posed by the mixed-race 
neighborhood: 13 of the 24 Black plaintiffs in the school
desegregation suit lived in Atlantic City.48 Even though 
Patrick Henry Elementary was removed from the challenge, 
these plaintiffs as well as other Blacks in the area still 
lived closer to the white schools in the Ghent portion of 
the city than to the Black institutions further downtown. 
Although the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority 
indicated that it had been planning the project since 1954, 
formal announcements of the demolition did not come until 
December 7, 1956,49 and the bulldozers began to roll seven 
months later. Former Mayor and Redevelopment and Housing 
Commissioner Pretlow Darden indicated that the Atlantic City 
project was initiated in part to "rid Ghent of the cancerous 
growth approximate to it,1150 although there is little 
evidence that the blighted housing conditions would have 
spread beyond the natural geographic barriers that isolated 
most of Atlantic City from the rest of Norfolk.
48Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
49Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 8 December 1956.
5°Pretlow Darden.
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At least in the eyes of those who had the most 
professional knowledge of deterioration in the neighborhood, 
Atlantic City was not a slum, in spite of the efforts of the 
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority to characterize 
it as such. The 1950 Census revealed that more than half of 
the houses had central heat and indoor plumbing — both still 
rarities in many parts of town— were in adequate repair, and 
commanded moderate rents twice those of the areas demolished 
in N.R.H.A. Project One and the Downtown Project.51 In 
spite of the fact that some residents complained that 
persistent rumors of redevelopment had driven down real 
estate values and hastened the neighborhood's decline,52 
the new Black families moving in were apparently willing to 
pay even higher rents than the white residents because of 
the crisis in adequate housing for the Black community.53 
The Health Department's housing inspection division had just 
completed a major code enforcement initiative in the area, 
one of the first major attempts in the country to salvage a 
neighborhood by concentrating enforcement efforts. Federal 
law required cities to rehabilitate one unit of housing for 
each unit torn down under redevelopment. The Health 
Department chose Atlantic City precisely because it was
51U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of 
Population, 1950, v. Ill, Census Tract Studies, Chapter 38 
(Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government, 1952), p. 22.
52Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 1 July 1957.
53Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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salvageable: it was "not so good that we couldn't
rehabilitate it, and not so bad that we were wasting our 
time."54
Because of the necessary link between the rehabilita­
tion project and redevelopment, there was close cooperation 
between the Health Department and the Housing Authority. 
When queried about future plans for the area, N.R.H.A. 
executive director Larry Cox reportedly indicated that it 
would be at least "five to ten years" before the Housing 
Authority would initiate a project in Atlantic City. That 
was why it was such a surprise for the Health Department 
officials to read in the paper the sudden announcement of 
the Atlantic City project; they had been present for months 
at the cabinet meetings of the N.R.H.A., and there had been 
no mention of such a project. The Health Department was 
doubly upset when it found that its own surveys were being 
used by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority to 
declare the area a slum.
The code enforcement project had been a major success, 
and almost every residential unit in the area had been 
brought up to the standard of the city's minimum housing 
code. Although there was a two-block wide area of dilapi­
dated buildings in a mixea-use area of commercial, residen­
tial, and light industrial structures that ran along the
54G. D. Monola, former director of Environmental Health, 
interview by author, Norfolk, 3 April 1991.
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present site of Brambleton Avenue, these structures could 
have been demolished in the highway project, and the rest of 
the neighborhood saved. This is precisely the course urged 
by the Health Department; Atlantic City was not a slum in 
the eyes of the individuals who had the most intimate pro­
fessional working knowledge of the area. According to the 
director of the code enforcement project, Atlantic City, 
even in 1956, had a "surprisingly large number of owner 
occupied dwellings" that should have never been included in 
the redevelopment project. Although a structure could pass 
the city's minimum housing code and still have major 
structural defects under federal redevelopment standards, a 
number of blocks in Atlantic City had only one or two 
defects. These blocks could only have been included for 
demolition by carefully designing the project boundaries so 
that the overall project area could meet the federal 
requirement of an average of five defects per dwelling.
This accounts for the odd shape of the project, and why it 
zigged around some blocks and then zagged to pick up others 
(see Figure 2, page 227).
The Health Department was so upset at how its services 
and its surveys had been used to declare Atlantic City a 
slum, that a major rift developed between it and the Norfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, a division that can be 
seen even today in the overlapping of housing inspection and 
enforcement authorities between the city and the N.R.H.A.
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The perception that the Health Department was really trying 
to help the Housing Authority find new slums dealt a severe 
blow to the city's code enforcement efforts. In spite of 
its arguments and its expertise, the Health Department was 
powerless to help the residents of Atlantic City, many of 
whom were doubly bitter after realizing that the prices 
being paid for the acquisition of their homes was less than 
they had spent in bringing them up to the Health Depart­
ment's code.55
In short, there was much that was worth saving in the 
Atlantic City area: many of the brownstones, row houses,
and turn-of-the-century dwellings were clearly salvageable, 
and would have commanded a premium price when urban pioneers 
rediscovered in-town neighborhoods a little more than a 
decade later. Although the parts of the area along the 
present site of Brambleton Avenue were dilapidated, many of 
the blocks closer to the downtown had a distinctively 
"Greenwich Village flavor" and a "Bohemian and cosmopolitan 
character."56
Neither was Broad Creek Village a slum. Built during 
World War II, all of the units were free-standing dwellings 
with modern plumbing, electrical, and central heating 
systems. The 2,598 units each had two to three bedrooms, 
hardwood floors, deep sash windows, and sturdy interior
S5Ibid.
5SNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 31 January 1959.
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constructions; many, in fact were moved by their owners 
before they could be torn down, and still survive in other 
parts of the city. Moreover, residents were proud of the 
community, and especially pointed to its warmth, friendship, 
compassion, lack of crime, and sense of positive spirit, 
hardly signs of deterioration.5-7 Nevertheless, the 
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority could not wait 
to take possession of the property from the federal govern­
ment so that it could be torn down. Since the Authority 
owned the housing as a result of the federal government's 
gift, demolition of the project did not have to meet 
redevelopment standards. Although there was some discussion 
of maintaining the area as residential, the City Council, 
especially realtor Robert Ripley, was adamantly opposed to 
having a low rent project in that area of the city. Mayor 
Fred Duckworth suggested using the land, which had rail 
service as well as a prime location between Virginia Beach 
Boulevard and Princess Anne Road, the two major thorough­
fares into the downtown, as an industrial park, and its fate 
was sealed.58 Once the Housing Authority took over 
(November 1954), the area was doomed; the N.R.H.A. never 
maintained the structures properly and had no interest in 
renting the vacant units, so it was not long before neglect 
and vandalism took their toll on both the structures and the
^ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 15 July 1979.
5SRoy B. Martin, Jr.
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Broad Creek community. By the time the bulldozers started 
to roll, the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority had 
been successful in creating a bona fide slum out of a once 
proud and even modern, low-rent housing development.59
These two major redevelopment projects share another 
common element: both were rushed into the demolition phase
so quickly that portions of the cleared land sat vacant for 
close to three decades. The Atlantic City Project area, 
especially, was poorly conceived as an industrial park: 
although it encompassed just more than a 140 acres, it was 
long and narrow, and badly cut up by Brambleton Avenue, the 
new superhighway that crossed its spine. Why would an 
industry choose to be in this somewhat isolated spot on the 
edge of the downtown when the city was also developing 
almost 500 acres in the Broad Creek Project closer to major 
thoroughfares and the population heart of the area? Not 
until the 1980s, when the Red Cross moved into the indus­
trial park and the hospital complex eventually expanded to 
fill the western corner, did the project looked like any­
thing more than an urban desert. Even today most of the 
land in the project is dedicated to government use, either 
by the U. S. Commerce Department, transportation facilities, 
a largely unused waterfront park, the city health depart­
ment, medical school, and hospital authority.
59G. D. Monola.
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If the project had been designed with more care, the 
city would have seized the last two blocks to the waterfront 
as well, and the area could have blossomed with highrise 
housing developments, a use it is just now discovering 
somewhat tenuously. In fact, the area has much that would 
recommend it to upscale apartment buildings, condos, and 
highrise residences: partly because it is cut off from the
rest of the city by both natural geographic barriers and 
major transportation facilities, it is much more conducive 
to residential than industrial uses. The fact that it is 
bounded on very nearly all four sides by waterfront makes 
for spectacular vistas for an in-town neighborhood. Still, 
the planners seemed to do everything possible to destroy its 
future use as a residential area. Brambleton Avenue cuts 
across it in such a way that only the two corner pieces of 
property on Smith Creek (the Hague), one of the city's 
premiere real estate assets, could be used for highrise 
apartment houses; the small commercial area, with its quaint 
shops and artsy flavor, was demolished; and the failure to 
seize its rotting wharves and crumbling factory district has 
made it difficult for all but the most persistent developer 
to realize any of the great potential of the site.
In 1957, when the two projects were planned and exe­
cuted, the city appeared to be violently opposed to residen­
tial use of either site. There was no talk of demolition in 
phases, as had been done in N.R.H.A. Project One, to mini­
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mize hardships or plan for orderly expansion. In spite of 
the fact that Norfolk was also clearing almost 200 more 
acres in the downtown business district and starting another 
project near the present site of Old Dominion University, it 
was just more than a year between the time the projects were 
announced and most of the demolition had been completed. In 
just 16 months Norfolk appears to have torn down the homes 
of almost 20,000 people— roughly ten percent of its popula­
tion— and these were not the substandard dwellings of its 
poorest residents. Instead these were the homes of working- 
class white families and a few Black residents attracted to 
decent housing in safe neighborhoods. It was these latter 
residents, because of the threat they posed to school segre­
gation, that the city wanted to remove, but in the process, 
it embarked upon a terribly destructive course.
The Black families in Atlantic City and Broad Creek 
Village posed more than just an academic threat to school 
segregation. Because they represented the upwardly mobile 
portion of the Black middle-class, they held high aspira­
tions for their children. For this reason, many had taken 
the lead in initiating the lawsuit (i.e., Leola Pearl 
Beckett, et al.. v. the School Board of the City of Norfolk, 
et al., op cit.) that challenged the status of de jure 
segregation in the city. Because the N.A.A.C.P. had wished 
to follow the Brown precedent as closely as possible, the 
original 24 plaintiffs, and other like them, were probably
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sought out precisely because they lived closer to white 
schools than the Black institutions to which their children 
were assigned. Nevertheless, they were willing to enlist 
and take a very prominent and somewhat risky role in the 
effort. Thirteen of the original plaintiffs lived in 
Atlantic City; another five lived in Berkley section of the 
city and had petitioned to go to the all-white Gatewood 
Elementary. This is one of the institutions that the School
Board transferred to the Black school system, thereby
leaving the remaining whites in Berkley without a school of 
their own. Although the other six plaintiffs lived closer 
to a Black school than a white, all lived in the Lamberts 
Point section of Norfolk,60 on the edge of the city's 
prestigious Edgewater and Larchmont neighborhoods. The 1950 
Census shows that the Black section of Lamberts Point was
just then in the process of expanding further towards
Edgewater and Larchmont. Redevelopment activity and the 
crisis in the Black housing market helped to push the 
transition area a little more each year. Even though 
Smallwood Elementary (Black) stood in the center of the area 
(the Old Dominion University Library now stands on the 
site), the city initiated a small redevelopment project in 
this area to provide land for expansion of the then two- 
year Norfolk Division of the College of William and Mary and 
Virginia Politechnical Institute, now Old Dominion
s°Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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University. The project had the effect of bulldozing some 
of the transition neighborhoods, stabilizing racial lines in 
the area, and interposing a large barrier of public land, 
i. e., Old Dominion University, between the Black Lamberts 
Point section and the white neighborhoods of Larchmont and 
Edgewater, an effect that is still obvious today.
Moreover, Atlantic City, Broad Creek, and Lambert's 
Point were all integrating fairly peacefully,sx and ex­
perienced none of the marches, bombings, threats, or intimi­
dation found in the Brambleton of Coronado neighborhoods 
when the color lines were first crossed there. Instead, all 
three of these redevelopment areas had supported a few 
Blacks families for a number of years. Because of the 
critical housing shortage in the Black community, in part 
created by the redevelopment activity in N.R.H.A Project 
One, landlords could command higher rents from Blacks than 
from whites, and this fact helped smooth the transition of 
Black residents into additional parts of these communities.
Thus, just as school boards could tear down or close 
schools directly threatened by court ordered integration, 
cities had the power, through redevelopment, to tear down 
mixed race or transition areas where the racial composition 
of the neighborhood schools would have been equally mixed. 
Parallel to the power to size the school to the capacity of 
the neighborhood in order to maintain its single race
S1G. D. Monola.
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identity, is the authority, through redevelopment, to adjust 
the size of the neighborhood to meet the racial designation 
of the school. School boards could change attendance zones, 
but cities could achieve the same effect by seizing land, 
demolishing the housing, or erecting barriers between 
neighborhoods that would force resizing of the attendance 
zones.
The evidence that Norfolk at least took this route and 
directly intervened with its powers of school administration 
and urban renewal to move the status of its segregated 
school system from de jure to de facto is overwhelming: one
of the two elementary schools most directly threatened by 
court ordered integration, Patrick Henry, was closed and the 
neighborhood around it demolished because Blacks still 
threatened other nearby white schools; the other, Gatewood 
Elementary in Berkley, was transferred from the white to the 
Black school system. These two actions removed the direct 
threat posed by 18 of the original 24 plaintiffs in the 
school desegregation suit. The other 6 plaintiffs lived in 
the Lamberts Point section of the city close to the 
prestigious white neighborhoods of Larchmont and Edgewater; 
although they posed no direct threat to the nearby Larchmont 
Elementary School because Smallwood Elementary, a Black 
school, was closer, neverthe-less Norfolk initiated a 
redevelopment project that had the effect of providing land 
for the expansion of Old Dominion University, then a
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two-year junior college, shoring up the color lines in the 
area, and posing a formidable barrier of public land between 
the Black and white school districts. The John Marshall 
School on the Eastern edge of East Ghent was transferred 
from the white to the Black school system; two elementary 
schools serving integrated Navy housing projects, Benmoreell 
and Broad Creek Village, were torn down and a third, 
Pineridge Elementary, was closed for a few years; two white 
schools (Norview Elementary and Norview Junior High) in the 
newly annexed portion of the city were spared by the quick 
construction, first of the Rosemont combination elementary 
and junior high school, and later by six portable classrooms 
dumped on a 2.5 acre lot and dubbed Coronado Elementary; and 
four other white schools (W. H. Taylor Elementary, Blair 
Junior High, Maury High, and James Madison Elementary) were 
partially rescued by the Atlantic City and Old Dominion 
redevelopment projects (see Figure 6, page 265).
In spite of the monumental effort of its political 
leaders to preserve segregation, the ploy worked for only a 
single year. The schools that would have been integrated in 
the fall of 1957 were either torn down or removed from 
service, and in many cases, the neighborhoods, too, were 
demolished. But for the quick use of urban renewal powers, 
Norfolk may have joined Little Rock as the first major 
battleground of court ordered school integration. Judge 
Hoffman was obviously cognizant that the city was working to
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counter his authority. Writing before either the fate of 
the school or the full boundaries of the Atlantic City 
Project were known, he indicated that:
Additionally, as to the Patrick Henry 
School, there is a redevelopment and housing 
plan now in its early stages which, if carried 
to completion, will substantially reduce the 
number of children who would ordinarily be 
assigned to Patrick Henry School.®2
Norfolk had both the motive and the opportunity to use 
its powers of urban renewal to forestall school desegrega­
tion. That it did so, and with a vengeance, seems patently 
obvious. Even so, any such assessment of motive and munici­
pal power would be incomplete without at least some discus­
sion of possible rival hypotheses for the observed events. 
Although several alternate explanations are offered by other 
authors, the research supporting their conclusions comes 
from the 1960s or even the 1970s, and not the era under 
consideration.
Karl and Alma Taueber, in their major study of resi­
dential segregation and neighborhood change, noted that in 
Southern cities, in sharp contrast to most of the rest of 
the country, residential segregation generally increased 
between 1950 and 1960. In their general comments on this 
trend, they attribute this difference more to a number of 
market forces than to deliberate government policy. Before
62Leola Pearl Beckett, et al., op cit., Race Relations 
Law Reporter 2: 2 (April, 1957), p. 339.
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World War II, they noted, Blacks and whites in the South 
lived in much closer proximity to one another because Blacks 
needed access to white residential areas in order to serve 
as domestic workers; thus there was much less segregation in 
Southern cities than in the North or Midwest. After the 
war, however, this was less a factor, other job oppor­
tunities developed outside of domestic service, and Blacks 
were freer to choose their neighborhoods in closer associa­
tion with each other. Although the Tauebers indicate that 
the racial exclusivity of new construction in the suburbs 
and other factors associated with white population changes 
were major reasons that the level of segregation increased 
between 1940 and 1950, they did not appear significant in 
the decade of the 1950s. Instead more than half of the 
variance in segregation measures of cities was attributed by 
the Tauebers to non-white occupational and population 
changes, that is, Blacks choosing to move into Black areas. 
Partly because the supply of housing appears by the 1950s to 
have caught up with the demand, they indicate that the 
choice of housing was broad enough to permit such voluntary 
segregation of the races, especially in the South, where 
Blacks occupied a much higher percentage of new housing than 
elsewhere. In Northern cities Blacks tended to take over
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established neighborhoods, while whites moved in much larger 
numbers to new housing on the suburban fringe.53
In their more detailed study of several selected 
cities, however, the Tauebers note that governmental action 
may have been a factor in maintaining segregated neighbor­
hoods. Charleston, South Carolina, for instance, deliber­
ately used separate race public housing projects to maintain 
segregated neighborhoods. Also in that city, the pattern of 
back yard residences for Black domestics in white neighbor­
hoods that was evident before World War II, was almost non­
existent by 1960, but whether this was caused by voluntary 
housing changes or by official zoning and housing code 
enforcement initiatives is not indicated. The Tauebers do 
note that in Memphis, the City Planning Commission blocked 
expansion of Black housing into several white areas, a 
pattern that they felt was quite prevalent:
In some Southern cities informal political 
agreements permitting "zoning" portions of the 
city for white or black occupancy may have 
played a part in making available the requisite 
land for building new housing for blacks.
Finally, they indicate that Southern cities were much 
more aggressive in their annexation efforts in order to 
"capture new areas of white population." Although Norfolk 
was not one of the cities selected for in-depth study, the
s3Karl E. and Alma F. Taueber, Negroes in Cities: 
Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 3-96.
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Taueber's index of racial segregation indicates that Norfolk 
had one of the highest indexes of residential segregation in 
the country in both 1950 and 1960. By 1960 only Richmond, 
two cities in Alabama (Monroe and Shreveport), and six 
cities in Florida (Daytona Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Jackson­
ville, Miami, St. Petersburg, West Palm Beach), out of more 
than 200 studied, had a higher index.64
In his major work on the history of urban America, 
Kenneth T. Jackson notes many of the same trends as the 
Tauebers, but he points to deliberate government action as 
one of the primary cause of the increasing segregation of 
America’s cities. The government he blames, however, is not 
municipal, but rather federal. In a chapter entitled 
"Federal Subsidy and the American Dream: How Washington
Changed the American Housing Market," Professor Jackson 
provides a stunning indictment of how the federal Home 
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) of the 1930s invented red­
lining of urban, Black, and racially mixed neighborhoods— a 
practice that was later followed by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA). 
According to Jackson, the professional real estate community 
knew that with these red-lining practices in effect, the 
sale of homes in a white community to Black buyers meant 
that the area would be red-lined and essentially placed 
off-limits to future sales, and thus worked to steer buyers
64Ibid., pp. 49, 191, 124, 240, 33-41.
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into single race neighborhoods and away from transition 
areas. In addition, since the loan standards of these 
various federal agencies specified minimum lot sizes, set­
backs, widths, and other standards, they favored newer sub­
urban housing over older in-town neighborhoods. Because of 
these rigid standards, it became difficult to sell inner 
city housing, thereby hastening the decline of the central 
cities. Potential new property owners could not get 
federally-backed loans in mixed race or declining neighbor­
hoods, and this factor increased absentee ownership, 
property abandonment, and the development of slums. By the 
time the federal government finally reversed its red-lining 
practices (1966), the switch only helped the remaining white 
homeowners escape to the suburbs, thereby furthering the 
segregation of America's housing.65
The federal government's role in forcing housing 
segregation was more, however, than just strict adherence to 
discriminatory lending practices. Professor Jackson also 
documents how federal public housing policies pushed public 
housing units into existing slum areas, thereby reinforcing 
segregated housing patterns and leading to the further 
decline of the surrounding neighborhoods. Although public 
housing had originally been intended for the "working poor" 
and the "deserving poor," by 1960 the federal government's
6SKenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier; The 
Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), pp. 190-218.
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policies had forced it into the role as housing of last 
resort for welfare clients, thereby relegating it to ghetto 
status— a permanent home for the nation's underclass. Al­
though the role of local governments is not entirely blame­
less in the design and location of public housing, neverthe­
less it appears that a whole host of national polices, from 
subsidized highways, mortgage investment, and expansion of 
military and government facilities also helped to isolate 
Blacks in the cities, while their former white neighbors 
moved to the suburbs. The only direct role attributed to 
municipalities is the use of zoning powers by Southern 
cities to enforce racial segregation of neighborhoods.66
Although Professor Jackson's treatment does not deal 
directly with the issue at hand, his thesis lends some 
support to the premise that Norfolk's post-Brown redevelop­
ment activity was prompted by racial as well as economic 
considerations. Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village were 
not slums, but the fact that they were integrated communi­
ties on the edge of the downtown meant that, according to 
Jackson's research, they were red-lined and in great danger 
of tipping rapidly into slums. Thus, even though the 
structures themselves were sound, the fact that they could 
not be sold with government backed loans in a Navy town like 
Norfolk was a fatal flaw that doomed them to continued 
decline. At the time of its demise, the Norfolk Redevelop­
66Ibid., pp. 227, 216, 242.
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ment and Housing Authority labored mightily to prove to the 
skeptics that Atlantic City was in danger of becoming a slum 
because of its increasing incidence of tuberculosis, 
venereal disease, juvenile delinquency, dilapidated housing, 
racial unrest, crime, fires, rat infestation, and the 
like.67 Later, the Authority would make the argument that 
the project was initiated to give the medical center space 
to grow.68 This justification is a little hard to accept, 
especially since the entire medical complex even today 
occupies only a corner of the sprawling project. The idea 
of a medical school in the project was not advanced until 
well after the entire 145-acre area had been swept bare,69 
and much of the land used for this and other medical pur­
poses could have been acquired by eminent domain by the 
various governmental agencies and authorities involved 
without tearing down the rest of the community. Redevelop­
ment and Housing Commissioner Pretlow Darden, who was also 
on the board of Norfolk General Hospital, indicated that 
Atlantic City was torn down as much to protect Ghent as it 
was to help the hospital;70 his response is cryptic enough 
to accommodate either an economic interpretation (i.e., that
67Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 June 1957.
SBNorfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Report 
(Norfolk: N.R.H.A., 1957), op cit.; Francis Crenshaw.
63Roy B. Martin.
7°Pretlow Darden.
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slums, if left standing, spread to surrounding areas) or a 
more political explanation related to efforts to save the 
white schools in Ghent from court ordered integration.
The "white flight" theory advanced by James Coleman'71- 
and David Armour-72 is equally inadequate as an explanation 
of events in Norfolk, especially when the facts show that 
whites were pushed out of transition areas like Atlantic 
City and Broad Creek Village by deliberate municipal 
redevelopment activity. Moreover, most of the research on 
"white flight" was developed in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, and shows that whites left areas when school 
integration efforts were at their maximum, and most urban 
communities faced extensive crosstown busing of whites and 
Blacks to achieve fully integrated schools. These same 
concepts do not appear appropriate to an era in which 
schools were not yet desegregated, unless one thinks in 
terms of the economic theories already discussed. "White 
flight" may be an adequate description of the final stages 
of decline of transition or mixed race neighborhoods, one 
that has been red-lined by the mortgage industry so that it 
is quickly becoming a dumping ground for the city's under­
7xJames S. Coleman, Sara P. Kelly, and John A. Moore, 
Trends in School Segregation, 1968-1973 (Washington, D.C.: 
Urban Institute, 1975).
72David J. Armour, "White Flight and the Future of 
School Desegregation," chap. in Walter G. Stephan and Joe R. 
Feagin, eds., School Desegregation: Past, Present, and
Future (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 187-225.
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class. Although there were some preliminary indicators that 
"white flight" may have started to some small degree in 
Atlantic City,73 Norfolk's redevelopment projects appear 
to have been initiated more to prevent "white flight" by 
keeping the schools segregated, than because of it.
Similarly, the "tipping theory" advanced by Charles V. 
Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt deals with events once large 
scale integration had begun under federal court orders. In 
their study of ten school systems, only four of which were 
in the South (Richmond, Corpus Christi, Dallas, and Mobile), 
they found that if the percentage of white students in a 
given school was much less than 50%, then the school and 
neighborhood it served "tipped" precipitously from mixed 
race to all Black. Although their work parallels the 
research of David Armour and James Coleman in both the era 
studied and the effects determined, they did, however, 
discern several instances where direct municipal actions had 
an impact on efforts to preserve desegregated schools. They 
report that the federal courts found that the Boston School 
Committee manipulated school district boundaries and 
utilized student attendance patterns to reinforce patterns 
of residential segregation in that city. Similarly, the 
federal district court in Wilmington, Delaware, found that 
discriminatory actions by both the state government and the 
real estate community contributed to residential segregation
73Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 March 1957.
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there. In their examination of school desegregation in 
Mobile, Alabama, the authors describe how that city appeared 
to place its interstate highway so that it would serve as a 
dividing line between the races, allowing it to zone the 
school districts accordingly. In Richmond, Virginia, which 
faced some of the same harsh political restraints as 
Norfolk, they discovered that the city entered into a 
racially motivated merger with its surrounding counties in 
order to redraw attendance zones for white schools. There 
was also in that city evidence of "block-busting" by the 
local real estate community, especially in areas on the 
north side of town. The Richmond School Board also appears 
to have established two distinct feeder system of schools 
with different grade organizations in order to minimize 
transfers between the majority Black and white schools: 
white schools operated on a grades 1-5, 6-8, and 9-12 
organization, while Black schools had grades 1-6, 7-9, and 
10-12.74 Another researcher found that the Richmond 
School Board, under the leadership of its chairman, Lewis F. 
Powell, later a U. S. Supreme Court Justice, spearheaded 
efforts to build new schools primarily to forestall school 
desegregation. Their building plan was apparently in 
response to the advice of James J. Kilpatrick, editor of the
74Charles V. Willie and Susan L. Greenblatt, Community 
Politics and Educational Change: Ten School Systems Under
Court Order (New York: Longman, Inc., 1981), pp. 33, 101,
189, 220-231.
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Richmond News-Leader, that a great part of the desegregation 
problem, "especially in the cities, could be handled by the 
relocation of school buildings and the gerrymandering of 
enrollment lines."75
One slight variation of the white flight and tipping 
approaches is offered by the avoidance theory of Cataldo, 
Giles, and Gatlan. According to their research, the 
resegregation of cities was based on more passive avoidance 
choices than the overt actions described by white flight or 
tipping. Thus, when property became vacant in mixed race or 
transition areas, potential white buyers merely avoided such 
housing in favor of surer investments in more established 
neighborhoods; their theory, which is based upon a 1962 
study, is more contemporaneous to events in Norfolk, and 
blends well with Professor Jackson's thesis that one reason 
mixed race areas were shunned was that whites could not get 
the same financing available in the suburbs.76
Gary Orfield, perhaps the premier researcher in the 
field, offers an amalgam of all of these alternate explana­
tions under the broader heading of the economics of segrega­
tion. His research, which was conducted mostly in the late
75James W. Ely, Jr., The Crisis of Conservative 
Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive
Resistance, Twentieth Century America Series (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee, 1976), pp. 134, 36.
7SEverett F. Cataldo, Michael W. Giles, and Douglas S. 
Gatlan, School Desegregation: Compliance, Avoidance, and the
Metropolitan Remedy (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1978).
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1960s and early 1970s and focused more on Chicago and other 
Northern cities, documents both the advent of "white flight" 
and the rise of private and parochial schools in mixed race 
neighborhoods as alternatives to extensive court-ordered 
integration efforts. He, too, lays much of the blame for 
the failure of mixed race neighborhoods on the federal 
government and its discriminatory lending practices. His 
indictment goes even farther than Professor Jackson's, how­
ever, and accuses federal officials of permitting pervasive 
segregation of residents in buildings constructed with 
federal funds on segregated sites and employing discrimina­
tory assignment policies. He also blames federal urban 
renewal policies, but feels that cities share some of the 
responsibility for their own demise. Unlike Norfolk, 
Northern cities apparently used their redevelopment powers 
to clear away vast tracks of Black housing from the downtown 
area. Also unlike Norfolk, very few public housing units 
were built for the residents cleared out the redeveloped 
areas. Of the more than 400,000 units cleared in the cities 
under study, less than three percent were actually replaced 
with public housing units. Orfield feels that this failure 
to build replacement housing tended to accelerate the 
ghettoization of the neighborhoods adjoining the renewal 
areas.77
77Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and 
National Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute,
1978), pp. 80-81.
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His thesis is particularly applicable when a city like 
Norfolk, where there was both extensive urban renewal 
activity and a large scale commitment to public housing, is 
examined. Unfortunately, the two developments were not 
always coordinated. In Norfolk's first phase of redevelop­
ment, 1950 to 1955, begun under the leadership of the 
People's reformers, urban renewal and public housing were 
marvelously woven together as integral parts of the same 
plan. The city's business leaders worked closely with 
Washington to convert many of its wartime housing projects 
into public housing in the postwar period. N.R.H.A. Project 
One, which was the first redevelopment project in the 
nation, was so carefully planned that residents of the 
renewal area were relocated to offsite public housing units, 
their neighborhood demolished, and new public housing units 
built in the project area, so that the former residents 
could be moved back before the next area was demolished. 
Since Black areas were torn town and new public housing for 
Blacks rebuilt on the same site, the action had little 
impact upon the segregation of the city.
Norfolk's second phase of redevelopment, 1956 to 1959, 
initiated under the leadership of Mayor Duckworth, stood in 
sharp contrast to N.R.H.A. Project One. First, the scope of 
the projects was enormous: the city proposed to bulldoze
more than 800 acres, destroying the homes of almost 20,000 
people— approximately a tenth of its population and one
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eighth of its housing— in less than a year and a half. Not 
only were no new public housing units planned, none of the 
areas being redeveloped would return to residential use. 
Moreover, except for the tiny (44 acres) project around what 
would eventually become Old Dominion University and a 
portion of the Downtown Project, which was more commercial 
and industrial than residential, most of the housing torn 
down belonged to white working-class residents who would not 
have been eligible for relocation to public housing. This 
second phase of redevelopment confirms part of Orfield's 
theory on the expansion of slums, but with a twist. Since 
the private real estate market could not absorb this 
enormous movement of people with any combination of new 
construction or existing units, the sudden, mass migration 
of residents out of the project areas put tremendous 
pressure on the existing housing stock. Private homes and 
apartment buildings on the fringe of the downtown were badly 
cut up and expanded to accommodate some of this influx. The 
end result was that the enormous scope of the four projects 
(Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village, Downtown East, and Old 
Dominion) and the speed of their demolition led to rapid 
deterioration of East Ghent, Park Place, Colonial Place, 
Riverview, Lafayette, Winona, Ballentine, and the other 
street car suburbs that ringed the downtown area. Because 
the projects had also displaced Black residents and equally 
burdened the Black real estate market, it was not long
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before many of these same neighborhoods, once they became 
overcrowded, began to decline, integrate, and then "tip" as 
whites sought housing choices in the suburbs. This type of 
"chain reaction effect," whereby destruction of one slum 
only creates new slums, is more fully explained by other 
critics of redevelopment;"78 the difference in Norfolk is 
the realization that redevelopment, because it tore down 
housing and neighborhoods that were still salvageable, only 
created slums where pleasant neighborhoods once stood.
Although Orfield's work deals with a later era, well 
after federal courts had ordered school desegregation in the 
cities under study, he reports that federal courts in a 
number of school desegregation cases found that the combina­
tion of federal and municipal housing policies increased 
school segregation in Charlotte, Wilmington, Cleveland, New 
York and other cities, although the focus of these findings 
was more on racially segregated public housing than other 
redevelopment and planning activities of the cities.79 
This finding is echoed by the research of Karl Taueber, who 
similarly reports that federal courts all across the South 
found that, once they were ordered to integrate schools,
"^Bernard J. Frieden and Robert Morris, Urban Planning 
and Social Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 130;
Scott Greer, Urban Renewal and American Cities: The Dilemma
of Democratic Intervention (New York: Bobbs-Merritt Co,,
1965), p. 56; Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Evaluation of Urban 
Renewal: Conceptual Foundation of Benefit-Cost Analysis
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 68-69.
79Gary Orfield, op cit., p. 84.
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Southern school boards used their powers to delay the impact 
of the orders by closing school buildings directly threaten­
ed by integration, building new "vest pocket" schools to 
minimize integration, redrawing attendance zones, and 
establishing liberal transfer policies.80 Although both 
researchers deal with events that occurred in the 1960s, 
nevertheless they form an important part of the framework 
for the thesis of this work, namely that cities took similar 
action in the 1950s, well before they actually faced the 
threat of large scale school integration, to defer or delay 
court-ordered desegregation. The only twist in the current 
work is the inference that in addition to relying upon 
school administrative and housing policies to achieve de 
facto segrega-tion, cities may also have used their 
extensive powers of redevelopment and urban renewal to block 
the encroachment of Blacks into white housing areas and to 
remove mixed race neighborhoods that posed a threat to the 
continuation of segregated schools. The efforts of the 
Norfolk School Board to close schools, redesignate their 
racial composition, redraw attendance zones, and even 
demolish buildings in an era in which enrollment was 
expanding so rapidly that many schools were operating on 
double shifts,83- seems to have had little to do with rapid
soKarl Taueber, "Desegregation of Public School
Districts: Resistance and Change," Phi Delta Kappa 21: 1
(September, 1990), pp. 18-24.
aiNorfolk Virginian-Pilot, 10 February 1956.
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changes in the white population explained by these approach­
es. Thus, even though the "white flight," avoidance, or 
tipping theories are difficult to accept, especially as they 
relate to school desegregation before schools were actually 
integrated, they may be useful in understanding the process 
of neighborhood change that precipitated such dramatic 
redevelopment activity.
Even though the advocates of redevelopment enterprises 
have always claimed a purely economic motive for their ini­
tiatives,82 the critics, and there have been many that 
disapproved of the way urban renewal was handled by cities 
in the 1950s, have indicated that the economies of rede­
velopment have been false and even counterproductive.83 
In essence, the argument of the critics is that redevelop­
ment has been a concerted attack upon the poor, those least 
able to cope with the hardship of relocation and loss of 
neighborhood ties; that many of the areas torn down were 
still salvageable and served a useful purpose by providing
82Paul Kantor, The Dependent City: The Changing
Political Economy of Urban America (Glenview, 111.: Scott
Foresman and Company, 1988); L. Alfeld and D. Meadows,
"A Systems Approach to Urban Renewal, chap. in Mihajlo D. 
Mesarovic and Arnold Reisman, eds., Systems Approach and the 
City (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1972),
pp. 43-67.
83James Q. Wilson, Urban Renewal: The Record and the
Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966);
Herbert J. Gans, "The Failure of Urban Renewal," chap. in 
in James Q. Wilson, Urban Renewal: The Record and the
Controversy, op cit., pp. 540-545; Bryton and Ella Barron, 
The Inhumanity of Urban Renewal (Arlington, Va.: Crestwood
Books, 1965).
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housing for the poor that was never replaced; and that much 
of the land actually developed was put to uses that could 
have been accomplished anyway without the wholesale 
destruction of neighborhoods and massive clearance efforts.
Norfolk provides both a fascinating counter and over­
whelming confirmation of these critical approaches:
N.R.H.A. Project One, because it tore down vast tracks of 
what was generally recognized as some of the worst slum 
housing in the country34 and replaced it with both well 
designed public housing developments and badly needed 
industrial space, represents a triumph of the planners' art, 
especially since the entire 127-acre area was cleared and 
rebuilt in about five years. On the other hand, the 
Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village, and Old Dominion 
Projects initiated suddenly in Norfolk's second phase of 
redevelopment, provide confirmation of the worst nightmares 
of the critics. Not only did they clear away vast acres of 
decent, even modern, homes, they left the city's working- 
class poor without recourse in the housing market, thereby 
creating the slums of the future by overburdening the 
surrounding neighborhoods. In their rebuilding phases, the 
projects provided a rich subsidy to governmental agencies, 
industries, and corporate developers who required no such 
assistance. Most of the uses for which the cleared land was 
eventually developed— public universities, medical schools,
84Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 26 July 1961.
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hospitals, government buildings, highrise apartments, 
highways, and industrial expansion— could have been achieved 
gradually and without the awesome destruction of redevelop­
ment and its attendant hardships.
Part of the tragedy of Norfolk's second phase of 
redevelopment is that most of the land, once cleared, sat 
vacant for so very long: it took 20 to 30 years before
portions of Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village were 
developed, and Norfolk's downtown still has 17 acres of 
prime real estate for which, even now, well more than three 
decades after it was cleared, there are no real prospects 
for development. Norfolk's second phase of redevelopment 
provided the acid test of the "land bank" concept, whereby 
vast tracts of urban land were cleared and "saved" in their 
vacant state, ready for the day when a prospective developer 
was ready to make a withdrawal. Indeed, Larry Cox, Director 
of the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority and later 
Under-Secretary of the U. S. Housing and Urban Development 
(H.U.D.) Department, was one of the nation's greatest pro­
ponents of the land bank concept:
Delays and land lying idle are inevitable if 
urban renewal is going to do what it should do 
in downtown areas. Projects involving great 
investments do not spring full-blown upon the 
scene in the average-size American community.
Delay counseled by realistic appraisal of land 
potential is worthwhile delay. So my thesis is
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have worthwhile delay introduced into urban
renewal, particularly in central city areas.35
Unfortunately, Norfolk's experience provides a 
stunning rebuttal to Mr. Cox's thesis: except for a strip
shopping center on the edge of the downtown area, a few 
high-rise bank buildings and office towers that would have 
been built anyway, and several small residential develop­
ments that are still underway in the Freemason Harbor area, 
almost all of the "full-blown" or major developments in 
downtown Norfolk--the SCOPE arena and concert complex, the 
municipal center. Waterside marina and urban marketplace, 
Town Point Park, NAUTICUS maritime center, and the new 
convention hotel center— have all been public, not private, 
developments that could have been built without redevelop­
ment. Similarly, there was no need to "bank" away vast 
tracts of land in the Atlantic City, Broad Creek Village, 
and Old Dominion project areas; all of the public and 
private investments there could have been achieved by timely 
destruction and phased development of the project areas. 
Except for the unstated purpose of achieving de facto school 
segregation, the vast scope and destruction of these areas 
was both unnecessary and ill-advised. According to one 
contemporary of Cox:
e5Lawrence M. Cox, address before the American Society 
of Planning Officials, National Planning Conference, Miami 
Beach, May 22-26, 1960, reprinted as "The Disposition 
Problem in Urban Renewal," Journal of Law and Contemporary 
Problems XXV: 4 (Autumn, 1960), p. 738.
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Technical skills relating to land use design 
have today [1960] reached the point where it 
matters little whether the land has been cleared 
in advance of planning, so that existing 
improvements need not be demolished before 
replacement can proceed . . . .  usually in the 
central city areas, even those structures bad 
enough to be the subject of a clearance project 
contribute significantly to the local tax 
revenues. The demolition of these structures 
not only takes the value off of the tax roll, 
but also burdens the tax structure with payment 
of the city's share of the clearance cost, 
together with interest on money borrowed in 
order to accomplish this . . . .  Analyzed in 
terms of planning future land use, the prudent 
course of action for the city is to plan first 
and undertake the execution of urban renewal 
projects only when it is apparent that the land 
can be advantageously put to use immediately 
upon completion of the clearance. Therefore, 
the only situation which would justify creation 
of a "land bank" would be the one in which the 
project area was so bad that the city would be 
better off without it, even if nothing arose in 
its place.36
All four of the projects initiated in Norfolk's second 
phase of redevelopment have unquestionably contributed hand­
somely to Norfolk's tax base. The Medical Tower complex, 
for instance, which occupies 2.5 acres of the 106-acre 
Atlantic City Project returns more property taxes than 
previously paid by the entire area.37 Also, prior to 
redevelopment, the annual taxes paid on properties in the 
200-acre Downtown East Project were only $165,650 per year, 
less than that paid by any one of the highrise bank or
86Lyman Brownfield, Ibid.. p. 761.
37George M. Raymond, "Urban Renewal: Controversy,"
chap. in Jewel Bellush and Murry Hausknecht, op cit., 
p. 488.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 0 3
office buildings which now occupy the area.88 Similarly, 
the industrial park development built on the site of the 
former Broad Creek Village Navy Housing Project has provided 
innumerable jobs and a major economic boost to both the city 
and the entire surrounding area. The economic assessment of 
redevelopment is not whether it has been profitable and even 
moderately successful in its stated aim of providing vacant 
land for development, it is rather whether these successes, 
most of which could have been achieved without the massive 
scale of destruction, the disruption of human lives, and the 
adverse impact on the rest of the city's housing stock, were 
worth the trauma and the social cost. In spite of the fact 
that downtown Norfolk is undergoing a tremendous renaissance 
(largely at public expense), the economic argument for major 
portions of the other redevelopment projects pales, 
especially when one considers that the second, unspoken 
motive of preserving segregated schools was the prime reason 
for the rush to demolish housing and "bank" the vacant land.
In spite of the pros and cons of the economic argu­
ment, however, there has always been an undercurrent that 
redevelopment activities have been guided more by political
saWilliam L. Slayton, Commissioner of the Urban Renewal 
Administration of the U. S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, 
"The Operation and Achievements of the Urban Renewal 
Program," reprinted in James Q. Wilson, Urban Renewal: The
Record and the Controversy, op cit., p. 233.
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than developmental considerations.s9 Martin Anderson 
coined the phase "black removal" to characterize what he saw 
as municipal efforts across the country to rid cities of 
unwanted elements of the community; by "black," however, he 
meant not a racial designation, but rather areas of blight, 
crime infestation, and unprofitable business uses.90 It 
is easy to show how Norfolk used its redevelopment powers to 
remove some of the "black" spots of the community. N.R.H.A. 
Project One provides a prime example of black removal at its 
best: a horribly blighted section of housing, with its
massive attendant problems of crime, infestation, juvenile 
delinquency, disease, and public health menace, was removed 
and then replaced with modern public housing, designed in 
the garden apartment fashion and arranged to provide a 
continued sense of community. Demolition of the city's 
notorious East Main Street sin district, that brought such 
ill repute to Norfolk during the war years, also represents 
another element of black removal. Cities may be able to 
make a strong case for using redevelopment to clear such 
extensive areas of blight, but there can be little
89Scott Greer and David W. Miner, "The Political Side of 
Urban Development and Redevelopment," chap. in Jewel Bellush 
and Murray Hausknecht, eds. , Urban Renewal: People, Politics,
and Planning, op cit., pp. 152-163.
9°Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical
Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
M.I.T. Press, 1964).
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justification for demolishing the ’’gray areas"91— neigh­
borhoods like Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village— which 
were still viable and salvageable. If Anderson's thesis of 
black removal can be applied to these projects, and perhaps 
to other similar redevelopment initiatives undertaken in the 
South at the same time, one explanation is that the unwanted 
elements in these projects were neighborhoods where Blacks 
and whites lived too close together to be served by separate 
race schools.
This is precisely what the plaintiffs in a number of 
school desegregation suits have claimed, i.e. that cities 
deliberately used their urban renewal powers to create 
segregated neighborhoods, strictly enforce well defined 
color barriers, isolate Black populations, relocate 
integrated schools, and otherwise frustrate efforts to 
desegregate the public school system.92 Although this 
claim has been in part supported by demographic 
researchers93 and other social scientists,94 they have
91Bernard Frieden, "Policies for Rebuilding," chap. in 
James Q. Wilson, ed., Urban Renewal: The Record and the
Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966),
pp. 585-623.
92Karl Taueber, "Desegregation of Public School 
Districts: Resistance and Change," Phi Delta Kappan 21: 1
(September, 1990), pp. 18-24.
93Gary Orfield, "Ghettoization and Its Alternatives," 
chap. in Paul E. Peterson, ed., The New Urban Reality 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985),
pp. 161-196.
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chosen to blame school boards, rather than redevelopment 
authorities, planning commissions, or city councils, for 
efforts to replace de jure with de facto segregation. 
Although Norfolk provides the perfect case history of all of 
these charges, far from being the villain, the School Board 
in Norfolk played only a bit part in the effort to divide 
the city into racially distinct school districts. In fact, 
it is only through the somewhat heroic actions of its School 
Board that Norfolk still had some semblance of an opera­
tional public school system left after its municipal leader­
ship had finally given up their fight to preserve segregated 
schools.
In Norfolk, at least, the fight to preserve segregated 
education clearly went much farther than the School Board's 
efforts to close effected schools, select racially "safe" 
sites, redraw attendance zones, and manipulate the other 
factors of school plant planning and student attendance, 
transfer, and grade organization. In several instances 
(Atlantic City and Broad Creek Village), the School Board's 
action to close a threatened school came after the city had 
committed to the far more precipitate act of demolishing the 
entire school zone. In other cases (Easton, Fairlawn,
Poplar Halls, Pretty Lake, and East Ocean View), the School
94Karl E. Taueber, "Residence and Race: 1619 to 2019,"
chap. in Winston A. Van Horne, ed. Race: Twentieth Century
Dilemmas--Twenty-First Century Prognoses (Milwaukee: 
University of Wisconsin, 1989).
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Board went along with the Council's desire to build tiny 
"vest pocket" schools, even though it had opposed the 
structures; the financial control of the City Council, 
especially over school capital expenditures, was such that, 
because the city was desperately short of classroom space, 
the School Board had to take whatever it could get. in 
several other areas of the city interstate highways 
(Brambleton, Broad Creek Shores, Ingleside, Coronado), parks 
(Titustown and Benmoreell), and other major public 
facilities (Old Dominion University and the National Guard 
Armory) were used, appear to have been used, along with 
natural geographic barriers, to provide both a clear-cut 
color line between school districts and a logical limitation 
to the size of the attendance zone. These same barriers 
would make it even more difficult to provide racially 
balanced neighborhood schools once the effort to preserve 
segregation was finally abandoned.
Even though the actions in Norfolk to preserve segre­
gated schools were dramatic, they do not appear to be 
unique. Norfolk as well as many other communities in the 
South had a strong motive to preserve segregation: public
reaction to the dictates of the U. S. Supreme Court were 
overwhelmingly negative, and large portions of the populace 
indicated that they may have been prepared to engage in 
disruptive, even illegal, activity to block court-ordered 
integration. State political leaders all across the South
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were attempting to interpose the authority of the state 
governments between the courts and the local schools in a 
legal juryrig of hastily enacted legislation controlling 
pupil assignment, transfer, and attendance policies.
Southern senators and congressmen had banded together to 
urge their constituencies to use every legal means at their 
disposal to oppose integration. In addition to this element 
of motive, which may actually have been tempered in Norfolk 
by the leadership of the School Board, the editorial writers 
of the Virginian-Pilot, and the Norfolk Committee for Public 
Schools, an urgency of the situation also existed, caused in 
part by the fact that so many areas of the city appeared to 
run afoul of the Supreme Court's doctrine of proximity in 
assigning school attendance zones.
Because it had extensive areas of Navy housing, which 
were integrated, a few mixed-race neighborhoods in various 
stages of transition, and several communities where there 
were pockets of Black population too small to be served by 
their own school, Norfolk faced the prospect that it would 
be among the first cities in the South to face widespread 
school integration. In Virginia that meant political death, 
and the fear of being cut off from funding or state 
resources was very real; for two decades after it had 
finally peacefully integrated its schools, local residents 
referred to the Norfolk area as "Tollwater," an ironic 
allusion to the fact that the state seemed to be punishing
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the city for killing Massive Resistance through it's 
unwillingness to provide highway funds for the badly needed 
bridge, tunnel, and highways so necessary for economic 
growth.
Norfolk, as well as other communities all across the 
South, had ample opportunity to bend the powers of school 
administration, school plant planning, and urban renewal to 
serve the cause of preserving segregation as well as 
economic development. Southern cities faced a rapid period 
of growth in population, school enrollment, industry, land 
area, and economic development. This meant that they could 
use the opportunity already available through building new 
schools or changing school zones because of newly annexed 
territories to make sure that new school districts would be 
segregated, and therefore acceptable to the public. This at 
least was the course urged by James J. Kilpatrick, editor of 
the Richmond News Leader and chief publicist for the 
doctrine of interposition.93 They could go a step farther 
and use the opportunity to close schools, redesignate their 
use, or reallocate their grade composition as another way to 
defer or delay integration in a couple of areas of the city. 
Or they could go the final step proposed by this work and 
make sure that the schools in threatened areas of the city 
remained segregated by using their urban renewal and
95James W. Eley, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: 
The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance, 
op cit., p. 35.
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municipal planning powers to carefully position parks, 
highways, or other public facilities so that they posed a 
barrier to Blacks living near a white school; municipalities 
could control land use policies so that Black housing could 
move no closer to white schools; and cities could use their 
powers of redevelopment to tear down mixed-race neighbor­
hoods or other areas that proved threatening under the 
court's doctrine of proximity. Norfolk was not alone in 
taking these extra steps; there is strong evidence to 
suggest that Richmond, Mobile, Charleston (South Carolina), 
Memphis, Boston, Wilmington (Delaware) and other cities used 
at least some of these techniques. Only in Norfolk is the 
record so far complete enough to project an extensive and 
concerted use of the powers to urban renewal to preserve 
segregated schools.
This interpretation does not, however, entirely dis­
credit the economic argument made for annexation, industrial 
development, urban renewal and city planning. For most of 
these cities, growth in both land area and tax base was 
absolutely essential for survival, and every element of 
municipal government was concerned with the effort to plan 
for and sustain that growth. The suggestion that the effort 
to preserve school segregation was also involved in these 
planning, development, and redevelopment decisions is not 
meant to denigrate the purely economic considerations of 
such activities; it is only meant to infer that the
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municipal powers of urban renewal in many cities in the 
1950s was meant to serve two masters, the public avowed one 
of growth, and the privately held determination to stay the 
same, at least as far as segregated schools were concerned.
Finally, some larger historical context is necessary 
to fully understand the events and actions herein described. 
Other contemporaneous researchers9*5 found that appointed 
school boards were far more adept at handling the contro­
versies surrounding school desegregation than their elected 
counterparts. This definitely seems to be the case in 
Norfolk. All seven members of the Norfolk School Board 
responded to the crisis in admirable, even heroic, fashion, 
and their calm and deliberate approach, coupled with their 
overriding devotion to the concept of free public educa­
tion, was largely responsible for the peaceful resumption of 
classes, the sense of continuity and control, and the fact 
that quality schools continued in Norfolk once the legal 
issues were settled. Their courage and devotion to duty 
brought them into constant conflict with the elected leaders 
of their day. None of its members had sought appointment to 
the Board,9-7 and, for the most part, they were not the 
sort of individuals who seek election to office. All had 
been chosen because of their record of involvement in 
volunteer, not political, community service, and it was this
9SRobert L. Crain, et al., op cit.
9VFrancis Crenshaw.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 1 2
experience that served them well when the clamor of the 
constituency of the day demanded short-term approaches.
There was unanimity on the Board, the kind of calm consensus 
that rarely is seen in elected bodies in times of such 
violent social upheaval and conflicting values. The Norfolk 
School Board had the long-term interest of public education 
in mind throughout the controversy; their judgement was not 
, clouded by political expediency or the need to seek re- 
election. Their calm reaction to crisis and their devotion 
to the future of quality public education in the city should 
give pause to all those who think that urban school systems, 
especially those beset with major problems and diverse 
clientele, would be better served by elected, rather than 
appointed, boards.
Although school boards all across the South were 
vilified for their efforts to delay or defer court-ordered 
desegregation efforts, in Norfolk, at least, the School 
Board was clearly but one actor in a larger cast of 
characters that included the Mayor, the Council, the Norfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, and other municipal 
officials responsible for the planning and development of 
the city. While this larger relationship has been the 
source of some speculation, it is the major contribution of 
this work that the interplay between school desegregation 
and urban renewal in one community has been more completely 
analyzed. The response to court-ordered school
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desegregation did not begin with the first local court case, 
the traditional starting date of other histories of the 
process; instead it began with a realization in the South 
that predates even the Brown decision, that is, that in
order to pass court review, "separate" school facilities for
the two races must be made more nearly equal; later, when it
became clear that the courts would not accept separate
facilities as equal when the pupils lived in close 
geographic proximity to one another, a much larger cast of 
characters than just Southern school boards followed the 
dictates of their state and national political leaders, as 
well as their voting constituencies, to do everything in 
their power to prevent school integration. The powers of 
urban renewal, school plant planning, redevelopment, and 
school administration appear to have been used liberally to 
create separate race neighborhoods and school attendance 
zones, thereby replacing segregation by law (de jure) with 
the type of de facto separation of races already approved by 
the courts in Northern and Midwestern cities.
Even though a temptation exists to affix blame or 
criticism for actions that turn out now by modern standards 
to be misdirected, judging the motives of the 1950s by the 
mores of the 1990s is just as unfair as requiring the 
citizens of the 1950s to share the same advantage of our own 
more modern perspective in order to receive fair treatment 
in any account of their own era. Enough time has passed to
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gain both the advantage of historical hindsight and a 
passionless examination of the events and issues, few cities 
could withstand the judgement of a serious local history 
' viewed from the high ground of both hindsight and moral 
certainty. Norfolk is no better or no worse than other 
cities; if it is proud of its accomplishments, and the city 
has every right to boast, then it should not be afraid to 
learn lessons from its failures.
There are no villains to this piece. Not only is 
judgement not intended by this critical examination of the 
era, one has to marvel at both the competence and the 
devotion to principle exemplified here. Mayor Duckworth and 
the other members of the City Council, the School Board, 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, and other public 
officials were responding to a tremendous public mandate to 
do everything legally possible to preserve what was con­
sidered by the city's voters to be a sacrosanct way of life. 
Not only did they respond to this mandate with, vigor and 
ingenuity, they received close counsel and guidance from 
others in the state and national government who shared their 
sentiment. That all of these officials enjoyed the over­
whelming support of their constituencies is evident in the 
voting patterns of the era. In a democratic society we must 
be prepared to accept the fact that powerful and principled 
elected leaders will do everything in their power to respond
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to such a mandate without condemning in any way their 
actions or criticizing their motives.
Partly because Norfolk encountered its school desegre­
gation crisis early and faced it so precipitously, the city 
has been able to achieve and maintain a level of racial and 
political harmony that exists in few other areas of the 
country. Norfolk emerged from the school closing crisis 
with an intensity of support for public education that has 
never diminished. Even when it was faced with the prospect 
of court-ordered crosstown busing that was more extensive 
than almost anywhere else in the country, community support 
remained strong. Partly because of this support and because 
it continued to offer quality inter-racial education,
Norfolk did not experience the level of white flight found 
in a number of other central cities. Almost two decades ago 
the federal courts declared that Norfolk operated a truly 
"unitary" school system, a step that paved the way for it to 
be among the first major school systems in the country to 
leave the phase of court-ordered busing behind and return to 
neighborhood schools at the elementary level. Today the 
Norfolk Public Schools continue to win accolades as one the 
nation's few truly effective urban school systems: test
scores are up, white enrollment stable, dropout rates down, 
and community support remains high.
The Norfolk story is not that of a deviant case; 
instead the history of its school desegregation crisis
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exemplifies the level of the struggle that took place in 
cities all across the South in the 1950s and then moved to 
the Northern, Midwest, and Border States in the 1960s when 
they, too, were faced with the prospect of massive court- 
ordered school integration initiatives. Although perhaps 
more compelling than events in other cities, partly because 
of the collapsed time frame and the fact that Norfolk was 
among the first cities in the South to desegregate, the 
actions of the public officials to preserve racially 
identifiable schools were not unique. Only the scale of the 
battle in Norfolk was larger than elsewhere, but that is why 
the story of this struggle is so instructive.
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